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Abstract 
The Chairman of a Roundtable on Subsidies and State Aid held at the OECD in 
2001 concluded the proceedings noting that 
[t]he major problem identified is the issue of the definition - not just the 
definition of a subsidy but also the question of how to determine what is 
legitimate and what is not legitimate. 
The `issue of the definition' thus intended, which includes both the notion of 
subsidy and the regulation determining what effects are acceptable and what are not, 
represents the research topic. The thesis attempts to identify what is the best way to 
regulate public subsidies at an international level. 
This is done through a comparison between WTO and EC law which constitute the 
two most developed international systems of control of subsidies. 
Despite being a legal analysis, the writer draws from other disciplines, such as 
economics, political science and regulation. 
After an introduction outlining the research scope and methodology, the thesis 
analyses the four main essential elements, the `formants', of the definition of public 
subsidies (public intervention, advantage, beneficiaries and effects). 
The recurring theme is, the need to properly consider the interplay between the 
distortions of competition of subsidies and the public policy objectives they pursue. 
Legally, this requires an appropriate definition of what is scope and what is 
justification. Related issues concern i) the increasing role played by economic 
analysis between the needs to devise a sound regulation and to preserve legal 
certainty, and ii) the importance of institutional and procedural systems of control 
of public subsidies and their interplay with the substantive regulation. 
The main, general finding of the research is that, against a paradigm optimal 
regulation of subsidies, each system has its strengths and weaknesses. Most 
importantly, both systems can be improved through a process of cross-fertilization, 
by learning something from the other. 
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GATT/WTO dispute settlement cases (in alphabetical order 
of short title) 
Short Title Full Case Title and Citation of Case 
Argentina - Footwear Appellate Body Report, Argentina Safeguard Measures on Imports 
of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted on 12anuarv 2000 
Australia - Automotive Panel Report, Australia - Subsidies provided to Producers and 
Leather Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/R, adopted on 16 
Se tember 1999 
Australia - Automotive Panel Report, Australia - Subsidies provided to Producers and 
Leather (Article 21.5 - Exporters of Automotive Leather, recourse to Article 21.5 of the DS( T 
US) by the US, WT/DS126/RW, adopted on 11 February 2000 
Begium - Income Tax Panel Report, Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, 
L/4424, adopted on 7-8 December 1981, BISD 23S/127 
Brazil - Aircraft Panel Report, Bra #1 - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
WT/DS46/R, adopted on 20 August 1999 
Brazil - Aircraft Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for 
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted on 20 August 1999 
Brasil - Aircraft (Article Panel Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
21.5 - Canada) IST/DS46/RW7, recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DS[ t, 
adopted on 4 August 2000 
Bra#1- Aircraft (Article Appellate Body Report, Bra 1- Export Financing Programme for 
21.5 - Canada) Aircraft, recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 
WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted on 4 August 2000 
Brasil - Aircraft (Article Panel Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
21.5 - Canada II) second recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 
WT/DS46/RW, adopted on 23 August 2001 
Canada - Aircraft Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted on 20 August 1999 
Canada - Aircraft Appellate Body Report, 
Canada - Alearunr Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted on 20 August 
1999 
Canada- Aircraft (Article Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
21.5 Bra l) Aircraft, recourse by Bra! l to Article ? 1.5 of the DSU, 
WT/DS70/RW, adopted on 4 Au st 2000 
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Canada- Aircraft (Article Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
21.5 Bratil) Aircraft, recourse by Brasil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 
WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted on 4 August 2000 
Canada - Automotive Panel Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted on 19 June 
2000 
Canada - Automotive Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the 
Industry Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/A'B/R, 
adopted on 19 June 2000 
Canada - Dairy Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
and the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS103/R, 
WT/DS113/R, adopted on 27 October 1999 
Canada - Dairy Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R, adopted on 27 
October 1999 
Canada - Dairy (Article Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
21.5 - New Zealand and and the Exportation of Dairy Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
US) DSU by New Zealand and the United States, WT/ DS 103 / RW, 
WT/DS113/RW, adopted on 18 December 2001 
Canada - Dairy (Article Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the 
21.5 - New Zealand and Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, recourse to 
US) Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, 
WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113/AB/RW, adopted on 18 
December 2001 
Canada - Dairy (Article Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk 
21.5 - New Zealand and and the Exportation of Dairy Products, second recourse to Article 21.5 
US II) of the DSU, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New 
Zealand and the United States, WT/ DS 103 / RW2, 
WT/DS113/RW2, adopted on 17 January 2003 
Canada - Dairy (Article Appellate Body Report, 
Canada - Measures Affecting the 
21.5 - New Zealand and Importation of 
Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, second 
US II) recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, 
WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted on 
17 January 2003 
Canada - Export Credits Panel Report, 
Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R, adopted on 19 February 
2002 
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Chile - Price Band System Appellate Body Report, Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002 
Chile - Taxes Appellate Body Report, Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted on 12 
anus 2000 
EC - Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Measures Containing Asbestos, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001 
EC - DRAMS Panel Report, European Communities - Countervailing Measures on 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, 
WT/DS299/R, adopted on 3 August 2005 
EC - Sugar Three identical Panel Reports: 
- European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Australia, WT/DS265/R, adopted on 19 
May 2005 
- European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Braril, WT/DS266/R, adopted on 19 May 
2005 
- European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
Complaint by Thailand, WT/DS283/R, adopted on 19 
May 2005 
EC - Sugar Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Export 
Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS/266/AB/R, 
WT/DS/283/AB/R, adopted on 19 May 2005 
France - Income Tax Panel Report, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, 
L/4423, adopted on 7-8 December 1981, BISD 23S/114 
Korea - Commercial Panel Report, Korea - Measures affecting Trade in Commercial 
Vessels Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted on 11 April 2005 
Korea - Dairy Appellate Body Report, Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted on 
12 January 2000 
Indonesia - Automobile Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, 
WT/DS64/R, adopted on 23 July 1998 
Japan - Taxes Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Bevera es, 
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WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11 / AB/R, 
adopted on 1 November 1996 
Netherlands - Income Tax Panel Report, Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, 
L/4425, adopted on 7-8 December 1981, BISD 23S/137 
US - Atlantic Salmon Panel Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties of 
Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 
SCM/153, adopted on 28 April 1994 
US - Byrd Amendment Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted on 27 January 2003 
US - Carbon Steel Panel Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
Originating in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, SCM/ 185, 
of 15 November 1994 unado ted 
US - Carbon Steel II Panel Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R, adopted on 7 
une 2000 
US - Carbon Steel II Appellate Body Report, United States - Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Orzginating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 7 June 2000 
US - Cotton Panel Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/R, adopted 21 March 2005 
US - Cotton Appellate Body, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 March 2005 
US - Countervailing Panel Report, United States - Countervailing Measures concerning 
Measures Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS212/R, 
adopted on 8 March 2003 
US - Countervailing Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Measures 
Measures concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, 
WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted on 8 March 2003 
US - Export Restraints Panel Report, United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints 
as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R and Corr. 2, adopted on 23 
August 2001 
US - FSC Panel Report, 
United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
Co oration", WT/DS108/R, adopted on 20 March 2000 
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US - FSC Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for 
'Foreign Sales Corporation", WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted on 20 
March 2000 
US - FSC (Article 21.5 Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales 
EC) Corporation". recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSC by the European 
Communities, WT/DS108/RW, adopted on 29 January 2002 
US - FSC (Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for 
EC) "Foreign Sales Corporation", recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSC by 
the European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted on 
29 anua 2002 
US - DISC Panel Report, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), L/4422, 
adopted on 7-8 December 1981, BISD 23S/98 
US - DRAMS Panel Report, United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from 
Korea, WT/DS296/R, adopted on 20 July 2005 
US- DRAMS Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Duty 
Investzgation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB, adopted on 20 July 
2005 
US - Gambling Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 
on 20 April 2005 
US -Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 20 April 2005 
US - Pork Panel Report, United Sates - Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Pork from Canada, DS7/R, BIDS 38S/30, adopted 
on 11 July 1991 
US - Softwood Lumber III Panel Report, United States - Preliminary Determinations with 
respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS236/R, 
ado ted on 1 November 2002 
US - Softwood Lumber IV Panel Report, United States - Final Countervailing Duty 
Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS257/R, adopted on 17 February 2004 
US - Softwood Lumber IV Appellate Body Report, L united 
States - Final Countervailing Duly 
Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted on 17 February 2004 
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US - Shrimp Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Shrimp and 
Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 6 
November 1998 
US - Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of 
Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 
on 6 November 1998 
US - Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 1996, adopted on 
20 May 1996 
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Scope and methodology of the research 
`Probe everything and keep the 
best' (Paul, First Epistle to the 
Thessalonians) 1 
`... The British don't know how to 
make a good cup of coffee. You 
don't know how to make a good 
cup of tea. It's an even swap. ' 
(From the Instructions for American 
Servicemen In Britain 1942) 
I. Scope of the research 
The Chairman of a Roundtable on Subsidies and State Aid which was held by the 
Committee on Competition Policy in February 2001 concluded the proceedings by 
`noting that the discussion has raised more questions than answers. ' 2 Interestingly, 
[t]he major problem identified is the issue of the definition - not just the 
definition of a subsidy but also the question of how to determine what is 
legitimate and what is not legitimate. 
3 
The `issue of the definition' thus intended, which includes both the notion of 
subsidy and the regulation determining what effects are acceptable and what are not, 
represents the research topic of this thesis. 
This evocative sentence has been the title of a lecture on comparative law given by Professor Markesinis in 
at the Faculty of Law of the University of Leicester on 24th November 2005. 
2 OECD (2001: 179). 
Ibid. 
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1. Brief background notes: subsidies and their history 
Bounties, subsidies or aids have always been granted to undertakings. Different 
ways of reacting or controlling them have been devised. Similarly, different views 
have surrounded both subsidies and their regulation. These issues have been 
touched by the likes of Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton. In his famous _-1n 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Smith devoted a whole 
chapter on `bounties'. He concluded that 
[T]he effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients of the mercantile 
system, can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel much less 
advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord. 4 
This masterly explains the inefficiency, in the form of misallocation of resources, 
caused by subsidies, issue which we analyse in chapter 5. 
It is also worth quoting a passage of Hamilton drawn from his 1791 Report on 
Manufacturers (and reported by Jackson (1997: 417)), which introduces other 
interesting elements: 
[T]he greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of 
industry in a country, in which it was before unknown, consists, as far as the 
instances apply, in the bounties premiums and other aids which are granted, in a 
variety of cases, by the nations, in which the establishments to be imitated, are 
previously introduced. It is well know ... that certain nations grant 
bounties on 
the exportation of particular commodities, to enable their own workmen to 
under sell and supplant all competitors, in the country to which the 
commodities are sent. Hence the undertakers of a new manufacture have to 
contend not only with the natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but will 
the gratuities and enumerations which other government bestow. To be 
enabled to contend with success, it is evident that interference and aid of their 
own governments is indispensable. 
What is interesting in reading this excerpt is that it touches with both the crucial 
issues in the area, the question of `bounties and other aids' and the question of the 
4 Smith (1776: book IV, chapter 5). 
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possible, in his words `indispensable', counter-reactions to them, ie `the interference 
and aid of their own governments'. Among remedies, the most natural means to 
restore the playing field has been that of granting subsidies to the aggrieved 
industry. 5 Another idea that has soon gained success was that of imposing on 
foreign imports benefiting from subsidies a duty to countervail the subsidy. Fiore 
ambitious projects about creating international obligations regulating the grant of 
subsidies themselves, and some forms in international control, needed more time, 
and more global (historical, political and legal) changes, to emerge. 
International treaties increasingly tackled the issue of subsidies, mainly referring to 
the use of countervailing duties. In 1923, in his famous work on dumping (since the 
beginning, in consideration of the similar effects, this term has included both 
dumping and subsidization), Viner (1966: 166-168) counted twenty-nine treaties 
containing rules on subsidies, of which seven were signed after 1900. 
A crucial one was the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902 which introduced rules to 
curb export bounties on sugar. It is not necessary to recall to the reader how 
support to sugar is currently particularly topical in WTO. The significance of the 
Brussels Sugar Convention goes well beyond this specific subsidy aspect. In the 
recent words of Moura Filho (2006: 1), through it `multilateralism had been 
established as a conceptual alternative and a practical possibility'. This, just before 
the outbreak of WWI in 1914 and the subsequent period of protectionism which 
would have culminated with WWII in 1939. Only thereafter, the idea of 
multilateralism resurrected. The Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902, however, was 
never forgotten: 
the compromise treaty package that was agreed established for the first time a 
multilateral trading regime, albeit for one commodity, that contained many 
elements that would become standard in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and other later twentieth-century liberal trade regimes. 6 
S Lowenfeld (2002: 200, note 1) reports another proposal of Hamilton, that of introducing a countervailing 
duty for products imported into the US, with the revenue to be used to subsidize domestic production of the 
same products. It is not clear whether a prerequisite for this `indispensable 
interference of the government' 
should have been that the imported goods had been subsidized. In any event, 
it is interesting that the US 
Byrd Amendment resembles this proposal remarkably (and, as seen in the next chapter, has been considered as 
illegal under WTO law in the (IS - Byrd Amendment dispute). 
6 Pigman (1997: 199). 
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Indeed it was not until the GATT was established in 1947 that a more 
comprehensive international regulation on subsidies (or `bounties'), focussing on 
both unilateral reactions (Article VI) and international obligations (Article XVI), 
appeared. The developments on the issue of subsidies since (mainly the 1979 
Tokyo Subsidy Code, the 1995 WTO Agreement and the current Doha Round 
negotiations on the one side and the EC Treaty on the other side) are analysed in 
this research. 
As will soon appear from the analysis, subsidies are ambivalent in their effects. The 
may distort both international and domestic trade and competition, but, at the same 
time, they may pursue legitimate public objectives arriving where market forces 
alone cannot. 
The issue of public subsidies is currently gaining prominence in the debate of 
political, legal and academic circles. This mainly depends on the increasing 
liberalization, privatization and globalization of the economy. Governments are 
retreating (shifting from direct provision to regulation) from what were regarded till 
now as public reserves. Their role, particularly the pursuit of the public interest, and 
the tools of public intervention in the economy, are all subject to a process of 
redefinition. Subsidies and their distortions come more and more into prominence. 
These are just some of the reasons that explain why public subsidisation is 
increasingly becoming topical, at both national and international levels. 
2. Research problem: the `issue of the definition' of subsidy 
The research problem can be formulated as follows. What is the best way to 
regulate public subsidies at an international level? 
This has been, and still is, a hotly debated topic. 
subsidies of the classic textbook of Professor Jacks 
Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade'. 
concludes the same chapter by suggesting that `[t]he 
efforts of elaboration and definition also'. 
The tide of the chapter on 
on (1997: chapter 11) is `The 
This authoritative scholar 
subject probably merits other 
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The research problem can also be nicely formulated as the issue of the definition of 
subsidy. As came out clearly from the recent OECD's Roundtable, this should not 
be limited to what, strictly speaking, is considered as the definition of subsidy but, 
more generally to include also those rules that determine `what is legitimate and 
what is not legitimate'. Hence, the title of this thesis which combines the definition 
and regulation of WTO subsidies and EC State aids. 
These two notions are strictly interrelated with each other. It is often difficult to 
distinguish what is within the definition of public subsidy and what is within its 
regulation. Although it seems that the concept of definition should include the 
main constituent elements or requirements of the phenomenon to describe, in the 
instant case of public subsidies, in many cases, some elements are rather included 
within the regulation thereof. 
Certainly, this also depends on the lack of clarity at a theoretical level, where, 
although some factors (for example the need for an advantage and the public origin) 
are stronger candidates for a position in the definition than others, it is difficult to 
draw the line. It is indeed difficult to distinguish between those elements that, using 
a philosophical language, should be considered as essentials for the notion of subsidy 
on the one side and those that should be regarded as accidentals. The writer may 
tentatively suggest (but this should be viewed more as a divertissement than a 
pretentious classification) that the core of the notion of public subsidy is represented 
by two essential elements, first the public origin and secondly the existence of an 
advantageous derogation. Conceptually, this might well represent a minimal notion 
of public subsidy. Other elements which more markedly concern the impact of the 
subsidy, such as its selectivity (ie that it benefits only certain undertakings) and its 
negative and positive effects, are more difficult to position. 
The blurriness of the boundaries between definition and regulation, together with 
the fact that these significantly interplay with each other, justifies, in the writer's 
view, the use of the general - pragmatic - expression formulated by the Chairman 
on the OECD's Committee on Competition Policy, ie the `issue of the definition'. 
Despite this lack of clear lines between what is definition and what is regulation, «"e 
can certainly draw the line between the regulation of the substantive aspects of the 
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law and procedural regulation. It can be anticipated that there will not be any 
treatment of the procedural regulation unless this is considered as useful to explain 
the substantive regulation. 
The writer's belief, which is increasingly being strengthened along the research, is 
that the best way to address the research problem is through a comparative approach. 
This again was the approach of the OECD's Roundtable where no less than eight 
different `national' experiences were debated and confronted. 7 Although the merits 
of a comparative analysis are explained in more detail in the next section on the 
methodology of the research, it can already be said that the choice of the WTO and 
the EC as the two legal systems to compare has been dictated by the simple 
consideration that they represent the two most developed systems of control of 
public subsidies at an international level. 
7The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea, Lithuania, Poland, the EC. 
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II. Methodology of the research 
1. Legal and multidisciplinary analysis 
After defining the scope and the research problem, it is now necessary to say 
something about the methods that are used in this exercise. This is a 
methodological section. 
The first, immediate remark is that this research is done by a lawyer, and hence from 
a legal perspective and with a legal objective. The writer will therefore carry out its 
analysis by using the usual legal tools, ie the methods of interpretation that are 
appropriate in the various circumstances. 
Although the research is legal, in many cases the writer takes advantage of the 
findings of other disciplines, such as economics, political science and regulation. 
This mainly depends on the recognition that reality is complex and different 
perspectives may provide useful insights and suggest solutions to the problems. 
The research thus benefits from an (admittedly limited) interdisciplinary approach. 
In dealing with subsidies, this remark particularly translates in the reference to 
economics. Although the writer does not fully agree with the conclusion famously 
drawn by Brandeis j that `lawyer who has not studied economics ... is very apt to 
become a public enemy', 8 it is clear that economics can constitute a useful aide for 
many reasons. The trend, particularly in the EC, is to increasingly refer to 
economics when solving State aid problems. 
This increasing use of economics should however prompt a few warnings. 
Although economics is not a `dismal science', it is not an `exact science'. There is 
no ready made solution. It is a fact that economists disagree between themselves 
with the result that no clear answer is provided to a given problem. Further, by its 
nature, economic analysis may often result difficult to apply for its complexity and 
this to the detriment of certainty and predictability. Finally, economics mainly 
attempts to explain, on the basis of certain assumptions, how things do work and 
not how they ought to work. In other words, normative, value-based decisions are 
not for economists, but for policy-makers. What economics can often do is to 
8 Reported by Whish (2003: 1). 
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provide the most efficient, one would say the best, way to reach a result which has 
been set. 
Similarly, reference will be made to other sciences that can result useful in 
understanding subsidies and their discipline, such as political science and regulation. 
With the necessary amendments, caveats similar to those made above apply. 
In a word, we are dealing with legal rules which have certainly to be drafted and 
applied soundly, taking into due account of their policy objectives and of the most 
effective way to achieve them. At the end, however, the result must be a system of 
rules which should guide the behaviour of international organizations, States and 
undertakings. So far as possible, they should feature the characteristics of clarity 
(and hence certainty and predictability) and workability, which are the typical (if not 
the exclusive) concerns of lawyers. 
The balance of this research is therefore strongly towards legal analysis. 
A final note. This conclusion is also the recognition of the personal limitations of 
the writer. Claims of universal knowledge can rarely be made. Exceptional 
individuals, capable of moving with ease and outstanding results among various 
fields of knowledge, are infrequent. 9 
2. Comparative analysis 
Subject and purpose 
This section answers two questions. 
a) What is a comparative analysis? 
b) Why carrying out a comparative analysis? 
9 History provides us with few paradigmatic examples, for example that of Leonardo da Vinci. On this 
outstanding personality, the reader may wish to look at Burckhardt (1860) where he defines Leonardo as a 
truly `universal' man to then lapidary conclude the relevant chapter by saying: The colossal outlines of 
Leonardo 's nature can never be more than dimly and distantly conceived. ' 
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A particular emphasis will be placed on the second question as the first is blended 
with the issue of the method which is examined below. 
Comparing means to analyse two or more entities, in the case of comparative law 
two or more legal systems, in the attempt to solve a (legal) problem. Comparative 
analysis is a useful method of knowledge. In very general terms, it can be said that you 
learn more if the analysis focuses on two or more entities, in our case two different 
legal systems, rather than on a single one. A similar point has been made when 
talking about a multi-disciplinary approach: to see the same thing from different 
perspectives help in understanding it. 
More specifically, the assumption seems to rest on the recognition that, if problems 
are similar, it may be interesting to enquire how they are addressed and solved in 
different contexts. As Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 34) wittily underlined `every 
comparatist [soon] learns ... that the 
legal system of every society faces essentially 
the same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means though very 
often with similar results. ' 10 
As the methodological issues below show, however, comparing does not mean to 
expose the results of the analysis of the two or more entities (here: legal systems), 
that is to simply juxtapose them. 11 To compare rather means to contrast them in a 
critical fashion. What is required is to explain the convergences and divergences that 
have inevitably emerged from the analysis and to draw teachings from them. In a 
word, comparing enables a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
each entity. 
If one wanted to concentrate on the aims and benefits of comparing, he should start 
from very basic remarks. As often happen, curiosity is the spark (and at the same 
time the inherent disease! ) of research. This occurs too with comparative analysis 
which starts with the recognition, masterly expressed by Lord Bingham, that `there 
is a world elsewhere'. It is the explorer's instinct that leads the researcher to wander 
through new paths and lands in the quest for an answer to a problem. 
1° Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 34). The bracketed insertion is of the writer. 
II Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 43). 
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Drawing from the previous remarks, we might attempt to sum up the goals of 
comparative analysis. 
The first general goal of is the enhancement of knowledge, in the instant case of the 
regulation of public subsidies. 12 This is strictly linked to a crucial cultural and 
pedagogical -even ethical - value of the recognition that `there is a world elsewhere'. In 
other words, comparative law can produce the awareness that our system is by no 
means perfect -a sort of `benchmark' - but it features not only strengths but also 
weaknesses, and, most interestingly, that we can actually learn from a foreign system 
and the growing willingness to learn from what is foreign to us (Sacco (1992: 
Chapter 1)). 
The improvement of knowledge inevitably leads to another crucial phase. The 
ultimate aim and benefit of comparative law is critical and the writer uses this term in 
its broadest and more neutral meaning. Drawing inspiration from the solutions 
adopted by the other system, the lawyer is naturally led to verily the correctness of 
the solutions of the two systems - inevitably referring to a model - and to propose 
new ones. 13 
This important critical phase, which prevents comparative law from merely being an 
exercise of `piling up blocks of some that no one will build with', 14 inevitably leads 
to a practical impact which may have various dimensions. 
As said, the comparative exercise may have prompted new interpretations of the 
existing law or even proposals for law reform. The SCM Agreement is a good 
example in this regard, since many of its provisions draw inspiration from EC or US 
law. 
Comparative law can even contribute to the development of legal systems. The 
example of the EC is a good one. There the role of comparative law in the 
development of, for example, the general principles and the protection of 
fundamental rights has proved fundamental in the EC. 
'2 A similar motive seems to have inspired a recent comparative analysis between EC and \VFO trade law. 
See Ortino (2004: 5). 
13 Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 46-47). 
14 Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 47) quoting Binder. 
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Moreover, the knowledge of other legal systems may lead to avoiding conflicts. If 
different legal systems have to apply to the same fact, a proper understanding of the 
two may allow, whenever possible, to avoid inconsistencies by interpreting one 
system in line with the other one. Returning to the area of public subsidies, a 
convergence in the interpretation of the discipline of EC State aid and WTO 
subsidy cannot but be beneficial. 
Along these lines, it can be appreciated that the role to play by comparative law is 
increasingly `urgent' in the current context of globalization which also involves 
relationships and interdependence of legal systems. 15 
Method 
This section focuses on the comparative method and its difficulties. 16 Methodology 
in comparative law is an intricate issue. 
On the one hand, precision is required in the identification of the problem, of the 
systems and the rules to analyses and compare, on the comparator, and on a 
`common language'. On the other hand, the faithful companions of the 
comparative lawyer are common sense, experience and intuition (as well as the 
awareness of his/her limitations and of the fact that the risk for misunderstanding is 
everywhere). 
The comparative method therefore blends two different attitudes. This 
combination has been masterly summed up in two phrases, one by Zweigert & Kötz 
(1999: 37) whereby what is needed is `imagination and discipline', and another by 
Eichendorff `Hüte disch, sei wach and munter', which can be translated with 
`Watch out, be brave and keep alert'. 17 
The steps of the comparative analysis 
We now have to go back and analyse the most important steps of this method. 
Is See Twining (2000: chapter 7). 
16 The following exposition benefits from the master work of Zweigort & Kötz (1999). 
17 The sentence is reported, and translated, by Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 36). 
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First, it is necessary to identify a problem. In our case, this has been indicated already 
and can be formulated in two different ways, one more general, one more precise. 
First: what is the definition of subsidy? Secondly: what is the best way to regulate 
public subsidies at an international level? 
The second important step is the identification of the legal ystems and, most 
importantly, the rules that need to be analysed and compared. As said, this research 
focuses on the regulation of subsidies and State aids in WTO and EC law. The 
choice of EC and WTO law depends on the fact, recognised by the OECD (2001), 
that they undoubtedly represent the two most developed, and hence important, 
disciplines of public subsidies at an international level. 
It is now important to make a more technical comment which concerns the 
identification of specific rules to compare. The comparative lawyer should focus on 
those rules that, irrespective of their possible domestic qualification, perform the 
same function since they regulate the same phenomenon. In other words, only 
comparables can be compared, and `in law the only things which are comparable are 
those which fulfil the same function'. 18 In the case of this research, the 
identification of these rules has been quite straightforward since the provisions that 
are expressly conceived to regulate public subsidies can be easily detected. Thus, the 
main focus in WTO law will be on the GATT, the SCM Agreement and the 
Agreement of Agriculture. In the EC, the attention will almost exclusively 
concentrate on the competition rules of the Treaty concerning State aids, ie Articles 
87 to 89 EC. 19 
18 Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 34). 
19 It is important to underline that the analysis mainly concentrates on the interpretation of WTO subsidy 
rules as made by the Panels and the Appellate Body and of EC State aid rules by the Commission and the 
Community Courts. 
No mention is therefore made to the interpretation made in the domestic countervailing duty practice of the 
various jurisdictions, and in particular of those of the US or the EC. For a comprehensive exposition of EC 
countervailing duty law see Adamantopoulos & Pereyra Friedrichsen (2001) and Van Bael and Bellis (2004). 
For a brief, but updated, exposition of US countervailing duty law see Trebilcock & Howse (2005: 2-'5 et 
seq). Only occasionally, reference is made to domestic countervailing duty law insofar as it may be useful to 
show a particular point. 
Analogously, the analysis does not refer to the reading made by national courts in the EC of the concept of 
State aid. Reference is sometimes made to the study of the topic recently entertained by some national 
competition authorities, such as the OFT. 
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That said, when necessary, the research takes into account of the rules that, albeit 
pursuing a different role and operating in a different manner, may also apply to 
subsidies/State aids or to similar forms of conduct. 
The third step required by the comparative method is the development of a language. 
As Zweigert & Kötz (1999: 44) explained the comparative lawyer must `build a 
system'. This requires a `special syntax and vocabulary'. It is therefore necessary to 
identify concepts, categories, paradigms, in the comparative law jargon `legal 
formants', that is the, written and unwritten, essential elements that characterize a 
given sets of rules. 20 Inevitably, this system and its concepts must be flexible 
enough to accommodate the differences in the compared systems. 
As is explained in the last section of this chapter, the main formative elements of the 
definition of subsidy, have been identified in the public intervention in the economy, the 
grant of an economic advantage, the identification of the beneficiaries, the analysis 
of the effects, and constitute the four core chapters of the thesis. The specific 
analysis of each of these broad concepts then has led to the emergence of other 
essential elements which, sometimes implicitly, guide the lawyer's reasoning. 
Interestingly, all these elements already constitute the outcome of a first 
comparative exercise between the two sets of rules. 
Fourthly, a true comparative analysis, which is not merely limited to a preliminary 
detection of similarities and differences, but, more radically, attempts to provide 
judgments on the soundness of the solutions to the problems provided in the two 
legal systems, requires the identification of an appropriate comparator, or tertium 
comparationis, to be used as a model. The big issue is: where this model should be 
found? There is not a single answer. The model may be constituted of another 
legal system which is considered as a standard, it may derive from a meta-juridical 
analysis, ie from the examination of other disciplines such as economics. 
Intriguingly, it may well have emerged from the comparative exercise itself. 
Further, in some cases, there is not one single solution. It may well be that, 
depending on various factors and circumstances, different solutions to a given 
problem can be envisaged. The comparator has thus to be necessarily flexible. 
20 The concept of legal formant' has been defined by Sacco (1991); id (1992). 
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The caveats of the comparative analysis 
The analysis of the main steps of the comparative analysis would not be complete if 
we would not consider the inevitable warnings. 
The first caveat concerns the general context (legal, political, historical, economic, etc). 
It is indeed necessary to take into due account of the, sometimes significant, general 
contextual differences since these may have an impact on the definition of the . rpecii c 
problem. This point is very important. The remainder of the analysis of this 
chapter will therefore focus on the differences, and similarities, of the two general 
contexts of the WTO and the EC and on the impact that these may have on the 
approach to legal interpretation. 
Secondly, to compare does not necessarily mean to look for similarities or d ferencer. 
Although the approach of the comparatist may depend on aim of his/her research, 
21 in many cases, the discovery that there is a convergence or a divergence is simply 
the result of the comparative exercise. Whatever the aim underlying the 
comparative effort it, what is in any case crucial is to attempt to critically explain 
these similarities /convergences or differences/ divergences. 
3. The WTO and EC as two (different) (legal) contexts 
The first warning that has been made above is that the general context, be it legal, 
political, economic or other, of two legal systems may have an impact on the 
comparison of two specific sets of rules within the two systems. 
This paragraph, which is the outcome of a brief macro-comparison, outlines the 
main similarities and the differences between the EC and WTO law. The aim is just 
to sketch the main features of the two systems at issue. 
The differences between the two systems are clear. They pursue different levels of 
integration with only a partial similarity in the objectives. Unlike the WTO, which is 
still an economic - better a `trade' organization -, the catalogue of the objectives and 
policies of the EC is impressing, almost universal. Just to provide a brief insight, 
21 See, eg, Eeckhout (2001: 211) who expressly recognises that `this chapter is looking for similarities rather 
than differences'. 
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the EC does not merely pursue quite extensive economic policies (trade 
liberalization, competition, industrial policy, economic and monetary policy, 
infrastructure, transport, energy, agriculture, etc) but is increasingly involved in 
other important policy areas (regional cohesion, health, culture, environment, 
immigration, etc). 
The different vocation of the two systems is also reflected in their membership. 
Despite a recent substantive enlargement, the EC is a regional organization 
constituted of a rather small and cohesive group of nations with a substantial degree 
of commonality of values and objectives. The WTO's universal vocation - it 
currently counts 149 Members - necessarily shows a different picture. 
These general differences in aims, vocation and membership have an implication at 
the constitutional and institutional level. The institutional structure of the EC is 
both complex and mature. Generally the three functions (judicial, legislative and 
executive) are clearly defined and equally strong with a resulting balance of powers. 
An element of further solidity is given by the integration between the EC legal 
system and the national systems of the Member States guaranteed by the direct 
effect of EC law and the consequent idea that national courts and administrations 
are EC `organs'. In the WTO, the institutional structure is complex but less 
effective. There is virtually no legislative power. As an inevitable counterbalance, 
however, the judicial branch, the Dispute Settlement System, is highly developed 
and authoritative. 
An important issue, which will be soon analysed, is whether these differences may 
have an impact when the lawyer has to interpret the relevant rules. In other words, 
the crucial issue is whether there is any difference in the approach to legal 
interpretation in the two systems. 
One might ask whether, in consideration of the important differences above, it is 
really possible to entertain any meaningful comparison between the two systems. 
More precisely, the problem would not only be at a macro level but even at the micro 
level of the rules that specifically regulate certain phenomena, say tax discrimination, 
quotas, general justifications, and ... subsidies. 
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Although not spelled out expressly, this objection was certainly in mind of 
Eeckhout (2001: 211) when, introducing his comparison between the law on free 
circulation of services in the EC and in the WTO law, and making adamant that he 
was not proposing that one system should have been the model for the other, he 
felt it necessary to acknowledge that 
There are obvious differences, in wording, objective, context, and scheme of 
liberalization mechanisms in the respective systems. But that does not mean that 
comparison could not be enriching... 
The writer might add that the justification for carrying out a comparative exercise 
between rules that regulate the same phenomenon and, from this perspective, 
pursue the same function is not precluded by the differences, even in objectives, in 
the general legal systems.. Far from being an obstacle to the comparison between 
rules that regulate the same fact, this difference in objectives (at both macro and micro 
levels) is certainly a factor, among the others, that has to be taken into account in 
the comparison. 
At a more general level, it should also be added that, when comparing the regulation 
of economic activities, usually the differences tend to wither. This is certainly due 
to the ongoing processes of liberalization which produce an impact, even cultural, 
towards uniformity which goes well beyond the limited arena of commercial 
struggle. 
In other words, the aim to reach a certain - albeit minimal - degree of liberalization 
of the economy seems to represent a leit motif in the regulation of economic activities 
and of the obstacles thereof. 22 This common denominator makes the comparison 
between the rules that in various legal systems govern these phenomena 
appropriate. 
We might even go further. Not only is it common to find similarities in the rules 
concerning economic phenomena, but, more generally, there is an increasing 
22 Bognetti (1994). 
46 
tendency to give more legal relevance also to non-economic considerations and the 
protection of fundamental rights). 23 
Legal interpretation 
One of the most important issues for the current analysis is the impact of the 
general context on the approach to legal interpretation. 
There is no mistaking that law and interpretation is one and the same thing. 
Legal interpretation is a fascinating topic, particularly in an international law context. 
One scholar once uttered that there is no part in the law of the treaties which he 
approaches with more trepidation than the question of interpretation. 24 Certainly, 
most of the passion that it arouses depends on its elusiveness, on the fact that the 
process of interpretation is by its own nature more an art than a science. 
25 
Although the interpreter has at its disposal various, and to some extent long- 
established, rules of interpretation, their actual scope is not settled, being rather 
flexible, and, most importantly, the relative weight of these rules in the process of 
interpretation may substantially differ. This can greatly affect the approach to 
interpretation and its outcome. 
In the next two sections the approach to legal interpretation in the WTO and in the 
EC is briefly examined. 
The approach to legal interpretation in the WTO 
One of the first fundamental steps made by the newly constituted Appellate Body, a 
true sign of the WTO's more legally oriented dispute resolution system, was to 
define the rules of interpretation it would follow. It did so in interpreting Article 3.2 
DSU that in its second sentence states that the dispute settlement system serves to 
clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements 'in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law'. In two important 
reports the Appellate Body found that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
2.1 For a review see Trebilcock and Howse (2005: chapters 13,17,18 and 20). 
24 Sinclair (1984) page 114, referring to (and agreeing with) McNair. 
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on the Law of Treaties CVCLT) have attained the status of rules of customary 
international law relating to treaty interpretation. 26 
The 'general rule on interpretation' can be found in Article 31(1) \TCLT which reads 
that 'a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose'. Article 32 on the 'supplementary means of interpretation' 
provides that 'recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable'. 
Professor Ehlermann (2002: 615-616), a former judge of the Appellate Body, has 
summed up the approach of the Appellate Body with respect to these criteria. The 
Appellate Body attaches the greatest importance to the first criterion, ie 'ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty'. The 'context' is given less weight than the first, 
but it is certainly been more relied upon than the third, the 'object and purpose'. 
Little importance is by contrast attributed to the 'preparatory work of the treaty'. 
This seems to closely follow the balance struck by the VCLT. Article 31 VCLT 
includes a `general rule of interpretation'. The use of the singular ('rule') instead of 
the plural (`rules') is a clear indication that the process of interpretation envisaged by 
that provision is `a single combined operation', in other words a `holistic' approach. 
27 The holistic, or global, nature of the rule means that its application should not 
involve a strict sequential examination where the assessment of each criterion is 
completely separate from the others. 
That said, it is clear that, if all the criteria indicated in Article 31 should be used in 
order to reach the appropriate interpretation, it seems that, in this process, some have 
more weight than others. This is clearly explained by Sinclair (1984: 117), who 
actively participated in the Vienna Conference as a delegate: 
25 Sinclair (1984) page 118. Cf also Brown & Jacobs (2000) page 323. 
26 US - Gasolene, para 3; Japan - Taxes, para 97. A similar view was expressed 
by Sinclair (1984: 153). 
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[t]he Convention rules on interpretation reflect an attempt to assess the relative 
value and weight of the elements to be taken into account in the process of 
interpretation rather than to describe the process of interpretation itself. 28 
Indeed, apart from implying that the process of interpretation should be a single, 
combined operation, its actual operation is not described and it is for the interpreter 
to face it in each individual case. What Article 31 VCLT does it to give a `relative 
value and weight' to the various elements of the general rule. 
In particular, this `general rule' certainly favours a 'textual approach', with some relevance 
given to a strictly interpreted 'purposive method' and little weight to the 'subjective 
method'. 
Among the various criteria enshrined in the holistic general rule of Article 31 VCLT, 
the examination of 'the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty' (so-called literal 
or textual interpretation) is certainly the most important one. On the clear premiss 
that it should represent the most direct expression of the intentions of the parties, 
the text of the treaty constitutes the natural starting point of any process of 
interpretation. Sinclair (1984: 121) underlined that the 'ordinary meaning' does not 
necessarily result from a pure grammatical or linguistic analysis but has to take 
account of all the consequences normally and reasonably following from the text. 
In other words, the interpretation of legal rules necessarily has to take their practical 
application into due account. 
Most crucially, as Pauwelyn (2003: 245) notes, the text of the treaty is the necessary 
reference for and the limitation of the other tools of treaty interpretation. Since 
interpretation is about giving meaning to existing rules and not about creating new 
rules, it cannot go either beyond or a, gain. rt the text of the rule in question. 
According to Ehlermann (2002: 616-617), these considerations show how, in the 
WTO, the heavy reliance on the 'ordinary meanings of the terms of the treaty' by 
the Appellate Body and the Panels has contributed to 'providing security and 
27 See the ILC Commentary (1966: vol II, 219-220). Brownlie (2003: 633); Shaw (1997: 656); Lennard (2002: 
22-23). 
28 Emphasis added. 
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predictability of the multilateral trading system' (Article 3.2 DSU, first sentence) and 
has had a legitimizing effect of the activity of the dispute settlement organs, by 
keeping at bay the criticisms that they were attempting to 'add or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided in the covered agreements' (Article 3.2 DSU, third 
sentence). 
Although it may be obvious, 29 Article 31(1) VCLT hastens to add that the terms of 
the treaty should not be read in the abstract but should be put 'in their context' 
which is constituted by the text of the treaty, including its preamble and annexes, 
and any other agreements related to the treaty or drawn in connection with it. The 
most important issue here is the identification of the most appropriate context in 
the case at hand. Although the WTO is one single agreement, the various 
instruments and provisions can certainly be distinguished between themselves on 
the basis of various considerations (such as ! ex ipecialis), and hence, through- 
interpretation, we may certainly identify a more or less immediate and appropriate 
context. 
Particularly significant is the remainder of Article 31(1). The interpretation of the 
'ordinary terms of the treaty in their context' shall be read 'in the light of the 'object 
and purpose' of the treaty. Lennard (2002: 27) has intriguingly claimed that also the 
object and purpose of the provision under examination may become relevant insofar 
as it is evidence of the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Most importantly, the phrase in the light of arguably indicates that purposive or 
teleological interpretation is seen as a secondary and ancillary tool. In any event, as 
confirmation of the centrality of the text of the treaty, it is generally said that the 
object and purpose of a treaty are primarily to be gathered therefrom (and 
particularly, if there is any, from its preamble). 
30 Whereas this anchorage to the text 
of the treaty may well circumscribe the more radical risk that the interpreter imports 
what can be viewed as its own object and purpose of the treaty, the fact remains 
that, for various reasons, it may be particularly difficult to identify them. Sinclair 
(1984: 130-131) rightly observed that most treaties, and this is particularly true with 
"Jacobs (1969: 334); Lennard (2002: 24). 
50 
respect to multilateral conventions, have more purposes, and quite often these may 
be in conflict with each other (as the fact itself that a dispute arises may show). 
We may conclude our analysis of the main criteria expressly set forth in the V'CLT 
with the supplementary means of interpretation referred to by Article 32, and in 
particular the preparatory works. As said, the recourse to the latter is not very 
common. This is partly due to the fact that these are accorded a secondary role in 
the process of interpretation. However, the caution in referring to them seems 
more radically to depend on two other arguments clearly summarized by Sinclair 
(1984: 142). The relevant passage deserves a full quotation: 
the obscurity of a particular text will often find its origin in the travaux priparatoires 
themselves. The natural desire of negotiators to bring negotiations to a 
successful conclusion will often result in the adoption of vague or ambiguous 
formulations. Sometimes the parties will have deliberately wished to avoid too 
much precision in order to allow themselves in future to argue that the provision 
as formulated does not commit them to an inconvenient or too onerous 
obligation. Finally, the travaux preparatoires are unlikely to reveal accurately and in 
detail what happened during the negotiations, since, more often than not, they 
will not disclose what may have been agreed between the heads of delegations 
during private corridor discussions. 
Whereas the first argument highlights the substantial inconclusiveness of the recourse 
to the preparatory works, the second argument warns against the unreliability of the 
records of negotiations. Crucially, both these inconveniences suggest that the 
insight into negotiations, far from providing the sought clarification, might in fact 
divert from the results that, despite any uncertainty, have emerged from the 
primarily textual interpretation under Article 31 VCLT. 
31 
It is finally important to briefly refer to two other rules of treaty interpretation, not 
expressly codified in the VCLT, which have been used by the Appellate Body and 
may be relevant for our analysis. 
30 Sinclair (1984: 118); Jacobs (1969: 337). Lennard (2002: 29) notes that the ILC Commentary (1966: vol II, 
221) considered the reference to the `object and purpose' of the treaty as referring to expressed objects and 
purposes, particularly, but not exclusively, as expressed in the preamble. 
31 For a similar argument cf Brownlie (2003: 636). 
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The first is the principle of effectiveness (also known as ut rrs magis valeat quam pereat 
or ffet utile). This requires that 
when the treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other 
does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, goods faith and the objects 
and purpose of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be 
adopted'. 32 
The Appellate Body has accordingly noted that 'interpretation must give meaning 
and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading 
that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy 
or inutility'. 33 
The common interpretation is that this finding is an expression of the principle of 
effectiveness. 34 This interpretation is `based upon the presumed interest of the 
authors to make the treaty provisions effective rather than ineffective'. 35 With a 
nice expression, Pauwelyn (2003: 249) has summarized this finding as requiring that 
`words cannot be interpreted `out of WTO provisions'. An interesting point is put 
forward by Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 133-134). The Appellate Body would 
have reinforced the textual approach to the treaty by responding to the previous 
alleged `tendency of panels to overlook exact textual wording in order to give effect 
to what they see as the "object and purpose" of the treaty as a whole'. 
We can now pause for a moment and ask whether this principle of effectiveness 
really differ from the interpretation 'in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty', or whether they rather are two different ways - possibly with a different 
emphasis (one referring to the text, the other to the object and purpose) - to 
describe the same thing. 
36 
32 ILC Commentary (1966: vol II, 219). 
33 US - Gasolene, paragraph 23; confirmed 
in, ixte-aGo, Japan - Taxer, paragraph 12. 
'" Pauwel)-n (2003: 249). 
3S Sinclair (1984: 118). 
36 On the point see Sinclair (1984) page 118. In particular, it has been argued that the approach based on 
effectiveness is a matter of necessity based upon the presumed interest of the authors to make a treaty 
provision effective rather than ineffective. By contrast, the teleological approach would require a much mare 
subjective appreciation by the would-be interpreter of what were the aims of the parties. 
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In any event, both principles raise the same concern. They can be close allies of the 
text, giving it its full meaning, but, if pushed too far, they may turn against it This 
has been raised by Pauwelyn (2003: 249) when he noted that there may well be a 
tension between effective and textual interpretation. 
The Appellate Body itself seems to have understood the risks of a too much liberal 
interpretation (that is too remote from the text and the object and purpose of the 
treaty) when it noted that the Vienna Convention 'principles of interpretation 
neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there 
or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended'. 37 
This finding shows two things. First, that, in the same way as it is not possible to 
read words `out of the treaty, words cannot be read `in' the treaty (cf Pauwelyn 
(2003: 249)). Secondly, it shows the connection between what sometimes is called 
extensive interpretation and what sometimes is called purposive interpretation. The 
first part of the finding refers to imputing into the treaty `words that are not there', 
with a clear emphasis on the text, the second part, which mentions the importation 
into the treaty of `concepts that were not intended', seems to use a different 
language. A language which may well hint at a broader analysis of the object and 
purpose of the treaty. 
The result of this analysis is that, with respect to both effective and purposive 
interpretation, the problem is to go against the text which should represent both the 
basis and the limit of the general rule of interpretation of Article 31. 
In the Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body has also referred to the principle of 
restrictive interpretation, also known as in dubio mitius, whereby 'if the meaning of 
the term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the 
party assuming an obligation, ... or 
involves less general restrictions upon the 
parties'. 38 
37 Appellate Body, India - Patent, paragraph 46. 
38 See Appellate Body, Hormones, paragraph 165. 
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Leaving aside the issue of whether the principle was actually relevant in the Hormones 
dispute, 39 it seems that this rule is increasingly less used and subject to criticism. 40 
As early as in 1961, Lord McNair expressed the view that it was of declining 
importance and dated 'from an age in which treaties were interpreted not by legal 
tribunals, and not even much by lawyers but by statesmen and diplomats'. 
Underlying the in dubio mitius principle is the idea of deference towards the 
sovereignty of the states. The writer does not touch the current intriguing debate 
on the concept of sovereignty, wittily dubbed as one of the 'mantras' of WTO. 41 
The fact is that, in a treaty, very much like in any contract between private parties, 
one party's obligation usually corresponds to another party's right. As Pauwelyn 
(2003: 186, note 57) noted, 'to interpret obligations for one state restrictively could, 
indeed, amount to not giving the intended effect to the rights of another state'. A 
treaty is the result of a sophisticated exercise of balance of obligations and rights as 
has been recognised by the Appellate Body itself in the Japan - Taxes case. The 
particularly illuminating passage deserves full quotation: 
[t]he WITO Agreement is a treaty - the international equivalent of a contract. It is 
self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own 
respective national interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In 
exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they 
have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the commitments they 
42 have made in the WTO Agreement. 
The writer's final proposition, which is also of more general relevance, is that the 
admittedly balanced approach of the mainly textual analysis of the Vienna 
Convention is capable enough to capture, in each given case, the bargain underlying 
the words of the WTO Agreement. 
The issue of interpretation is currently very topical in the context of WTO law. The 
recent US - Gambling dispute seems to have put the proper tuning of the customary 
19 Even on a plain textual interpretation, it was clear that the Panel's equation between the terms 'based on' 
and 'conform to' in respectively Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement was not correct. As the Appellate 
Body found, one ('conform) ckarly required of Members 'much more' than the other ('based on'). 
40 Brownlie (2003: 636); Pauwleyn (2002: 186). 
41 See Jackson (2006). 
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rules of interpretation of public international law, and in particular of the rules of 
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, at the top of the agenda of 
international trade lawyers. The need to fully give meaning to the `holistic' `general 
rule' of Article 31(1) VCLT seems to be the motto. 43 
We would like to conclude by quoting an interesting passage of Pauwelyn (2003: 
245-246) which shows the potential (and at the same time the limitation) of this rule. 
The example cited is the interpretation of `exhaustible natural resources' under 
Article XX(g) GATT made by the Appellate Body in US - Shrimps. 
First, interpretation 
... is about giving meaning to the terms of a treaty. It is a 
matter of definition. Second, interpretation must be limited to giving meaning to 
rules of law. It cannot extend to creating new rules. Within the process of treaty 
interpretation, other rules cannot add meaning to WTO rules that goes either beyond 
or against the `clear meaning of the terms' of the WTO rule in question. 
Interpretations contra legem are prohibited. Interpretation thus allows, for 
example, reading the WTO term `exhaustible natural resources' to include certain 
living species with reference to international environmental law (such inclusion does 
not run counter to the `clear meaning of the terms'). Interpretation, would, 
however, prohibit this term being read so as to include also resources which are 
`clearly' not exhaustible (such as tomatoes) or resources that are `clearly' not 
natural (such as plastic). 
The approach to legal interpretation in the EC 
No express reference by the ECJ to any method of interpretation in particular can 
be found. 
A corollary is that the ECJ does not follow the methods of interpretation prevailing 
in public international law when interpreting EC law (the case is of course different 
when it is necessary to interpret international agreements binding on the 
Community). 44 
When it comes to defining the general approach of the Court to legal interpretation, 
it seems that the words uttered by a former President of the Court in 1976 are still 
relevant: 
t2 Appellate Body, Japan - Taues, paragraph 15, emphasis in the original. 
{3 See, eg, Ortino (2006). 
N Eeckhout (2004: 256 et seq). 
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The literal and historical methods of interpretation recede into the background. 
Schematic and teleological interpretation ... is of primary importance. 45 
Further, according to Kutscher, contextual and purposive interpretation `are closely 
interlocked in the case-law of the Court'. 46 
The main implication that can be drawn is that the text does not generally represent 
a limit. 
In this regard, Brown and Jacobs (2000: 326) noted: 
[f]aced as it often is with texts which are vague, ambiguous or incomplete, the 
Court has recognised the limitations for itself of the literal methods of 
interpretation. Particularly, after 1958, when the Court was confronted with the 
more programmatic EC Treaty, its interpretation shifted perceptibly towards the 
contextual and teleological, with emphasis on the ratio legis and the objectives of 
the Treaty. 
In another passage, the favour for the teleological approach is again explained as 
being `peculiarly appropriate in Community law where ... the Treaties provide 
mainly a broad programme or design rather than a detailed blue-print'. 47 
This has been considered appropriate on the premiss that the Treaties are (already) 
substantially a Constitution and the Court of Justice a Constitutional Court. 48 
The Court's reasoning therefore puts a heavy reliance on context and, in particular, 
on teleology and fet utile with the result that EC law is usually interpreted quite 
freely and liberally. Indeed in EC law purposive interpretation has various 
applications. Referring to the crucial objective of integration underlying the 
common/single market the expression 'integrationist' interpretation has also been 
used. 49 
45 Kutscher (1976: 16). 
46 Kutscher (1976: 40). 
47 Brown and Jacobs (2000: 339). 
48 Jacobs (1992: 32); Tridimas (1997: 199); Albors-Llorens (1999: 373) 
49 Pescatore (1974). 
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One of the most notable example is the famous Van Gend en Loos case 50 where the 
Court laid down the principle that the Community constitutes a `new legal order' 
and that Community Law can have direct effect, that is can give rise to rights that 
individuals can invoke before national courts and that the latter have to protect. If 
the reasoning of the Court is looked at for a moment, what is meant by contextual, 
purposive and integrationist approach can be fully appreciated. 51 
This approach has sometimes been negatively dubbed `judicial activism' and subject 
to strong criticism. 52 
In any event, it cannot however be said that the Court does never feel to be 
constrained by the Treaty language. In the recent UPA case, 53 contrary to a 
powerful Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, the Court found not to be able to 
construe the notion of `individual concern' in Article 230(4) EC more liberally since 
this would have meant running against the text of the Treaty. 
Brief comparative comments 
Ehlermann (2002: 616) has recently summed up the difference in approach to 
interpretation in the two legal systems: 
[w]hile the Appellate Body clearly privileges "literal" interpretation, the ECJ is a 
protagonist of "teleological" interpretation. 
The big difference between the two systems seems thus to depend on the different 
weight given to respectively textual and purposive interpretation. 
In turn, this difference in approach to legal interpretation partly justifies different 
judicial styles. If one has to be - or, at least, show to be - particularly faithful to the 
wording of a treaty this will require a particularly elaborate style where every step of 
the reasoning is put down, sometimes various times but with different formulations. 
50 Case 26/62. 
51 Ibid pages 12 and 13. On this case see Pescatore (1983). 
52 Rasmussen (1986). 
53 Case 55/OOP UPA. 
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Conversely, the style of the Court of justice is definitely more concise, sometimes 
even cryptic. 
From a lawyer's perspective, probably the two styles are excessively extreme, in 
either direction. Dispute settlement organs, particularly Panels, would better 
attempt to simplify. On the other hand, the Court of justice may sometimes be less 
hermetic in its reasoning. 
But these remarks forget the political dimension. Like the different emphasis in the 
use of the methods of legal interpretation, it may well be argued that the two 
different judicial styles - extremely elaborate vs extremely concise - are ultimately a 
reflection of the different need for legitimacy required by the two tribunals. 
Hermetism or unclearness are often a different story and may be explained with lack 
of consensus. 
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III. Exposition of chapters, selection of issues 
We have seen that one of the main steps of the comparative analysis is to identiý- 
the essential categories, or the legal formants, of the `issue of the definition of 
subsidy' in the two legal systems. 
Four macro elements of the `issue of the definition of subsidy' have been identified: 
a) the public intervention 
b) the derogation/ advantage 
c) the beneficiaries 
d) the effects 
These four general categories will be analysed in turn in the following four chapters 
which constitute the core of the thesis. 
The underlying drift may easily be noted. We start from concentrating on the actor 
and its conduct to progressively move towards the mechanism and the impact of its 
action that are liable to produce negative and/or positive effects. 
It is finally important to underline that, in his effort, the writer has necessarily had to 
make a selection in the `vast universe of subsidies' 54 and focus only on those 
problems that, in his view, are particularly significant to explain the underlying 
trends of the `issue of the definition of subsidy'. 
In his Parallel Lives, in the beginning of the book on Alexander, Plutarch noted: 
[j]ust as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the 
expression of the eyes, wherein the character shows itself, but make very little 
account of the other parts of the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself 
rather to the signs of the soul in men, and by means of these to portray the life of 
each, leaving to others the description of their great contests. 
Appellate Body, Canada - Ain-raft, paragraph 47. 
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The writer has similarly attempted to analyse those `signs of the soul' of the subsidy 
and State aid rules which better `portray the life of each'. In doing so, it may well be 
that, in many cases, he has omitted `the description of their great contests', leaving it 
to others - or indeed to his future research. 
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Chapter 2 
The Public Intervention 
I. Scope of the chapter 
The initial step of the analysis is to concentrate on the first requirement of the 
definition of subsidy or State aid which is the public intervention. 
This chapter attempts to answer three questions on the governmental action that are 
progressively more critical, in the sense of both analytical and crucial. In particular: 
- what action might in principle amount to a subsidy or a State aid, 
- what action does in fact constitute a subsidy or a State aid under the two 
legal systems, and, finally and most significantly, 
- what action should be considered a subsidy or a State aid under the two 
regimes. 
We begin our examination with an introductory section which answers the first 
question and, at the same time, provides the necessary foundations for approaching 
the two other issues. This introduction is followed by the central part which mainly 
analyses the current state of the law in the two systems (and at times evaluates it). 
The more critical and comparative remarks are left to the conclusive section. 
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II. Introduction: the Public Intervention in the Economy 
In this introductory section the analysis focuses on the forms of public intervention 
in the economy that may in general confer an economic advantage, and may thus in 
theory be covered by subsidy or State aid rules. Having in mind the findings of this 
analysis, we will afterwards examine the techniques that may actually be used to 
determine the legal relevance of the action of the government in a system regulating 
subsidies. 
1. Forms of public intervention in the economy and grant of economic 
advantages 
Governments may - and do - intervene in the economy for various reasons and in 
various ways. 55 
Quite crucially, this intervention may produce an impact, be it positive or negative, on 
undertakings. 56 When a positive impact occurs we may be entering in the territory of 
public subsidies. This land is however full of uncertainties. It has been noted that 
... in considering which government actions may 
be regarded as providing 
subsidies, the term subsidy can be all-embracing. Virtually every government 
action can be regarded as a subsidy for someone, and virtually all such actions 
can affect international trade. 57 
55 This is indeed the subject of study of normative or we(arr economics, the `branch of economics dealing with 
normative issues. Its purpose is not to describe how the economy works but to asses how well it works': 
Begg, Fisher and Dornbusch (1997: 240). With a different language, this is the part of economics which 
concerns how the economy ought to be run: Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 326, emphasis added). 
On the intervention of the State in the economy see Barr (2004: passim and 72 et seq); Stiglitz (2000: passim 
and 27 et seq). 
56 For the sake of accuracy, we may immediately underline that to intervene in the economy does not 
necessarily mean that the government operates in the market as its conduct may affect undertakings also when 
it acts qma government, for example by levying taxes or introducing rules. The next chapter will show that the 
distinction market/non-market conduct has an important impact on the analysis of of the advantage, and in 
particular of the benchmarks that are used therein. 
57 Snape (1991: 140). Along the same line, but in a more economic jargon, Low (2001: 103) observed that: 
`any intervention that affects relative prices or the conditions of competition in a market can, at least in 
theory, be expressed as a subsidy or tax equivalent'. With another definition, which importantly underlines 
the impact on producers' costs, it is said that a subsidy is `a payment by the government to consumers or 
producers which makes the factor cost received by producers greater than the market price charged by 
producers': Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 451). 
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What we are attempting to do here is to focus on the forms of governmental action 
that may be regarded, at least in theory, as subsidies or State aids. Drawing 
inspiration from a distinction recently set forth in OECD (2001: 25-28), and 
concerning financial transfers, public goods, regulatory and tax policies, it is possible 
to identify in general three different forms of government action that may confer an 
economic advantage on undertakings and that, by distorting competition and trade, may 
hence be regarded as subsidies or State aids. These forms, ie financial assistance, 
public goods and regulation, are analysed in turn. 
Financial assistance and publicly provided goods or services 
The government may firstly provide financial assistance to some undertakings by 
transferring economic resources to them in various ways. This for example occurs 
with grants, capital injections, loans, guarantees, provision or purchase of goods or 
services, special or differential tax treatment. 
Secondly, any government may provide goods or services (such as infrastructures, 
education, public order) that, despite being in principle open to all members of 
society (hence generally called public goods), 58 in certain circumstances may have a 
favourable impact only on certain undertakings. 
Regulation (and deregulation) 
It is finally possible to confer an advantage on certain undertakings by regulating or 
deregulating their business environment, that is by introducing or removing rules on 
and restrictions of economic activities. OFT (2004: note 10 at 4) generally noted 
that `regulations that alter the costs incurred by businesses could also be considered 
to be subsidies'. 
The government may control the functioning of markets, for example the quantity 
and price of the relevant goods or services, by way of regulation, that is by introducing 
rules and restrictions in these markets. Governments may affect prices and 
quantities in quite an immediate way by fixing (minimum or maximum) prices 
58 For an analysis and application of the proper economic meaning of public goods see chapter 3. 
63 
and/or imposing obligations to sell or buy the relevant products. Governments 
may also adopt a less direct course of conduct, for example by introducing border 
measures, such as import or export barriers which, by respectively reducing or 
increasing the quantity of goods or services in the market, may result in an 
advantage for those undertakings that sell or buy them in terms of, respectively, 
higher or lower prices. 
In other cases, with a course of action usually called deregulation, the government may 
decide to relax, or remove altogether, rules and restrictions, for example labour or 
environmental standards, that are applicable to undertakings and thus benefit them. 
It may immediately be highlighted the inherent `double-way effect' of regulatory 
intervention. To impose or lift restrictions on some individuals almost inevitably 
means that, more or less directly, restrictions are conversely lifted or imposed on 
other subjects. Along the same line, there is a similar redistributive impact. 
Resources are reallocated so that the enrichment of some inescapably corresponds 
to the impoverishment of others (which, to be true, may also occur in some cases of 
indirect financial assistance). 
This consideration leads us straight to the core of the next paragraph, and to the 
two crucial concepts of indirect action and of transfer of economic resources. 
2. The distinction between financial assistance and regulation 
The importance of distinguishing 
We may now compare financial assistance and regulation. 59 Far from being of 
mere academic interest, this comparison is helpful to introduce issues and concepts that 
will become familiar in the further analysis. It is also useful to introduce the basic 
elements for the examination of the controversial issue of the treatment of 
regulatory measures in the two systems. 
S9 Most of the observations we are making with respect to the cases of financial assistance can substantially Ix 
transposed to the provision of public goods. 
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The complexities of indirect action 
It may be suggested that, in general, financial assistance and regulation differ with 
respect to the degree of complexity of the action of the government and of the 
relevant transfer of economic resources. In other words, the mechanism whereby 
the economic advantage is conferred seems usually to be more complex in regulation 
than in financial cases. 
The first element of complexity of regulatory conduct depends on its indirect 
course. When the government provides financial assistance it usually (albeit not 
necessarily) does so directly. This is not the case for regulatory measures which, in a 
more or less immediate way, seems always to involve an intermediary in the transfer 
of economic resources, with the consequence that the public intervention may 
appropriately be defined as indirect. 
The main aspect of complexity of indirect action is whether the conduct of a third 
party - which, in principle, may act autonomously - may be associated with, or, in a 
more legal jargon, may be attributed or imputed to the government. 
The direction exercised by the government does not always feature the same degrees 
of clarity, immediacy and intensity, ranging from straight ordering somebody to do 
something to merely creating the conditions to enable the latter to perform that 
conduct. It can however quite safely be suggested that, if compared with measures 
of indirect financial assistance, regulatory measures are commonly connoted by less 
clear, immediate and intense degrees of direction. A good example thereof is when 
the government attempts to influence the quantity and the price of a product in the 
domestic market by introducing border measures such as export or import restrictions. 
Another difficulty of the indirect action is that it is not always clear to determine 
whom the government is actually directing. 
This is particularly so in the cases of regulation and substantially depends on the 
`double-way effect' that we have underlined above whereby one party's burden 
necessarily corresponds to another's advantage. We may, for example, think of the 
case of price regulation. In the case of the fixing of a minimum price, shall we say that 
it is the buyer that is ordered to pay it or, from another perspective, the supplier is 
ordered to charge it? The converse is obviously true for maximum prices. Is it the 
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producer that is prohibited to charge more, or is it rather the buyer who is entitled to 
pay that price? 
Despite some hesitation the most natural conclusion seems to be that the party that 
is most immediately subject to the direction of the government is the one that, in all 
probability, has an opposite interest to the measure, ie the buyer «who is ordered to 
pay the minimum price, or the supplier who is prohibited to charge more than the 
maximum price. From another perspective, it seems that the directed party is the 
intermediary through which the financial support is effected. 
A different conclusion can be drawn in some cases of deregulation where the 
governmental measure seems to be immediately directed to the beneficiary 
undertaking, for example by exempting it from certain rules or restrictions (such as 
labour or environmental standards), and not to the intermediary. This measure 
almost inevitably affects a third party (following the examples above, the employees 
or the undertakings supplying environmental devices or services). It seems however 
that this third party, which may still be considered as the intermediary of the 
governmental conduct since the financial support necessarily passes through it, is 
subject to a lesser degree of direction as compared with, say, an order or a prohibition 
immediately directed to it. 
The complexities of the financial dimension 
The complexity of the mechanism of conferral of the economic advantage may have 
an impact on the clarity of its financial dimension. 
Although any public intervention is liable to produce an economic impact on 
undertakings, and more specifically an allocation of economic resources (whereby 
the benefit to one party is somewhat linked to the burden to another), it is not 
always possible to identify a clear transfer of economic resources from one party to 
another. 
In the cases of financial assistance the existence of a transfer of economic resources 
is normally particularly clear. This may partly be explained by the fact that we are 
often dealing with direct governmental action or that, in the case of indirect action, 
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the measure does not involve a great degree of complexity. Last, but not least, we 
are usually dealing with commonly accepted forms of subsidy. 
By contrast, such transfer of economic resources is more difficult to identify for 
some forms of regulatory action. We may think of the cases of deregulation 
discussed above where the direct addressee of the action of the government seems 
to be the beneficiary of the measure and the intermediary is only affected 
derivatively. What seems to emerge from these cases is that the clarity of the transfer 
is proportionately linked to the role played by intermediary. In other words, the less 
active the latter is the less clear the former seems to be. 
An ancillary point concerning the financial dimension of the action focuses on the 
origin of the resources that are used to finance the transfer. Generally, whereas the 
large majority of cases of financial assistance inevitably involve a transfer of public 
resources, regulatory measures usually call for a use of private resources. This may 
well depend on the fact that in the former the government usually acts directly 
whereas in the latter it almost invariably relies on the role of third parties. More 
radically, this seems to depend on the fact that the most commonly accepted forms 
of subsidy, which certainly belong to the category of financial assistance, are strictly 
linked to the government's prerogative to tax and spend the collected revenue (which is quite 
separate from the prerogative to regulate). 
The role of rules 
We have seen that most of the complexities of regulatory measures are connected to 
the fact that, in those cases, the government acts indirectly. Nevertheless, since 
governments may also provide financial assistance through an intermediary, this 
cannot be the truly distinguishing element between what financial assistance is and 
what regulation is. Analogously, the clarity of the financial element in itself does not 
provide conclusive indications. 
Although it is sometimes difficult to draw the line and distinguish with precision 
between financial assistance and regulation, it is suggested that a useful perspective 
- which does not have the pretension of being more that a good but modest rule of 
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thumb - is represented by the role played by the ruler in the process of conferral of the 
advantage. 
As a direct consequence of the rule of law, governmental conduct necessarily finds its 
legal basis in rules. The previous analysis seems however to suggest that financial 
assistance measures feature both a particularly clear and rather immediate transfer of 
economic resources. Whereas the regulatory element stays in the background, they 
seem to be characterised by a clear financial component. By contrast, the financial 
dimension of regulatory measures is not always represented by clear and immediate 
transfers of economic resources. It is the introduction or removal of rules (and 
restrictions) that plays a crucial role in the mechanism of conferral of the economic 
advantage with the consequence that they are particularly denoted by a re(gulatog 
component. 
A reminder on the importance of the previous analysis: introducing useful 
issues and concepts 
After this long - and exhausting - theoretical analysis, it may be useful to recall its 
purpose to the reader. 
In itself, the question of whether the measure at issue is one of financial assistance 
or of regulation is of limited importance. This is not the case for the various issues 
and concepts that have emerged from the previous analysis. These are crucial tools in 
order to answer the most important questions of what action does, or indeed 
should, constitute a State aid or a subsidy under EC and WTO law. 
3. Techniques to define the legal relevance of the public intervention 
Before turning to the analysis of the actual coverage of WTO and EC law, it is 
necessary to examine the techniques that may be used to define the legal relevance 
of the public intervention, that is to determine what forms of governmental action 
are covered by the provision at issue. 
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These techniques, which interestingly reflect most of the issues and concepts that 
have been analysed in the previous paragraph, will be taken into account when 
examining the two legal systems. 
Formulation of the definition 
The first, general method is the formulation of the definition. 
Definitions may be formulated in different ways. They may be sufficiently specific 
so as to cover only certain forms of action, for example those that involve clear and 
direct transfers of economic resources, or they may be more generally worded with 
a potentially wider coverage, comprising more indirect and complex measures 
granting economic advantages. 
Further, they may, more or less explicitly, distinguish measures according to their 
(financial or regulatory) nature. 
Rules of imputability 
The second technique refers to those cases of indirect action when, in one way or 
another, the government acts through a third party. The main legal issue is whether 
the government may be held responsible for the conduct of the third party. 
We have seen that the direction of the government may be connoted by various 
aspects of complexity. Definitions reflect this complexity in the relevant rules of 
imputability. Crucially, these may be crafted in different ways, which are more or less 
sophisticated and comprehensive. A final, legal gloss. Even if, generally speaking, 
the involvement of the government in the conferral of the economic advantage is 
particularly clear, for example in the cases of deregulation discussed above, the 
determination of its actual responsibility under the provision at issue may still be an issue 
since it fully depends on the formulation of the relevant rule of imputability. 
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Origin of the resources 
The third method to determine the relevance of the measure at issue focuses on the 
origin of the resources used to finance the action of subsidisation. A long-standing issue 
in the two systems is indeed whether the definitions of subsidy and State aid should 
necessarily require a cost to government or may also be financed with private 
resources. 
Objective of the measure 
Finally, the fourth technique concerns the objectives of the public intervention. The 
government usually acts in the pursuit of various public policy objectives. 
What is interesting to ask -a truly recurring theme in all the steps of our analysis - is 
what role is played by the objectives of the measure in its assessment under subsidy 
and State aid rules, and, in this chapter in particular, in the context of the definition 
of the action by the government. Because of its general relevance, we will examine 
the role of the objectives in a final section which deals with EC and WTO law 
together. 
4. The legal treatment of regulatory measures 
An economic advantage can be granted through various forms of public 
intervention. As the reader may certainly have guessed by now, one of the most 
intriguing legal problems, to which particular attention is devoted in this chapter, is 
the treatment of regulatory measures under subsidy and State aid rules. 
What can already be anticipated is that this issue cannot be given an easy, or better, 
an unequivocal answer. Regulatory measures may take various forms and legal 
provisions may be drafted in different ways. A conclusive answer cannot be 
provided before having analysed each of the provisions of the two systems and 
assessed whether the requirements provided for therein are satisfied by the form of 
regulation at issue. 
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Omission and derogation: a crucial distinction revolving around sovereignty 
Nevertheless, we can immediately dispose of one argument that is sometimes put 
forward to negate the possibility that some regulatory measures be considered as 
subsidies or State aids. 
Consider the case of two States with two different levels of regulation (one higher, 
one lower) with respect to, for example, labour or environmental standards. It is 
sometimes observed that it would be implausible to consider a country's omission to 
enact regulation as a subsidy. 60 
In the absence of measures of harmonisation at the international level, it is indeed 
within the sovereignty of each State to decide what is the standard of environmental 
or labour protection which it sees as most appropriate to its society. Accordingly, 
differences in standards (and, more generally, in how regulatory regimes are drafted) 
between various States may well affect competition, 61 but they cannot be relevant 
as such for subsidy rules. 
Where however it can be determined that the imposition of lower standards is not 
simply an omission but does in fact constitute derogation from the general policy in the 
country in favour of certain undertakings, there are no reasons why this form of 
deregulation may not be capable of being regarded as a form of subsidy. This issue, 
which revolves around the question of the limitations to sovereignty, shows an 
overlap between the public intervention and the analysis of the advantage granted thereby 
which is thoroughly analysed in the next chapter. 
60 Benitah (2001: 70). Cf also Didier (1999: note 76 to 231). 
61 OECD (2001: 27- 28) which deals with the issues of differences in regulatory regimes, in terms of 
higher/lower standards and in the choice of so-called `initial entitlements'. 
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III. The forms of governmental action covered by subsidy and 
State aid rules 
After analysing in general the forms of public intervention in the economy that may 
confer an economic advantage and the techniques to define their legal relevance, we 
may now proceed to answer the second question formulated at the beginning of this 
chapter - what action in fact constitutes a subsidy or a State aid - and examine the 
forms of governmental action covered by the two legal systems at issue. This 
analysis paves the way to the third issue on what action should be considered a 
subsidy or a State aid, which is mainly dealt with in the critical and comparative 
section of the chapter. 
We thus commence with the examination of the state of the law in the WTO. 
1. WTO law 
The analysis focuses on the legal treatment of subsidies in the GATT first and in the 
WTO afterwards. 
In so doing we concentrate on the first two techniques described above, ie the 
formulation of the definition and the rules of imputability which, for the sake of 
simplicity (mainly depending on the tight link between the two aspects in the most 
important provision under examination, Article 1.1(a) (1) SCM), are largely analysed 
together. 
Formulations of the definition of subsidy and rules of imputability 
The GATT era 
The GATT did not include any express definition of subsidy, and hence of its main 
constituent elements such as the forms of governmental action covered. It is 
known from an early Panel report that this was not considered as 'necessary nor 
feasible' and that it 'would probably be impossible to arrive at a definition that 
would at the same time include all measures that fall within the intended meaning of 
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the term in Article XVI without including others not so intended'. 
62 To be true, the 
lack of a definition depended on divergences of views. This comes out clearly from 
a report of a group of experts adopted one year earlier. Considering its interest, it is 
worth quoting it in full: 
[w]ith respect to the meaning of the word "subsidies", a large majority of the 
experts considered that it covered only subsidies granted by governments or by 
semi-governmental bodies. Three experts considered that the word should be 
interpreted in a wider sense and felt that it covered all subsidies, whatever their 
character and whatever their origin, including also subsidies granted by private 
bodies. 
Despite this divergence, however, 
it was agreed that the word "subsidies" covered not only actual payments, but 
also measures having an equivalent effect. 
The writer cannot but see an interesting resemblance between this conclusion and 
the language used by the Court of justice a few months later when it quite 
ingeniously distinguished the terms `aid' and `subsidy' saying that the former does 
not cover only positive benefits (ie subsidies) but also those forms of financial 
support that `are similar in character and have the same effect' of positive benefits'. 
63 
Returning to the GATT, some linguistic hints against a limited coverage could be 
found in various provisions which alternatively referred to 'any subsidy' (Articles 
VI: 3 and Article XVI: I GATT) or to 'any form of subsidy' (Articles XVI: 3 and 4), or 
which noted that subsidies could be granted directly or indirectly (Articles VI. 3, 
XVI: 3 and XVI: 4 GATT) or, with a particular emphasis on the effects of the 
measure, that they could affect imports or exports in a direct or indirect way (Article 
XVI. 1 GATT). 
6' Report of Panel 'Operation of the Provisions of Article XV'I', BISD 10'' Supp/201 (1962) paragraph 23. 
'3 Case 30/59 Steexkolexmijxex, page 19. See below for comment. 
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From the beginning, the consistent reading of the term subsidy has thus been quite 
extensive. The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, for instance, mentioned some 
'examples of possible forms of subsidies', encompassing 'government financing of 
commercial enterprises, including grants, loans or guarantees; government provision 
or government financed provision of utility, supply distribution and other 
operational or support services or facilities; government financing of research and 
development programmes; fiscal incentives; and government subscription to, or 
provision of, equity capital'. 64 An examination of the disputes confirms that 
various measures of assistance have been regarded as subsidies (such as direct 
payments, capital injections, loans, debt forgiveness, credit facilities, tax deferrals 
and exemptions). 
Although it was debated whether more complex regulatory mechanisms such as lax 
environmental or labour standards could also be included in the notion of subsidy, 
65 it seems that, albeit comprehensive, the concept of subsidy in the GATT was 
limited to measures involving a clear transfer of economic resources and, in the case 
of action through intermediaries, requiring a quite close involvement of the 
government. 66 This is the interpretation arguably made by an early Panel 
67 and 
confirmed prior to the Uruguay Round by the Group of Experts on the Calculation 
of the Amount of a Subsidy (a body operating under the Tokyo Round Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), which noted that 
there can be no subsidy in the absence of a financial contribution by government 
... there 
is a necessary link between a subsidy and the taxation function of 
government, exercised either directly or delegated to other, private bodies. 
68 
"Article 11.3. We can also mention a 1960 Working Party that, during the negotiations to put the provision 
of Article XVI: 4 fully into effect, reported a proposal of a quite detailed list of measures considered as export 
subsidies. Quite interestingly, it was thought it necessary to underline that'this list should not be considered 
exhaustive or to limit in any way the generality of the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article XVI'. See Report 
'Provisions of Article XVI: 4', BISD 9thSupp/185 (1961), paragraph 5. 
as Pro Bronckers & Quick (1989: 22); O'Brien (1994); contra Benitah (2001: 68). 
66 It was accordingly concluded that price support systems which are maintained by indirect methods such as 
quantitative restrictions, flexible tariffs or similar charges, would not constitute a subsidy. See Panel Report 
'Review pursuant to Article XVI: 4', BISD 9'h Supp/188 (1961) paragraph 11. 
67See Panel Report'Review pursuant to Article XVI: 4', BISD Sch Supp/188 (1961) paragraph 12. 
'8 This view was incorporated in a Note by the GATT Secretariat on'Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' 
presented during those negotiations (MTN. GNG/NG10/W/4, Section 4.1. A). It may be noted that these 
findings of both the Panel (ibid) and the Group of Experts anticipate, almost verbatim, the future wording of 
the financial contribution requirement of Article 1.1 SCM, and will play a significant role in its interpretation 
by the Panel, US - Export Restraint (see paragraph 8.71). 
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In particular, the concept of 'financial contribution', construed with reference to the 
link with the 'taxation function of the government', clearly hints at the forms 
involving a quite defined transfer of economic resources connected with the 
governmental prerogative to collect revenue and spend it. These correspond to the 
most commonly accepted forms of subsidy. On the other hand, the rule of 
imputability of the forms of indirect action shows a particularly tight degree of 
government involvement by using the term 'delegation'. 
What emerges is therefore that there was a certain agreement that only 
(clear/established) forms of financial assistance would have been covered in the 
GATT definition of subsidy with the exclusion of (more complex) forms of 
regulatory measures. 
The WTO era 
The regulation of subsidies in the WTO is included in two main instruments, the 
SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The analysis 
concentrates on two provisions which the writer considers particularly significant, 
the financial contribution requirement of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM and the form of 
export subsidy in Article 9.1(c) AoA. 
SCM Agreement 
The SCM Agreement, which constitutes the most general and important regulation 
of subsidies, has introduced for the first time a fairly sophisticated definition of 
subsidy. 
In particular, under Article 1.1(a), the action by the government may be constituted 
of two alternative elements, a financial contribution or any income or price support, which 
should confer a benefit. 
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Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM: the financial contribution requirement 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM requires that for a subsidy to exist there must be a 
financial contribution by a government or any public body. Article 1.1(a)(1) also 
includes an elaborate list of various forms of financial contribution which occur 
where: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e. g. grants, loans, 
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e. g. loan 
guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e. g. 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, 
or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payment to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs 
a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in 
(i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by 
governments. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the important questions to answer are the 
following. What are the interpretation and the role of this requirement and, in 
particular, of its fourth subparagraph? Does the financial contribution require a cost 
to government? 
We now attempt to answer the first question, leaving the issue of financing to the 
next section. 
Interpretation and function of the financial contribution 
The Appellate Body has early underlined that the financial contribution is separate 
from the benefit and that these two elements together determine whether a subsidy 
exists. 
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69 Appellate Body, Brad! - Ainaft, paragraph 157. See also Canada - Aircraft, paragraph 156. 
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The most interesting findings on the interpretation and the function of the financial 
contribution requirement can however be found in the (unappealled) report of the 
US - Export Restraints PaneL 
70 
The issue before the Panel was whether an export restraint could constitute a 
financial contribution in the form of the government-entrusted or government- 
directed provision of goods in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and (iv) of SCM. 
For the reader's convenience, the Panel considered as an export restraint 'a border 
measure that takes the form of a government law or regulation which expressly 
limits the quantity of exports or places explicit conditions on the circumstances 
under which exports are permitted, or that takes the form of a government-imposed 
fee or tax on exports of the product calculated to limit the quantity of exports. ' 71 
The core of the debate: nature v effect of governmental action 
The central argument of the United States, the defendant in Export Restraints, which 
mirrored its position with respect to the notion of subsidy during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, was based on an exclusive emphasis on the (beneficial) effects 
produced by the governmental intervention in the economy. 
An export restraint can be caught by the fourth subparagraph when its effect is to 
induce domestic producers to sell their products, in greater quantities or exclusively, 
to domestic users. In other words, when the producer of the restrained goods has 
no other practical or commercial option than to sell in the domestic market, an 
export restraint would be functionally or conceptually equivalent to an entrustment or 
direction to that producer to provide those goods in the domestic market under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM, the difference being merely semantic. In such 
circumstances, it would be as if the government had explicitly and affirmatively 
ordered those producers to do so. 
70 See, in particular, the long reasoning in paragraph 8.15 to 8.76. 
71 In so doing, the Panel followed the definition proposed by the claimant, Canada. Interestingly, the US 
proposed a broader definition, ie 'an action or an act that holds back or prevents exports' (ibid, paragraph 
8.16). 
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In response to the 'effects approach' advocated by the US, the Panel underlined that 
the determination of whether a financial contribution exists must concentrate on the 
examination of the nature of the action by the government and not on its ffectr. 
The interpretation whereby, irrespective of its nature, any governmental action 
producing a certain result would effectively amount to a financial contribution, 
would eventually mean reading the financial contribution requirement out of the 
SCM Agreement. The Panel concluded that the focus of the financial contribution 
assessment must therefore be on the government's action rather than the possible 
effects of that action on, or the reactions to it by, those affected, even if those effects 
or reactions are expected. From another perspective, it was noted that the reaction 
of private entities to given governmental measures cannot constitute the basis of 
establishing that Member's compliance with WTO law. 
The Panel then crucially found that the SCM Agreement regulates only certain 
forms of governmental action that distort or may distort international trade. 72 It is 
with this express purpose in mind that the definition of subsidy (with its three 
'gateways': financial contribution, benefit and specificity) 73 was drafted. 
Most importantly for our analysis, the function of the financial contribution 
requirement is to ensure that not all government measures that confer benefits can 
be deemed to be subsidies. As a necessary corollary of this function of limitation, 
according to the Panel, those forms should be considered as exhaustive. 
Although a different reading of the financial contribution requirement has been 
advanced, 74 the construction made by the US - Export Restraints Panel seems to be 
correct. 
72 This would significantly be in line with the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement. See in particular 
Panel, Canada - Ain. -raft, paragraph 9.119; Panel, Bra1- Aircraft, paragraph 
7.26. 
73 Strictly speaking, the specificity test is not part of the definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement. See 
Articles 1.2 and 2.1 SCM. 
74 McGovern (1994: 11.31-3) shows that, whereas, on the one hand, the four modes of subsidy under point 
(a)(1) are introduced by the phrase 'i. e. where' (thus suggesting the exclusiveness of the list), on the other 
hand, point (a)(1)(iv) refers to the 'functions illustrated in (t) to (iii) above (thus indicating the contrary). The 
author concludes by noting that 'it would be unfortunate if they were found to constitute a comprehensive 
definition'. We believe that the function of limitation of the financial contribution requirement is particularly 
dear from the introducing phrase 'i. e where'. In our view, the conflicting term 'illustrated' is just a remnant of 
the very first draft of the provision which was introduced by'such as where'. Whereas the latter was 
subsequently replaced by 'ie' and eventually by the final form 'ie where', in our view the former term remained 
untouched due to a clear oversight. 
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The limiting role of the financial contribution element has been substantially 
confirmed by the following jurisprudence. After underlining that 'Article 1.1(a)(1) 
makes clear that a "financial contribution" by a government or public body is an 
essential component of a "subsidy"', 
75 the Appellate Body has recognised that 
'paragraphs (i) through (iv) of Article 1.1(a) (1) set forth the situations where there is a 
financial contribution by a government or public body'. 76 Consequently, 'not all 
government measures capable of conferring benefits would necessarily fall within 
Article 1.1(a)' as, otherwise, there would be no need for the financial contribution 
'because all government measures conferring benefits, per se, would be subsidies'. 77 
In the light of the previous construction of the financial contribution element, the 
function of the fourth subparagraph is not to encompass forms of action other than 
those provided in subparagraphs (i) to (iii), and consequently to enlarge the coverage 
of the definition of subsidy, but rather to avoid circumvention of those 
subparagraphs by a government simply acting through a private body (or, indeed, 
through a funding mechanism). 78 Using a particularly illuminating expression, the 
Panel noted that that provision has to do with the identity of the actor and not with 
the nature of the actions covered by the financial contribution requirement. 
It may finally be noted that, according to the Panel, all forms of financial 
contribution involve a clear transfer of economic resources in the form of a transfer 
of something of value, either money, goods or services, from the government or an 
intermediary to a private entity. Crucially, as a consequence of the function of 
limitation of the financial contribution, we should note that the converse is not 
necessarily true, that is not all transfer of economic resources constitute a financial 
contribution under the SCM Agreement. 
Further, a restrictive, albeit not necessarily an 'exclusive', approach seems to be confirmed by the coda to 
subparagraph (iv) which makes it clear that the conduct of the intermediary 'would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments'. 
75 Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 107 (emphasis added). 
76 Ibid, paragraph 108 (emphasis added). 
"Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 114 building on its finding in US - Softwood Lumber !I', note 35 to 
paragraph 52. See also Panel, EC - DRAMS, paragraph 7.58. 
7e This anti-circumvention function has been confirmed by the Appellate Body. See US - DRAftIS, paragraph 
113; US - Softwood L+cmbtr II, paragraph 52. 
79 
The rules of imputability of the fourth subparagraph of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCH I 
Subparagraph iv) between restrictiveness and expansiveness 
The reader has certainly noticed the inherent - and intriguing - tension between two 
findings. On the one hand, the restrictiveness of the conclusion that subparagraph (iv) 
cannot extend the coverage of the financial contribution - which is just a corollary 
of the general finding that the function of the financial contribution requirement is to 
limit the forms of governmental action regulated thereunder. 
On the other hand, the natural expansiveness of any mechanism to counter 
circumvention - which has been recognised as the true function of subparagraph (iv). 
What is crucial, then, is to find an appropriate balance between these two objectives, 
a point of equilibrium between these two conflicting forces. 
Any legal norm is subject to interpretation. As such, any legal provision is very 
much comparable to a valve that controls the passage of a given substance. As the 
exposition of the various interpretations made by dispute settlement organs will 
show, this is particularly true for the rules of imputability under the fourth 
subparagraph. Depending on which of the two objectives indicated above prevail 
(limited coverage v anti-circumvention of the financial contribution), more or less 
courses of conduct will 'pass' through the valve, thus enlarging or restricting the 
scope of the financial contribution requirement and, consequently, of the definition 
of subsidy. 
Our proposition is that, according to the prevailing canons of interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention, the balance between the two tendencies described above has 
mainly to emerge from - and be consistent with - the text of the financial 
contribution requirement itself. 
The quest for a balance: the development of the law 
What we see with respect to the financial contribution through a private party can 
appropriately be viewed as a quest for a balance between the two opposing trends 
indicated above. We commence with an examination of the development of the law 
with respect to the relevant rules of imputability. 
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In US - Export Restraints, the US were substantially claiming that the key factor in the 
interpretation of the terms 'entrust' and 'direct' was the proximity of the causal 
relationship between the action by the government and the conduct of the private 
body (an export restraint would thus fulfil the required 'direction' when the 
producer of the restrained goods has no other choice but to sell in the domestic 
market). 
In its disagreement, the Panel gave a restrictive interpretation of those two terms. 
The ordinary meanings of the concepts of 'entrust' and 'direct' necessarily conveyed 
an idea of 'explicit and affirmative action [of] delegation or command'. 79 
A first step towards a more liberal interpretation can be found in the recent US - 
DRAMS, Korea - Commercial Vessels and EC - DRAMS Panels (for simplicity, 
hereinafter referred to as 'the Panels'). While they agreed that the terms 'entrust' and 
'direct' must respectively contain an element of delegation or command, and that 
they should invariably take the form of an affirmative act, they disagreed as to 
whether they necessarily need to be explicit insofar as they could be 'explicit or 
implicit, informal or formal'. 80 
Finally, most recently, in the US - DRAMS dispute the Appellate Body made a 
significant step further by rejecting that the concepts of entrustment and direction 
be limited to the notions of delegation or command. 
On the one hand, the concept of entrustment would generally be connoted by an 
action of giving responsibility to someone for a task or an object. This interpretation is 
not limited to acts of delegation, either formal or informal, as there may be other 
means, be they formal or informal, that governments could employ to give 
responsibility to carry out one of the functions listed in paragraphs (i) to (iii) of 
Article 1.1(a) (1) SCM. 81 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body found that the notion of direction is 
connected with the exercise of governmental authority over a private body. A command 
is certainly one way which a government can use to exercise such authority, but, 
79 Panel, US - Export Restraints, paragraphs 8.29-8.30. 
80 Panel, US - DRAMS, paragraph 7.33; Panel, 
EC - DRAMS, paragraph 7.57; Panel, Kona - Commenia! 
Vessels, paragraph 7.470. 
81 Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 110. 
81 
most significantly, there are equally other means which may be used, some of which 
are more subtle or may not involve the same degree of compulsion. 82 
The quest for a balance: analysis of the law 
After exposing the state of the law, we may now attempt to explain these 
interpretations in the light of the observations that have been made with respect to 
the two conflicting objectives within the financial contribution element, and the 
need to strike an appropriate balance between them. 
The main concern, and hence the focus, of the US - Export Restraints Panel was to 
show that the financial contribution requirement only covers certain forms of public 
intervention. It is against this background that the admittedly strict interpretation of 
the tests of imputability under subparagraph four (which would require the 
explicitness of the action) can be properly understood. 
In the following cases, we notice a shift in emphasis. The role of delimitation of the 
financial contribution was not an issue. 83 What we have is the attempt to give an 
effective interpretation to the anti-circumvention device of the fourth subparagraph. 
Thus the Panels underlined that to require that the action of delegation and 
command be always explicit would undermine the utility of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) as it 
would enable governments to circumvent their commitments. 84 In US - DRAMS, 
the Appellate Body searched the essence of the terms 'entrustment' and 'direction' 
which it found in the broad concepts of conferral of responsibility to or exercise of 
authority over somebody. In so doing, it eventually rejected the assimilation with 
the notions of delegation and command. 
This final outcome (entrustment and direction are respectively different from 
delegation and command), however, raises some concerns. 
82 Ibid, paragraph 111. As regards the complexity of the act of entrustment or direction, it may also be noted 
that, unlike all previous dispute settlement organs, the Appellate Body did not request that the action of the 
government be affirmative. 
83 Cf Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 114; US - Slamber IV, note 35 to paragraph 52; Panel EC - 
DRAMS, paragraph 7.58 
84 Panel, US - DRAMS, note 50 to paragraph 7.33, Panel, Kona Commercial I 'eijels, footnote 209 to paragraph 
7.370; Panel EC - DRAMS, footnote 65 to paragraph 7.57. 
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This may well be illustrated by the analysis of the Appellate Body's construction of 
the term 'direct' (a similar exercise could be entertained with the interpretation of 
'entrust'). 
Using the traditional approach, the writer commences with the ordinary meaning of 
the word set in its immediate context. In particular, the choice of the appropriate 
meaning of 'direct' would be significantly influenced by the syntax of the phrase 
'direct a private body to carry out'. Thus, in our view, to direct somebody to do 
something cannot but mean to order him or her to do something. 85 The 
examination of the meanings of the corresponding verbs in the French and Spanish 
versions (respectively 'ordonner' and 'ordenar'), when inserted in similar structures 
('ordonner a quelq'un de faire quelque chose'; 'ordenar a alguien que lleve a cabo 
algo'), 86 would confirm the conclusion that the phrase at issue refers to an 'order to 
somebody to do something'. 87 
The textual interpretation of 'direct' thus refers to a course of conduct, which might 
well be 'explicit or implicit, informal or formal' as it was found by the Panels, but 
which is necessarily characterised by a well defined - and rather marked - degree of direction 
and compulsion in the governmental action. 
Crucially, this interpretation sits uneasily with the conclusion of the Appellate Body 
that a command is not necessary and that even forms of action that are more subtle or that 
not involve the same degree of compulsion are covered. 
88 
We are aware that legal interpretation does not exclusively depend on grammatical 
analysis. The already underlined importance of the textual approach in the WTO 
however requires that the letter of the law should not be emptied. 
85 For a similar reading cf Panel, US - Export Restraints, paragraph 8.28. 
86 See Diecionario de !a kngua e paiola e Nouveau Petit Robert. 
87 It may be recalled that, according to Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention, '[t]he terms of the treaty are 
presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text'. 
118 It is worth noting that the Appellate Body too started its analysis from similar dictionary meanings of to 
'direct' ('give authoritative instructions to' and 'order (a person) to do'). 
Although, probably, envisaging two different forms of conduct, the Appellate Body itself seems to have 
recognised that the degree of compulsion required by the term 'direct' is the same of the term'mandate' 
(which undoubtedly means 'command' or 'order'). This finding was made in the context of the interpretation 
of the phrase 'governmental action' in Article 9.1(c) AoA. See Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 -New Zealand and 
US II), paragraph 128: 'Article 9.1(c) does not require that payments be financed by virtue of government 
'mandate', or other 'direction'. Although the word 'action' certainly covers situations where government 
mandates or directs that payments be made, it also covers other situations where no such compulsion is 
involved' (emphasis in the original). 
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An excessively extensive interpretation of subparagraph iv) inevitably risks 
expanding too much the scope of the financial contribution requirement and thus 
endangering the balance between its two consolidated functions of limitation and 
anti-circumvention. We have already suggested that if a balance between two 
conflicting objectives has to be struck, this has to be consistent with the letter of the 
law. In this regard, it is interesting to compare for a moment the Appellate Body's 
construction with the reading made by the Panels. There is no doubt that the latter 
is textually more correct and is hence more successful in achieving an appropriate 
balance. 
Interestingly, the Appellate Body concludes its reasoning by underlining that its 
interpretation is in line with the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement, which, 
using its words, 'reflects a delicate balance' between those Members that sought 
more discipline on the use of subsidies and those that sought more discipline on the 
application of countervailing measures. 89 This general statement is certainly 
correct, and will be quite useful for our analysis, in particular when we attempt to 
make some conclusive remarks on the coherency of the definition of subsidy in the 
WTO. Nevertheless, it does not address our more specific concerns about the 
(different) balance between the two conflicting objectives of limitation and anti- 
circumvention that have emerged from the analysis of the financial contribution, 
concerns that are also motivated by the need to fully respect the text and hence the 
object and purpose of the SCM Agreement. 
Even assuming, for the sake of the analysis, that the Appellate Body's novel 
interpretation of the term 'direct' is correct, we are not left with a clear guidance on 
the applicable standard. The Appellate Body itself recognises that difficulty when it 
hastens to add that the relevant determination 'will hinge on the particular facts of 
the case'. 90 
The fact remains that the actual meaning and impact of the general finding that the 
concept of direction refers to situations where the government exercises its 
authority over a private body on the more specific finding that this may be more 
89 Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 115. 
90 Appellate Body, US - DRAMS, paragraph 116. 
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subtle than a command and does not necessarily involve the same degree of 
compulsion is still difficult to capture. 
With an express reference to the nature of the form of intervention, the . 'appellate 
Body has emphatically ruled out that the interpretation of paragraph (iv) can be so 
broad as to cover measures whereby governments merely exercise their 'general 
regulatory powers'. 91 In our view, it is however still an open question whether, on 
the basis of the more liberal interpretation of the term 'direct' (and the same could 
equally be said for the term 'entrust'), quite complex regulatory mechanisms, such as 
those involving lax labour or environmental standards or import and export 
restraints, could now fall - at least under certain circumstances - within the scope of 
the provision. 92 
Finally, it cannot pass unnoticed that, despite the Appellate Body's stated intention, 
the proposed liberal interpretation has the potential to weaken the finding that the 
financial contribution focuses on the nature and not on the effects of the action of the 
government. The more we leave clear notions such as command, moving towards 
more subtle and less intense courses of action, the more there is a risk that the 
financial contribution be defined on the basis of the circumstances of the case and the 
behaviour of third parties. 93 
Brief parallel with the other form of action (payments to funding mechanism) 
We may finally say a few words on the other form of action provided for under the 
fourth subparagraph of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM where 'a government makes payments 
to a funding mechanism'. 
91 Ibid, paragraph 115. 
92 We leave aside other possible obstacles to the inclusion in the financial contribution requirement. In some 
cases, for example when the government f4 exempts the undertakings concerned from any environmental 
requirement, it may be difficult to identify a clear transfer of economic resources from the suppliers of 
environmental devices or services and consequently to determine which form of financial assistance is at issue 
(provision of goods? transfer of funds? ). In other cases, such as in the case of labour standards, it can reallN- 
be disputed that by its own nature the measure cannot be performed by a government (government cannot 
be employed and provide employment sen er) and, as such, cannot be covered b) paragraph (iv). 
9' Citing the US - Export Restraints Panel, the Appellate Body confirmed that entrustment and direction cannot 
cover'the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may not 
have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the exercise of free choice by the 
actors of the market'. Government entrustment or direction 'cannot be inadvertent or mere by-product of 
governmental regulation' (CIS - DRAMS, paragraph 114). 
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The meaning of the two terms 'funding' and 'mechanism' is rather apparent and 
does not need much clarification. The provision refers to those cases where the 
government makes payments to a system that is established to transfer financial resources 
to entitled categories. 94 
It has been said that the two forms of indirect action under the fourth subparagraph 
'are aimed at capturing equivalent government actions'. 95 
The correctness of this assimilation is however put into question by the recent 
interpretation of the term 'entrust' in the other form of indirect action which, 
according to the Appellate Body, would not necessarily refer to an act of delegation. 
If this is correct, the financial contribution through a funding mechanism would 
arguably be characterised by a more direct and intense course of action than the 
entrustment of a private body to carry out a financial contribution. The government 
makes a payment to a funding mechanism which - unlike any other private body - is 
there exclusively to finance somebody, and hence any payment received from the 
government should almost automatically be used for such mission. 
Conclusions 
The concept of financial contribution as formulated by the SCM Agreement, and as 
interpreted by the dispute settlement organs, seems to partly depart from the notion 
of subsidy that can be derived from the GATT. 
Although the financial contribution generally seems to refer to well-defined and 
commonly agreed forms of governmental action involving a clear transfer of 
economic resources, the most recent Appellate Body findings on the standards of 
imputability in the case of indirect action have created a bit of uncertainty raising the 
question of whether also more complex regulatory mechanisms, which have so far 
been excluded, could now be covered. 
96 
94 It is interesting to mention the very similar wording used by the GATT Panel Report'Review pursuant to 
Article XVI', in BISD, 9th Supp/188 (1961) paragraph 12. 
95 Panel, US - Export Rufradau, paragraph 8.32.. 
' The previous, consistent interpretation was that the financial contribution requirement would preclude 
regulatory measures from being covered. See Benitah (2001: 68-74); Jackson (1997: 296); Beviglia-Zampetti 
(1996: 28). A dissenting view, under GATT rules, is provided by O'Brien (1994) and Bronckers and Quick 
(1989). 
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It has been suggested that the concepts of 'direction' and 'entrustment' in 
subparagraph (iv) should be construed so that the action of the government should 
involve a marked degree of direction and compulsion. This interpretation, which is 
the most consistent with the text of the financial contribution requirement and is 
thus capable of striking an appropriate balance between its functions of limitation 
and anti-circumvention, would limit the possibility of extending the scope of the 
provision to more complex courses of action. 
Article 1.1(a)(2)SCM. " any income or price support - an additional concept in 
search for an expansive reading 
According to Article 1.1(a)(2), a subsidy shall be deemed to exist when there is 'any 
form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994'. 
Income and price supports are forms of government intervention aimed at 
sustaining the income of a certain category or at maintaining the price of a certain 
commodity at a given, usually a minimum, desired level. 97 
Before analysing the actual scope of Article 1.1(a)(2), in terms of forms of action 
covered and rules of imputability, we should immediately underline that, to do 
justice to its separate mention and hence to its utility, this provision should naturally 
regulate measures different from those considered as financial contribution under 
Article 1.1(a)(1). This has also been expressly confirmed by the Appellate Body 
when, after setting forth the 'financial contribution' and the various forms of 
government action disciplined in the four subparagraphs of Article 1.1(a)(1), it 
noted that '[t]his range of government measures capable of providing subsidies is 
broadened still further by the concept of "income or price support" in paragraph (2) of 
Article 1.1(a)'. 98 
97 This formulation largely corresponds to the entries 'income support' and 'price support' that can be found 
in the Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 225 and 336). The phrase 'in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994' means that the measure must operate to increase exports of the product benefiting from the 
subsidy or decrease the imports of competing products. In our -view, this refers to the effea of the subsidy, 
that is to the strengthening of the beneficiary of the subsidy and, ultimately, to the consequent increase of its 
exports or decrease of its competitors' imports. 
98 US - Softwood Lw caber IV, paragraph 
52 (emphasis added). 
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Having said that, what is really interesting is the definition of the actual scope of the 
expression 'any income or price support'. In this regard, it may be useful to draw a 
parallel with our previous findings on the financial contribution. 
One reading would indicate a quite restrictive coverage. An early GATT Panel 
focused on price-support schemes and 'discussed the circumstances under which a 
system which fixes domestic prices to producers at above the world price level 
might be considered a subsidy in the meaning of Article XVI'. 99 The Panel 
emphasised that there could be cases in which a government maintained a fixed 
price without resort to a subsidy, ie without a loss to the government. One example 
would be the case of a minimum price fixed by law 'which is maintained by 
quantitative restrictions or flexible tariff or similar charges'. 
What is interesting to note is that one of those cases where 'a government 
maintained a fixed price above the world price without resort to a subsidy' was 
considered by the Panel in US - Export Restraints. That Panel noted that the support 
of the price of a commodity by imposing high tariffs on imports would not 
constitute subsidies within the meaning of Article 1. In particular, it is doubtful 
whether the `concept of financial contribution contained in Article 1.1(a)[1] of the 
SCM Agreement seeks to bring such government action within the ambit of the 
SCM Agreement'. 100 
Now, the comparison between the findings of the GATT Panel and the US - Export 
Restraints Panel seems to highlight a high degree of similarity with respect to the 
degree of government involvement required by the criteria of financial contribution 
and of income or price support. In other words, it would seem that, although 
producing a transfer of economic resources, complex regulatory mechanisms 
involving border measures, such as tariffs and export restraints, cannot be caught 
within the scope of either provision. 
" Panel Report based on a review pursuant to Article XV'I: 4, BISD Sch Supp (1961), 188, at paragraph 11. 
100 Panel Report, US - Ex4or! Restraints, paragraph 8.38. It may be useful to recall that, in that dispute, the 
Panel was actually analysing whether, an export restraint, a practice similar to a tariff but with complementary 
effects (by limiting exports, export restraints increase the quantity of goods produced domestically and 
decreases its price; by limiting imports, tariffs decrease competitive pressure from outside the domestic 
market and hence contribute to maintain a certain price level), was covered by subparagraph (iii) read in 
conjunction with subparagraph (v). 
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There are however various indications in support of a more expansive reading of 
Article 1.1(2)(a) SCM. They are partly based on a textual interpretation of the 
provision, and partly based on a trend made evident by the recent jurisprudence on 
the definition of the public intervention. 
On the one hand, unlike the financial contribution requirement, the phrase 'any 
income or price support' is not limited to specific forms of governmental action. 
On the contrary, its general wording is capable of encompassing various forms of 
public intervention that may be deployed to execute any income or price support. 
Further, there is no express qualification of the standard of government 
involvement required. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that that phrase could 
catch also more complex regulatory measures that would not constitute a financial 
contribution. 
On the other hand, we can draw inspiration from some recent findings on the more 
sophisticated language of the financial contribution requirement. Leaving aside for 
the moment the issue of the loss to government, which the GATT Panel required 
for price support schemes (and which, as we will see, is probably not good law 
anymore) it is interesting to focus on the recent relaxation of the rules of 
imputability of the financial contribution by the Appellate Body in US - DRAMS. 
This interpretation has already been extensively examined (and criticised) because it 
does not completely fit with the text of subparagraph iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM. 
Irrespective of its (in)correctness, it is however interesting to appreciate in the 
context of our analysis the more liberal approach towards the degree of government 
involvement requested. This is particularly so if this approach is more liberal than 
that of the US - Export Restraints Panel which we 
have found to be rather similar to 
the early GATT interpretation of price support schemes. 
The conclusion may be that, according to various indicators, the tide might be 
changing. With its potentially broad language, the phrase 'any income or price 
support' may well include complex regulatory measures, such as those involving 
border measures, which were originally considered not to be covered (and which, 
arguably, still remain outside the scope of the financial contribution requirement). 
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AoA 
AoA and SCMAgreement: about definitions and relationships 
In the context of our current analysis, the most striking difference between the AoA 
and the SCM Agreement is that the former does not include any definition of 
subsidy. 
Some direction can however be found if we consider the relationship between the 
two agreements. 
As has been made evident by some recent disputes, particularly EC - Sugar and US 
-Cotton, the relationship between AoA and SCM Agreement is particularly complex. 
To some extent it can certainly be described as one between ! ex specialis on the one 
hand and lex generalis on the other. The SCM Agreement, which applies to any 
sector of the economy (except for services and agriculture), would thus represent 
the general discipline of subsidies. Its generality is arguably reflected in the primary 
provisions, of which the best example is that of basic definitions. In other words, 
whereas there may well be differences between the SCM and other instruments or 
provisions regulating subsidies (which determine the latter's . speciality), 
it may be 
argued that these seem to concern mainly the actual discipline rather than the most 
fundamental provisions such as those defining basic concepts. 
However, things are more complex, in particular because of the various references, 
or cross-references, between the two instruments. Looking at the SCM, for 
example, apart from Article 3 (which generally reads `except as provided by the 
AoA': along the same line, but with a more general language, see Article 21.1 AoA), 
other provisions such as Articles 5,6 and 7 expressly referred to the application of 
Article 13 AoA, the so-called `peace-clause', which, for a few years, somewhat 
protected subsidies otherwise in compliance with the requirements of the AoA from 
the application of the SCM disciplines. The peace-clause itself, in the writer's view, 
was evidence of a relationship of `ancillarity' of the AoA towards the SCM. Now 
that its shelter is gone, probably the relationship between the two agreements will be 
clearer. Article 21.1 AoA, with its general wording which seems to confirm the 
`speciality' of the AoA's discipline, is however still there. 
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The previous statements, and doubts, find some confirmation in the case-law. 
Under certain circumstances (and, in particular, when defining the notion of 
`subsidy'), it may be appropriate to look at the SCM for contextual guidance when 
interpreting the AoA. The Appellate Body itself interpreted the term `subsidy' b)- 
drawing, as context, upon the definition of subsidy - and in particular both elements 
of financial contribution and benefit - in Article 1.1 SCM. It accordingly observed 
that a subsidy involves a transfer of economic resources from the grantor to the 
recipient for less than full consideration. 101 
Further, according to the Appellate Body itself in US - Cotton, since these two 
instruments are `integral parts of the same treaty [the WTO Agreement]', they 
should be read harmoniously. 102 EC - Sugar was somewhat more complicated than 
Cotton because what was at issue there was not the alternative but rather the cumulative 
application of the two agreements. 103 Many issues of relationship therefore remain 
open. 
Having said that, we should highlight that the absence of a definition of subsidy 
does not mean that the provisions of the AoA are completely irrelevant for 
definitional purposes. In fact various provisions offer valuable indications with respect 
to the forms of public intervention covered under that agreement and hence to their 
characteristic elements. 
Article 9.1 AoA 
This is, for example, the case of Article 9 AoA which encloses a list of export 
subsidies concerning scheduled products which are subject to reduction 
commitments. In these provisions the legislator has usefully described many 
features of the forms of governmental action covered. 
Leaving aside for the moment Article 9.1(c), we may make some brief remarks on 
the forms covered by these provisions and highlight their specificity. Either because 
of their formulation or because their anchorage to the definition of financial 
10 Canada - Dairy, paragraph 87; US - FSC, paragraph 136. 
102 US - Cotton, paragraph 549. 
10; See paragraph 339: `the question of applicability of the SCM Agreement to export subsidies causes a 
number of complex issues'. 
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contribution of Article 1.1 SCM, all those provisions seem to encompass measures 
of financial assistance featuring a clear transfer of economic resources. Depending 
on the formulation of the provision, they may involve only a direct or also an 
indirect course of action. Most interestingly, with respect to the cases of indirect 
conduct, the relevant rules of imputability seems to involve different degrees of 
intensity (from the more demanding one embodied in the term 'mandate' in 
subparagraph e) 104 to the potentially more comprehensive one expressed by the 
word 'provide' in subparagraph d)). 105 
Domestic support 
Analogously, the examination of the discipline of domestic support measures offers 
some indications with respect to the characteristics of the forms of action that are 
regulated as domestic subsidies. 
106 
For example, it seems that most of the measures of domestic support involve a 
transfer of economic resources. 107 It is moreover clear that, at least in some cases, 
domestic support may also be granted indirectly. 
An interesting issue concerning indirect action is whether also less immediate 
actions of support, such as those carried out through border measures (think of the 
case of export restraints) can be covered. 
The AoA distinguishes between import quotas and other non-tariff border measures 
on the one hand and forms of domestic support, including income and price 
104 Subparagraph e) regulates internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or 
mandated by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. It may be noted that the 
verb'to mandate' is particularly clear (it means'to command' or'to order'; see Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (2002: vol I, 1688) and, consequently, cannot raise the sort of interpretative doubts that we have 
seen with respect to the verb 'direct' in Article 1.1(a)iv) SCM. 
tos Subparagraph d) refers to the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of 
agricultural products and the costs of international transport and freight. The verb 'provide' features 'to make 
available' among its various meanings (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2002: vol II, 2382) 
106 We may safely assume that the term 'support' is very similar in meaning to'subsidy'. Even a quick scan 
through the various meanings of the verbs 'to support' and 'to subsidise' shows a great deal of similarity: see 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2002: vol. II, 3090 and 3119). After a comprehensive analysis of the 
AoA, the CTS - Cottony Panel has explained that'all relevant types of support for the purposes of the Agreement 
ON Agriculture are subsidies' (see paragraphs 7.420 to 7.423). The equation support-subsidy is especially evident 
from Annex 3 to the AoA, on the methodology to calculate aggregate measurement of support, and in 
particular at paragraphs I and 2 thereof. 
107 See, for example, Articles 6 and Annexes 2,3 and 4. 
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support measures, on the other. 108 While the former are treated under the 'market 
access' chapter and assimilated to tariffs, the latter are subject to a different 
regulation. 109 Article 4 on 'Market Access' provides that Members shall not 
maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required 
to be converted into ordinary customs duties. These measures include various 
examples of border measures. 110 
The Appellate Body has made it clear that these measures should have been 
converted into ordinary customs duties before the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement and thus subject to the same mechanism of liberalisation constituted of 
bindings and reductions. III Crucially, if they have not been converted, they could 
not be maintained and, hence, they should be regarded as prohibited. 112 Now, the 
important issue is whether border measures, which have not been converted into 
tariffs and are thus prohibited under Article 4, could be regarded as measures of 
domestic support. 
We will now concentrate on the form of subsidy under subparagraph (c) of Article 
9.1 AoA, concentrating in particular on its interesting rule of imputability. 
The rule ofimputability in Article 9.1(c) AoA 
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture subjects to reduction commitments 
'payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved'. 
This provision is particularly interesting for its rule of imputability, and in particular 
for the phrase 'financed by virtue of governmental action', which the Appellate 
Body thoroughly analysed in the three stages of the Canada - Dairy dispute. 
In the original proceedings, governmental agencies played a crucial role at every 
stage of the supply of cheaper milk with the result that there was no difficulty in 
108 As seen, export subsidies are regulated in a separate part (V) of the AoA. 
109 The Agreement on Agriculture provides for reduction commitments of domestic support measures. 
110 A footnote mentions 'quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, 
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, voluntary 
export restraints and other similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties' 
Cf Appellate Body, Chile - Pnee Band Syrtem, paragraphs 206 and 207. 
112 Cf ibid, paragraph 207. 
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concluding that the payment took place 'by virtue of governmental action'. After a 
substantial deregulation of the market for export milk, the regulatory framework 
under examination in the two Article 21.5 DSU proceedings was more elusive. The 
Appellate Body had thus the opportunity to concentrate more extensively on the 
various elements of the standard of imputability. 
The phrase 'governmental action' is 'somewhat open-ended, perhaps even abstract', 
with the result that that provision 'extends, in principle, to any governmental action 
whereby the government 'regulate', 'control' or 'supervise' individuals. 113 On its 
part, the word 'finance' refers 'generally to the mechanism or process by which 
financial resources are provided to enable "payments" to be made'. 
What is crucial in the definition of the standard of imputability is the determination 
of the nexus between the governmental action and financing which is indicated by 
the phrase 'by virtue of. This would require that 
there must be a demonstrable link between the governmental action at issue and the 
financing of the payments, whereby the payments are, in some way, financed as a 
result of, or as a consequence of, the governmental action. 
114 
The Appellate Body underlined that 'it is extremely difficult ... to 
define in the 
abstract the precise character of the required link between the governmental action 
and the financing of the payments'. 
115 It then noted: 
[g]overnments are constantly engaged in regulation of different kinds in pursuit 
of a variety of objectives. For instance, we can envisage that governmental action 
might establish a regulatory framework merely enabling a third person freely to 
make and finance 'payments'. In this situation, the link between the 
governmental action and the financing of the payments is too tenuous for the 
'payments' to be regarded as 'financed' by virtue of governmental action' 
(emphasis added) within the meaning of Article 9.1(c). Rather, there must be a 
tighter nexus between the mechanism or process by which the payments are 
financed, even if by a third person, and governmental action. In our opinion, the 
It 3 Canada - Dairy, (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and 
US II), paragraphs 129 and 131; Canada - Dairy (Arr k 21.5 - 
New Zealand and US), paragraph 112. 
114 Canada - Dairy (ArAirk 21.5 - 
New Zealand and US), paragraph. 113. 
1Is Ibid, paragraph 115. 
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existence of such a demonstrable link must be identified on a case-by-case basis, 
taking account of the particular governmental action at issue and its effects on 
payments made by a third person. 
116 
Most importantly, according to the Appellate Body, the existence of a 'demonstrable 
link' does not necessarily require the exercise of compulsion. Article 9.1(c) 'does not 
require that payments be financed by virtue of government 'mandate, or other 
'direction'. Although the word 'action' certainly covers situations where government 
mandates or directs that payments be made, it also covers other situations where no 
such compulsion is involved'. 117 In this regard, the first Article 21.5 DSU review 
Panel noted that 'by virtue of does not refer only to those cases where obedience is 
'enforced' but also those where action is simply 'influenced' as 'in both instances the 
result would not occur but for the power to enforce or influence'. In other words, 
'whether the government "forces" or merely "encourages" producers to sell into the 
commercial export market are qualifications of the causal relationship required under 
Article 9.1(c)'. 118 
A parallel between the rules of imputability in Article 9.1(c) AoA and Article 1.1(a)(iv) SCM 
We may now attempt to draw a parallel between Article 9.1(c) AoA and that under 
Article 1 . 1(a) (iv) 
SCM. 
It may be immediately noted that the two provisions have a different approach with 
respect to the forms of governmental action that are covered. In both systems it is 
necessary to have a transfer of economic resources. Whereas, however, the financial 
contribution element under Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM encompasses only certain forms 
of governmental action, Article 9.1(c) AoA in principle extends to any governmental 
action (the only notable qualification being that we are dealing with export subsidies). 
The analysis becomes particularly interesting if we concentrate on the rules of 
imputability under those provisions. 
116 Ibid. See also Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and CIS II), paragraph 134. 
117 Canada - Dairy (Artcle 21.5 - New Zealand and 
CIS II), paragraph 128 (emphasis in the original). 
118 Canada - Dairy Prodacts (Article 21.5 - New 
Zealand and CIS), paragraphs 6.35 and 6.44 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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If we look at the findings of the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body we find 
contradictory indications. 
On the one side, it is said that neither provision requires a high degree of 
compulsion, in the form of, respectively, a 'mandate' or 'direction', 119 or 'delegation' 
or 'command'. 120 The same reports, however, provide in the small print of the 
footnotes conflicting indications when expressly comparing the rule of imputability 
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM and that under Article 9.1(c) AoA. Whereas in the 
second implementation report in Canada - Dairy, Article 9.1(c) AoA has been 
'contrasted' to Article 1.1 (a) (1) (iv) SCM to explain that the former does not require a 
standard of attributability as high as that of the latter, 121 in US - DRAMS the 
Appellate Body interpreted Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) by making an express reference to 
Article 9.1(c) thus suggesting that, in its view, the two standards of imputability are 
substantially comparable. 122 
A closer scrutiny seems to show that the two standards of imputability do not have 
the same scope. 
We have highlighted that the relaxed interpretation of the Appellate Body of the 
term 'direct' still leaves a great deal of uncertainty and suggested that, to avoid that 
the letter of the law is emptied, it is still necessary to require a well-defined degree of 
direction and compulsion. 
That is not necessarily the case with respect to the phrase 'financed by virtue of 
governmental action'. Although it is not easy to define the required 'demonstrable 
link' with certainty, it seems clear that it is broader than that of the SCM provision 
both in terms of i) complexity of the causal nexus (encompassing even less direct 
actions) and of ii) intensity of the action (including also actions of encouragement). 
123 
Further, comparing the two standards of imputability, we somewhat see the passage 
from a more formalistic approach, whereby only certain, well-defined, forms of action 
119 Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US 11), paragraph 128. 
120 US - DRAMS, paragraphs 110 and 111. 
121 Footnote 113 to paragraph 128. 
122 Footnote 184 to paragraph 114. 
123 In the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(v) SCM, the Appellate Body made it clear that mere policy 
pronouncements and mere acts of encouragement cannot be enough (US - DRAMS, paragraph 114). 
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are relevant, to a more sophisticated one, where what matters is not the classification of 
the form of intervention but rather a more comprehensive analysis of its impact in 
the context of the circumstances of the case (including the behaviour - or reaction - 
of the affected parties). 
Abstract rules of imputability: the definitions of government agency and 
public body 
The definitions of government agency under Article 9.1(a) AoA and of public body 
under Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM are two good illustrations of a particular technique to 
determine whether the conduct of a public entity is imputable to the government. 
Article 9.1(a) AoA subjects to reduction commitments export subsidies that consist 
of 'the provision by governments and their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind'. 
The Appellate Body noted that 
[t]he essence of "government" is ... that it enjoys the effective power to "regulate", "control" or "supervise" individuals, or otherwise "restrain" their 
conduct, through the exercise of lawful authority. This meaning is derived, in 
part, from the functions performed by a government and, in part, from the 
government having the powers to perform those functions 
The Appellate Body then turned to the notion of 'government agency' and found 
that it referred to 'an entity which exercises powers vested in it by a "government" 
for the purpose of performing functions of a "governmental" character'. 
124 The 
key elements were therefore the delegation by the government of powers and the 
performance of functions of governmental character. By contrast, the fact that the 
agency enjoyed a certain degree of discretion in the exercise of its duties and that it 
was composed, completely or partially, of individuals representing production 
sectors was not relevant. 
124 Canada - Dairy, paragraph 97. 
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The most important indication of Canada - Dairy is that the operation of the rule of 
imputability underlying the action through governmental agencies seems to simply - 
rely on the classification of the body as 'government agency'. In this process, the 
degree of influence of the government is certainly considered but at a rather general 
and abstract level with the result that the standard of imputability is rather strict. In a 
word, once a given body is found to be a 'governmental agency', virtually every 
instance of its conduct is caught by the discipline. 
Interestingly, the phrase 'financial contribution by a government or any public body' 
in the chapeau of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM can be read in a similar fashion. 
The SCM Agreement provides for a clear distinction between 'public' and 'private 
bodies'. This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1) 
SCM as different parts of the provision, and in principle different rules of 
imputability, may be applicable. The US - Export Restraints Panel has indicated that 
any entity that is neither a government nor a public body would be a private body. 
125 As the notion of private body is residual (and we may assume that the meaning 
of government is the same as that provided in the AoA), we may focus on the 
concept of 'public body'. The Korea - Commercial Vessels Panel has recently made it 
clear that 
an entity will constitute a "public body" if it is controlled by the government (or 
other public bodies). If an entity is controlled by the government (or other 
public bodies), then any action by that entity is attributable to the government 
and should therefore fall within the scope of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement. 126 
It is clear that this definition, with its general reference to the control exercised by the 
government, leaves many interpretative issues open. There may be cases where the 
boundaries between the concepts of 'public body' and 'private body' are not easy to 
draw. We can for example think of the case of public undertakings that can be 
generally defined as those undertakings that are under the control of the government. 
Should they be regarded as public bodies? Some fine-tuning may be required with 
125 US - Export Restmists, paragraph 8.49 
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respect to the notion of control. This leads to the second remark. We should ask 
whether the assimilation between 'public bodies' and 'government' (which is 
explicitly made by Article 1 SCM) should indicate that further elements should be 
considered in order to define an entity as a 'public body' and, in particular, whether 
these should be represented - as in the definition of governmental agency in Article 
9.1(a) AoA - by the conferral of public powers for the performance of governmental functions. 
The most significant observation is, however, that the test emerging from the phrase 
'financial contribution by a government or any public body' is remarkably similar to 
that of the phrase 'provision by government and their agencies of direct subsidies' in 
Article 9.1(a). What seems to be required is a general and abstract assessment of the 
control of the government. 
A briefparallel between abstract and concrete rules ofimputability 
We may conclude our examination of the rules of imputability by comparing the 
abstract rules emerging from the expressions 'government or any public body' and 
'governments and their agencies' with those resulting from the fourth subparagraph 
of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM and Article 9.1(c) AoA. When compared with the former 
the latter can certainly be defined as concrete. 
Whereas the two cases regulated under the fourth subparagraph of Article 1.1(a)(1) 
SCM and Article 9.1(c) AoA describe the action of the government, the phrases 
'financial contribution by a government and any public body' and 'provision by 
governments and their agencies of direct subsidies' put a considerable stress on the 
d finition of the agent the government, the public body or a government agency. 
This structural characteristic plays an important role in the definition of the rules of 
imputability. 
Under the chapeau of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM and Article 9.1(a) AoA, the crucial 
interpretive step is the classification of the body under scrutiny as a 'public body' or 
a 'government agency'. In this regard, general considerations, such as those 
concerning the statute or the nature of the body, or the general control or influence b}, the 
126 Koma - Commtmial Nestur, paragraph 7.50. 
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government, certainly play a more important role than the assessment of the government 
influence actually, exercised in the case at issue which is, by contrast, required - albeit in 
different ways - under Article 1 . 1(a) (1) (iv) 
SCM and Article 9.1(c) AoA. 
The crucial consequence is that, since they feature rules of imputability which are 
more or less strict, the relevant provisions are accordingly more or less comprehensive with 
respect to the forms of public intervention that they cover. For example, a more 
rigorous rule of imputability (eg an abstract one) will make it more likely that the 
conduct at issue is covered. Conversely, a less rigorous rule of imputability (eg a 
concrete one) can make it less likely that the conduct is caught. This is however 
only the result of the comparison between what the writer has dubbed as abstract v 
concrete rules of imputability. In fact, particularly when the rules of imputability 
focussing on the action of the government are considered, various standards (again 
more or less demanding) can be found. 
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The origin of the resources 
We now examine the regulation of subsidies in the GATT/WTO by focusing on the 
third technique to define the legal relevance of the public intervention, that is the 
origin of the resources used to finance the subsidy. The last technique - the 
objective of the measure - is considered afterwards by analysing WTO law and EC 
law together. 
It is worth commencing with a terminological premiss. 
Premiss on definitions: costs between economics and accounting 
When discussing the financing of a subsidy, various concepts have been used in the 
GATT and in the WTO such as 'financial contribution', 'charge on the public 
account', 'budgetary expenditure', 'loss of public revenue', 'loss or cost to 
government', 'governmental resources'. It is therefore particularly important to 
clarify immediately these concepts and see what their relationship, if any is. 
The notion of 'financial contribution' is rather ambivalent. It may equally refer to 
the action of the government that transfers economic resources, as we have seen in 
the first part of this chapter, and to the governmental origin of the resource. 
'Budgetary expenditure' and 'charge on the public account' 127 seem to refer to the 
use of public revenue which, according to accounting rules (and practices), is 
recorded in the public accounts. By way of simplification, it can be said that these 
accounts usually take note of actual expenditure (such as a payment), potential 
expenditure (such as guarantees), and capital loss (such as when revenue, like a 
credit, is waived). By contrast, the expressions 'loss of public revenue' and `loss or 
cost to government', 128 which can indeed be compared to that of use of 
'governmental resources', are more general, and include any form of financing 
involving government resources irrespective of whether any trace is left in the 
public accounts. In particular, they can be construed so extensively as to include 
127 The latter is commonly used in the legislation. Cf Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture and item 
(1) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies enclosed, as Annex I, to the SCAT Agreement. Cf also the 
GATI' Panel Report'Operation of the Provisions of Article XV'I' adopted on 21 November 1961, GATT, 
10th Supp BISD 201 (1962), paragraph 5. 
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also the costs in the economic sense, that is opportunity costs in the form of, for example, 
foregone interests. 
As Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch (1997: 6-94) explain, the concept of opportunityy, i. n. rt, 
which can be distinguished from that of accounting cost, is the one that is particularly 
significant in economic terms. It is the amount lost by not using the resource at 
hand, such as capital, in its best alternative use. In other words, whereas this 
economic concept is concerned with the best allocation of available resources, the 
accounting notion of cost is focused on the actual payment made by a firm which 
should leave a trace in its accounts. 129 
In sum, whereas some concepts (eg 'loss' or 'cost to government' and 'governmental 
resources') are more concentrated on the economic substance of the matter, others are 
more connected to the accounting side. 
All the concepts above are however used indifferently and the meaning that prevails 
is the actual or potential use of governmental resources, whether noted or not on 
the public accounts (in the remainder of the analysis we will mainly use the 
expression `cost to government'). It may be useful to anticipate that also the 
concept used in the EC (grant through State resources') focuses on the actual use of 
government resources, or, with another term, on a financial burden, rather than on 
budget recording. 
Once it is accepted that a cost to government is necessary, the crucial issue from a 
legal standpoint is to determine whether, in the case at hand, this has been incurred. 
The GATT era 
One of the most controversial issues in the debate on the definition of subsidy has 
always been whether a cost to government is necessary. 
12s The expression'loss to government' can be found in the GATT Working Party Report 'Provisions of 
Article XVI: 4' adopted on 19 November 1960, GATT, 9"h Supp BISD 185 (1961), paragraphl 1. 
1=9 In our context, the issue of opportunity costs usually arise when it has to be determined whether 'soft 
loans' amount to a subsidy. This occurs when, for example, the government lends money to an undertaking 
at an interest rate (say 9%) that is above the rate at which the government borrows (say 8°o) but below the 
relevant rate in the private market (say 100, 'o). The government can be said to have incurred an opportunity 
cost by 'giving up a portion of the interest it cnxld obtain': Jackson (1997: 295). 
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Different views have been adopted and defended along the years by the various 
Contracting Parties, in particular the US (traditionally arguing that a cost to 
government is not necessary) and the EC (claiming, by contrast, that it is a necessary 
requirement). The conflict sparked during the 'Steel War' between US and EC in 
the early 1980s. 130 The clash perpetuated itself through the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and was eventually settled in the WTO era. 
The official position on the issue of the GATT was difficult to ascertain. 
Whereas no significant indication has been offered by the disputes, various reports 
of the early 1960s substantially lend support to the view that a cost to government 
was in any event necessary. 131 The Tokyo Subsidy Code does not feature a 
definition of subsidy and hence does not include any definitive answer on the issue 
either. It has sometimes been argued that the requirement of a cost to government 
in substance emerged from its annexed Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. 132 The 
language used in most of the examples of export subsidy (such as 'provision', 
'allowance', 'exemption', 'remission', 'deferral', 'drawback', 'grant') seems to suggest 
the use of public resources. 133 A particular confirmation of this reading seems to 
derive from the closing item (1) which, by referring to 'any other charge on the public 
account constituting an export subsidy' (emphasis added), was read as indicating a 
common denominator of all the previous examples. 
Interestingly, this has also been the view taken by the European Court of justice in 
the two Fediol cases decided in the late 1980s. The Court noted that the various 
items of the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies, and in particular the last item (1), 
justified the fact that 'in the mind of the Community legislature [ie Regulation No 
130 Bronckers & Quick (1989: 17) refer to the 1981/1982 so-called `steel war' between US and EC as the first 
point in time when the latter argued for the necessity of a cost to government. 
131 See the Panel Report 'Review pursuant to Article XVI: 5' adopted on 24 May 1960, GATT, 9t' Supp. 
BISD (1961), page 188, paragraphs 11 (on price support schemes) which refers to loss to the government' 
and 12 (on the action through intermediaries) which underlines the importance of the 'source of the funds'. 
See also the incidental recognition that subsidies would involve a charge on the public account in Panel 
Report'Operation of the Provisions of Article XVI' adopted on 21 November 1961, GATT, 10n Supp. 
BISD (1962), page 201, paragraph 5. 
'32 See Beseler & Williams (1986: 123-124). Contra Bronckers & Quick (1989: 14). The illustrative list is a 
revision of a list included in a 1960 Working Party Report (Report on the 
'Provisions of Article XVI: 4' 
adopted on 19 November 1960, GATT, 9th Supp. BISD (1961), page 185, paragraph 
5), and is substantially 
reproduced in Annex I of the WTO SCHI Agreement. 
133 Admittedly, some support to the opposite argument could be found in item c) which, 
by simply referring 
to measures 'mandated' by government, is broad enough to cover also transfers 
financed with private 
resources. 
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2176/84 implementing the Tokyo Subsidy Code] the concept of export subsidy 
necessarily implied a financial burden borne directly or indirectly by public bodies'. 
134 
The fact is, however, that the Tokyo Round Code did not solve the issue. The 
reliance on the Illustrative List, for example, is not decisive because it merely refers 
to some examples of export subsidies and not to the definition of subsidy itself. 
A close reading of the Fediol decisions shows that the Court of justice itself was 
aware of this. 
It rejected the more affirmative arguments of the Commission and the Advocate 
General. The former distinguished the concept of GATT subsidy from that of State 
aid, which at the time did not involve a financial burden for the State. The latter 
went even further arguing that, `although unsupported by rules of Community or 
international law', it is 'semantically and logically indisputable' that the requirement 
of cost to government is inherent in the notion of subsidy. 
The Court more cautiously found that 
'[t]he concept of subsidy thus understood is not incompatible with the Community's 
obligations under international law, in particular under GATT and agreements 
concluded in the framework thereof. 135 
The Court pointed out that, in GATT law, there has never been an express definition of the 
term 'subsidy'. Accordingly, the Commission 
'was not wrong or arbitrary in concluding that the concept of subsidy in Article 3 of 
Regulation No 2176/84 presupposes the grant of an economic advantage 
through a charge on the public account'. 
136 
The conclusion that the Community was entitled - but not required - to take the view 
that a charge on the public account was necessary in its countervailing duty law 
134 See paragraph II of Case 187/85; paragraph 12 of Case 188/85. 
135 Paragraphs 12 of Case 187/85; paragraphs 13 of Case 188/85. Emphasis added. 
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cannot simply be justified by the usual deferential approach in the judicial review of 
Community's acts. It is more intriguingly the Court's acknowledgement that the 
choice of EC countervailing duty law was just an option, permitted by the GATT. 
The latter did not provide for an express definition of subsidy and hence a final 
word on the cost to government issue. 
The WTO era 
In the analysis of the cost to government issue in WTO law, the writer mainly 
concentrates on the definition of subsidy in Article 1 SCM, and in particular on the 
financial contribution. The SCM is the most general regulation of subsidies in the 
WTO and it is with respect to the definition of subsidies therein that there was a 
fierce confrontation during the Uruguay Round. 
The situation is different with respect to agriculture. It seems indeed that the issue 
of the financing of subsidies has not been equally controversial in the context of the 
AoA. 
In some cases, it is the actual provision that seems to indicate that there is no need 
that government resources are used. We may recall Article 9.1(c) AoA which 
regulates payments financed by virtue of governmental action, 'whether or not a charge 
on the public account is involved. 137 
In other cases, this may be easily inferred, for example with respect to the forms of 
domestic support that do not fulfil the condition of Article 1(a) Annex 2 (that is that 
'the support in question shall be provided through a publicly funded programme (includin(g 
government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from consumers'). 
138 In other cases, for 
example Article 9.1(a) ('provision by governments or their agencies of direct 
subsidies, including payments-in-kind'), the dispute settlement has made it clear that 
136 Paragraphs 13 of Case 187/85; paragraphs 14 of Case 188/85. Emphasis added. 
137 See Appellate Body, Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), paragraph 114; id, Canada - Dair) 
(Article 21.5 - New Zealand and US), paragraphs 132 and 133. 
13$ Emphasis added. That might be the case of a parafiscal charge imposed on consumers or even on 
producers at large. 
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there is no need for a transfer of government resources 139 and, quite probably, the 
relevant findings can be transposed also to other items of Article 9.1.140 
The SCMAgreement 
The financial contribution: unresolved compromise or creeping victory? 
The two opposite views on the cost to government issue, and, more generally, on 
the definition of subsidy, confronted with each other during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations and were mainly heralded by the United States on one side and the 
European Communities on the other. 141 The former's more extensive approach 
contrasted with the stricter approach of the latter. 
In particular, along with Australia, the United States position was very much 'effect- 
oriented'. It proposed that subsidy be defined as 'any measure or combination of 
governmental measures which confers a benefit on the recipient enterprises'. 142 
According to this view, which corresponds to the broad approach to the definition 
of subsidies in US countervailing duty law history, 143 what matters is the distorting 
effect of the measure and not its form or how it is financed. 
Together with other negotiating countries, the European Communities counter- 
argued that 'actions by public authorities which do not imply expenditure of public 
funds, or, anyway, a charge on the public account, are not subsidies and thus a 
fortiori cannot be actionable or be otherwise subject to subsidies discipline'. 
144 The 
concern was that the omission of such requirement would be that an indefinite 
number of measures would be caught. 
The chapeau of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM provides that, for a subsidy to be deemed to 
exist, it is necessary to have 'a financial contribution by a government'. Then we 
have a list of three forms of financial assistance and a provision, item (iv), which 
139 See Panel, Canada - Dairy, paragraph 7.56. 
140 Consider, for example, paragraphs d), e) and f). 
141 See McDonough (1993: 898-899); see also Didier (1999: 230-233). 
142 GATT Document MTN. GNG/NGIO/W/29. 
143 Cf the footnotes at page 899 of Stewart. at. 
144 Cf GATT Document MTN. GNG/NG10/W/31. 
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envisages that the government may make the financial contribution through 
intermediaries, such as a private body. 
Commencing with the expression 'financial contribution', although the negotiating 
history shows that it has often been regarded as a synonymous to cost to 
government, 145 taken in itself, its meaning remains uncertain. Moreover, the 
wording of item (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM, which disciplines also the case where 
'a government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out' a financial 
contribution, is capable of encompassing also those cases where the transfer of 
economic resources is not actually financed by the government but rather by the 
intermediary. 
The scope of Article 1.1(a) (1) SCM is thus ambiguous. What is however interesting 
to ask is how this ambiguity can be justified. On the one hand, it can be advanced that 
it is the necessary price for reaching an agreement between two very different 
positions. More bluntly, it is the result of an unresolved compromise. In this light, since 
both the expression 'financial contribution', and the wording of item iv), are vague 
enough to accommodate both positions, Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM would have been 
simply postponed the solution of the issue. On the other hand, it may well - and 
has - been argued that the ambiguity of the provision, and in particular its capability 
to include the more extensive position, should be read as the creeping victory of the 
latter. 
Bourgeois (2001: 220-221) has reported that the scholars' views on which position 
ultimately succeeded diverge. Some suggest that a cost to government would not be 
necessary. 146 Low (2001: 111) suggests that the 'financial contribution' in Article 
1.1(a)(1) SCM implies a 'financial outlay' by the government. Along the same lines, 
others seem to suggest that an important implication of the new definition may be 
i's This is well illustrated in the Secretariat's note MTN. GNG/NGIO/13, page 4. If we wanted to carry out 
this exercise through the various documents we would find that this equivalence is expressly made by Japan 
(MTN. GNG/NG/W27, page 2) and can almost certainly be inferred from the words of Canada 
(MTN. GNG/NG/W25, page 4). Some doubts might be entertained with respect to India's position 
(MTN. GNG/NG/W16, page 1; MTN. GNG/NG/W 33, page 3). 
146 McDonough (1993: 899), points out that the language of Article 1.1(a)(1)(v) SCM 'apparently 
encompasses' the forms of 'private subsidies"wherein benefits are conferred on recipients from private 
sources but at the direction or mandate of government'. Cf also Didier (1999: 232- 233) who underlines that 
'the dispute on the financial contribution concept was settled by a compromise which reflects, in the main, 
the US position'. As regards the term 'financial contribution', 'while excluding non financial contributions' he 
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to prevent the use of the SCM Agreement to attack 'regulatory subsidies' (ie the 
failure of governments to provide certain levels of regulation, such as environmental 
protection or labour standards) which, as seen in the introduction, often do not 
involve any cost to the government. 147 
The Appellate Body has unravelled this ambiguity. Before setting forth its findings, 
it may however be worth saying a few words on the other limb of Article 1 SCM 
which concerns the public intervention and which, like the financial contribution, 
raises an issue of financing. 
Article 1.1(a)(2): forms of income or price support 
The 1960 GATT Panel report concluded that, under Article XVI GATT, only 'price 
support' measures requiring a 'loss' to the government could be regarded as 
subsidies. 148 This interpretation is consistent with the general position as to the 
definition of subsidy and the cost to government issue prevailing in the GATT. 
Article 1(a) (2) SCM now regulates 'any form of income or price support in the sense 
of Article XVI of GATT 1994'. The issue of whether measures of income support 
can be fully assimilated to those of price support may be left aside. The interesting 
question is whether the new provision should be interpreted as the GATT Panel did 
with Article XVI GATT, or, rather, whether a new reading is possible, particularly if 
the general position with respect to the issue were changed with respect to other 
forms of public intervention, notably those provided in the financial contribution. 
It does not seem that this point has been discussed during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. Some support for the more extensive interpretation can be found in 
the literature. Low (2001: 111) argued that, whereas 'income and price supports will 
often imply a financial outlay of some kind by the government', it is indeed possible 
to devise a minimum price regime which does not involve a financial outlay and 
which would certainly distort trade in a GATT 1994 Article XVI sense. 
argues that it seems 'sufficiently wide to encompass many forms of State intervention which have financial 
consequences, whether or not they imply a call on the public purse'. 
147 Jackson (1997: 296); Benitah (2001: 71 and 73-74). 
'48 GATT Panel Report adopted on 24th May 1960 (Review pursuant to Article XV'I: 5 GATI), BISD 9th 
Supp l 1961 188, at p. 191. 
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As anticipated, a more liberal position would definitely be strengthened by a more 
general finding that the definition of subsidy in general no longer requires a cost to 
government. This point - the prevailing interpretation of the 'financial contribution' 
requirement - is analysed in the next paragraph. 
Unravelling the ambiguity of the financial contribution: Canada - Aircraft 
The wording of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM does not expressly indicate whether a subsidy 
requires a cost to government is required but is ambiguous on this point. Whatever 
reading is given to the resulting ambiguity - as we have suggested, either unresolved 
compromise or creeping victory - it was predictable that, sooner or later, the issue 
would have been subject to the scrutiny of the newly-established dispute settlement 
organs for a decision. What, arguably, was not fully predictable is the direction that 
would have been taken. 
The issue of whether a 'cost to government' is relevant in the context of Article 
1.1(a) of the SCM was raised in the Canada - Aircraft dispute. The context of the 
debate, however, was not the interpretation of the 'financial contribution' element in 
Article 1.1(a)(1) but rather the definition of the 'benefit' under Article 1.1(a)(2). In 
particular Canada was arguing that the notion of 'cost to government' is relevant in 
the interpretation of the term 'benefit' within the meaning of the latter. By rejecting 
the argument, the Panel noted that 
if "benefit" were to include the notion of net cost to government, it could 
exclude from the definition of "subsidy" situations explicitly identified in Article 
1.1(a)(1) itself as constituting government financial contributions even though no 
cost to the government might be involved. Specifically, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) 
identifies as a "financial contribution" the situation where a government directs a 
private body to make "financial contributions" within the meaning of Article 
1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). In such a situation, the net cost could be incurred entirely by the 
private body rather than the government. Canada's interpretation of "benefit" 
(i. e., to include net cost to government) would render Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) 
meaningless, since a form of "financial contribution" explicitly included in Article 
1.1(a) would automatically (i. e., because it would never meet the net cost to 
government test) be excluded by Article 1.1(b). 
149 
'49 Canada - Ain-aß, paragraphs 9.115. 
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Although the argument of effectiveness is arguably over-marked (the consideration 
that the alternative reading 'would render Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) meaningless' seems to 
want to prove too much), the position of the Panel is unmistakably clear. 
Albeit with a more laconic language, the Appellate Body confirmed that a 'cost to 
government' is not implied in the context of the 'financial contribution'. It crucially 
observed that Canada's argument, whereby the concept of 'cost to government' 
would be relevant in the interpretation of the 'benefit', 
would exclude from the scope of that term those situations where a 'benefit' is 
conferred by a private body under the direction of government. These situations 
cannot be excluded from the definition of 'benefit' in Article 1.1(b), given that they 
are specifically included in the definition of 'financial contribution' in Article 
1.1(a)(iv). 150 
These findings are highly significant, 151 not only in the context of the financial 
contribution requirement. This interpretation may have a spill-over effect with 
respect to a more a more extensive reading of the other form of government 
intervention concerning'any income or price support'. 
The only regret is that this controversial issue was not raised in its natural context - 
the financial contribution - thus requiring the dispute settlement organs to provide a 
full reasoning. The importance of the conclusion, however, cannot be 
underestimated, quite the contrary. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body were 
certainly fully aware of the long-standing debate on the cost to government issue 
and of the importance of any, even though incidental, finding on the issue. 
Exercise of interpretation: the issue in the context of the financial contribution 
The challenging goal of this paragraph is to test the conclusion of the Panel and the 
Appellate Body on the cost to government issue by addressing it in its natural 
context - the financial contribution requirement - and by using the 'customary rules 
ISO Canada - Ain-raft, paragraph 161. 
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of interpretation', ie the criteria indicated by the Vienna Convention (VCLT) which 
have been thoroughly analysed in the previous chapter. In other words, this section 
offers an exercise of interpretation. 
For the reader's convenience, the 'general rule' of interpretation of Article 31.1 
VCLT may be repeated: 'a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose'. According to Article 32 VCLT, this may be 
complemented by the use of supplementary means of interpretation, such as the 
preparatory works, in order to confirm the discovered meaning or to determine it 
when the general rule has left it ambiguous or obscure. 
Among all these hermeneutic instruments we have already underlined the centrality 
of the textual approach, ie of the interpretation of the ordinary meanings of the 
words of the provision. Having this in mind, we make use of other relevant tools of 
interpretation which may be, expressly or implicitly, derived from those provisions. 
Textual and contextual interpretation 
We have already said that the expression 'financial contribution' is not fully clear. 
A quick check of the dictionary meanings of the constituent elements of 'financial 
contribution' indicates that this expression substantially refers to a payment, ie to a 
transfer of financial or economic resources. Whereas 'financial' means 'of or pertaining 
to revenue or money matters', 152 the examination of the most relevant dictionary 
meanings of 'contribution' ('something paid or given (voluntarily) to a common 
fund or stock; an action etc. which helps to bring about a result; the action of 
contributing') 153 seems to indicate that the meaning conveyed by the phrase 
`financial contribution' essentially refers to a payment, which is most probably 
executed to reach a particular aim. 
This is in line with findings of our previous analysis of financial contribution which 
led us to conclude that it refers to forms of action that involve such financial transfer. 
151 For a more recent confirmation see Panel, CIS - Export Restraints, note 167 to paragraph 
8.73. 
152 Shorter Oxford Exgkrh Dirtionary (2003: Vol I, 959). 
153 Sho, *r Oxford En 1isb Didronay (2003: Vol I, page 506). 
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What is not however equally clear is that this definition would necessarily refer to 
the origin of the resources involved. Although the phrase 'financial contribution' 
has often been used as a synonymous of cost to government or charge on the public 
account, that does not seem to be its main focus and its wording is actually general 
enough to encompass also cases with no use of governmental resources. This 
conclusion finds confirmation if we concentrate (as immediate context) on one 
form of financial contribution, that embodied in the fourth paragraph of Article 
1.1(a)(1) SCM which regulates the case where the government entrusts or directs a 
private party to carry out one of the previous forms of action and which (as the 
dispute settlement organs in Canada - Aircraft have already noted) is certainly capable 
of encompassing transfers of economic resources which are actually provided by the 
intermediary, and not by the government. 
The results of our textual/ contextual analysis are therefore that: 
a) the expression 'financial contribution' seems mainly to refer to the action of 
transfer of financial resources, and not to the source of the latter, 
b) this definition does not necessarily refer to the origin of the resources, 
particularly the fourth item of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM. 
We do not find any other contextual guidance, in support of or against, our reading 
either in other provisions of the SCM or in other WTO instruments. 
On the one hand, provisions such as Article 14 SCM or Article 1 of Annex IV to 
the SCM Agreement, which are mentioned by Didier (1999: 232), are not relevant 
because, in our view, they are not appropriate context in the interpretation of the 
financial contribution requirement. The former refers to the concept of benefit 
(more particularly, to the calculation of the amount of the subsidy for countervailing 
duty actions), the latter to the (now expired) presumption of serious injury under 
Article 6.1(a) SCM. 
On the other hand, the interpreter might be tempted into looking at similar 
definitional provisions of other WTO instruments, such as the AoA. Irrespective of 
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the fact that these do not provide unequivocal indications, the most fundamental 
obstacle is of systematic nature. The reference to a specific discipline (on agriculture), 
may be of limited help when we should interpret the general discipline of subsidies 
(such as the SCM Agreement), and in particular its express general definition thereof. 
Interpretation `in the light of the object and purpose' of the treaty 
Some support to our textual (and contextual) interpretation - Article 1.1(a)(1) 
generally refers to a transfer of economic resources provided by the government but 
not to its method of financing - could arguably be found in the analysis of the object 
and purpose of the SCM Agreement. 
The object and purpose of the treaty should mainly be derived from its text, and in 
particular its preamble which usually spells out the background and the objectives of 
the relevant discipline. 
However, as a clear evidence of the considerable disagreement on the 'subsidy issue', 
the SCM Agreement does not have a preamble. The dispute settlement organs have 
thus been cautious in defining the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement, and 
formulating arguments based on it. 154 What can usually be found are general 
statements which summarise it as the establishment of a multilateral discipline on 
the premiss that some forms of government intervention distort international trade, 
or have the potential to distort international trade, or, with an alternative more 
laconic formulation, as a multilateral discipline on subsidies which distort 
international trade. 155 
Admittedly, along with the US - Export Restraints Panel, we might underline that the 
SCM Agreement does not regulate 'every government intervention that might in 
economic theory be deemed a subsidy with the potential to distort trade'. 1% Along 
these lines, it would be concluded that Members wanted to regulate only those 
forms of governmental action that involve a cost to government. 
154 It has been noted that 'the SCM Agreement does not contain any express statement of its object and 
purpose. We therefore consider it unwise to attach undue importance to arguments concerning the object 
and purpose of the SCM Agreement'. Cf Panel, Canada - Aircraft, paragraph 9.119. 
X55 The two definitions can respectively be found in Panel, Canada - Airrmft, paragraph 9.119, and Panel, Bra i1 
- Air aft, paragraph 10.11. 
Is' Panel, US - Export Rcstmintr, paragraph 
8.62. 
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Another reading is however possible. Despite the caution underlined above, a 
certain degree of agreement on the purpose of the subsidy discipline can be reached. 
By relying on the consideration that subsidies are regulated because they cause, or 
may cause, distortions, it could indeed be suggested that no relevance should be given 
to a factor, the financing of the measure, which, in general, does not seem to be 
relevant to capture its distorting potential. 
Admittedly, certain conduct, such as predation (ie under-cost selling), are more 
likely to be successful if they draw from the resources of the clearly deep pockets of 
public coffers. This, however, does not lend any support to considering the cost to 
government as a necessary requirement of the definition of subsidy, It merely 
indicates that, in some cases, the fact that a practice is publicly subsidised should be 
taken into due account when the impact of the measure is analysed because of its 
more likely danger to the competitive process. 
Effectiveness, preparatory works, restrictive interpretation 
Arguments on the basis of the principle of effectiveness, which, as we have seen, 
directly flow from 'good faith' and 'the object and purpose of the treaty' under 
Article 31(1) VCLT, do not seem to substantially shift the balance as they would not 
add any more weight to the arguments already based on purposive interpretation. 
Quite similarly, we do not consider that the recourse to the preparatory works may 
be useful to confirm our reading. The general reservations with respect to the utility 
and reliability of this method have already been underlined. This is particularly true 
in the case at issue. The negotiating history can only tell us that there was a heated 
debate but are silent on whether one of those positions in the end prevailed and, if 
so, which one. 
We may conclude by just underlining the irrelevance of the increasingly criticised 
principle of restrictive interpretation (in dubio mitius). In this regard, it is sufficient to 
refer to our analysis in the previous chapter. 
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Conclusion 
The result of the exercise of interpretation is that, on balance, the conclusion of the 
dispute settlement organs that the financial contribution - and more specifically the 
fourth subparagraph of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM (it should be recalled that this was the 
provision interpreted by the Appellate Body) - does not necessarily involve a cost to 
government, is substantially supported by an interpretation of the natural context of 
the issue, the financial contribution requirement, and `in accordance with the 
customary rules of international law'. This conclusion seems to essentially rest on a 
textual interpretation since the other usual tools have not provided any useful 
indication. 
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2. EC law 
This section deals with questions similar to those that have been analysed in the 
previous one on WTO law. Following the first three techniques to define the legal 
relevance of the conduct of the government that we have set forth above 
(formulation of the definition, standards of imputability, origin of the resources), the 
attempt is to analyse the forms of governmental action that are covered by State aid 
rules, and in particular by Article 87(1) EC. 
Formulation of the definition of State aid 
Unlike in WTO law, in the EC there is only one provision featuring the definition of 
State aid. Article 87(1) EC regulates 'any aid granted by the State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever'. 
Broad language between potentially wide coverage and prevailing 
interpretation 
Even on a first reading, it seems clear that this provision should not be interpreted 
formally or narrowly. The wording refers to 'any aid' 'in any form whatroever' which is 
'granted by the State or through State resources'. Many linguistic elements thus hint 
towards a particularly comprehensive reading, broad enough to cover various forms 
of governmental action that provide for assistance to undertakings. Crucially, what 
is underlined here is merely the capacity of the definition of being interpreted broadly 
which does not necessarily, and always, corresponds to its prevailing interpretation. 
A potentially broad interpretation was arguably in the minds of the fathers of the 
EC Treaty as comes expressly out in various points of the Spaak Report which 
underline the irrelevance of the form of the public intervention: 
Les aides accordees par les Etats doivent etre examinees de tres pres, 
indipendamment de la forme exterieure qu'eller revctent ... La regle generale est que sont 
incompatibles avec le marche commun les aides, sous quelque forme qu'eller soient 
accordees ... 
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The potential of State aid control has been immediately captured by the European 
Court of Justice. In 1961 already, it had to interpret the expression 'aid or subsidy' 
in Article 4(c) ECSC. In a finding, which has become a standard also in the context 
of Article 87(1) EC, it held that the concept of aid is wider than that of a subsidy 
because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but 
also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, 
being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and 
have the same effect. 157 
The subsequent case law of the Court of justice has consistently confirmed the 
rather open-ended coverage of Article 87(1). The Court has thus found to 
constitute State aids various forms of governmental assistance such as direct grants, 
loans, guarantees, exemptions from taxes and social contributions, under-price sales, 
purchases at market price but in extremely large quantities, equity injections, 
provision of market research and advertising activities or logistical and commercial 
assistance, payment of outstanding wages or redundancy costs, exemption from the 
normal application of insolvency rules allowing companies owing debts to public 
bodies to continue trading, renegotiations of debts or credit waivers. 
This rather broad coverage seems to be favoured by an interpretation which puts 
emphasis on the effects of the conduct at issue. This has already been seen in the 
Steenkolenmýnen decision. In another locus cla sicur, the Court of justice put it down 
even more clearly: 
[Article 87] does not distinguish between the measures of State intervention by 
reference to their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects'. 158 
157 Case 30/59 S1eeako%nmýaem, page 19. Cf also ibid., at 27. 
158 Case 173/73 Italy v Commi sion, paragraph 13. 
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Along these lines it has more recently been said that the concept of State aid is an 
objective one. 159 
Moreover, the Court of justice has repeatedly stated that Article 87(l) EC covers 
not only measures granted by the State (which does not include only central national 
authorities but also regional and local ones), 160 but also by other bodies which, in 
one way or another, are under its control. 
The Court made it clear that State aid law regulates all subsidies threatening the play 
of competition coming from the public sector, 161 a notion that generally refers to 
'that part of the economy or an industry that is controlled by the government'. 162 
This notion of public sector clearly reminds the definition of 'public undertaking' 
adopted in Transparency Directive whereby a public undertaking is 'any undertaking 
over which the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant 
influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or 
the rules which govern it'. 163 
With a broader language, the Court has also held that Article 87(1), which merely 
refers to any aid 'granted by the State or through State resources', should be 
construed so as to cover subsidies granted directly by the State as well as those 
granted indirectly by public or private bodies established or appointed by the State 
to administer the aid. 164 
The boundaries 
Despite this openness, what emerges from the case-law is that Article 87(1) EC has 
boundaries and that attempts to extend its application will not necessarily be 
warranted. 
On the one hand, the Court has put some clear limits to the inherent expansiveness 
of a purely effect-based analysis. It has accordingly been made clear that there is no 
159 Case T-67/94 Ladbmke Racing v Commarion, paragraph 52. 
160 Cf, eg, Case 248/84 Germany v Commission, paragraph 17. 
161 Cf Case C-305/89 Ita# v Commission, paragraph. 13; Joined Cases C-27-73/91 Sloman Neptun, paragraph. 
19; Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission, paragraph. 56. 
162 Black's Law Dictionary (1999: 1246); an almost identical meaning can be found in the Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary (2003: Vol. II, 2394). 
163 See Article 2(1)(b) of the Commission Directive 80/723/EEC. 
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such concept as that of a 'measure having an effect equivalent to state aid'. 
Although, this finding does not preclude the possibility of interpreting Article 87(1) 
EC extensively, it certainly draws a line. On the basis of the general duty of co- 
operation imposed on Member States by Article 10 EC, the scope of other rules of 
competition law, which are addressed to undertakings, can exceptionally be 
extended to cover the anti-competitive conduct of Member States. This is not the 
case for State aid rules which are already specifically addressed to a certain type of 
anti-competitive conduct of Member States. 
It is interesting to compare the similarity of the conclusion of the Court - there is 
no such concept as that of measure having an effect equivalent to State aid - with 
the findings in the US - Export Restraints dispute where the Panel rejected the 
attempt to extend the scope of the financial contribution requirement of Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM to other forms of action that produce a similar effect. 
On the other hand, the case law of the Court of justice has made clear that certain 
forms of public assistance with a more or less clear regulatory element are not 
generally caught by State aid rules (price fixing; lax labour/social law; insolvency 
law). 165 The reasoning underlying these decisions is not however fully clear. On 
the one side, there is a heavy emphasis on the lack of use of State resources (which, 
under the current state of EC law, is required of any State aid). On the other side, it 
may well be that in certain cases the regulatory nature and/or the objectives of the 
measure at issue have played a role in the decision. 
By contrast, it does not seem that the negative answer depends on the fact that in 
these cases it is not always possible to identify a clear transfer of economic resources 
since what Article 87(1) EC simply requires is that the public action confers an 
economic advantage. Similarly, as the next section shows, it does not seem that the 
imputability of the measure under scrutiny to the State was an issue. 
I" Case 78/76 Sttiaicke v Ger waxy, paragraph 21; Case 290/83 Commission v France, paragraph 14. 
ras See, for example, Case 82/77 Van Ti&wk, Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Doman Neplxa, Case C- 
189/91 Kiriammer-Hatte, Joined Cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 Vücido, Case C-2(MI)/97 Erntroie, Case 
C-295/97 Piasgio, Case C-379/98 Pnx. uenEkkra, Case C-59/03 QSÜOla. 
119 
Rules of imputability under Article 87(1) EC 
The coverage of Article 87(1) EC is virtually quite broad encompassing various 
forms of financial assistance by governments. One element which contributes to 
such wide coverage is the possibility that public intervention conferring an 
economic advantage be carried out through an intermediary. In such cases the main 
issue is the rule of imputability. 
No precise rule of imputability 
It may immediately be underlined that, unlike Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM, Article 87(1) 
EC does not provide for a detailed rule of imputability. The provision at issue here 
simply requires that the aid be `granted by the State or through State resources'. 
Leaving aside the issue of financing, this wording has been construed in a liberal 
fashion, to encompass many cases where the government provides financial support 
indirectly. Crucially, there does not seem to be a precise rule of imputability but, as 
we are about to see, what seems to prevail is a rather flexible approach. 
The main question of imputability occurs when the State uses a public, and all the 
more so a private, body as a vehicle to grant aid. What is crucial to determine then 
is whether the action of that body, which may well act independently, should in fact 
be attributed to the State. 
In some cases the direction of the State, and hence the imputability of the measure, 
is particularly clear. The State may for example introduce legislative or 
administrative measures requiring the provision of assistance. 166 It may also 
specifically establish or appoint a public or private body to administer the aid or, in 
any event, give an order or an instruction to grant it. 
There is also another special case where, at least in principle, the imputability seems 
to be rather clear-cut. We have seen that in some cases of deregulation the 
governmental direction operates in a peculiar way inasmuch as it immediately 
empowers the beneficiary, for example by exempting it from certain standards, and 
'66Although the State aid point was not discussed by the Court, this was the clear situation in Case 21/88 Du 
Pont do Nenrours Itakanw where the provision in Italian legislation that required public bodies and companies to 
120 
the third party, which effectively provides the financing, is affected only rather 
indirectly. However, some examples of these measures of deregulation have not 
been considered as forms of State aid. Some of the possible reasons of such 
conclusion have been hinted at. What is important to note here is that this does not 
really seem to depend on difficulties with respect to their imputability to the State 
which seems to be clear, especially in the light of the flexible language of Article 
87(1) EC. 
The most significant findings of the case law concerning the issue of governmental 
direction may now be briefly exposed. We will then proceed to an assessment. 
A brief review of the case-law 
In the recent Stardust Marine case, Advocate General Jacobs has analysed the case 
law on the issue of imputability and noted the variety of rules thereunder. We may 
indeed closely follow the clear exposition by the Advocate General. 167 
There have been some cases where the 'Court established in concreto that the 
particular measure at issue had been the result of action of the State'. In Commission 
v France (Poor farmers) 168 the Court thus held that a solidarity grant to farmers was 
covered by Article 87(1) because it was 'decided and financed by a public body' (the 
Caisse National du Credit Agricole), its implementation was 'subject to the approval 
of the public authorities', the detailed rules for its grant corresponded to 'those for 
ordinary aid' and it was 'put forward by the Government as forming part of a body 
of measures in favour of farmers which were all notified to the Commission' under 
Article 88(3) EC. 
In other cases, the concrete involvement of the government `has been inferred from 
the circumstances taken as a whole'. The Van der Kooy 169 case concerned a 
preferential tariff for natural gas applied by Gasunie with respect to glasshouse 
growers. The Court found, first, that the State directly or indirectly held 50% of the 
purchase 30% of their supplies from companies established in the Mezzogiorno was by definition imputable 
to the State. 
167 Case C-482/99 Starrhut Marine, paragraphs 58 to 62 of the Opinion. 
' Case 290/83 Coarau ox v Frame paragraph 15. 
169 Joined Cases 67,68 and 70/85 Van der Kooy and others v Commission. Cf also Case C-56/93 Bel ixm v 
Commission, paragraph 10. 
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shares of Gasunie and appointed half of its supervisory board (whose powers 
included that of determining tariffs). Secondly, the `Netherlands Government was 
empowered to approve the tariffs applied by Gasunie and could thus block any 
tariff which did not suit it and, third, the Netherlands Government had on two 
occasions successfully exercised its influence over Gasunie in order to seek an 
amendments of its tariffs'. In conclusion, according to the Court, `considered as a 
whole, these factors demonstrate that Gasunie in no way enjoys full autonomy in 
the fixing of gas tariffs but acts under the control and on the instructions of the 
public authorities. It is thus clear that Gasunie could not fix the tariff without taking 
account of the requirements of the public authorities'. 170 
In other cases, it seems that the Court has been content to find that the body at 
issue 'operated in general under the control of the government'. In ENI-Lanerossi 
and IRI Alfa Romeo, the Court found that the members of the boards of directors 
and the management boards of the two Italian holdings ENI and IRI were 
appointed by decree and did not have full freedom of action since they had to take 
the directives of the CIPE, the ministerial committee for economic planning, into 
account. Thus the conclusion was that, 'taken as a whole' those factors showed that 
ENI on the one hand and IRI on the other operated, 'in essence', 'under the control' 
of the Italian State. 171 
Finally, in other cases, the Court seems to have mainly focused on the public or 
private nature of the body at issue without examining 'whether it took its decisions - 
in the actual case or even in general - under the decisive influence of the public 
authorities'. In the Air France case the Court of First Instance found that the 
measure, although formally granted by a limited company governed by private law, 
was in reality carried out at the decisive instigation of the majority shareholder of 
the company, a public body, the Caisse des Depots et Consignations. `The Caisse 
was established by law, it was placed under the supervision and guarantee of the 
legislature, its tasks was the administration of public and private funds composed of 
compulsory deposits, it was governed by statutory and regulatory rules and its 
Director-General and directors were appointed by the President of the Republic and 
170 Vox derKoo_y, paragraphs 36 to 38, emphasis added. 
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the French Government Those factors were sufficient for it to be held that the 
Caisse belonged "to the public sector" and the Commission was accordingly entitled 
to treat the Caisse as "a public-sector body whose conduct is attributable to the 
French State". The public nature of the Caisse was not called into question by the 
existence of rules which ensured that the Caisse enjoyed legal autonomy. ' 
According to the Court, those rules did `not call into question the principle itself of 
the public nature of that body'. 172 
The exposition of these cases shows that the assessment of the government 
involvement may operate at a more concrete or abstract level, and may be more or less 
sophisticated. Advocate General Jacobs put forward a convincing explanation of the 
variety of these rules - and of the seeming tension between these cases. The 
intensity of the standard, and hence of the Court's review, would `depend on how 
far the public authorities are likely to be involved'. 173 
The doctrine of the Stardust Marine case 
In the Stardust Marine case the Court for the first time attempted to elaborate the 
rule of imputability under Article 87(1) EC. 174 
In so doing it heavily relied on the suggestions in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs. 175 He had significantly begun by noting that `it is not easy to establish a 
general test to determine whether a given measure of a public undertaking is 
attributable or imputable to the State'. The same consideration would certainly be 
true also for the conduct of private undertakings. He then underlined that mere 
control over a body should not be sufficient inasmuch as 'the fact that the public 
authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence does not prove 
that they actually exercised that influence in a given case'. At the same time, to 
avoid risks of circumvention, it should not be required that the involvement of the 
State be represented by an explicit instruction. In his view, it should `be sufficient 
171 See Case C-303/88 Ito v Commwion CENI-Lanerossi'), paragraph 12; Case C-305/99 Italy v Consmürion 
(IRI-Alfa Romeo'), paragraph 14. 
"' Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission, paragraphs 57 to 62. 
173 Case C-482/99 Stankst Marine, paragraphs 62 and 63 of the Opinion. 
174 Case C-482/99 Starlast Marine, paragraph 50 et seq. 
17S Ibid, paragraphs 64 to 68 of the Opinion. 
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to establish on the basis of an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case 
that the undertaking in question could not take the decision in question "without 
taking account of the requirements of the public authorities"'. 176 
On the one hand, the Court upheld that a measure should not be imputed to the 
State merely because it is taken by a public undertaking. Being in the position to 
control a public undertaking does not mean actually exercising it in a particular case 
because 'a public undertaking may act with more or less independence, according to 
the degree of autonomy left to it by the State'. What -intriguingly - has to be 
examined is 'whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been 
involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures' (emphasis added). 
On the other hand, the Court denied that it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
public authorities have specifically incited the public undertaking to take the aid 
measure in question. Having regard to the close and privileged relations between 
the State and public undertakings, that would provide an incentive to grant aid in a 
non-transparent way. It would also make it difficult for a third party to demonstrate 
in a particular case that aid measures were in fact adopted on the instructions of the 
public authorities. 
Having taking out the two most extreme standards (mere control - express 
instruction), the Court followed the rather flexible approach suggested by Advocate 
General Jacobs, concluding that 
the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may 
be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the 
context in which that measure was taken. 177 
176 As examples of the facts and circumstances which could be taken into account he listed the evidence that 
the measure was taken at the instigation of the State; the scale and nature of the measure; the degree of 
control which the State enjoys over the public undertaking in question; and a general practice of using the 
undertaking in question for ends other than commercial ones or of influencing its decisions. Again to cope 
with any danger of circumvention, he indicated that, in his view, a generous approach should be taken with 
regard to proof possibly including also circumstantial evidence. Cf paragraphs 65 to 68 of the Opinion. 
1n Paragraph 55, emphasis added. 
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In line with the previous case law, a significant consideration was the fact that the 
decision to grant aid could not be made without taking the requirements or directives o 
public authorities into account. It then underlined that, 'in certain circumstances', other 
indicators 'might' be relevant 'in concluding that an aid measure taken by a public 
undertaking is imputable to the State, such as, in particular, `its integration into the 
structures of the public administration, the nature of its activities and the exercise of 
the latter on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators, 
the legal status of the undertaking (in the sense of its being subject to public law or 
ordinary company law), the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public 
authorities over the management of the undertaking, or any other indicator 
showing, in the particular case, an involvement by the public authorities in the 
adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard 
also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains'. 
It may finally be interesting to note that, applying the findings above to the instant 
case, the Court concluded for the incorrectness of the adoption of the sole organic 
criterion, whereby the various measures of financing would have been imputable to 
the French State because Credit Lyonnais and its two subsidiaries, as public 
undertakings, were under the control of the State. 
The Pearle case: the double-role of the concept of control in a boundary-case 
We may now digress a bit by focussing on a recent and interesting case which can 
be viewed as a boundary-case. 
A public body (notably a trade association) imposed on its members a compulsory 
earmarked levy to finance a collective advertising campaign for opticians' 
businesses. This levy was introduced on the initiative of a group of opticians 
belonging to the trade association, and, as said, was in the interest of all its 
members. The collective advertising campaign was eventually financed with the 
revenue collected from the earmarked levies. 
Contrary to the usual situation, what emerges even from these brief factual elements 
is that it is the public body here that is used as vehicle of private action. 
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Although the reasoning of the Court is brief and not fully clear in distinguishing 
between the determination of imputability and the definition of the origin of 
financing, 178 it seems that the fact that the measure was taken at the initiative of a 
private association of opticians (and - we may add - was indeed in the interest of all 
members of the public body) was considered as sufficient to exclude its imputability 
to the public body. 179 
We might even suggest that, maybe also as a consequence of its not fully accurate 
drafting, what is interesting in Pearle is the revelation of the tight link between the 
two separate questions of imputability and financing. The connecting element is 
given by the concept of control which, as has already been shown in Stardust, plays a 
crucial role in both issues. 180 On the one side, to determine imputability we 
consider the public control over the acting third party. On the other side, as we will 
see, the qualification of resources as State resources requires the establishment of 
public control over them. 
Although the Court could have drafted its findings in a better way, the Pearle 
decision does not depart from the previous case-law, and in particular from the 
doctrine elaborated in Stardust. 181 
Analysis of the rules of imputability under Article 87(1) EC 
This section analyses the findings of the case law of the Court, and in particular the 
test developed in the Stardust case which represents the first attempt to elaborate the 
rule of imputability under Article 87(1) EC. 
The Stardust's rationalization: towards a flexible and case-by-case rule 
We have seen, and concurred with, Advocate General Jacobs' explanation of the 
variety of standards applied by the Court in the case law preceding Stardust, which 
178 Westendorf (2005) page 399 even suggest that the Court conflated the separate questions of control of 
resources and imputability. 
179 Cf Gambaro, Nucara & Prete (2005) page 5. 
180 Cf Hancher (2003) pages 748 and 749. 
"I Hancher (2004) page 363. 
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was based on the likeliness or intensity of the involvement of public authorities in the 
conduct of the third party. 
What we substantially see in Stardust is a rationalisation of the previous case-law which 
takes the shape of a defined rule of imputability. Nevertheless, and inevitably (if 
both the variety of real situations and the looseness of the wording of Article 87(1) 
EC are considered), it may be appreciated that, far from being distinguished by 
precision, the test developed by the Court is rather characterised by a flexible 
approach. 182 After taking out the two extremes (a mere situation of control is not 
enough; an express instruction is not necessary), what the Court requires is a case-by- 
case analysis. The imputability may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from 
the circumstances of the case and the context surrounding the measure. 
As suggested by Jacobs, a crucial factor for establishing imputability is obviously the 
impact of the direction exercised by the government on the third party (which the 
Court finds in the requirements and directives of public authorities). 
In this regard, we should recall the Court's strict stand towards public control with 
respect to the issue of imputability. There is indeed a shift from a formalistic to a 
functional test. 183 The Court excluded that a mere situation of control on the public 
undertaking is enough to attribute all its activity to the State. What is required is an 
assessment of the actual exercise of such control in the case at hand. 
This might seem to be partly contradicted by the reference, `in certain 
circumstances', to other indicators that `might' be relevant and that often seem to 
involve a rather abstract link with the public power (see, for instance, the integration 
of the public undertaking into the public administration, its legal status, or the 
intensity of the supervision exercised by public authorities) and thus to simply 
correspond to the fact that the undertaking in question is under public control. 184 
In the writer's view, there is no contradiction in the findings of the Court if it is 
accepted that they constitute a rationalisation of the indications of the previous 
case-law. The key-words are flexibility and case-by-case analysis. Whereas what is 
usually required is an assessment of the actual exercise of direction, in other cases, 
IL= Alexis (2002) page 152. 
113 Hancher (2003) page 749. 
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considering that the government involvement is quite likely, more abstract or 
organic elements are sufficient to establish the imputability. 
Regulatory measures and imputabi ity: beyond Stardust 
What is now interesting to ask is whether the rule of imputability under Article 87(1) 
EC as defined in the Stardust case could cover some of those measures that we have 
defined as regulatory which always involve the role of an intermediary. 
We may commence with the measures of deregulation. The peculiarity of this 
course of conduct is that the State's direction is clearly addressed to the beneficiary 
undertakings, which are immediately exempted from rules or restrictions, with the 
intermediary, which effectively finances the operation, playing a passive role. 
Clearly, the test as developed in Stardust, which focuses on acts of direction 
immediately addressed to the intermediary, does not apply here. Nevertheless, to 
negate that the measures at issue are imputable to the State would be absurd. Since 
the State's conduct directly affects the beneficiary undertakings by exempting them 
from rules and restrictions, the former's involvement is rather apparent, better self- 
evident. As anticipated, if these measures are not considered as State aid, this 
should be explained for other reasons, concerning their financing and/or their 
objectives. 
The next question is whether more complex cases where the government may be 
viewed as directing a third party to carry out a measure of support but certainly does 
not do so in an immediate and direct way, such as where the benefit is conferred 
through border measures (whose legal status under GATT/WTO law it has been 
extensively analysed above), could be covered by the rule of imputability crafted by 
the Court in Stardust. 
It does not seem that the Court had these cases in mind when it laid down the rule 
in Stardust. There has been no previous case-law on the point. Despite its inherent 
flexibility, the Stardust test seems to refer to more traditional cases, where, if present, 
the involvement of the government is particularly direct 
I" See Lübbig & Von Merveldt (2003) page 623. 
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The issue however remains open. Generally speaking, although less immediate, the 
involvement of the government can certainly be established in some cases. 
Especially in certain circumstances, when the causal nexus between the border 
measure and the third party's conduct is particularly proximate, the imputability to 
the State may be particularly clear (cf the US argument in US - Export Restraints). 
Most crucially, from a more legal perspective, Article 87(1) EC does not face the 
strictures of a well-defined test (such as that of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM) or, more 
generally, of a rigid textual approach (such as in the WTO). It has already been seen 
in the first chapter, and the point will be developed in the final section of this 
chapter, that the approach to interpretation is quite liberal in EC law since it is 
heavily influenced by teleological considerations. 
Arguments against the coverage of these measures under Article 87(1) EC would be 
similar to those deployed with respect to measures of deregulation, and might thus 
revolve around the source of financing or the objectives of the measures. 
Conclusions on the rules ofimputability under Article 87(1) EC 
Various arguments, based on the loose wording of Article 87(1) EC and on the 
liberal approach to interpretation in EC law, seem to support the adoption with 
respect to more complex courses of action, such as some forms of regulatory 
measures, of a rule of imputability more extensive than that laid down in the Stardust 
case. A confirmation thereof is that the objections to the coverage of these more 
complex measures have not focused on imputability but on other levels (financing 
and objectives). Arguably, some support to our broad reading might even be found 
in the ethos of Stardust itself and, in particular, in the two defining concepts of its 
rule of imputability: flexibility and case-by-case anall sir. 
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Origin of resources 
In the EC, a controversy similar to that on the 'cost to the government', has come 
out from the interpretation of the - rather ambiguous - expression 'granted by the 
State or through state resources' in Article 87(1) EC. 
The current official position, as stated in PreussenElektra, is that the definition of 
State aid necessarily implies the use of State resources. It is however argued that the 
stability of this conclusion is somewhat weakened by other, more or less 
concomitant, hesitant and contradictory statements. 
Before the State resources requirement is analysed, it may be interesting to examine 
the jurisprudence of the Court on the issue. 
The case-law on the need of a transfer of State resources 
It may be useful to divide the exposition of the case-law in two parts, the first 
concerning the initial period, where the case law of the Court was not settled yet, 
and the second focusing on the second period, where the Court consolidated its 
jurisprudence whereby financing through State resources is necessary. 
It may also be useful to recall that in the reasoning of the Court the financing 
argument is often blended with other considerations which seem to be based on the 
regulatory nature or on the objective of the measure. Although this ambivalence 
emerges from the following exposition, the reader is invited to concentrate on the 
point concerning the origin of the resources which will then be subject to analysis. A 
final note on style. For the reader's convenience, the writer opted for extensive 
quotations of the significant findings of the Court. 
The first period: fluctuations 
In the first period the Court was still fluctuating. 
containing contradictory statements. 
We therefore find decisions 
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The Van Tiggele case concerned a measure fixing a minimum price for gin. 185 One 
of the issues was whether, apart from constituting a measure having an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports under Article 28 EC, 'price- 
control rules' could amount to a state aid under Article 87(1) EC. The Court 
followed the Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti 181 and concluded that: 
[w]hatever definition must be placed on the concept of an 'aid' within the 
meaning of [Article 87] it is clear from the wording thereof that a measure 
characterized by the fixing of minimum retail prices with the objective of 
favouring distributors of a product at the exclusive expense of consumers cannot 
constitute an aid within the meaning of Article [87]. 187 
Probably, as a sign that this finding in itself was not self-sufficient, the Court went 
on to underline immediately that: 
The advantages which such an intervention in the formation of prices entails for 
the distributors of the product are not granted, directly or indirectly, through 
State resources within the meaning of Article [87]. 188 
The issue was subsequently raised before the Court in the Norddeutsches Vieh- und 
Fleischkontor case which concerned the allocation of special tariff quotas for the 
importation of frozen beef and veal from non-member countries. 189 Three traders 
challenged German legislation that determined the allocation of national quota share 
between domestic traders also on the ground that it constituted State aid in favour 
of certain other traders. Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat opined that it 
was possible to argue, on the basis of the distinction made in Article 87(l) between 
'aid granted by a State' and 'aid granted through state resources', that the 
independent grant of pecuniary advantages which were not paid for by a Member 
State were caught by Article 87 EC. He mentioned, as an example, the case of 
Iss Case 82/77. 
186 See paragraph 8 of the Opinion. 
187 Paragraph 24. 
188 Paragraph 25. 
'89Joined Cases 213 and 215/81. 
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reduced rates which Member States might require private electricity companies or 
haulage contractors to grant to certain undertakings or in respect of certain 
products. 190 
The Court disagreed and found that: 
the financial advantage which traders derive from receiving a share in the quota is 
not granted through State resources but through Community resources because 
the levy which is waived is part of Community resources. Although the term 'aid 
granted through State resources' is wider than the term 'State aid', the first term 
still presupposes that the resources from which the aid is granted come from the 
Member State. 191 
In Commission v France (Poor Farmers) what was at issue was a solidarity grant to poor 
farmers which was financed by the operating surplus of the French Caisse national de 
credit agricole. 192 As we have seen in the previous section, there was no doubt that 
the decision to grant the aid could be imputed to the State. The Commission 
considered that the resources used to finance the measure were generated from the 
management of private funds and not State resources. It nonetheless claimed that, 
although the measure under scrutiny was not, strictly speaking, a State aid, it should 
have been prohibited by Article 10 EC, being a measure having an effect equivalent 
to a State aid. 
On a different construction of the facts, Advocate General Mancini concluded that 
the use of State resources was indeed involved. 193 The Court did not examine 
whether the grant was financed by State resources. It however noted that 
[b]y the generality of the terms employed in that provision any State measure, in 
so far as it has the effect of according aid in any form whatsoever, may be 
assessed on the basis of Article [87] for its compatibility with the common 
market. 
190 Ibid, page 3617. 
191 Paragraph 22. 
192 Case 290/83. 
193 It is useful to recall the quite firm stance of the same Advocate General in the Fediol cases (Cases 18^/85 
and 188/85) where he underlined that, `although unsupported by rules of Community or international law, it 
is 'semantically and logically indisputable' that the requirement of cost to government is inherent in both the 
notions of GATT subsidy and EC State aid (see pages 4177 and 4178). 
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As is clear from the actual wording of Article [87(1)], aid need not necessarily be 
financed from State resources to be classified as State aid. 194 
The persisting fluctuations of the Court can be appreciated in two cases decided 
shortly afterwards, Van der Kooy (where the point is not clearly touched) 195 and 
Greece v Commission (which fully upholds Commission v France). 196 
The second period: towards stability? 
The Sloman Neptun decision represents a robust revirement towards a restrictive 
approach with respect to the 'State resource' issue which, after more than ten years, 
is now firmly consolidated. 197 
The national legislation under examination enabled certain shipping undertakings 
flying the German flag to subject seafarers who were nationals of non-member 
countries to working conditions and rates of pay less favourable than those 
applicable to German workers. Albeit not fully clear, the reasoning of the Court 
heavily relies on the fact that the legislation at issue would not allegedly involve a 
transfer of State resources. 
It can also be recalled that neither the Commission nor Advocate General Darmon 
concluded that a transfer of State resources is necessary under Article 87(1) EC. 
Contrary to its position with respect to the notion of subsidy under GATT law, 198 
the Commission was arguing that a measure of whatever nature which entails for a 
particular sector a relief which is not part of a comprehensive system is State aid 
even if it is not financed from public funds. This conclusion derived from both the 
wording of Article 87(1), and in particular the distinction between aid granted by a 
State and aid granted through State resources, and from the purpose of State aid 
rules to protect competition. In any event, the loss of tax revenue resulting from 
194Paragraphs 13 and 14. 
195 Joined Cases 67/85,68/85 and 70/85. Although the emphasis of the analysis of the Court seems to be on 
the issue of imputability, there is indeed a brief reference to the lower profit that the State would have 
received from the application of a lower tariff (see paragraph 28). What is not clear, however, is whether this 
reference should be viewed as a recognition that a financial burden is a necessary requirement of the notion 
of State aid or, more simply, of a conferral of an out-of-the-market advantage. 
'' Respectively and Case 57/86, paragraph 12. 
197 See Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91. 
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the level at which rates or pay were fixed supported the view that the measure at 
issue was financed from State resources. On its part, Advocate General Darmon 
argued that the origin of the financing of an aid measure was not relevant. In his 
view, Article 87(1) only required that the aid measure was the result of conduct for 
which a Member State was responsible (and conferred an advantage on certain 
undertakings by derogating from the relevant system). 
The Court rejected these arguments and, referring to its decision in Van Tiggele, held 
that 
only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be 
regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article [87(1) EC]. The wording of 
this provision itself and the procedural rules laid down in Article [88 EC] show 
that advantages granted from resources other than those of the State do not fall 
within the scope of the provisions in question. 199 
In the light of this finding, (and with a reminiscence of one dictum in Steinicke und 
Weinlig) 200 the Court then underlined the anti-circumvention purpose of the 
distinction set forth in Article 87(1) EC: 
[t]he distinction between aid granted by the State and aid granted through State 
resources serves to bring within the definition of aid not only aid granted directly 
by the State, but also aid granted by public or private bodies designated or 
established by the State. 201 
Turning then to the issue of whether the advantages deriving from the measure at 
issue were to be viewed as being granted through state resources, the Court held: 
[t]he system at issue does not seek, through its object and general structure, to 
create an advantage which would constitute an additional burden for the State or 
the abovementioned bodies, but only to alter in favour of shipping undertakings 
i9a See Cases 187/85 and 188/85 Fediol 
Paragraph 19. 
200 Case 78/76 Skiduke und Weixkg, paragraph 21. 
201 Paragraph 19. 
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the framework within which contractual relations are formed between those 
undertakings and their employees. The consequences arising from this, in so far 
as they relate to the difference in the basis for the calculation of social security 
contributions, mentioned by the national court, and to the potential loss of tax 
revenue because of the low rates of pay, referred to by the Commission, are 
inherent in the system and are not a means of granting a particular advantage to 
the undertakings concerned. 202 
The principle of Sloman Neptun was upheld in the following Kirsammer-Hark and 
Viscido cases. In the first case the Court concluded that the exclusion of small 
businesses from a legal regime requiring payment of compensation in the event of 
unfair dismissals of employees (and at the same time exempting the latter from 
bearing the legal costs incurred in the relevant legal proceedings) did not constitute a 
grant of aid. 203 Following the line of Sloman Neptun, the Court found that 
the exclusion of a category of businesses from the protection system in question 
does not entail any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to those 
businesses but derives solely from the legislature's intention to provide a specific 
legislative framework for working relationships between employers and 
employees in small businesses and to avoid imposing on those businesses 
financial constraints which might hinder their development. It follows that a 
measure such as the one in question in the main proceedings does not constitute 
a means of granting directly or indirectly an advantage through State resources. 
204 
A similar conclusion was reached in Viscido where the measure at issue allowed only 
one undertaking, Ente Poste Italian, to derogate from the general rule under Italian 
law that employment contracts should be of indeterminate duration, and permitted 
the recruitment of staff under fixed-term contracts. 205 Contrary to the two 
previous cases, the Court did not refer to the regulatory nature or the objective of 
the legislation but merely concluded that the measure at issue `does not involve any 
direct or indirect transfer of State resources' to the benefited undertaking. 206 
202 Paragraph 21. 
Case C-189/91 Kirsammrr-Hack. 
204 Paragraphs 17 and 18. 
205 Joined Cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 Viscido. 
206 Paragraph 15. 
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The principle that the notion of State aid under Article 87(1) necessarily requires a 
transfer of State resources has been followed also in the Ecotrade and Piaggio 
decisions. 207 The examination of these decisions leads us to two brief remarks. On 
the one side, we cannot but note the language used by the Court in its reasoning 
which alternatively refers to the concept of `State resources' and, with a 
reminiscence of Sloman Neptun (see paragraph 21 therein), to the notion of 
`additional charge for the State'. Frankly, no explanation for this linguistic variation, 
nor any argument affecting the substance of the debate, can be found. On the 
other side, it is more intriguing to highlight the inconsistency between the reasoning, 
which unequivocally requires a burden for the State, on the one hand, and the 
conclusions of that reasoning (see Ecotrade, paragraph 45, and Piagio, paragraph 43) 
and the corresponding operative parts of both decisions where the use of State 
resource is merely formulated as an alternative requirement, on the other. What is 
interesting to ask is whether this can quite simply be explained with poor drafting or 
is more tellingly ascribable to a sort of Freudian slip... 
In the last vigorous attack to the `State resources' doctrine, in the PreussenElektra 
case, the Court followed the well-reasoned Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs 
and reaffirmed its position. 208 The Court concluded that national legislation 
requiring private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced in 
their area of supply from renewable energy sources at minimum prices higher than 
the real economic value of that type of electricity did not constitute state aid within 
the meaning of Article 87(1) because there was no direct or indirect use of State 
resources. Indeed the financial burden resulting from that purchase obligation was 
distributed by the legislation between those electricity supply undertakings and 
upstream private electricity network operators. 209 
It is, however, the latest (at least to our knowledge) word of the Court on the issue 
which leaves some perplexities about the solidity of this jurisprudence and, in 
particular, about the real rationale underlying the Court's position. 
207 Respectively, Case C-200/97, paragraph 35; Case C-295/97, paragraph 35. 
x" Case C0379/98. 
209 Paragraphs. 58-60. 
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In the Cigliola case, 210 the Court was asked by the Tribunale di Genova whether 
Italian legislation which 'allows an undertaking, Ferrovie dello Stato, to dismiss its 
older employees - thereby creating a situation in which the undertaking can save on 
labour costs (salaries and insurance obligations), with an immediate resulting burden 
to the State in the form of reduced contribution revenue and the payment of 
pensions to dismissed workers - fall within the concept of aid that is incompatible 
with the common market within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty'. 211 
Considering that the answer to the question referred by the national Court could be 
clearly deduced from the existing case law, the Court disposed of the case on 14th 
April 2004 by way of order. 212 Even from a brief reading of the question referred, 
it however emerges that the factual and legal background was not really the same as 
that in the previous case-law and that the issue as to whether, in this case, State 
resources had been used or not would have requested a more thorough analysis, 
probably with an Opinion of the Advocate General, a hearing, and, ultimately, a 
judgment. 
The reasoning of the order refers to the previous case-law, particularly to Sloman 
Neptun. 213 It nonetheless seems that at least two circumstances distinguished this 
case from Sloman Neptun. First, the national measure allowed the dismissal of 
employees, thus clearly impacting on ongoing relationships, and, most importantly, 
on labour costs currently borne by the undertaking at issue. This is why the national 
court probably highlighted the immediacy of the burden for the State finances. The 
financial impact of the measure could indeed be increased by the second 
distinguishing factor, that is the fact that, as a consequence of the said dismissal, the 
State was obliged to pay the dismissed workers' pensions immediately. Oddly, this 
element is not dealt with at all by the Court. 
210 Case C-59/03 Cigliola v Ferret e de/lo Stato. 
211 See OJ 2003 C83/12,5 April 2003. 
212 The relevant legal basis is Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure which allows the Court to decide a case 
with reasoned order (and without Advocate General's Opinion) 'where a question referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the answer to such a 
question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question admits of no 
reasonable doubt'. A notice with a provisional translation of the operative part of the order has been 
published in COJ 2004 C106/17. 
213 A copy of the order in the language of the case (Italian) has been obtained from the Registry of the Court 
on 7th November 2005. 
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Admittedly, doubts could be entertained about whether the overall impact of the 
measure was really to involve a use of State resources. As in Vircido the measure at 
issue was intended to give flexibility to the beneficiary undertaking and thus the 
actual assessment of any net burden for the State might be difficult to ascertain. 214 
The Court, however, was quite sure about which position to take, and this is rather 
apparent from the language of its conclusion which follows almost word for word 
the (controversial) question referred. Considering its significance, it deserves a full 
quotation: 
[a] national law which allows an undertaking to terminate the contracts of 
employment of its oldest workers, setting aside ordinary law that permits 
continuation of the employment relationship and which thereby creates a 
situation in which the undertaking can save on labour costs, with an immediate 
resulting burden on the State in the form of reduced contribution revenue and the payment of 
pensions to dismissed workers, does not constitute State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87(l) EC. 215 
To our eyes the contradiction is clear. The Court expressly recognises that the 
measure produces `an immediate resulting burden on the State in the form of 
reduced contribution revenue and the payment of pensions to dismissed workers'. 
This, however, does not amount in its view to a use of State resources. 
It is time for the final, important questions. Can we really say that, after the 
fluctuations of the first period, the Court has eventually achieved stabiliy? Are these 
cases really, decided on the basis of the technical argument of the `State resources' 
requirement? Or, rather, the real rationale must be found somewhere else? 
Analysis of the 'State resources' requirement 
The determination of whether the notion of State aid necessarily requires a use of 
State resources has always been subject to a heated debate. The phrase 'granted by 
214 See, in this regard, the penetrating observation of Advocate General Jacobs in Joined Cases C-52/9; and 
C-54/97 Viaido, paragraph 15 of the Opinion, with respect to the uncertainty and non-quantifiability of the 
cost to the government in such circumstances. 
215 See paragraph 25 and the operative part (emphasis added). 
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the State or through State resources' in Article 87(1) EC has usually been subject to 
two contrasting interpretations. 
Extensive interpretation 
According to the first, more extensive approach, 216 only the second part of that 
phrase would refer to a financial burden for the State. The first part, quite generally 
referring to 'any aid granted by the State', would include all remaining measures 
which, although attributable to the State, are not financed by it. This interpretation 
is consistent with the broad wording of Article 87(1) EC, which prohibits 'any aid in 
any form whatsoever', and, in particular, with the focus on the effects of the measures 
which is usually derived therefrom. 217 Indeed the most important argument in 
support of this position is the teleological one. If, according to Article 3(g) EC, the 
main purpose of State aid rules is to safeguard the functioning of competition from 
distortions created by public intervention in favour of certain undertakings and 
production, the source of the financing of that measure is not material. 
The (too) formalistic interpretation of Article 87(1) EC, whereby only advantages 
financed through State resources would be considered as State aid, would eventually 
create an incentive on Member States to circumvent State aid regulation. The clearest 
example would occur when the State, rather than granting aid through a fund 
financed by private contributions, decided to mandate on private individuals or 
undertakings to make payments directly (ie without the intermediary of any fund) to 
given undertakings. The State would achieve its aim without suffering any cost. 
The potential distorting effect of the two measures would not be different. This 
point has been clarified by Advocate General Darmon in Sloman Neptun: 
[l]et us take, for the sake of argument, a public measure which requires 
individuals - consumers, workers, trading companies or any other category of 
private persons - to pay certain sums to a given undertaking or a given sector of 
, gis of 
Article [87], namely the industry. In my view, it follows from the ratio It 
216 Cf Slotboom (1999); Ross (1995); Bacon (1997); Roberti (1997); Conte (1999); Ross (2000). On the 
widespread criticism of the recent Prurue, Ekktra decision see, among others, Broncker & Van der sties 
(2001). Baquero Cruz & Castillo de la Torre (2001); Goossens & Emmerechts (2001); Rubini (2001). 
217 See Case 173/73 Itay v Cohn sioa, paragraph 13; Case 78/76 Steinicke und U einkg, paragraph 21. 
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maintaining equal conditions of competition between rival traders, that such a measure 
ought to be classified as aid. The 'public' nature of the aid which is implicit in 
Article [87(1)] relates more to the authority which adopted the measure - the 
State and its agencies - thereby disrupting normal market conditions, than to the 
body or person financing the aid. 218 
Restrictive interpretation 
The other approach, which, as we have seen, is supported by the consistent case law 
of the Court, 219 construes the notion of State aid in a more restrictive fashion. 22° 
The principle is that only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State 
resources can be considered as state aid. The reference in Article 87(1) to aid 
'granted through State resources' would only mean that that provision covers not 
only State aid granted directly by the State but also that granted through other public 
or private entities. 
In his Opinion in the PreussenElektra case Advocate General Jacobs put forward 
various arguments in support of this more restrictive position whereby the use of 
State resources is a constituent element of the notion of State aid. In particular, he 
observed that this is so because it'provides more legal certainty'. In his view, 
the more extensive interpretation would oblige the Member States, affected 
undertakings, the Commission, national courts and ultimately the Community 
Courts to decide in respect of all legislation regulating the relationship between 
enterprises whether it does confer selective advantages on certain undertakings 
within the meaning of Article [87(1)]. Since such an assessment is a difficult 
exercise with an uncertain outcome, it seems preferable that legislation regulating 
the relationship between private actors is as a matter of principle excluded from 
the scope of the State aid rules. 221 
218 Paragraph 40 of the Opinion. An additional argument is that the restrictive interpretation is likely to 
prejudice the power of control of the Commission under Article 88 EC. In the PrrmssexEkktra case, the 
Commission itself underlined the importance for State aid control of such procedure, particularly in the light 
of the recent developments in the EU (the completion of the internal market and the introduction of the 
EMU). In this regard, `selectively applied aid measures are the last remaining instrument which the Member 
States can use to confer competitive advantages on domestic undertakings' (cf paragraph. 146 of the Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs). 
219 After PmusexEkktra, more recent confirmations can be found in Case C-482/99 Starthut, and Case C- 
245/02, Pearle. 
2" Cf, for example, Plender (2004); Biondi & Eeckhout (2004). 
221 Opinion in PnxssexEkktra, paragraph 157. 
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This argument is similar to the pragmatic argument advanced in the Opinion in 
Viscido. After observing that the measures at issue did not involve a use of state 
resources, Jacobs rejected that state aid rules could cover 'all labour and other social 
measures' that are selective and might distort competition because 'to investigate all 
such regimes would entail an inquiry on the basis of the Treaty alone into the entire 
social and economic He of a Member State'. 222 
In PreussenElektra he further observed that the danger that Member States resort to 
large scale support for certain domestic undertakings which is financed through 
private resources, have the same anticompetitive effects as State aid and escape the 
Commission's control, in a single phrase the 'risk of circumvention', should not be 
exaggerated. Other provisions of the domestic and Community order are indeed 
likely to apply to those measures. 223 
Method of financing and legal certainty 
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of the applicability of other rules (which can 
be summed up in the question of regulation of policy substitution), we will spend 
some time on the important argument concerning legal certainty. In particular, what 
we want to test is whether the `State resources' requirement provides for the legal 
certainty that we would lack in its absence. 
Before focussing on this important point, the writer would like to make some 
general remarks on the role of the method of financing a measure of financial support. 
It can be easily agreed that a subsidy to a given industry or undertaking will in 
general alter the level playing field irrespective of whether it is financed with public 
or private money (it is sometimes wittily underlined that the State resources are 
financed with taxes and hence, in the last analysis, with resources coming from 
private individuals and undertakings). 
This does not detract from the fact that the method of financing of the measure 
may indeed produce a different impact, and is thus a factor that the Commission has 
222 Opinion in Visado, paragraph 16. 
223 Opinion in P, rjrrrenEkktm, paragraph. 158. 
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to take into due account when examining a plan to grant State aid under Article 88 
EC. 224 
On a general note, it may be underlined that the allocation of the financial burden of 
the State aid measure may aggravate the distorting effect of the advantage conferred 
by it. That would occur, for example, if an aid to certain undertakings were 
financed by its competitors. 225 
With more specific regard to the `State resources' issue, the fact itself that the State 
grants aid, and, most importantly, provides the resources to finance it, may certainly 
raise particularly concerns because of the virtually unlimited government resources 
(or, in any event, potentially greater if compared with private ones). Thus predatory 
conduct backed by the hugely `deep pocket' of public actors has definitely more 
chances to succeed as, by definition, there is no need to `recoup' when competitors 
have been drawn from the market. 226 
That said, to require, in general terms, the use of State resources as a necessary 
element of the notion of State aid is not justifiable from the point of view of the 
stated objective of State aid rules, the safeguard of competition. For this reason, it 
is submitted that the reading that seems to be more in line with the purpose of State 
aid rules is the more extensive one, ie Article 87(1) EC does not require that a State 
aid be necessarily financed through State resources. Truly, although in some cases, 
public financing may have a bigger potential to disrupt competition and trade, it can 
in general be predicated that the nature of the resources used to finance a State aid is 
not crucial from this point of view. To put it in another perspective, it seems that 
the method of financing the measure is not very significant to define the boundaries 
of the definition of State aid but rather in order to assess its effects. 
224 Cf Case 47/69 France v Commission, paragraph 14, where the Court even suggested that the method of 
financing the aid could not be isolated from the 'aid as such' so that the former, in conjunction with the 'aid 
in its narrow sense', could render the 'whole' incompatible with the common market (paragraph 4). 
225 This is exactly what happened in PreussenEkktra. Cf also the remark of Advocate General Jacobs in Joined 
Cases C-261/01 and C-262/01 Van Calster, paragraph 40 of the Opinion, where he suggested that the 
recovery of charges financing an illegal aid scheme is particularly important'if they themselves create 
distortions of competition and trade which would add to and reinforce the distortion produced by the aid 
itself. That may occur if they are imposed on competitors of the beneficiaries of the aid or if the charges are 
such as to produce a protective effect and five some form of advantage to the domestic market'. 
Predation is a common - and controversial - topic in competition law. For a general treatment in EC and 
US antitrust law, and for further references, see W'hish (2003: 703-710); Jones & Sufrin (2004: 385-403). 
Predation is also an important topic in subsidy law (and anti-dumping law). See, for example, Jackson (199 i: 
283); Trebilcock & Howse (2005: 283). 
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We may now concentrate on the important argument, put forward by Advocate 
General Jacobs various times, concerning legal certainty. To briefly repeat the point. 
the `State resources' requirement would constitute a useful tool of selection of 
measures since, in its absence, the State aid regime might be confronted with `all 
legislation regulating the relationship between enterprises' and ultimately with `the 
entire social and economic life of Member State'. 
We start, as usual, from the analysis of the case-law which defines what `State 
resources' are. 
In Ladbroke the Court confirmed that the concept of State resources `covers all the 
financial assistance by which the public sector may actually support undertakings, 
irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public 
sector'. What, crucially, would ultimately matter is that these resources are 'under 
the control' of the State. 227 This principle was repeated in Stardust where the Court 
concluded that the resources of public undertakings, 'falling within the control of 
the State' and being therefore 'at its disposal', amount to State resources. 228 In 
explaining the previous case law on the point, Advocate General Jacobs noted that 
[t]he common denominator of the relevant cases is that the State exercised direct 
or indirect control over the resources in question despite the fact that the funds 
did not come from the State budget. In the case of parafiscal charges the funds 
were first brought under the State's control before they were redistributed to the 
undertakings concerned. In the case of a waiver of revenue the State renounced 
funds which it was legally entitled to claim. State resources are therefore those 
resources which are directly or indirectly under the control or in other words at 
the disposal of the State. m 
As said, the position of the Advocate General was upheld by the Court which thus 
adopted a quite extensive notion of 'use of State resources' (it is interesting to note 
u' Case C-83/50P France v Ladbrnks Radx, g and Commürion, paragraph 50. The same finding was previoush 
made by the CFI in Case T-358/94 Air France, paragraphs 66 and 67. 
"a Case C-482/99 Stardust, paragraph. 38. 
2" Paragraph. 41 of the Opinion. 
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that the concept of `public control' used to impute the conduct of the public 
undertaking to the State is stricter than that used to define State resources). 230 
Allegedly, this broad approach to the notion of State resources is not, formalistic; and, 
to some extent, may be regarded as a counter-balance to the previous, more formalistic, 
finding in PreussenElektra where the unclear wording of the phrase 'granted by the 
State or through State resources' Article 87(1) EC was read as requiring a `cost to 
government'. 
Arguably, however, this broad notion of State resources does not provide a useful 
key of interpretation. The point is that the exact boundaries of the scope of `public 
control' are difficult to define. In other words, the issue is: how far this crucial 
concept could be stretched? It could in fact be argued that it has the potential to 
include if not all, at least many, cases where the State is somewhat involved in the 
financing. 
The comparison between measures that are commonly held to be State aid and 
measures that are not makes this difficulty evident. 
Whereas it is clear that a measure funded through a tax borne by consumers would 
clearly be regarded as a State aid, it is not clear why support through a government- 
mandated minimum-price scheme, which is eventually financed by consumers, 
would not constitute a State aid (see Van Tiggele). Quite similarly, whereas, despite 
some doubts, 231 it is accepted that there is a use of State resources when the State 
empowers a private or public body to levy parafiscal charges on private 
undertakings, that is not the case when the State mandates private undertakings to 
make payments in favour of other undertakings (see PreussenElektra). 
It can further be asked how it is possible to distinguish between the non-application 
of employment legislation with the result that labour costs of certain undertakings 
(including social contributions) are reduced, which does not amount to State aid (see 
Sloman Neptun), 232 and the introduction of special legislation, notably training and 
230 While the Court finds that the resources of public undertakings are always under the control and at the 
disposal of the State and hence constitute state resources, what it requires to attribute the conduct of the 
public undertaking to the State is the actxa/exercise of its influence on the former. 
231 See Slotboom (2002: 522); Quigley (1988: 250). 
The Court's argument about the `inherency in the system' of the loss of social contribution (which could 
also be seen as referring to the rrmotenetr of the loss) is not very convincing. A similar conclusion can quite 
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experience contracts, providing for a reduction of social security contributions, 
which has been found to constitute State aid (see Case C-310/99 Italy V Commission). 
Admittedly, there are no sound reasons to distinguish between the cases set forth 
above as it can reasonably be held that, in all of them, the resources used to finance 
the aid measure are, `directly or indirectly', 'under the control' or 'at the disposal' of 
the State. On the basis of the current case-law, maybe through a progressive 
interpretation, they could all be regarded as involving a use of State resources. 
From this perspective, the differential approach of the Court seems to be too much 
formalistic and not in line with the case law that underlines the purpose of State aid 
rules. On the one side, with its Byzantinism, it provides for Member States an easy 
way, if not an incentive, to circumvent the rules. At the same time, and most 
importantly, it is not fully satisfactory because, with its distinctions, it does not 
provide clear and consistent directives. 
Two further examples can be given that show the blur of the `control' criterion. 
`Soft loans' are usually regarded as State aids. 233 In such a case, according to the 
key of interpretation of Stardust, despite its inherent impalpability, the revenue that is 
foregone in the cases of opportunity costs should be considered `under the control' 
or `at the disposal of' the lender. Another example is offered by the Pearle case 
where the issue of financing was not only intertwined with that of imputability, but, 
arguably, was in fact dependent on it. The important point (and element of 
instability) is thus that, in the last analysis, the resources were not held to be public 
because the measure was not imputable to the public body at issue. 
In conclusion, there are good reasons to doubt about the conclusiveness of one of 
the most important arguments which are put forward in support of the `State 
resources' requirement. The previous exposition has, in our view, shown that there 
are good reasons to conclude that, at least in some cases, rather than providing 
more legal certainty, the 'State resources' requirement does raise serious concerns 
thereon. 
probably be drawn also with respect to the potential loss of tax revenue deriving from the lower employees' 
wages (see also similar cases: C-200/97 Erndade, paragraph 36; C-379/98 PnxsrenElektra, paragraph 62). 
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Conclusions: is the `State resources' requirement the real issue? 
The previous analysis has shown that it should be asked whether the reference to a 
`cost to government' is really an appropriate tool to define the boundaries of the 
notion of State aid. 
It is however the assessment of the Cigliola decision that, in our view, fully sheds 
light on the real rationale of this strand of case law. What emerges is that the 
`State resources' issue is just the - rather unjustifiable and imprecise - technical 
argument which the Court expressly relies on to dispose of cases that, in fact, it does 
not consider as State aid for other reasons. 
In our view, this reason mainly (and, as we will argue, unjustifiably) relate to the 
regulatory nature and/or the objective of the measure at issue. 234 
233 For a definition of `soft loan' see note 129 above. 
234 This true rationale was indeed caught by Davies (1995), an article significantly cited also by Advocate 
General Jacobs in his Opinion in I ücido. 
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3. The relevance of the objectives in subsidy and State aid rules 
Government may intervene in the market for various reasons, to make up for 
market failures or to pursue other legitimate socio-economic aims. 235 
One of the techniques to define the legal relevance of a certain action of the 
government may be to refer to the public policy objectives that are pursued by the 
latter. In this section we put forward some brief considerations on the role played 
by the public objectives in the regulation of subsidies and State aids. Considering 
their general applicability we analyse both EC and WTO law together. 
There is a specific reason why we deal with this technique at the end (after having 
examined the formulation of the definition, the rules of imputability and the origin 
of the resources). 
On the one hand, it does not seem that the objectives pursued by the measure at 
issue have been particularly relevant in defining what conduct amounts to a subsidy 
or a State aid. On the other hand, the issue of the role played by the objectives of 
the measure is a recurring theme in the various stages of the analysis of the 
regulation of subsidy and State aid. This section is thus intended to represent a 
useful bridge to the analysis of the following chapters. 
Unrecognized objectives and rule-oriented systems 
We should immediately underline that some objectives cannot be relevant at all in 
either legal system. 
The most notable example is that of so-called countervailing-subsidies, that is of 
subsidies that are granted to counter the effects of similar practices of other 
Member States. 
Apart from the more general considerations concerning subsidy-races and potential 
political and diplomatic tensions, the main legal argument against giving relevance to 
235 It is known that quite often market do not function perfectly for various reasons and that their natural 
outcomes may not be acceptable to a given society for reasons of efficiency or equity. This kind of issues 
belongs to we(farr economics (see note 55 above). See, inter olia, Begg, Fischer, Dornbush (1997: 240) et seq; 
Stiglitz (2000: pa sim and 53 et seq); Barr (2004: passim and Part 1). The issue of market failures is dealt with in 
the final chapter on the regulation of effects and objectives. 
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countervailing-subsidies is that they undermine any rule-based system founded on co- 
operation and on an agreed regime of control of subsidies. This was already clearly 
found by the GATT DISC Panel when it noted that 
[i]t could not accept that one distortion could be justified by the existence of 
another. 236 
A few years afterwards, the Court formulated a similar principle in the context of 
EC law observing that: 
[t]he effects of more than one distortion of competition on trade between 
Member States do not cancel one another out but accumulate and the damaging 
consequences to the common market are increased. 237 
From another perspective, countervailing subsidies or aids are a form of self-defence. 
It is known that this is in principle accepted only in exceptional and residual 
circumstances (with a Latin tag it is called extrema ratio). 238 However, in solidly rule- 
based systems such as the EC and the WTO they are not permitted altogether. 239 
In the context of GATT/WTO (but not in the EC), what is exceptionally permitted 
(constituting an express derogation - but always a derogation - from Article II 
GATT) is only to apply, in certain circumstances and according to certain 
procedures, countervailing duties. 240 
An important affirmation of the importance of `staying within the rules' comes from 
Article 32.1 SCM which provides that `no specific action against a subsidy of 
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 
236 Paragraph 79. 
237 Case 78/76 Steinicke v Germany, paragraph 24. 
238 See, more generally, Shaw (2003) page 1024 et seq.; Brownlie (2003) page 697 et seq. 
239 In the EC, this principle has been affirmed also with respect to the grant of aid by third countries which 
cannot justify the non-application of the EC Treaty rules in the EC; the issue should rather be addressed in 
the context of EC's external policy (see the 1994 Commission's guidelines on the application of State aid rules 
in the aviation sector, paragraph 11). Cf the different view of Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat in 
Case 169/84, COFAZ, page 407, who argued for the admissibility of countervailing aid. 
2" And, even with respect to this more limited, act of self-defence, it is known how many voices of criticism 
have been raised. See, in general, Jackson (1997) page 279 et seq; 'Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis 
(2003) page 262. The more comprehensive account is that of Trebilcock & Howse (2005) page 282 et seq. 
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1994, as interpreted by this Agreement'. The dispute settlement organs had the 
opportunity to interpret this provision with respect to the US Byrd Amendment 
(which provided that the proceeds of antidumping and countervailing duties should 
have been distributed to affected domestic producers). 241 In the recent US - Offset 
Act dispute, the Appellate Body considered the Byrd amendment as a `specific action 
against a subsidy' and thus found it contrary to Article 32.1 SCM. 242 
Finally, as we will more diffusely see in the next chapter on the advantage analysis, it 
also seems that subsidies to compensate for disadvantages of a given domestic 
industry as compared with foreign competing industries are not generally accepted 
because of their direct interference with comparative advantages and hence with 
international competition and trade (as we will see, the case might be different when 
these specific forms of intervention are justified by certain circumstances - such as a 
regional handicap or a restructuring, or, certainly when general measures, that is 
measures applicable to the whole of the economy, are concerned). 243 
Relevance of public objectives and various analysis levels 
Having said that, it is certainly true that both subsidy rules and State aid rules may 
take into account the objectives pursued by governments when they intervene in the 
economy. 
At the beginning, it has been anticipated that the analysis of the objectives of the 
governmental action may be one of the techniques to define the latter's legal 
relevance. According to the previous analysis, this seems, for example, to have 
occurred in a strand of the EC case law where the Court's negation that the measure 
at issue constituted a State aid seems to have partly been influenced by the purpose 
to compensate for some disadvantages faced, for various reasons, by the beneficiary 
undertakings (see the Sloman Neptun, Kirrammer-Hack, Viscido, Cigliola decisions 
241 Quite interestingly, the intellectual origin of the Byrd Amendment might probably be traced back as far as 
to 1791 and the famous Rrßort on Maxxfachms of Alexander Hamilton (see Lowenfeld (2002) note I at page 
200). 
242 Paragraphs 263 to 274. 
243 The main authority in the field in the EC is Case 173/73 Ita# v Commies ox, paragraph 13. See also joined 
Cases 6 and 11 /69 Commission v Frame, paragraph 21; Case C-6/97 Ital# v 
Commission, paragraph 21. As for 
\VI'O law, see the Panel, CIS - FSC, paragraph 7.122. For a useful comment on the 
latter see Hudec (2003) 
page 189. 
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thoroughly examined above). Another argument, as said, might have been the 
regulatory nature of these measures. 
It however seems that, on a proper construction of the rules, and in accordance 
with the consistent case-law that State aids should be defined on the basis of their 
effects, 244public objectives should not be relevant, at least at the very preliminan level 
of the definition of the action of the government. A similar conclusion can certainly 
be drawn with respect to WTO law where, although it is often recognised that 
governments may act for various policy reasons, 245 the assessment of the action of 
the government is always maintained at an objective level (suffice to read the 
financial contribution element thoroughly analysed above). 
Turning now to the observations that are of more general relevance for our work, 
we have to say that public objectives may in fact play a role - although a different 
one - in the legal analysis of rules but at subsequent levels. In particular, there is an 
interesting debate about their relevance at the level of the advantage analysis (see 
chapter 3) and of the effects analysis (chapter 5). 
The reader has certainly recognised from the previous brief remarks one of the 
recurring themes of this work, ie the importance to distinguish between scope and 
justification (or, from another perspective, between prohibition and justification). 
-'u See Case 173/73 ItaF v Commi i on, paragraph 13. 
245 See, for example, Panel, US - E4'ort Restraints, paragraph 8.31; Panel, US - Softwood Lrmber III, paragraph 
7.16. 
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IV. Bringing WTO and EC law together: critical and comparative 
analysis 
1. Critical and comparative analyses, internal and external perspectives 
In this final wrap-up section, our analysis will feature three different characteristics. 
The writer first attempts to provide a critical assessment of the state of the law of what 
governmental actions constitute a subsidy or a State aid in the WTO and in the EC, 
and provide suggestions about whether the law (or its interpretation) should be 
changed. In other words, we mainly focus on the third question that we have put 
ourselves at the beginning of the chapter (what action should be considered a subsidy 
or State aid under the two legal systems). 
Further, this critical assessment will be carried out from a comparative standpoint, that 
is the analysis of the similarities and differences between the two disciplines - and 
the two legal systems as a whole - will help us to better evaluate the correctness of 
the solutions adopted in each legal system. 
Finally, our analysis will be divided into two parts, by adopting two different 
perspectives, which can indeed be seen as two sides of the same coin. On the one 
side, we will assess the regulation of subsidies and State aids in itself (which we may 
call internal perspective), focussing in particular on the concerns about expansiveness in 
terms of governmental actions covered. 
On the other side, from what we could call an external perspective, we will briefly look 
at the other rules that in the two legal systems might apply to the same or similar 
forms of governmental action to address the worries about gstem coherency. 
2. The regulation of subsidies and of State aids: the `internal 
perspective' 
Recapitulation of the state of the law in the two legal systems 
We should commence with briefly summing up the state of the law concerning the 
element of the action of the government in the two legal systems. 
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WTO law 
In the WTO, the definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement (Article 1) provides 
for a heavy reliance on the forms or nature of the action of the government. Mainly 
forms of financial assistance, as we have defined it at the beginning of the chapter, 
seem to be covered. With respect to the action through third parties, the exact 
scope of the rules of imputability under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is still open. Although, 
as suggested, the wording seems to direct towards a strict reading - with the result 
that more complex forms of regulatory action would be excluded - we have recently 
seen an increasing relaxation of the standards with the result that it is at present 
difficult to make a precise assessment. Similarly, the exact remit of Article 1.1(a)(2), 
focussing on `any income or price support', is still difficult to define with accuracy. 
The examination of the AoA has provided some interesting results with respect to 
the forms of action covered, in particular with respect to the angle of the rules of 
imputability for indirect action. In particular, the test under Article 9.1(c), which 
covers payments `financed by virtue of governmental action', expressly relies on a 
rule of imputability which is less formalistic than the ones examined under the SCM 
Agreement. What matters here is the degree of causality (which the Appellate Body 
calls `demonstrable link') between the government's conduct and the financial 
support through an intermediary. 
With respect to the `cost to government', the Appellate Body seems to have 
definitely put this highly debated issue to rest by excluding its necessity under the 
definition of subsidy under Article 1 SCM, at least with respect to the cases of 
indirect action under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
Finally, it does not seem that the pursuit of public objectives by the government 
through subsidisation plays any role at the level of the definition of the actions 
caught in the discipline. 
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EC law 
In the analysis of EC law we have focused on the only definition of State aid which 
is enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 87 EC. 
Despite a broader language as compared with that of Article 1 SCM, we see a 
remarkably similar interpretation with respect to the forms of governmental action 
covered. In other words, it seems that only forms of financial assistance are 
covered by the provision with the exclusion of more complex forms of regulation. 
The arguments that are relied on to reach this conclusion partly refer to the nature or 
form of the measure (as occurs in WTO law), partly on the objectives of the measure, 
and partly rely on the use of `State resources'. 
With respect to the financing through public funds, it has to be highlighted that it is 
required of any form of support - be it financial assistance or regulation. It has also 
been seen that the test used to determine what constitute `State resources' - ie 
whether they are `under the control' or `at the disposal' of the State - is not of easy 
application and the boundaries of the resulting coverage of the concept are difficult 
to draw with precision. A similar test of `public control' is used as rule of 
imputability to determine whether the conduct of third parties can in fact be 
attributed to the State. It has however been seen that it remains open whether more 
complex and less direct regulatory mechanisms can in fact be covered by such rule 
or whether another, more comprehensive, rule of imputability could be found in the 
broad language of Article 87(l) EC. 
Critical and comparative assessment 
After this brief summing-up of the state of the law with respect to the forms of 
public action covered in the two systems, the time has come for making a critical and 
comparative assessment thereof. 
We may recall that the main worry of the `internal perspective' is about expansiveness, 
that is about whether the scope of the relevant regulation is too comprehensive or, 
with a single word, excessive. 
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The issue is therefore where boundaries should be more appropriately set, which is 
indeed one of the leitmotifs of the thesis. In this regard, we may briefly note that 
there are two principal ways through which boundaries can be set in a regulation of 
subsidies or State aids. 
On the one hand, and this is what is under scrutiny in this chapter, one route may 
be to directly deal with the governmental action itself and its characteristics. As we have 
seen, this may in turn require concentrating of the form/nature, imputability, 
financing, or objective of the measure. 
On the other hand, one can draw boundaries to the discipline by focussing on the 
various aspects concerning the impact of the governmental action. We will see in the 
next chapters that this may be done by revolving around the advantage granted by the 
measure, by the - more or less specific - subjective breadth of its impact, and, eventually, 
by the - negative and/or positive - effects that are produced and objective that are 
pursued. 
Having clarified that, we may commence with WTO law whose appraisal is quite 
straightforward, and, we may anticipate, positive. 
We will mainly direct our observations on the main discipline, that is on the SCM 
Agreement, and in particular on the `financial contribution' requirement, which we 
believe to be the most significant provision. 
It seems to us that the balance struck by Article 1.1(a)(1) is sound. The difficult 
outcome of the fatigues of the negotiators, that is the wording of the financial 
contribution requirement, has been correctly construed by the jurisprudence of the 
dispute settlement organs (the only qualification concerns the perplexities raised by 
the Appellate Body in the US - DRAMS Report). 
In substance, the financial contribution element, as interpreted by the dispute 
settlement organs, represents the medium way between the two extremes vigorously 
put forward during the Uruguay Round negotiations. On the one side, the US 
wanted to push through a definition of subsidy which singled out the benefits and 
effects produced by governmental intervention in the economy without paying any 
attention whatsoever to the form or nature of that conduct. On the other side of 
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the spectrum, the EC were focussing only on those forms of governmental action 
that produce a charge on the public account. 
The solution of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM is arguably a reasonable balance between 
these two positions: i) the form or nature of the financial contribution matter, ii) the 
origin of the resources does not matter. In sum, while rejecting the significance of 
the origin of the financial resources, the SCM mainly includes in the definition of 
subsidy only those forms of financial assistance that are generally considered as 
subsidies (and, conversely, leaves out the most controversial forms of regulatory 
action). 
If we looked at the wider context, we cannot but underline how this middle position 
is certainly consistent with the current limited degree of economic integration of the 
WTO (cf the different EC context). In brief, this solution is in tune with a certain 
degree of deference towards the regulatory action of Member States (we may regard 
in this context the limited scope for harmonisation in the WTO, in particular as 
compared with the EC). Further, it is in line with customary rules of interpretation 
of the Vienna Convention, with their emphasis on the textual approach and the 
corresponding rather restrained role played by teleological arguments, particularly in 
a context, that of subsidy rules, where we have traditionally seen a significant 
disagreement between Members on the objective(s) of the discipline. 
This latter argument leads us to consider the `double-relevance' played by the 
definition of subsidy in the WTO regulation of subsidies where, beside the 
multilateral track (ie international obligations on the use of subsidies), there exists 
also a unilateral track (ie imposition of countervailing duty on subsidised imports). 
The problem is that a too excessively extensive definition of subsidy would risk 
expanding too much the resort to the - consistently criticized - countervailing duty 
path. 246 With an extreme, but, for this reason, forceful argument, Jackson (1997: 
293-294) underlines how an unduly broad definition of subsidy would expose too 
many government measures to countervailing actions (which, we should recall, 
already constitute an exception to Article II GAT I) with the ultimate risk of 
undermining the whole system of post-World War II GATT liberal trade. The 
246 Particularly, if the major user so far of countervailing duty actions (the US) traditionally propends for an 
extensive notion of subsidy. 
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foregone conclusion is that `the international system should be trying to define a 
subset of a certain type of "subsidy" with which it will be concerned'. 
Having a single definition of subsidy for both `tracks' (one controlling subsidies, one 
controlling reactions to subsidies), it was particularly important to reach a balanced 
interpretation of the financial contribution element. This would in turn have 
resulted in a balanced approach to the remedy-issue. The importance of this 
balance has been recently underlined by the Appellate Body whose findings deserve 
full quotation: 
... the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement ... reflects a 
delicate balance 
between the Members that sought to impose more disciplines on the use of 
subsidies and those that sought to impose more discipline on the application of 
countervailing measures. Indeed, the Appellate Body has said that the object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement is `to strengthen and improve GATT disciplines 
relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures, while, 
recognizing at the same time, the right of Members to impose such measures 
under certain conditions' [US - Softwood Lumber IV, paragraph 64]. 247 
Having assessed WTO law, we may now pass to EC law. For the sake of fairness, 
the result of the appraisal should be anticipated in this case too. The current state 
of the law with respect to the forms of governmental action covered by Article 
87(1) EC, particularly as it results from the interpretation thereof, is substantially 
unrati factory. 
The main, general finding is that the scope of EC State aid rules (at least with 
respect to the forms of governmental action covered), is substantially equal to, if not 
even, narrower than that of WTO subsidy rules. 
This is indeed paradoxical as we would have expected a different coverage but, 
arguably, the other way round, with WTO proceeding at a slower pace. 
Unlike the financial contribution requirement in Article I SCM, Article 87(l) 
provides for a broad and potentially comprehensive language: `any granted by the 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever'. This provision, and its 
wording, should be set in the broader EC context where we certainly have a higher 
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degree of economic (and not-only) integration between its Member States, and 
where, consequently, the approach to interpretation is quite flexible, being 
characterised by a heavy reliance on teleology. 
These elements - broader language, higher integration, more reliance on teleological 
arguments - would all together lead to a comprehensive reading of Article 87(1) EC 
from various perspectives. 
It could be argued that Article 87(1) should not cover only the more commonly 
accepted and traditional forms of financial assistance but also the more complex 
forms of regulatory action. Thus the reference to the form or nature of the action of 
the government should not be relevant. And, as suggested, the consideration of the 
public objectives of the measure at the level of the definition of the action is not in line 
with the consolidated emphasis on the ffects of the measure and hence does not 
seem correct. 
With respect to indirect action, we should - and, admittedly, the quite flexible 
Stardust test might lead in this direction - expect a quite loose approach to the rules 
of imputability, much more resembling the causality approach that we have found in 
Article 9.1(c) AoA than the more formalistic one of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) SCM. 
Finally, the repeated - and now consolidated - reference to the necessity of a use of 
`State resources' should be put aside as it does not make much sense from the 
perspective of the competition purpose of the discipline (particularly in the context 
of an increarin completed internal market). What matters is that an undertaking or an 
industry receives an unfair economic advantage and not who is burdened. 248 
Moreover, the loose criterion of public control which is used to define what 
constitutes `State resources' is uncertain - if not contradictory - when it comes to its 
actual application. It may even be suggested that the reliance on the argument of 
`State resources' can be viewed as a technical surrogate for disposing of certain forms 
of action based on their regulatory nature or their objectives. 
Further, considering the remedy-side, we should underline that, contrary to what 
happens in the WTO, in the EC Members do not have the possibility to resorting to 
247 US - DRAMS, paragraph 115. 
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unilateral defensive measures such as countervailing duties. The argument put 
forward in the WTO in support of a balanced - better, cautious - interpretation of 
Article 87(1) with respect to definition of State aid would thus not be applicable. 
To explain the restrictive approach of the EC towards certain regulatory measures 
and towards the issue of financing, a comparison is appropriate. It is interesting to 
consider the interpretation of State aid in EC `internal' law together with that of 
subsidy in EC external relations (the one defended during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations). 
With respect to the latter, it seems indeed that the motive that has led the EC to 
introduce the `cost to government' requirement was to limit the concept of subsidy 
and through this keep at bay the aggressive use of countervailing duty actions made 
by the US. Interestingly, this additional element was required of the definition of 
GATT subsidy at the same time when, in EC law, the concept of State aid was 
generally held (surely so in Commission's policy) not to demand a use of `State 
resources'. 249 It has thus been suggested that `the Community seems to have 
elevated a tactical move to the level of policy'. 250 
A similar attempt of limitation can be found in the restrictive interpretation of the 
definition of EC State aid. This move, which is heavily based on the requirement of 
`State resources', is aimed at excluding certain forms of regulatory measures from the 
coverage of State aid rules. This may partly, be explained for reasons of 
constitutional deference towards Member States' policies. We said `partly' because, 
as we will see, the non-application of State aid rules does not necessarily preclude 
the application of other EC rules. 
This attempt to exclude certain regulatory measures from the coverage of State aid 
law can be put in its historical momentum. Cases such as Sloman Neptun and 
Kirsammer-Hack belong to the same generation of Keck. 251 Both produced the 
248 As we have underlined, the method of financing, and in particular the use of public money, is relevant at 
the level of the assessment of the impact of the State aid and not of its definition. 
249 See the examination of the `first period' of the case law on the `State resources' requirement above. For 
the position of the Commission reference is once again made to what the latter argued in the Frdialcases 
(Case 187/85 and Case 188/85): see respectively paragraphs 32 and 34 of the two Report of the Hearing. 
2S0 Bronckers & Quick (1989: 18). See also Slotboom (2002: 532). 
251 Joined Case C-267 and 268/91 Keck was decided on 24th November 1993. While Kirsammer-Hack was 
passed only 6 days afterwards, its precursor, S/onrvn Neptxa, was judged a few months earlier (17th March). On 
the link between Keck and the other State aid cases see Davies (1995) page 59; Ross (1995) pages 82 and 83. 
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limitation of the scope of, respectively, Article 87 and Article 28 EC by sheltering, 
although in different ways, `certain' regulatory mearurer. 252 
252 It is important to make two remarks. First, although partly overlapping the concept of `regulation' is used 
in different senses in the two contexts (in the State aid context it is opposed to `financial assistan ce', in the 
internal market context to `restrictions to trade' which may well include regulatory requirements concerning, 
for example, products' composition and packaging). Secondly, Keck does not exempt `certain selling 
arrangements' from the scope of Article 28 EC altogether, but merely prohibits discriminatory measures. 
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3. The other rules: the `external perspective' 
Although the findings of the internal perspective are already significant, in our quest 
for boundaries we might also bri fly look at the external perspective of subsidy and 
State aid rules, that is at the other rules that might in principle apply to measures 
which may be classified as, or are similar to, subsidies or State aids. This `external' 
analysis is directly linked to the concerns about gstem coherency which, as anticipated, 
represent the other side of the coin of the concerns about the expansiven s of 
subsidy and State aid rules. 
Before commencing this analysis, two remarks should be made. First, the following 
observations are not confined to the more limited issue of the public intervention 
but more generally concern all aspects of subsidy and State aid regulation. Further, 
what is attempted to do here is merely to sketch a problem-framework. In other 
words, the writer will raise issues rather than providing answers, as the matter is huge 
and goes beyond the research topic. 
Sketching the terms of the problem: rules and system 
As a matter of principle, it can immediately be underlined the importance of setting 
each set of rules in its wider context. In other words, (at least) academic lawyers 
should try to look at legal systems as coherent systems where the scope of the various 
sets of rules, and the relationships between themselves, are well-defined. 
In the current context, the main issue when we are dealing with concerns about 
gstem coherency is whether measures that are alleged to be caught by subsidy or State 
aid rules should more appropriately be covered by other rules. 
A linked, and delicate issue, is that of circumvention of the law or, with another wording, 
of policy substitution. The legal system may present a lacuna or a gap in the regulation 
(which, to be as such, should always be non-deliberate and unjustifiable) enabling 
certain courses of conduct that should be regulated by a certain set of rules to fall 
outside the scope thereof (or, even, of any rule altogether). 
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Crucially, the application of different rules often involves a different substantive 
regulation (for example, with respect to the definition of the scope of application and 
of prohibitions/justifications). Further, different procedural rules may be applicable 
with an important impact on the institutional and, even, constitutional side. 
Rules overlap and system coherency 
It is sometimes argued that a too expansive scope of subsidy and State aid rule 
would entail a danger for the coherency of the system. The issue, however, is 
whether there is any such thing as system coherency with respect to those measures that 
may be covered by subsidy and State aid rules (and indeed even from a more general 
perspective). 
In this regard, it may be particularly useful to commence with a quotation of 
Professor Ehlermann (2002: 630) who, in a recent account of his experience on the 
bench of the Appellate Body, made the following considerations by drawing from 
his twofold experience as EC and WTO lawyer: 
[f]rom the beginning, I have been impressed by what seems to me to be a rather 
important difference between the two legal orders. Substantive WTO law 
appears to me to be less structured than EC law. The same contested measure 
is often examined under a series of provisions, possibly contained in different 
covered agreements. All of these provisions and agreements seem to apply 
simultaneously and cumulatively. There seems to be no - or at least little - 
structure, and overall architecture, which would allow distinguishing between lex 
generalis and lex specialir. 
The author then drew some examples. Quite interestingly, one of them was the 
`relationship between the GATT, the GATS and the Subsidies Agreement'. He 
concluded by asking `whether it would not be necessary (or appropriate) to 
determine a dividing line between these three agreements, in order to avoid a 
systematic overlap of the three texts'. 
The previous observations are precious and constitute a good starting point for our 
brief analysis (which, as said, will raise more issues rather than offering answers). 
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The most important consideration is that, despite any systemic uneasiness, it is a 
matter of fact in virtually any legal system that the same measure (or different aspects 
thereof) may be regulated by different provisions. Certainly this may cause some 
problems with respect to the applicable law, the procedure to follow, and the 
institutional/constitutional share of competence. But, as said, these situations of 
overlap do indeed take place and, to a large extent, the interpreter has to live up 
with them. 
This seems to occur both in EC and in WTO law with respect to subsidy and State 
aid. 
If we look for example at EC law, Biondi & Eeckhout (2004) underline how the 
case-law, although seemingly referring to the aspect of the measure under scrutiny, 
does not provide a clear divide between internal market rules and State aid rules. 
Admittedly, a quite clear distinction exists between specific measures distorting 
competition (covered by State aid rules) and general measures distorting 
competition (which may, in principle, be subject to harmonisation). 
In general, it seems that a similar situation - as underlined by Ehlermann - would 
occur in WTO law. There are indeed no special reasons why a measure falling 
within the scope of subsidy rules should not be covered also by other provisions 
such as Articles II, III or XI GATT. 
As said, however, the application of one rule rather than another has indeed 
different implications. 
The case of WTO is particularly instructive. The most important peculiarity is that 
to consider a measure as a subsidy may open the way to the imposition of a 
unilateral countervailing duty on the relevant imports, which would not occur if the 
same measure is covered only under Article XI or III GATT (or indeed Article II 
GATT to which Article VI - permitting countervailing duties - is just an exception 
Other interesting systemic observations are raised if we consider justifications. To 
classify a measure of financial support as a trade-barrier covered by Article XI 
GATT or as a discriminatory regulation under Article 111: 3 GATT opens up, at least 
in principle, the possibility of applying the justifications under Article XX GATT. 
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If, by contrast, the same measure is examined under subsidy rules, the possibility of 
justification seems to be much more limited in scope. It seems indeed that we 
should only resort to the category of `non-actionable subsidies' under the SCM, the 
latter being a development of the GATT provisions on subsidies. 253 
The issue becomes particularly intriguing if both sets of provisions (GATT 
provisions and SCM provisions) are held to apply cumulatively. Does a justification 
under one agreement, for instance the GATT, suffice to shelter the practice from 
the wrath of the other agreement, say the SCM? Further, considering that the 
category of `non-actionable' subsidies is for now dead letter, can the general 
justifications under Article XX become relevant again also with respect to the 
subsidy issue? 
As the previous non-exhaustive analysis has shown, there are many interesting 
systemic issues, which would well deserve further research. What, in our view, can 
already be said is, however, that whatever outcome this research should produce, 
our findings based on the `internal perspective' above should substantially remain 
safe. This is mainly due to the previous observation that the overlap between 
different provisions is an inevitable matter of fact in any legal system. 
253 It should, however, be recalled that, at least under the current state of the law, our reasoning is purely 
speculatively. The category of `non-actionable' subsidies has expired in the year 2000. 
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Chapter 3 
The advantage analysis 
I. Scope of the chapter 
The legal definition of the concept of advantage is the subject of this chapter. This 
element, which is inherent in both notions of subsidy and State aid, refers to the 
possession of economic resources that the beneficiary undertaking receives from the 
government. 
The importance of the concept of advantage, and hence of this chapter, can be 
appreciated if this element is placed in context. The advantage produced by the 
public intervention in the economy is the crucial factor that eventually makes the 
subsidy liable to produce negative (in the form of distortion of international 
competition and trade) and/or positive (in the form of remedy to an undesired 
socio-economic situation) effects. 
The following sections explain the process to determine the existence of an 
advantage in the two systems, ie the advantage analysis, and the main difficulties 
emerging therefrom. 
The first part introduces to the basic notions of comparison and benchmark, the 
underlying core idea/test of derogation from the norm, and the political and 
economic context of the advantage analysis. The exposition then follows a two-fold 
pattern, depending on whether the public intervention occurs in the market or 
outside it. The role played by the public policy objectives pursued by governments 
through subsidies is thoroughly examined. A case-study on the issue of the 
financing of public services closes the chapter. 
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II. Introduction: the advantage analysis 
1. The steps of the analysis 
In Canada - Aircraft the Appellate body laid down findings whose generality makes 
them suitable for explaining the operation of the advantage analysis in both legal 
systems. 
As expressed by its ordinary meaning, the concept of `benefit' under Article 1.1(b) 
SCM `clearly encompasses some form of advantage'. 254 This intuitive, still skeletal, 
idea, the need that the governmental conduct somewhat confers an economic advantage 
(ie an increase of financial means or revenue, or a decrease of costs), is immediately 
given flesh: 
the word "benefit", as used 
This must be so, for there 
'financial contribution' makes 
been, absent that contribution. 
in Article 1.1(b), implies some kind of comparison. 
can be no "benefit" to the recipient unless the 
the recipient "better off' than it would otherwise have 
In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate 
basis for comparison in determining whether a "benefit" has been "conferred" ... 
whether the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on terms more 
favourable than those available to the recipient in the market. 
255 
The added emphasis highlights the main steps of the advantage analysis. 
The determination of the conferral of `some form of advantage' is based on i) `some 
kind of comparison' which in turn requires ii) an `appropriate basis' for it, that is an 
appropriate benchmark. 256 Crucially, this comparative process should lead to 
determine whether the recipient is `better off than iii) it `would otherwise have 
been, absent' the government measure. 
These findings are examined in turn. 
2-4 Appellate Body, paragraph 153; cf also Panel, paragraph 9.112 
255 Appellate Body, paragraph 157 (emphasis added); cf also Panel, paragraph 9.112 
Incidentally, the reference to the marketplace depended on the circumstances of the case - the government 
was acting on the market - and this should not necessarily be considered as a rule 
in all cases. 
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2. The basic concepts: comparison and benchmark 
Basics first. The Appellate Body noted that the advantage analysis depends on a 
comparison of the measure at issue against the appropriate benchmark. This 
conclusion is plainly transposable to Article 87(1) EC. Advocate General Cosmas 
noted that the concept of advantage is based on the ideas of `comparison' and `point 
of reference'. 257 Similarly, it has been underlined that `[n]o advantage can be 
identified without a comparator first being found as a benchmark for treatment. ' 258 
Common sense is sufficient to understand this point. The question of whether one 
has received an advantage immediately begs another question: advantage in relation to 
what, in relation to whom? This means that it is necessary to make a comparison and, 
to do so, to find a suitable benchmark. This exercise discloses whether any 
advantage has been received. 
The `appropriate' benchmarks may be disparate. The government may intervene, 
and produce an impact, in the economy, in two broad ways. This distinction is 
important to identify the correct benchmark. If the public body performs an 
economic activity in the market, this conduct is tested against the market benchmark 
applicable in the circumstances. If, by contrast, the public body carries out a 
conduct which is not economic but inherently governmental, the suitable benchmark 
will be normative since it has to be found in the relevant regulation. 
It is worth underlining that the two-fold distinction between economic and non-economic 
activity, and market and normative benchmarks, is not based on the objectives pursued 
by the government (which in either case are presumed to be for the common good) 
but rather on the nature of the action. This important point is clarified further in 
paragraph 4 below. 
3. The operative test, or how the analysis works 
So far, we are still at a superficial level. To say that the advantage analysis implies 
`some kind' of comparison and that an `appropriate' benchmark needs to be found 
? 57 Case C-353/95P Ladbmkt, paragraph 30 of the Opinion. 
Ross (2000b: 407). 
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(be it a market or normative one) is still descriptive. It does not explain how this 
analysis works and, eventually, how the determination that an advantage has, or has 
not, been conferred can be made. To do so the comparative process mentioned 
above has to be embodied into an operative test. 
The findings in Canada -Aircraft provide again a useful indication. 
The Appellate Body noted that the comparison refers to what `would otherwise 
have been' in absence of the measure at issue and, in the case of economic activity, 
to whether the measure has taken place on `terms more favourable than those 
[otherwise] available in the market' (in the latter phrase the term `otherwise' has 
been added by the writer, assuming that this concept can be safely implied from the 
context). 
The derogation test: norm and deviation 
The key to define the operative test - the third step of the advantage analysis - is the 
construction of the idea of `otherwise available' which is referred to by the Appellate 
Body in both sentences. 
This wording hints at two ideas. First, it crucially defines the benchmark with 
reference to an idea of norm or normality. This is not an absolute standard but a 
relative one. What is the otherwise applicable - the `appropriate' - norm depends on 
the circumstances of the case, and mainly on the distinction made above between 
economic and non-economic activity. 
The second idea that can be derived from the `otherwise due' language is that the 
advantage would be the result of a derogation from the appropriate benchmark-norm. 
This (derogation) test is a serious candidate for the operative test giving shape to the 
`comparison with an appropriate benchmark' underlying the advantage analysis. 
This analysis finds confirmation in EC law. In the early Steenkyomenen case, the 
Court of justice laid down a statement which has become standard in the case-law. 
The concept of aid 
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embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges that are normally 
included in the budget of undertakings ... 
' 259 
The idea of (departure from) normality underlying the concept of aid is clear and 
supports the previous construction of the test of the advantage analysis. Two 
illustrious Advocate Generals of the Court underlined that it is necessary to 
establish whether there is an economic advantage which would not have been 
granted in the normal course of events. 260 With a general language, referring to a market 
transaction, the Court itself found that 
in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to 
establish whether the recipient receives an economic advantage which it would not 
have obtained under normal market conditions. 261 
Whereas the EC language expressly refers to the idea of normality, also the idea that 
the existence of an advantage would result from the derogation from this norm 
seems to find an implicit, albeit logical, confirmation. 262 
All this leads to the conclusion that the `derogation from the norm' is the operative 
test we were looking for, the core paradigm of the advantage analysis. 
Variations on the theme: defining the norm, determining the exception 
Sometimes a different formulation of the test to establish the advantage can be 
found. This echoes the principle of equality (or, negatively, the prohibition of 
discrimination) and focuses on whether the situation at issue is treated like comparable 
situations. In interpreting the phrase `otherwise due' under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) SCM 
(which concerns the taxation activity of governments), the Appellate Body found 
259 Case 30/59 Steenk'omenes, page 19 (emphasis added). 
260 Cf Advocate General Slynn in Case 84/82 Germany v Commitnon, page 1501; Advocate General Jacobs in 
Cases 278 to 280/92 Hytara, paragraph 28. 
261 Case C-39/94 SFEI, paragraph 60 (emphasis added). 
262 An express reference to a `derogation from the norm' can be found in the Commission's practice with 
respect to taxation and State aid. See below. 
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that `like will be compared with like' and that it is necessary to `compare the fiscal 
treatment of legitimately comparable income'. 263 
This variation can also be found in EC law. In Adria-Wien the Court noted that the 
question is whether a State measure favours certain undertakings `in comparison 
with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable 
in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question'. 264 Advocate 
General Cosmas expressly linked the prohibition of State aid to the principle of 
equality. 265 This linkage to a general principles discourse has been nicely elaborated 
by a scholar: `the prohibition of State aid appears as a result of the general principle 
of equality, and the rule derived from it that a like rule should apply to like 
situations'. 266 
All these formulations lay down what can be dubbed as `comparative test'. 
What is interesting to ask is whether there is a link between this idea of comparison 
of similar situations - and its underlying rule of equal treatment, or, to put it 
differently, of non-discrimination - on the one hand, and the idea of derogation 
from the norm on the other. Are these two tests different? Or, more simply, do we 
have two formulations of substantially the same test? Although this issue has come 
out prominently in the US - FSC dispute, and is comprehensively dealt with below, 
it is believed useful to anticipate the main findings. 
The derogation test directly focuses on the logical process to determine whether the 
measure at hand grants an advantage (by expressly using the suggestive language of 
derogation or exception). The other formulation seems to be more low-profile from 
this perspective (usually referring to the quite neutral concept of comparison rather 
than to the more expressive idea of discrimination). The comparative test is 
however particularly instructive when it comes to define the appropriate benchmark 
used in the derogation test. It will be seen that the reference to `comparable or like 
situations' represents the core concept around which the notions of general rule or 
norm should be defined. 
263 US - FSC (Artich 21(5)), paragraphs 90 and 
91. 
=61 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien, paragraph 41. 
Us Case C-353/95P Ladbrokt, at paragraph 30 of the Opinion. 
2" Ross (2000b: 407, emphasis added). 
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The substantial identity of the two tests is confirmed by the fact that their languages 
are always overlapping (also in this thesis). There may be a reference to the 
existence of an exemption from the rule or to a differential treatment between 
undertakings. In both cases, the subsequent issue is whether this apparent anomaly 
is in fact justified. Whatever language is used, the underlying process is the same 
and requires a complex analysis which focuses on similarities and differences, 
objectives and justifications, and eventually rules and exceptions therefrom. 
Whilst the intrinsic mechanics is the same, the `comparative' and `derogation' tests 
usefully emphasise and clarify different steps of the advantage analysis (respectively what 
the norm is and what the exception is). The writer's choice to refer to the 
`derogation test' as the paradigm of the advantage analysis is simply dictated by the 
belief that this formulation better conveys the ideas of deviation (or discrimination) 
that is eventually crucial in determining the conferral of an advantage. 
To conclude, a music aficionado would say that the two formulations are variations 
of the same theme rather than two distinct themes. Like variations in melody, 
rhythm, harmony or ornamentation show different facets of the theme to the 
benefit of beauty, conceptual variations in law, and indeed in other scientific areas, 
may clarify different issues to the benefit of better understanding. To seek beauty in 
law would probably be overambitious. 
4. The context of the advantage analysis: market liberalization 
and public role redefinition 
Market liberalization and social welfare recognition 
The advantage analysis, and more generally the debate on public subsidies, can be 
understood only if the more general economic and political context is properly 
considered. 
The current times have seen the emergence of two phenomena which involve 
strong cultural and ideological, financial and political forces. 
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First, there is a trend, well known at least in western economies, towards liberalisation 
of the economy and privatization of public undertakings. 267 Sectors that till recently 
were public reserves (such as health, education, transport and public utilities - post, 
communications, water, electricity, gas) are increasingly liberalized and privatized. 
The role played by private actors in the provision of theses services is more and 
more significant. This depends on various reasons, which can be fairly summed up 
in the belief that competitive markets are more beneficial to consumers and that the 
private sector is able to operate more efficiently. Ultimately, the greater budgetary 
constraints faced by governments also contribute to the reconsideration and retreat 
of direct public intervention in the economy. 
What governments are not retreating from is their main purpose and justification, 
the pursuit of the public interest. Whereas the means to reach it may change, for 
example regulation instead of direct provision, the social dimension of public action 
faces a renewed recognition. 268 The most notable example is the current debate on 
public services that can be seen in many legal and political contexts, including the 
EC and the WTO. 269 
These two phenomena underlie the current redefinition of the public role in the economy 
which also offers the opportunity for a conceptual clarification which is fundamental for 
the advantage analysis. 
Public role redefinition and conceptual clarification 
Liberalization and privatization are leading to a crucial redefinition of the role of 
governments in the economy. Governments are increasingly changing from providers 
to regulators. 270 Many activities, such as the provision of infrastructure or public 
services, which were typically supplied by the government and traditionally 
considered public, increasingly involve at various stages private actors. 
267 See, in general, Stiglitz (2000: Chapter 1). 
268 For two recent and interesting collections of essays of the EC debate see De Bt: irca (2006) and Dougan 
and Spaventa (2005). The need to `take action to redistribute opportunities in favour of the poor' is also an 
increasingly topical debate in the governance of the world trading system. For a general discussion and 
references see Van den Boosche (2005: 29-35) 
269 For various references the reader is referred to the last section of the chapter. 
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Economic and non-economic activities 
The redefinition of the role of the public intervention in the economy calls for a 
conceptual clarification between i) those activities that are truly non-economic because, 
even hypothetically, they would not be carried out be private agents and are thus 
inherently public, and ii) those that, although involving a public interest and thus the 
responsibility of the State, are economic because may take place in a market scenario 
and be ruled by market logic. 
This distinction is crucial for the operation of the advantage analysis because it tells 
us what is subject to the market, its logic and rules (ie economic activity), and what is 
not (non-economic activity). 
A brief exposition of some basics of welfare economics, and in particular the 
distinction between public and private goods, may be useful to better understand 
this important conceptual divide. 271 
A primer on public, private and publicly provided private goods 
Economics teaches us about two key concepts, those of public and private goods. 
Public goods are those goods or services which, if provided, are open to use by all 
members of society. 272 Conversely, private goods are any good or service which if 
used by one individual or firm are not available to others. 273 
More specifically, public goods are characterised by the fact that it is not possible to 
exclude any individual from the benefits of the good without incurring great costs, 
so-called excludability. Another property, less significant for the purposes of this 
analysis, is that of non-rival consumption. 274 
Pure public goods, ie those goods or services that clearly fulfil both properties above, 
are rare (eg defence, lighthouses, street-lighting). 
270 This phenomenon has been analysed by many commentators. See, eg, Mfajone (1994); La Spina and 
Majone (2000). For other references the reader may wish to consult the general work of Cave and Baldwin 
(1999). 
271 The following exposition substantially draws from the clear and authoritative work of Stiglitz (2000: 
Chapters 6 and 8). 
272 Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 379). 
273 Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 368). 
27' This means that public goods can be used simultaneously by more persons without this causing anm 
particular additional cost. 
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The importance of the distinction between public and private goods is that, under 
the common premiss that private agents normally act rationally (ie selfishly: sic! ) and 
not altruistically, public goods are not normally supplied by the private sector, mainly 
because individuals cannot be excluded from, and hence charged for, their use. For 
this reason, they are considered a paradigmatic example of market failure which 
justifies the public intervention. Although we return on the concept of market 
failure, it may be useful to quote the clear notion suggested by Friederiszick, Röller 
and Verouden (2006: page 13, note 34): 
markets fail when the market (based on private actors) does not provide a good 
or service even though economic benefits outweigh economic costs. This 
happens when the private benefits (or costs) are not equal to the public benefits 
(or costs). 
It can quite safely be assumed that the large majority of goods and services should 
be regarded as private since there are usually means to exclude from and charge for 
their use. In other words, the crucial finding is that, at least hypothetically, most of 
the goods and services can be provided by the private sector. 
There are however certain cases, mainly involving public services, which are more 
controversial. For example, whereas Stiglitz (2000: chapters 6 and 8) does not seem 
to include them among public goods, others, like more recently Friederiszick, Röller, 
Verouden (2006: 13), seem to share a different view. 
The remainder of the analysis attempts to explain this diversity, and suggest a 
tentative solution. 
As explained by Stiglitz (2000: chapters 6 and 8), many goods or services that, 
strictly speaking, may be considered private goods - because exclusion is possible - 
have been often directly supplied by the public (so called `publicly provided private 
goods'). 
Leaving aside the political, cultural or ideological reasons, which may have had an 
impact of this choice, according to economics the provision of private goods by the 
government may be justified for either efficiency or equity reasons. 
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For example, private agents may run hospitals and schools or universities. 
However, there is usually a large marginal cost associated with supplying additional 
individuals. This may result in fairly high prices being charged on patients and 
students. The government may thus think it fair to provide these services directly 
for a lower fee or indeed free of charge. This is an equity justification. 
Another example is where the existence of increasing returns of scale (ie where 
productivity increases with output) 275 may make markets not competitive because 
economic efficiency requires that there are only a limited number of players. In 
some industries, called natural monopolies (notable examples are some public utilities 
and transportation), the increasing returns of scale are so important that the market 
can support only one firm. 
The creation of a substantial infrastructure, usually a network, to provide the service 
may involve considerable sunk costs (that is costs that cannot be recovered by the 
undertaking if it ceases operation even in the long run). 276 Although the marginal 
additional cost for supplying the actual service may be relatively insignificant, the 
sunk costs associated with the network creation may represent a substantial 
investment as well as a crucial barrier to entry for would-be competitors. The 
incumbent may thus be in the position to exploit its monopolistic power and exploit 
consumers with high prices. This failure of competition is an fciency justification 
for the public provision of what in general are private goods. 
It is worth repeating the point. In both these cases, either for equity of efficiency 
reasons, the government often provides goods and services that the private sector 
may well provide. Alternative ways of providing them may indeed be possible. As 
the current liberalization/privatization trend clearly shows, the private sector is 
increasingly involved in their supply. However, to ensure efficient and equitable 
outcomes, governments may still intervene, complementing private production with 
regulation and/or subsidization (and taxes). 
27S Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 226). 
276 Black's Dictionary of Economics (2002: 452) 
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A good example is that of `universal service obligations'. The government may wish 
to ensure that certain essential services should `be offered at affordable price in 
order to be accessible to everybody'. 277 
If the private supplier is not in the position to guarantee this `affordable price to 
everyone', for example (in the common case of postal services) because mail 
delivery in remote areas is particularly costly for the supplier (and hence too 
expensive for the consumer), some form of public intervention may be needed. 
Otherwise, neither the necessary infrastructure nor service will be provided. 
We can concentrate on the provision of the service because it is its economic 
viability which is crucial (and directly influences the decision to create or extend the 
network). 
Apart from direct subsidisation by the government (more commonly to the supplier 
of the service than to the user), a uniform price for all consumers throughout the 
country may be set. Crucially, if the financial viability of the supplier has to be 
ensured, cross-subsidisation between the more profitable users (who will pay more 
than the marginal cost for the service) and the less profitable users (who will pay 
less than the marginal cost) is needed. So far, no public intervention is necessarily 
needed. 
The government may need to intervene if there is a risk that others might decide to 
enter the market and `cream off' the most profitable part of the business (in the 
example of postal services, urban areas) by charging at just the marginal cost. The 
public tool to ensure the financial feasibility of the uniform price may thus be the 
grant of an exclusive right to the supplier, ie a monopoly in the relevant business. 
The case of `universal service obligation', which inter alia includes the idea of 
affordability, is particularly instructive because it shows that, whereas in general the 
private sector may well deliver the relevant services, there may still be a need for 
further public intervention if, mainly for equity reasons, the private sector is required 
to supply them at certain conditions. 
It is indeed the weight given to these regulatory requirements which, in our view, 
explains the divergence among those that consider these service as private goods - 
2n See the Commission Green Paper on Services of General Interest (2003: 60-64). 
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focussing on the fact that in general they can be performed by private agents -, and 
those that regard them as public goods - arguably concentrating on the fact that the 
supply under certain conditions may require some form of public intervention 
because it somewhat increases the `cost of exclusion'. Depending on the 
importance attributed to this factor, the definition of public good is accordingly 
narrower or broader. 
The writer's tendency is to follow the first group, and their more abstract approach. 
The main reason is because, like in the case of education and health, these services 
may generally be performed by private agents. It is an equity, or with another word, 
policy reason which justifies either their direct provision by the government, or the 
imposition of certain standards and obligations and hence some form of public 
intervention to assist the private to reach them. In other words, these services can 
be provided by the private sector which, following the definition of private goods, 
can exclude from, and charge for, their use. 278 It is the resulting price which in the 
end may be not acceptable (by the government and/or the users) and may justify 
the interference of the government. 279 
Teachings from economics 
The writer's proposition is that, despite its difficulties, the debate on private and 
public goods is ripe with teachings for the advantage analysis of public intervention 
in the economy. 
The first important finding is that the distinction between economic and non-economic 
activities, and market and normative benchmarks, should closely follow the 
distinction between respectively private and public goods. Hence, whereas a non- 
economic activity is one that, even hypothetically, is not provided by private agents, an 
economic activity can be supplied by the private sector. 
278 Downgrading the `market failure' rationale for infrastructures, Santamato and Westerhof (2003: 646) 
observe that `non-excludable [public] goods are not very frequent-. for most infrastructure there are technical 
means of charging a price for the use of the facility'. 
279 It should be underlined that, so far, we have talked about pricing but there is also another important 
variable in the equation, which is the quality of the goods and services supplied. Whether, and under what 
conditions, public intervention may guarantee a higher quality is a huge issue which would deserve more 
attention than that permitted here. 
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Admittedly, this distinction is not always fully clear. We may have cases where, out 
of altruism or ostentation, private agents provide public goods. At the same time, as 
has been seen, the definition of the boundary between public and private goods may 
not always be easy to draw. It could be argued that, to some extent, it depends on 
the circumstances of the case at hand (it has been said that the distinction is a matter 
of `degree') 280 and on the more general context which may change, and rapidly. 
The Commission has, for example, observed that the concept of universal service 
obligation is `dynamic and flexible' and that it should be `redefined periodically in 
order to be adapted to the social, economic and technological environment'. 281 
Despite these uncertainties, the writer believes that the economic distinction 
between public and private goods provides a reasonably sound standard (at the very 
least a good rule of thumb) to distinguish between non-economic and economic activities 
for the purposes of the advantage analysis. 
The second important teaching is that it is not possible to equate i) the concept of 
responsibility of the government with ii) the concept of inherent governmental activity. 
The example of infrastructures is clear in this regard. These are crucial to the socio- 
economic development of a country and are often necessary for the supply of public 
services. Being in the public interest, the proper planning, creation and maintenance 
of infrastructures (and public services) is undoubtedly part of the responsibility of 
governments. The analysis of the previous paragraph seems however to indicate 
that they do not necessarily have to be provided by the government (in our jargon 
they are not an inherently public prerogative) but can generally be provided by private 
agents. 
Public interest between scope and justification 
The previous examination of the ways through which the public interest may be 
pursued gives the opportunity to introduce one of the recurring themes of the 
thesis, which is the analysis of the interplay between scope and justification. 
280 Stiglitz (2000: 134-135); Black's Dictionary of Economics (2000: 369). 
291 Commission White Paper on Services of General Interest (2004: 3.3). 
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This issue, which has a huge political and legal impact, enquires the role played by 
the public interest at the various stages of the legal analysis of the regulation of 
subsidies and State aids. 
Rephrased differently, the question is about what is covered by the rules and what is 
permitted. Two scenarios are indeed possible. In the first, the conduct is not caught 
at all by the rules. The pursuit of a public interest, which is considered at the very 
preliminary stage of the definition, leads to the conclusion that there is no 
advantage. In the second scenario, the presence of a public interest does not 
preclude the conduct from granting an advantage. If the other requirements of the 
definition are fulfilled the measure falls within the scope of application of the rules 
and, in some cases, is prohibited. However, the pursuit of a public interest may be 
recognised at a further stage of the analysis, when special exception-provisions 
come into play, and the conduct may eventually be permitted. 
Unlike in other contexts (see, for examples, the definition of `service' and 
`undertaking' under various provisions of EC law), the determination of whether the 
conduct is economic or not does not have a direct impact on whether the measure 
falls or not within the scope of application of the law. In the context of the 
advantage analysis, the goal of the classification is the identification of the 
appropriate benchmark - market or normative - to test the conduct at issue and 
eventually determine whether it does derogate or not from the appropriate norm. 
The issue of whether the conduct is economic or not is not however is fully neutral. 
A first distinction immediately comes out. Whereas in case of non-economic 
conduct the benchmark is the general rule in the area which, in its own choice, the 
government had defined, the standard to test a public economic activity, ie the 
market, is by definition external to any form of interference. 
Further, it cannot be denied that to define a conduct as economic, and to subject it 
to market logic, might actually result in a stricter standard to adhere to, at least in 
some circumstances (this may for example depend on how abstract/concrete the 
benchmark actually applied is). 
With more specific regard to the scope /justi fication issue, the economic 
classification makes the identification, and separation, of public policy 
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considerations, easier. This is more difficult when we are fully in the realm of non- 
economic conduct where public motives are intertwined among themselves. A 
public interest objective is more likely to be invoked at the level of the advantage 
analysis, arguing that there is no discrimination or derogation and, consequently, 
that the measure falls outside the scope of the rules. 
The following sections analyse what role the public interest does, or should, play in 
the context of the advantage analysis with respect to both economic and non- 
economic governmental activities. 
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III. Economic activity and market benchmarks 
Whereas the next section concentrates on the advantage analysis of the forms of 
conduct that are non-economic and hence inherently public, such as taxation and 
regulation, this section focuses on the economic activity of governments. 
The first part deals with the general principle of the market. The focus is on the 
exposition of the complexities and difficulties involved in the application of the 
actual benchmarks derived from this paradigm. 
In the second part, two case-studies explain the relationship between public 
intervention in the economy and market benchmarks. The attempt is to show, in 
the current context of redefinition of the roles of public and private actors in the 
economy, the interplay of two contrasting forces and their critical impact on the 
advantage analysis. 
A shift from the complexity discourse to the outspoken criticism is the subject of 
the final part. The fundamental critiques about the possibility and legitimacy of 
using market benchmarks to test the economic conduct of public bodies are 
examined, and followed by an attempt to provide a balanced rehabilitation of the 
market paradigm. 
1. The market: a complex paradigm 
The adoption of the principle 
The market has been elevated to the status of one of the most important paradigms 
of the advantage analysis. This is just half of the story however. Although based on 
an arguably solid rationale, it will become immediately apparent that the application 
of this principle is not free from complexities and difficulties. 
From the reticence of the law to the consolidation of a paradigm 
Article 1.1 SCM provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if a 'financial 
contribution' or a 'form of income or price support' confers a 'benefit'. 
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However, the concept of `benefit' is not developed at all in the SCM agreement, 
seemingly as a result of the disagreement of the negotiating parties, some seeking to 
refer to commercial benchmarks, others to the cost to the subsidising government, 
others to the recipients of the subsidy. 282 This can be contrasted with the 'financial 
contribution' requirement which, albeit not fully unambiguous and exhaustive, is 
highly elaborated. Although important issues, such as the cost to government, 
could not be solved during the negotiations, it was not difficult to codify with a 
certain degree of precision the forms of financial contribution that were regarded as 
subsidy already in the GATT. 283 
Article 87(1) EC generally prohibits 'any aid' which 'favours' certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods. Like the SCM, the EC Treaty does define what an 
`aid' - and, in particular, the advantage inherent in it - is. Nor a definition can be 
found in the previous, and now expired, ECSC Treaty. 
A simple, and at the same time general, explanation has already been suggested in 
the previous chapter. These two treaties of the 1950s share the same reticence, and 
immaturity, with respect to the definition of public subsidies that can be found in 
the context of the GATT, signed only a few years earlier. This silence not only 
concerned the forms of action that should be regarded as a subsidy or an aid but 
inevitably affected what is certainly the central - and at the same time the most elusive - 
element of the definition, the advantage. 
When the legislator is silent, it is often for the administrative and judicial bodies, 
which are called to apply the rules, to provide some clarification. The market has 
consistently been referred to as the standard to test the public activity in the market, 
thus becoming, despite difficulties and criticisms which we are about to examine, a 
true paradigm in the advantage analysis. 
Before giving some comments, some examples of this recognition may be provided. 
We may commence with the GA'IT. In the early 1980s, the US and the EC were 
confronted in the so-called `steel cases'. Although the GATT dispute settlement 
was never involved, this controversy sparked for the first time a serious debate on 
282 Low (2001: 114-115). 
283 Cf, for example, the examples of domestic subsidies in Article 11(3) of the Tokyo Subsidy Code. 
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inter alia the application of `commercial considerations' to establish whether various 
forms of financial assistance into State-owned enterprises constituted a 
countervailable subsidy. 284 Second example. Just a few months before the advent 
of the WTO, a Panel report was issued in the Carbon Steel I dispute. This report was 
never adopted but contains many significant findings which reaffirm the soundness 
of the use of commercial criteria to test various forms of public economic activity. 
We have to wait the WTO for the first sweeping formulation of the market as a 
general standard. In Canada - Aircraft, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
referred to the market as the `only logical basis' and `an appropriate basis for 
comparison' to establish the benefit. The Appellate Body noted that 
the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in determining 
whether a 'benefit' has been 'conferred', because the trade-distorting potential of 
a 'financial contribution' can be identified by determining whether the recipient har 
received a 'financial contribution' on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient 
in the market. 285 
Numerous findings of the Court of justice echo this definition. In one of the most 
quoted we can read: 
in order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary 
to establish whether the recipient receives an economic advantage which it would not have 
obtained under normal market conditions. 
286 
As has certainly not passed unnoticed to the attentive reader, the added emphasis in 
the two passages shows the striking similarity, or virtual identity, of the language of 
the two courts. 
264 See Barshefsky, Nfattice & Martin (1983); Dominick (1984); Benyon & Bourgeois (1984); Hufbauer & 
Shelton-Erb (1984: 100 - 102); Bourgeois (1991: passim). 
21's Paragraph 157 (emphasis added). 
26 Case C-39/94 SFEI, paragraph 60 (emphasis added). 
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First comments 
Conceptually, the reference to the market is no more than the application of the 
more general and core paradigm of the advantage analysis, ie that the advantage 
should result from a derogation from the norm. In the case of economic activity, the 
norm is represented by the market. 
Obviously, findings whereby the market is the 'only logical basis' or `an appropriate 
basis for comparison' can however be correct only with respect to the economic 
activity of governments. Borrowing from the second Opinion of Advocate General 
Leger in the famous Altmark case, 
it appears ... that in the field of State aid the Court distinguishes between two 
categories of situation: those where the intervention of the State is of economic 
nature and those where it forms part of the exercise of public power. 287 
Different criteria - economic or normative - apply to the two different types of conduct 
and the derogation test accordingly takes different shapes in both legal systems. 
More interestingly, if the market should be the norm in the field of economic 
activities, the Appellate Body's express reliance on the 'trade-distorting potential' of 
the financial contribution as the justification for the use of market benchmarks 
seems to reveal that the assessment should be based only on those economic 
considerations that may indicate distortions to the competitive process. 
Reformulating this thought, if a measure deviates from the market, this clearly 
suggests a potential of distortion of the market. 
The further implication might be that, inasmuch as the distorting impact of the 
subsidy remains (better: the `potential' as the Appellate Body merely stated), the 
role to be played at this stage by any public policy objectives pursued by the 
measure might be quite limited. This for now only tentative conclusion is of crucial 
importance for the construction of the advantage analysis, and more generally of 
the regulation of subsidies and State aids. It will therefore be thoroughly addressed 
in the analysis of both WTO and EC law. 
2b7 Paragraph 20. 
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Finally, the notion of market, as such, still remains a general principle. In order to 
be fully operative, it needs to be developed into precise benchmarks, applicable to 
the various forms of economic activity carried out in the market. This is the focus 
of the next paragraph, and it is at this level that the market paradigm begins to 
show all its complexity. 
Market benchmarks: complex decisions, difficult reviews 
Two-fold complexity 
As the conduct in the market can be varied (eg equity and debt financing, 
guarantees, purchase or sale transactions) so are the benchmarks which define 
whether that conduct is commercially sound. 
Despite this diversity, two variables stand out as crucial in any business decisions: i) 
the risk of the investment and ii) the expected remuneration for that risk. The 
complexity of these decisions and of their subsequent scrutiny can be understood at 
two different levels, one objective and one subjective. 
On the one hand, the key variables of risk and remuneration are significantly 
affected by many other factors and by the various circumstances of the transaction 
at hand. Further, information may be scarce, time limited and the context may 
change, and quickly. As a result, businessmen have to make difficult economic, 
financial and managerial assessments in a complex and dynamic (in a word: 
competitive) environment. 
On the other hand, although sophisticated technical tools are increasingly 
developed to make sense of this objective complexity, ultimately the decision 
making process cannot be solely described as objective and rational. The 
subjective, one could say human, factor plays a significant role. Eventually, most 
depends on the personal judgment of the entrepreneur which is based on his/her 
intuition and experience. Without necessarily adhering to the radical criticism 
examined in the last section, clearly business is far from being an exact science [or a 




The complexity of business decisions cannot be fully captured by the rules setting 
forth the relevant benchmarks. 
This is not just a matter of inadequate drafting. The problem is more radical and 
depends on the fact that the process underlying commercial decisions itself is so 
multifaceted that virtually any criterion - irrespective of its precision - can become 
really meaningful only when it is applied in practice. In other words, the proposition 
is that the starting point is certainly given by good, precise and clear criteria, which 
should take into account of sound indicators, but that eventually only a case-by-case 
analysis allows determining whether the actual decision is commercially sound. The 
Commission seems to have been aware of this flexibility when it underlined in its 
guidelines that various financial and economic factors have to be analysed and 
balanced to determine whether the contribution is commercially sound. 288 
A good example of this inherent regulatory limit can be found in Article 14 SCM 
which provides guidelines to calculate the amount of the subsidy in the context of 
countervailing duty procedures and which, by underlining the circumstances under 
which a given form of governmental action `shall not be considered as conferrin(g a 
benefit' (emphasis added), can clearly be used as relevant context for the 
interpretation of the term 'benefit' under Article 1.1(b) SCM as well. 
289 These 
guidelines refer to concepts such as `usual investment practice', difference between 
amounts actually paid and payable on the market, `adequate remuneration'. In their 
generality, they are not able to capture the complexity of business decisions. 
Though correct, they can only represent the beginning of the analysis. 
Another example. To say that the expected remuneration for a capital injection 
into a company is defined by the rate of return on equity 
290 is certainly more 
precise but, again, it cannot hide that what is required in the instant case is the 
determination of the actual rate which is a complex exercise involving complex 
288 1993 Communication, paragraph 37. 
289 See, for example, Panel, Canada - Aircraft, paragraph 9.113, Appellate 
Body, 14, paragraphs 155 to 158. Cf 
also Didier (1999: 220, footnote 33). 
'90 Panel, Canada - Airtmt, paragraph 9.165. 
In the EC see, for example, the 1984 Communication, paragraph 
3.3, and the 1993 Communication, paragraphs 35,43 and 44. See also Case 
T-296/9' Akialra. 
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economic, financial and managerial assessments and, as said, involving an 
ineluctable element of discretion. 
Decisions and reviews 
These brief remarks have quite probably already disclosed that the writer's purpose 
is not to provide a detailed analysis of the application of the various market 
benchmarks and of the quite often highly technical tools that are used in market 
analysis, but rather i) to highlight the degree of complexity of commercial decisions and 
ii) the difficulty of their review by administrative and judicial bodies. 
In this regard, it should not be forgotten that what is at issue in most of the cases is 
the review by an administrative or judicial body of an investment decision that a 
public body has taken, or wishes to take. Now, the complexity of business 
decisions is inevitably reflected into their review making it a particularly difficult 
task. The role of the examining body is certainly to check whether the decision at 
issue is commercially sound. However, the two-fold (objective/subjective) 
complexity set forth above should be duly taken into account. 
On the one side, it is commonly accepted that any review should be based only on 
the information that were, or could have been, available to the investor at the 
moment of the business decision (ex ante assessment). The premiss is that the 
commercial environment is dynamic and that the success or failure of the venture 
may well depend on changes of the circumstances which were unpredictable when 
the decision was made. 
On the other side, it should be repeated that business decisions are not calculations 
but judgments. It has been seen that they naturally imply a degree of discretion. This 
reality should necessarily be taken into account by the examining body which 
should resist the temptation of substituting the public body's business judgments 
with its own. In other words, if administrative or judicial bodies should certainly be 
controllers, they cannot pretend to be entrepreneurs. 
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Examples of complexity of market benchmarks 
Before focussing on two case-studies which attempt to explain the interplay 
between public intervention in the economy and the identification of the 
appropriate benchmark, the following paragraphs briefly discuss some examples of 
difficulty of application of market benchmarks. In so doing they particularly draw 
on the abundant indications offered by the EC case-law whose validity may well be 
extended to WTO law. 
Diversity ofinvestment objectives 
There are different types of investors and the circumstances of the investment may 
change. In a word, investment objectives may be disparate and may vary. As a 
result, the two key variables of risk and remuneration indicated above may be 
perceived differently in the various cases. 
One of the most apparent distinction is that between ordinary investors, which aim 
at realizing a profit in the relatively short term, and holding companies or groups of 
undertakings, which pursue a `structural policy' and are generally `guided by 
prospects of profitability in the longer term'. 291 Koenig and Bartosch (2000: 383) 
further noted that equity investment should be distinguished from debt financing 
because only the former involves the direct participation in the business. The 
application of market benchmarks to capital injections may thus be particularly 
complex since the `value of the investment' is much more `dependent on the 
personal goals of the investor'. 
The existence of a vested interest in the undertaking is another notable factor which 
has an impact on the evaluation of risk and remuneration. The fact that the 
investor is already a shareholder, a lender or a guarantor of the undertaking makes its 
situation completely different from that of one that does not have any interest in 
the relevant company yet and is still considering whether to invest in it. 
This becomes particularly clear when the company is in difficulties. The `owner' of 
the company may accept a lower return when this is necessary to preserve its 
=91 Alfa Romeo, paragraphs 19 and 20. 
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investment It may even consider covering the losses of its subsidiary for a limited 
period in order to enable it either to reorganise and become profitable again or to 
close down under the best possible conditions, 292 or to minimise the costs which it 
might incurred as guarantor and sole shareholder or a higher liability. 293 To 
anticipate a higher liability an investor may even decide to make afresh investment. 294 
How investment objectives can change according to the circumstances is nicely 
illustrated by the example of loans. There is a fundamental difference between the 
case where the loan is negotiated and granted and the case where, after the loan 
relationship has been entered into, the debtor is in default. In the former, the investor 
is motivated by profit. Things ma change however when the contractual 
relationship is already in place. The borrower may not pay or, more significantly, 
cannot pay. 
The default of the borrower usually triggers the application of penalties or interests 
higher than those normally due. The creditor's goal is still to make a profit out of 
the transaction. However, if the debtor is in difficulty and is not able to cope with 
the payments originally agreed, the investment objective changes. It is no more to 
get a profit but to avoid a loss or at least to recover part of the credit. 295 The debt 
may need to be rescheduled and the interest charged may be different (usually 
lower) than that agreed when the loan was initially granted. Similarly, the 
acceptance to reduce debts of a company in difficulty may be economically justified, 
in particular when, in the event of insolvency of the debtor, the creditor's loss 
would be considerably higher. 
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Two remarks to conclude this paragraph. 
From the perspective of the review of the investment decisions, on the assumption 
that economic actors usually behave similarly in comparable situations, the 
consideration of what other investors do in the transaction at hand may be relevant. 
Thus, even making allowance for the discretion underlying any business judgment, 
29= Case C-303/88 ENI-Lantmssi, paragraph 21. 
293 Case T-323/99 INMA, paragraph 100. 
291 For an interesting example see Case T-98/00 L nde. 
295 Case C-342/96 Txbaax, paragraphs 48 and 49; Case C-246/97 DMT, paragraphs 24 and 25. See the 
discussion on the `regulation of debt' below. 
296Case T-123/97 Salomon v Commission, paragraph 68. Cf also Tweno-Seurnth Report of Competition Polio (1997), 
page 237; Thirtieth Report on Competition Poky (2000) 313. 
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the participation of other (particularly private) investors in the operation may 
indicate its commercial soundness, in particular if their contribution is on equal 
terms and of real economic significance. 
297 
The second comment focuses on a crucial point but is limited to flagging an issue 
which is dealt with exhaustively below. The issue is whether private investors may 
be motivated also by considerations that are not strictly economic (such as 
employment or regional development) and, if so, to what extent. This issue is of 
particular importance because public investors should by definition pursue public 
interest objectives. It is thus important to understand what role, if any, is played by 
this consideration at the level of the advantage analysis. 
Restructuring of companies in difficulties and investment of large sums 
Parish (2003: 71) underlines how two cases pose particular problems when it comes 
to make a business decision to provide financing and to subsequently assess it. In 
these cases the evaluation of the risk of the investment and of its remuneration may 
be especially difficult. 
The first concerns the financing of loss-making companies in difficulties. We have 
already seen the impact that a situation of difficulty may have on investment 
objectives when the investor has a vested interest in the company. This paragraph 
builds up on those considerations, but focuses on the more specific problem of 
investments aimed at the restructuring of a company in difficulty. 
Two issues need to be addressed in the assessment of these cases. The first is 
whether the support is really aimed at restructuring the undertaking, or whether it 
merely represents a means to keep an ailing and unprofitable undertaking alive. 
The answer depends on the assessment of the numerous conditions of the 
restructuring (such as the economic, financial and managerial situation of the 
company and the market, the soundness of the restructuring plan, etc). This is a 
very difficult assessment. The various elements to evaluate and balance in order to 
reach a decision are several and may be judged differently by investors. 
"7 Didier (1999: 225). By contrast investment decisions of employees may not be significant as they may be 
motivated more by the desire to ensure the survival of their jobs than by prospects of profitability of the 
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Another case where it is particularly difficult to determine whether a private 
investor would have stepped in is when large sums of money are involved. This 
may occur (again) when the restructuring of big groups is involved. The fact that 
the financial resources necessary for the restructuring may be considerable is a 
further element that adds to the difficulty of an already difficult assessment. A case 
where the `money' factor comes into special relevance is when it is necessary to 
build big infrastructures, such as extensive networks. This case, which raises 
interesting issues concerning the advantage analysis, is thoroughly discussed below. 
Ambivalence ofmarket indicators 
Market indicators, such as price and quantity, are not always reliable, particularly if 
considered separately. The assessment of whether we have a normal commercial 
transaction requires the consideration of all the relevant factors. 
Normally, the procedure followed for the sale is important to establish whether the 
transaction is commercially sound. 
The price resulting from the sale through an open and transparent tender procedure 
to the highest bidder will generally be held to be the market price. Although in a 
different factual setting, the celebrated Almark case has provided a powerful 
confirmation of the importance of procedures, such as public procurement, to 
exclude the existence of an advantage. 298 Crucially, the government here was not 
. yelling 
but buying. As Hansen, Van Ysendyck and Zühlke (2004: note 16, page 204) 
cleverly noted, the test here is not about profit but efficiency. This does not detract 
that the rationale - the transaction process has a fundamental impact in determining 
that the price is commercially sound - is the same. 
The case is similar with respect to shares or other securities traded on the stock 
exchange. The market price is the price at which the relevant shares or securities 
are traded (ie sold at the price determined by the cumulative demand of buyers). 
company: see Case T-296/97 Alitaka, paragraph 83. 
"a See Case C-280/00, paragraph 95. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C- 126/01 
GEMO, paragraph 119. 
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An alternative procedure, for example with goods like land or building, may be the 
evaluation by an independent expert 299 
Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story. The payment of the market price, 
even though following a certain procedure which guarantees it is the result of 
market forces, may not be enough to exclude that the transaction is not 
commercial. An analysis of the EC case-law is particular useful in this regard. 
The first warning arrived in the Bremer Vulkan case where the Court underlined that 
sometimes considering the stock market price, without adequate explanation, as the 
sole determining factor of the value of shares may be 'too formal, rigid and 
restrictive'. 300 In other words, to rely only on one market indicator, and an 
important one such as the price, may not be enough, if the context demands a more 
complex analysis. The advantage may be conferred by other circumstances of the 
case. 
A good illustration thereof was given in two recent decisions of the Court of 
Justice. In the BAI and P&O Euro pean Ferries cases the issue was whether the 
conclusion by a public authority of an agreement to purchase travel vouchers for 
ferry travels between Spain and the UK at the market price could be regarded as a 
State aid. Contrary to the Commission, the Court of First Instance found that this 
was the case. In particular, the Court made it clear that 
... the mere 
fact that a Member State purchases goods and services on market 
conditions is not sufficient for that transaction to constitute a commercial 
transaction concluded under conditions which a private investor would have 
accepted, or in other words a normal commercial transaction, if it turns out that 
the State did not have an actual need for those goods and services. 
301 
In other words, it seems that variables such as price and even quantity may not be 
fully significant if the actual decision to purchase goods or services from the market 
does not correspond to a real and actual need of the buyer. In these cases, the result 
299 Cf the 1997 Commission Communication on the sale of land and building. 
300 For another interesting example, see joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 Brrmer Vulkan, 
paragraph 36. 
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would be the grant of a clear out-of-the market advantage to the supplier that would 
be able to dispose of goods or services which, according to commercial 
consideration, would not have been placed, particularly when large amounts are 
involved. 
This case law seems to be correct. Most importantly, it seems to remind us the 
complexity of market transactions. The advantage analysis of economic activity 
must be a comprehensive one which takes into account all relevant factors, among 
which the market price is an important although not an exclusive one. 
What are the implications of this case law? In BAI and P&O the public authority 
bought the services directly from the provider. The price was the normal market 
one. It was not determined through a special competitive procedure such an 
auction. Arguably, however this jurisprudence may have an impact also on those 
cases where the price of the good or service for which there is not a real need is 
determined by a stock market or through a tender process. In other words, the 
BAI/P&O decisions highlight that what is important is not the procedure followed 
to determine the price of the good/service at issue but whether a private operator 
would have bought (that quantity of) that good/service in the first place. 
The ambivalence of certain market indicators, and in particular prices, becomes 
apparent in the next section when an additional element of complexity - the public 
intervention in the economy - is considered. 
X01 Joined Cases T-116/O1 and T-118/01 P&O, paragraph 117; see also Case T-14/96 BAI, paragraph 74 et 
seq. 
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2. The critical interplay between public intervention in the economy 
and market 
The previous section has shown the complexity inherent in commercial decisions 
and in their assessment. This section analyses a further possible element of 
complexity in the advantage analysis of economic activity which is given by the 
public intervention in the economy, expression which generally refers to any public 
conduct - be it economic or not - that may have an impact on the market. Two 
case-studies, which emphasise different perspectives, are examined. 
The impact of the public intervention in the economy on market 
analysis 
(case study 1) 
Four WTO disputes are particularly significant in analysing the impact that the 
public intervention in the economy in its various forms may have on the 
identification of the appropriate market benchmark. The analysis touches both the 
SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. The brief exposition of the 
main arguments and findings in the various disputes is followed by some 
comments. 
Canada - Dairy (Article 21(5) I): the impact of regulation 
The first case is Canada - Dairy (Article 21(5) I). It should be immediately said that 
what was under examination was not the notion of `benefit' under Article 1.1(b) 
SCM, but the definition of 'payments' in Article 9.1(c) AoA. Drawing from the 
definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement as relevant context, the Appellate 
Body however confirmed that the notion of `payment' is meaningful only through a 
comparison with a market benchmark. 302 
Two findings emerge as particularly significant for our analysis. 
302 Canada - Dairy (Article 21(5) 
I), paragraph 87; US - FSC, paragraph 136. 
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First, the Appellate Body noted that it was not correct to consider the domestic price, 
fixed by the government in the context of a heavily re<gulated market, as a proper 
benchmark for determining whether the lower price of milk to processors for export 
represented an advantage. Secondly, in a clear exposition of micro-economics 
fundamentals, the Appellate Body indicated that the price is not the only useful 
market indicator. In its words, 
[a]lthough the proceeds from sales at domestic or world market prices represent 
two possible measures of the value of milk to the producers, we do not see these 
as the only possible measures of this value. For any economic operator, the 
production of goods or services involves an investment of economic resources. 
In the case of a milk producer, production requires and investment in fixed 
assets, such as land, cattle and milking facilities, and an outlay to meet variable 
costs, such as labour, animal feed and health-care, power and administration. 
These fixed and variable costs are the total amount which the producer must 
spend in order to produce the milk and the total amount it must recoup, in the 
long-term, to avoid making losses. To the extent that the producer charges 
prices that do not recoup the total cost of production, over time, it sustains a 
loss which must be financed from some other source, possibly 'by virtue of 
governmental action'. 
303 
In a nutshell, the impact of the public intervention in the domestic market (in the 
form of heavy regulation) made the reference to the prices prevailing therein not 
reliable for the analysis in the export market. The use of another market 
benchmark, the costs of production, was therefore necessary. 
US - Carbon Steel II and US - Countervailing Measures the impact of the 
`design of economic and other policies' 
The issue of the impact of public intervention in the market, and of the significance 
of prices derived therefrom, came out again in the US - Carbon Steel II and US - 
Certain Measures disputes with respect to privatisations. 
In US - Certain Measures the US had imposed countervailing 
duties on imports from 
privatised companies alleging that the benefit of the subsidies granted prior to 
303 Appellate Body, Caxada - Dairy (Artick 21(5) 1), paragraph 87. 
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privatisations had 'passed through'. One of the legal issues was whether the 
payment of a fair market value for the company, in the context of an arm's length 
transaction and in compliance with commercial considerations, exhausted the 
benefit of subsidies previously received by the company. 304 
The same question arose in a previous dispute, US - Carbon Steel II where the 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's conclusion that this was the case but significantly 
restricted its ruling to 'the particular circumstances of the case' and to 'the facts of 
the case'. 305 It is only in the US - Certain Measures dispute, however, that the 
Appellate Body more vigorously qualified the Panel's finding that privatisations at 
arm's length and for fair market value always exclude that the benefit is passed 
through. 
The crucial factor was the ability of governments to direct the conditions of the 
process of privatisation, and in particular to influence the sale price, with the result 
that the latter cannot be considered the outcome of a genuine market process. The 
Appellate Body held that privatisations at arm's length may result in extinguishing a 
previously conferred benefit but this is not necessarily so. In the words of the 
Geneva-based body, 
the Panel's absolute rule of 'no benefit' may be defensible in the context of 
transactions between two private parties taking place in reasonably competitive 
markets; however, it overlooks the ability of governments to obtain certain 
results from markets by shaping the circumstances and conditions in which 
markets operate. Privatizations involve complex and long-term investments in 
which the seller - namely the government - is not necessarily always a passive 
price taker and, consequently, the 'fair market price' of a state-owned enterprise 
is not necessarily always unrelated to government action. In privatizations, 
governments have the ability, by designing economic and other policies, to 
influence the circumstances and conditions of the sale so as to obtain a certain 
market valuation of the enterprise. 
306 
The conclusion was therefore that what is not consistent with WTO law is an 
irrebuttable presumption that privatisations at arm's length and for fair market 
3" This issue is also analysed from the perspective of the identification of the bentficiaries of the subsidy in the 
next chapter. 
30s Paragraph 74. 
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value exhaust the benefit. This may be so, and indeed there is a rebuttabk 
presumption that a benefit ceases to exist after privatisations at those conditions. 
Nevertheless, as this is not always the case, investigating authorities should always 
carry out a care-by-case assessment 
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The crucial finding coming out of these two disputes, which is in line with Canada - 
Dairy (Article 21(5) I), is that prices produced by markets are not always indicative of 
a genuine market process, particularly when there is a significant public intervention 
in the economy, in the case at hand in the form of `design of economic and other 
policies'. 
US - Softwood Lumber IV the impact of commercial presence 
What was at issue in the US - Softwood Lumber IV dispute was again the definition of 
the appropriate market benchmark following a significant commercial presence of 
the government in the market. The case is also interesting because - at a more 
general level - it gave the opportunity to clarify the important concepts of `market' 
and `prevailing market conditions'. 308 
Considering these two specificities - significant commercial presence and definition 
of the market concept - the arguments and the findings of this dispute deserve an 
extended examination. 
The case concerned countervailing duties imposed by the United States against 
imports of certain softwood lumber products from Canada. The practice under 
examination was the conferral by Canada of the right to harvest timber in Crown 
Land. This practice was found to constitute a financial contribution in the form of 
provision of goods (under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM) to lumber producers. 309 
The issue which is of interest for our analysis was whether these goods were also 
provided at less than adequate remuneration thereby conferring a benefit pursuant 
to Article 14(d) SCM. 
306 Appellate Body, US - Certain Measur?:, paragraph 124. 
307 Ibid, paragraph 127. 
See Trebilcock & Howse (2005: 268). 
30 Panel, US - Softwood Lumber IV, paragraphs 7.9 to 7.30; Appellate Body, US - Softwood Lumber 11". 
paragraphs 46 to 76. 
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It is known that the problem of the proper pricing of natural resources is not new. 
For example, Hufbauer & Shelton Erb (1984: 95 to 99) cites three US 
countervailing duty cases of the beginning of the 1980s concerning crude 
petroleum, natural gas and (again) lumber. The authors intriguingly distinguished 
between non-transportable and transportable natural resources, concluding that the 
provision of non-transportable natural resources should not be subject to 
international scrutiny for the lack of a `ready standard' (such as a world-wide or 
national price) to use as a benchmark. Whatever merits this distinction and 
conclusion may have, lumber is clearly transportable. A benchmark, and a market 
one, should be found. 
Returning to the dispute under examination, in its determination the United States 
Department of Commerce (USDOC) found that the prices of private timber sales 
in Canada did not represent a commercial market because they were distorted by 
government intervention. The supply of lumber originating in Crown Land was so 
dominant in the market that the prices of the few private supplies were not 
determined independently and were necessarily depressed and aligned to the lower 
level of governmental prices. The USDOC therefore used as a benchmark prices of 
stumpage in certain bordering states in the northern United States, making 
adjustments to account for differences in conditions between those states and 
Canadian provinces. 
The Dispute Settlement Organs had to determine whether the United States' 
practice was consistent with Article 14(d) SCM which requires that the adequacy of 
the remuneration in the provision of goods should be determined 
in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in 
the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale). 
The main point of disagreement between the United States and Canada concerned 
whether it was permissible under that provision for an investigating authority to use 
a benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision. 
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To address this issue, which technically revolved around the interpretation of the 
phrase `in relation to', 310 both the Panel and the Appellate Body made interesting 
findings with respect to the concepts of market and market conditions under 
Article 14(d) SCM. 
The Panel found that 'prevailing market conditions' refer to the market conditions 
'as they exist' or 'which are predominant' in the country of provision. 3 11 Thus, the 
United States' argument that the term 'market' means 'fair market value' or market 
'undistorted by government intervention' was rejected. 312 In particular, the Panel 
underlined that 
as long as there are prices determined by independent operators following the 
principle of supply and demand, even if supply or demand are affected by the government's 
presence in the market, there is a 'market' in the sense of Article 14(d) [of the] SCM 
Agreement' 313 
Although conceding that the United States' approach, whereby the term 'market 
conditions' would necessarily imply a market undistorted by the government's 
financial contribution, was going too far, the Appellate Body underlined that the 
Panel's interpretation was 'overtly restrictive' and that, in some cases, the prices of 
the country of provision may not be informative. 
The Panel itself had provided two examples of situations where it may not be 
possible to use in-country prices: where the government is the only supplier of the 
goods, and where the government administratively controls prices. The Appellate 
Body did not see any significant difference between the two situations: 
310 Contrary to the Panel, the Appellate Body construed the expression 'in relation to' in Article 14(d) as not 
necessarily meaning 'in comparison with but rather'as regards' and 'with respect to'. Consequently, although 
prices of similar goods sold by private suppliers in the country of provision should represent the starting 
point and the primary benchmark, they are not the exclusive benchmark if certain conditions make them 
unreliable. 
311 Panel, ibid, paragraph 7.50. 
312 ibid, paragraphs 7.50 to 7.51. 
313 ibid, paragraph 7.60 (emphasis added). On the facts of the case, the Panel concluded that the resort to US 
prices as the benchmark for the determination of benefit on grounds that private prices in Canada were 
distorted was inconsistent with Article 14(d) SCM (bid, paragraph 7.64). 
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[i]n terms of market distortion and effect on prices, there may be little difference 
between [those situations]. Whenever the government is the predominant 
provider of certain goods, even if not the sole provider, it is likely that it can affect 
through its own pricing strategy the pricer of private providers for those goods, inducing the 
latter to align their prices to the point where there may be little difference, if any, 
between the government price and the private price. 314 
As regards the benchmarks alternative to private prices in the country of provision, 
these should always relate or refer to or be connected with the prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision and accepted that these could include 
'proxies that take into account prices for similar goods quoted on world markets' or 
'proxies constructed on the basis of production costs'. 315 
Comments on the case-study 
The teachings of the case-study are numerous and significant. 
First, governments intervene in the economy and do so in various ways and for 
many reasons. The case-study has shown the variety underlying the expression 
`public intervention in the economy'. Governments may regulate markets (Canada - 
Dairy (Article 21(5) I)), they may `design economic and other policies' (US - Carbon 
Steel and US - Certain Measures), a formulation which is capable to include both 
economic activity and the exercise of public powers, and finally they can provide 
goods in the market in competition with private suppliers (US - Softwood Lumber IV). 
Secondly, the government is an important agent and its conduct may affect, 
sometimes substantially, the market functioning. This may be particularly clear 
when it exercises public powers, such as when it tightly regulates a market (Canada - 
Dairy (Article 21(5) I)). This can equally be true when it acts commercially and 
enjoys a dominant position in the relevant market thus enabling it to dictate a 
certain price level (US - Softwood Lumber IV). 
3" Paragraph 100 (emphasis added). 
315 In the light of the findings of the Appellate Body, it seems that the express reference to the 'country of 
provision or purchase' in Article 14(d) (and also in Article 14(a)) is in fact superfluous. It seems indeed 
natural that the starting point of o! 1 benefit determinations under Article 1.1(b) and, 'or Article 14 SCM is 
necessarily the market where the gonrcmment and the rrcrpu1 t operate. 
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Thirdly, the importance of the public intervention in the market can put into 
question the concept of market itself, one of the most important paradigms of the 
advantage analysis. The US - Lumber IV provides an interesting debate in this 
regard. The Appellate Body's sensible final word is that the existence of a market, 
and hence the possibility of deriving benchmarks from it, does not necessarily 
require an utopian place free from any form of external intervention by the public hand. In 
order to achieve certain results in the public interest, governments have to intervene 
in the economy. 
However, and we come to the fourth important discovery, since the public 
intervention in the economy may be significant and affect the working of market 
forces and market outcomes, the advantage analysis may become difficult. The 
identification and application of the appropriate benchmarks may be demanding. 
As the Appellate Body indicated, adjustments may be needed, `proxies' may be 
resorted to. In some cases, the most common market benchmarks, such as prices, 
may lose their significance altogether and the reference to other commercial 
indicators, such as costs, may be required (see Canada - Dairy (Article 21(5) I) and US 
- Softwood Lumber IV). 
It may finally be underlined that the use of costs as appropriate commercial 
references is sound and is not novel. It is sound because, along prices and revenue, 
costs are among the basis factors taken into account by firms in their production 
decisions. Its use is consequently not new in the field of anti-dumping, 316 of 
competition law, 317 and, as the coda to this chapter on the compensation of public 
services shows, also in the area of State aid/subsidy law. 
316 Van Bael, I and Bellis, JF (2004). 
317 The much debated area of pricing abuses, particularly predation, constantly refers to costs as relevant 
benchmarks. For EC and UK law see Whish (2003); for US law see Hylton (2003). 
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The expansion of market logic and the redefinition of the public 
intervention in the economy: the example of infrastructure 
(case study 2) 
The previous WTO case-study demonstrates the difficulties to determine the 
appropriate benchmarks when the market is significantly affected by the public 
intervention in the economy. Similar issues emerge in the EC La Poste saga where the 
government provided a national postal network to guarantee a public service. 
Using the example of infrastructures, this case-study has two aims: first, to confirm 
the special difficulties caused by the public intervention in the economy, and, 
secondly, to highlight the current trend of market liberalization, the extension of 
market logic to areas which were previously sheltered from it, and the consequent 
redefinition of the public role in the economy. 
The La Poste saga: the impact of a public `natural monopoly' 
Before analysing the Court of First Instance (2000) and the Court of justice (2003) 
decisions, it is useful to briefly explain the background. 
La Poste operates as a legal monopoly the ordinary mail service in France. It is 
further authorised by law to perform certain activities open to competition, and in 
particular express delivery services which are carried out by its subsidiaries, Societe 
Franfaise de Messagerie International (SFMI) and Chronopost (hereinafter SFMI- 
Chronoposi. 
The crucial legal and economic issue in the saga was whether the logistical and 
commercial assistance provided by La Poste to SFMI/Chronopost was in accordance 
with market conditions. Called to give a preliminary ruling in SFEI, the Court 
noted that 
[i]n order to determine whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to 
establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage 
which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions. 
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In examining that question, it is for the national court to determine what normal 
remuneration for the services in question is. Such a determination presupposes 
an economic analysis taking into account all the factors which an undertaking acting 
under normal market conditions should have taken into consideration when fixing the 
remuneration for the services provided 
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question must 
be that the provision of logistical and commercial assistance by a public 
undertaking to its subsidiaries, which are governed by private law and cam, on 
an activity open to free competition, is capable of constituting State aid within 
the meaning of Article [87 EC) if the remuneration received in return is less than 
that which would have been demanded under normal market conditions. 318 
A few months after the preliminary ruling delivered in 1996, the Commission 
adopted a decision and concluded that the logistical and commercial assistance 
provided by La Poste to its subsidiary did not constitute State aid because it 
corresponded to normal business conditions since it covered the full-cost prices (total 
costs plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital investment). 
The Court of First Instance 319 reviewed the Commission decision and found that 
its economic analysis was not consistent with the guidelines laid down by the Court 
in SFEI. The mere verification of the reimbursement of costs was not sufficient. 
In particular, even supposing that those costs were fully covered, could not exclude 
that any aid had in fact been granted, considering that La Poste, by virtue of its 
position of monopolist in the reserved sector, could have provided the services at 
lower cost than a private undertaking not enjoying those rights. The CFI concluded 
that the correct benchmark was the remuneration that would have been demanded 
by a private investor not operating in a reserved sector. 
320 
The CFI's decision was appealed before the Court of Justice. The significance of 
the Court's reasoning deserves an extensive quotation. 
321 For the reader's 
convenience, the main passages have been emphasised. 
The Court begins by repeating the main legal point laid down by the CFI: 
318 Case C-39/94 SFEI, paragraphs 59 to 61 (emphasis added). Building up on the market economy investor 
principle, Advocate General Jacobs was more precise in the indication of the various factors to consider (see 
paragraph 61 of the Opinion). 
319 Case T-613/97 UFEX, paragraph 64 et seq. 
320 Ibid, paragraph 75. 
3=' Joined Cases C-83/01P, C-93/01P and C-94/01P, Chroxopost, paragraphs 31 to 40. 
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... the appellants allege that the 
Court of First Instance infringed Article [87(1) 
EC], by giving an incorrect interpretation of the concept of normal market 
conditions used in the SFEI judgment. 
In that regard, the Court of First Instance stated ... that the Commission should 
at least have checked that the payment received by La Poste was comparable to that 
demanded by a private holding company or a private group of undertakings not 
operating in a reserved sector. 
The following of the reasoning is devoted to the criticism of this premiss 
That assessment, which fails to take account of the fact that an undertaking such 
as La Poste is in a situation which is very dßerent from that of a private undertaking 
acting under normal market conditions, is flawed in law. 
La Poste is entrusted with a service of general economic interest within the meaning of 
[Article 86(2) EC] ... 
Such a service essentially consists in the obligation to 
collect, carry and deliver mail for the benefit of all users throughout the territory 
of the Member State concerned, at uniform tariffs and on similar conditions as 
to quality. 
To that end, La Poste had to acquire, or was afforded, substantial infrastructures and resources 
(the postal network), enabling it to provide the basic postal service to all users, even in sparsely 
populated areas where the tariffs did not cover the cost of providing the service in question. 
Because of the characteristics of the service which the La Poste network must be 
able to ensure, the creation and maintenance of that network are not in line with a purely 
commercial approach.... Ufex and Others [ie the appellants] have indeed accepted 
that a network such as that available to SFMI-Chronopost is clearly not a market 
network. Therefore that network would never have been created by a private undertaking. 
Moreover, the provision of logistical and commercial assistance is inseparably 
linked to the La Poste network, since it consists precisely in making available 
that network which has no equivalent on the market. 
The conclusion of the Court offers the proper interpretation of `normal market 
condition' in the instant case. 
Accordingly, in the absence of any possibility of comparing the situation of La Poste with 
that of a private group of undertakings not operating in a reserved sector, normal market 
conditions, which are necessarily hypothetical, must be assessed by of erence to the objective and 
verifiable elements which are available. 
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In the present case, the costs borne by La Poste in respect of the provision to its 
subsidiary of logistical and commercial assistance can constitute such objective and 
verifiable elements. 
On that basis, there is no question of State aid to SFMI-Chronopost if, first, it is 
established that the price charged properly covers all the additional, variable 
costs incurred in providing the logistical and commercial assistance, an 
appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from use of the postal 
network and an adequate return on the capital investment in so far as it is used 
for SFMI-Chronopost's competitive activity and if, second, there is nothing to 
suggest that those elements have been underestimated or fixed in an arbitrary 
fashion. 
The case was thus remanded to the Court of First instance for a new decision based 
on the directions of the Court. 322 
Comments on La Poste 
Three main issues emerge from the case and induce comments. 
Incomparables: the singularity ofnatural monopolies 
Following Advocate General Tizzano, 323 the Court correctly questions the premiss 
of the reasoning of the Court of First Instance, ie the possibility of comparing the 
situation of La Poste with that of a private group of undertakings, and in particular 
one not operating in a reserved sector. 
The presence of the network, with its `substantial infrastructures and resources', 
represents a unique factor as well as a fundamental obstacle to the possibility of finding 
any `equivalent on the market'. This is certainly correct if the industry of ordinary 
mail is considered as a typical example of natural monopoly, that is an industry where 
only one firm can operate in the market profitably because the latter can support 
only one network. 324 
3'= See the recent decision in Case T-613/97. 
323 See paragraphs 38 to 63 of the Opinion. 
324 See the paragraph `A primer on public, private and publicly provided private goods' in section II for an 
analysis of natural monopolies and their problem. 
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The Court, however, also notes that the `creation and maintenance of that network 
are not in line with a purely commercial approach' with the result that it is `clearly 
not a market network' since `it would have never been created by a private 
undertaking'. Although the Court clearly refers to the situation of La Poste, for the 
sake of accuracy, it is worth underlining that, although this reasoning may well be 
true on the facts of the case, it does not necessarily represent a general rule. 
In this regard, it may be useful to refer to section 2 of this chapter and to the 
discussion on public and private goods. 
In general, being private goods, postal services could also be carried out be private 
undertakings. 
At least hypothetically, a postal network could be created and run profitably by private 
entrepreneurs. The investment to create a vast national network may be 
considerable but not necessarily impossible to finance. 
What is crucial, however, is the provision of the service, particularly if there are 
standards and obligations that have to be complied with. We have seen that the 
issue of the performance of a universal service obligation is particularly intricate because, 
under certain circumstances, some form of public intervention may be required. It 
has been underlined, however, that this concept is by definition `dynamic' and liable 
to change rapidly. Finally, it has also been tentatively argued that, more generally, 
the provision of any public service should be considered as an economic activity. 
In conclusion, what does not seem to be justified is to transcend the finding of the 
Court on the circumstances of the case into a formulation of absolute impossibility of the 
private sector to create and maintain the network and provide the relevant 
(universal) services. Although often some form of public support may be required, 
the market may generally provide these services. 
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'Normal market conditions' and `objective and verifiable elements' 
After underlining the uniqueness of a natural monopoly, what is still to be answered 
is how to interpret correctly the `concept of normal market conditions used in the 
SFEI judgment'. 325 
The Court correctly notes that `in the absence of any possibility of comparison the 
situation of La Poste with that of a private group of undertakings not operating in a 
reserved sector, normal market conditions, which are necessarily hypothetical, must 
be assessed by reference to the objective and verifiable elements which are 
available'. 326 
The first important observation is that the fact that a comparable market situation 
cannot be found does not lead the Court to simply reject the reference to `normal 
market conditions'. These are simply defined as `hypothetical'. Admittedly, this 
term may be misleading, since it may raise the impression that we are not really 
talking of a market and its rules, which is clearly not the case (albeit monopolistic, 
there is a market), but this doubt is immediately removed by the following 
reasoning and conclusion of the Court. 
The monopolistic structure of the market makes difficult the use of normal market 
benchmarks, such as prices. As the Advocate General indicated, the only possibility 
to rely on a price would have been the one that could have been obtained if the 
logistical and commercial services had been put on the market and that private 
investors would have been prepared to offer, but this eventuality did not occur in 
the case at hand. 327 
These difficulties do not preclude the reference to the `objective and verifiable 
elements which are available' to assess the compliance with market conditions. Absent 
the possibility of referring to prices, the only 'objective and verifiable' commercial 
benchmark could not but be represented by costs. 
This reasoning, which immediately calls to mind that of the Appellate Body, 
particularly in Canada - Dairy, is highly persuasive. As Advocate 
General Tizzano 
underlines 
325 Paragraph 31 of the Cbroxoport decision. 
3'6 Paragraph 38. 
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in the absence of adequate information on the market value of the services 
offered and with no estimates associated with a general group strategy to go on, 
an undertaking operating under normal market conditions would be obliged to fix the price of 
such services on the basis of their costs'. 328 
Finally, Morgan De Rivery, Le Berre-Doder and Thibault-Liger (2005: 163 et seq) 
make an important warning about the use of costs. 
First, transparency needs to be ensured. This is achieved through accurate separate 
accounts for each activity carried out by the undertaking. 329 Secondly, in the 
specific context of the costs of a public undertaking, there is a risk that `les coüts de 
l'operateur public peuvent etre minimises par l'existence meme de ce financement 
public'. 330 
Access to infrastructures and use ofmarket benchmarks 
The important teaching of La Poste is that, despite the difficulties for the presence 
of a natural monopoly, the Court still refers to market benchmarks. 
What underlies the Court's reasoning is the consideration that, once an 
infrastructure has been created (no matter whether the market would have provided 
it, or whether it is needed for providing a public service), it should be run according to 
market logic. The access to it - by operators wishing to manage it, service suppliers, 
and final users - should always be assessed on economic terms, in the SFEI jargon 
`under normal market conditions'. 
In a word, the hiatus between the creation of the infrastructure and its operation is 
so imperceptible that the whole emphasis is exclusively shifted towards the latter. 
The discussion about whether the creation of the infrastructure is economic or not 
becomes essentially otiose (see the `doubt' below). When the dust of the works is 
32' Paragraphs 54-55 of the Opinion. 
328 Paragraph 57 of the Opinion (emphasis added). 
329 See in this regard Directive 80/723/EEC - the 'Transparency' Directive - 
last amended by Directive 
2005/81 /EC. 
370 This point does not seem to have been taken into account in the remand 
decision of CFI in La Not (see 
paragraphs 189-190). 
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removed what remains is a facility which should be run economically. The otherwise 
inevitable conclusion is that an advantage is granted. 
Building up on the teachings of the La Poste saga the next paragraph attempts to 
analyse more in depth the relation between infrastructure and market, particularls" 
with respect to the EC law debate. 
The relation between infrastructure and market under State aid rules 
The traditional approach 
The language of the traditional approach stresses two elements. 
First, infrastructures are non-economic, substantially because the private sector 
would not provide them, and belong to the inherently public prerogatives. 
Although often unsaid, the certainly thought implication is that they should 
somewhat be sheltered from the application of State aid law. 
The second argument is that infrastructures are normally general, ie available across 
the board, with the result that they cannot confer any special advantage. The only 
problem under State aid rules would therefore occur when there is a discriminatory 
access to infrastructure. 
It is worth noting that this argument confuses the various meanings of the term 
general which is intended more with reference to the universal subjective application of 
the measure rather than with its normal character. The debate is thus usually but 
incorrectly put in the context of the specificity analysis rather than in that of the 
advantage. This confusion, which continuously recurs in the areas, and the need to 
distinguish between the two levels of the analysis, is analysed in more detail below 
In a word, the result is that, unless specific access is proved, infrastructures are not 
a problem for State aid law. 
Market ibera izadon: market logic expansion and multi-layered analysis 
Santamato and Westerhof (2003: 646) have questioned the force of the two main 
arguments of the traditional approach to infrastructure under State aid rules, that is 
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the `market failure' argument 331 and the `non-selectivity' argument. 
332 It is 
however the market liberalization process that calls for a review of the old , riew. 
The introductory section has shown the ongoing dramatic change in the economic 
and political context. The recent decades have seen a process of increasing 
liberalization of the market. 
This tide has involved also infrastructures and the services supplied through them. 
333 Increasingly, budgetary constraints and the desire to benefit from the know-how 
and efficiency of the private sector are increasingly seeing an involvement of the 
latter in the provision and operation of infrastructures and in the supply of services. 
Governments do not necessarily leave the field altogether but institute sometimes 
complex forms of co-operation with the private sector, so called Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP), where, at least that is the goal, the synergy should deliver more 
efficiently better services to consumers. 
In the field of infrastructure, all this has produced an expansion of market logic as well 
as an increase of the levels of public/private interaction. In other words, the current 
infrastructure debate under State aid law involves activities which are increasingly 
considered economic and which occur at various levels/markets. 
Without entering the details of a complex, and still not settled, area of State aid law, 
the brief analysis of two examples may be useful to sketch the two main traits of the 
said phenomena of the rise of market logic and of a multilayered analysis. 
The following considerations mainly draw on issues raised by the already mentioned 
phenomenon of PPP. 
If the government decides to fund the construction and/or the management of an 
infrastructure, in order to exclude any advantage, it has to do so at the (minimum) 
market price/cost resulting from an open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedure (general principles which are valid beyond the applicability of EC public 
331 `Non-excludable [public] goods are not very frequent: for most infrastructure there are technical means of 
charging a price for the use of the facility'. 
131 The presence of mechanisms to avoid discrimination between competitors 
is certainly capable of 
significantly reducing the distortion of competition. However, non-selectivity within a sector 
does not imply a 
total absence of potential distortion: the issue of selectivity between sectors or 
between territories remains 
open'. 
333 See, eg, Santamato and Westerhof (2003); Koenig and Kiefer (2005); Koenig and Haratsch (2004). 
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procurement law). 334 In addition, if the service purchased can be defined as one of 
general economic interest the conditions laid down by the Court in Altmark, which 
are thoroughly analysed at the end of the chapter, should be fulfilled. If a tender is 
not possible, market benchmarks should still be applied, in particular by attempting 
to construe an appropriate consideration. In this regard, even beyond the area of 
public services, the criteria indicated by the Altmark decision, particularly in its third 
and fourth conditions, could provide useful guidance. 
Just to underline the complexity of the involvement of private undertakings in the 
infrastructure area, Koenig and Haratsch (2004: 396-397) have underlined the 
possible State aid concerns at the level of the shareholders of the owner/operator 
of the infrastructure. Apart from a possible privileged access, these may benefit 
from the distribution of dividends (which should therefore be in line with 
commercial practice) and from the sale of assets/shares (which may justify the 
imposition of a temporary ban). 
Finally, at the level of the users of the infrastructure/service, it seems that the two 
main criteria to follow to exclude any advantage are those of an open (ie non- 
discriminatory) access and, again, of market pricing. Since it may well occur that an 
infrastructure is used by one or more specific undertakings only, it seems however 
that the most important criterion is the latter. Accordingly, in line with findings of 
the Court's La Poste decision, any advantage would be excluded if the access to the 
infrastructure is granted at the (maximum possible) market price. 335 
Another area where both market logic expansion and multi-layered analysis can be 
seen is airport financing. 
Following a shift of focus from the assistance to airlines to that to airport operators, 
and the controversial Ryanair decision which raised the attention to the new 
phenomenon of low-cost airlines and their natural bases, ie regional airports, in 
2005 the Commission adopted new Guidelines on Financing of Airports and Start- 
Up Aid to Airlines Departing From Regional Airports. 336 
»i It may be recalled that the area, which has close connections with State aid law, has recently been subject 
to a reform (embodied by Directive 18/2004/EC) which was to be implemented by the end of January of 
2006. 
335 Koenig and Haratsch (2004: 394). 
336 For a commentary on the guidelines see Bartosch (2005); Soltesz (2006). 
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This piece of soft law confirms the two trends indicated above. 
On the one hand, the complexity of infrastructure under State aid rules since 
different markets have to be considered in order to determine whether there is an 
aid (for example, not only that of users, particularly airlines, but also that of airport 
operators). 
On the other hand, many activities are increasingly classed as economic and subject 
to market rules. In this regard, paragraph 59 clearly reads that the guidelines apply 
to `all airports activities, with the exception of safety, air traffic control and any 
other activities for which a Member State is responsible as part of its official powers 
as a public authority'. Apart from this obvious safe harbour, the remainder of the 
activities concerning the construction, operation and other airport services are 
considered economic. Whereas it is not clear whether the new guidelines have 
revisited the famous statement of the previous guidelines whereby `the construction 
of (airport) infrastructure projects ... represents a general measure of economic 
policy which cannot be controlled by the Commission under the Treaty rules on 
State aid' (see paragraph 19 which merely refers to the old 1994 guidelines), the 
issue seem essentially moot in consideration of the substantially `imperceptible 
hiatus' between construction and use of the infrastructure which have been 
highlighted by the La Poste decision of the Court. Again, what clearly emerges from 
the new guidelines is that, except for the public duties above, virtually all the 
activities carried out through it are considered economic. 
Towards a modern approach: an application 
The previous analysis has shown that the liberalization/privatization process has 
produced two main effects in the State aid regulation of infrastructures. First, an 
increasing recognition that infrastructures may involve economic activities and may 
thus be subject to market criteria. Secondly, that these activities - and the relevant 
markets - may be several with the result that the advantage analysis should be 
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carried out at various levels. Finally, technology is another key-word in the field of 
infrastructure, as is evidenced by the topical issue of financing to broadband. 337 
The main teaching of La Poste is that, despite pursuing a public interest, 
infrastructures, and in particular the services provided through them, should 
necessarily be managed under market conditions. The market is the paradigm to 
determine whether an advantage is conferred. This has been confirmed by the 
analysis of the previous paragraphs on the more recent trends on infrastructures. 
Along the same lines, the Court has recently confirmed that the supply of a public 
service (in that case unrelated to any infrastructure) not consistent with market 
conditions, notably for no consideration, is liable to grant an aid. 338 
All this calls for a review of the traditional approach. Taking stock of the previous 
analysis, we could attempt test a new, modern approach with an application to the 
factual and legal background of the La Poste case. 
It has been previously argued that there are good reasons for concluding that the 
provision of a universal service should generally be considered as an economic activity, 
to be tested against market criteria. 
One of the crucial ideas underlying the concept of `universal service' is affordability, 
which, like in La Poste, often materializes in a `uniform tariff for all users in the 
territory of the country. 
What is often behind this tariff uniformity is cross-subsidisation, that is the financial 
support of one part of the business (the less profitable) by another part (the most 
profitable). The inevitable result is that the tariff applied to some users is not 
commercially sound because, as the Court itself recognised in La Poste, it may not cover 
the actual costs of delivering the service. 
If the conduct is economic, and a market benchmark should be used in the 
advantage analysis, the conclusion is foregone: an advantage is conferred on those 
137 The Commission generally looks with favour to financial assistance to 
broadband infrastructure and 
consider them as compatible aid: see IP/06/949; IP/06/755; IP/06/284; IP/06/214. 
The first negative 
decision was adopted very recently. It was considered that the area was already served 
by broadband 
networks and the aid was not necessary to remedy either a market 
failure or unaffordable prices: IP/06/1013. 
For a commentary on the policy in this area see Hecsey, Reymond, Riedl, Santamato and \Vesterhof (2005). 
3" Case C-126/01, GEMO, paragraphs 28 to 34. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 
paragraphs 64 to 78. 
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users. The impression is therefore that the legitimate equity justification which 
underlies the `affordability' and `uniformity' of the tariff should not be taken into 
account at this stage. 
The advantage analysis may however present a final element of complication which 
leads us back to the assessment of the construction of the infrastructure. 
The question is whether the fact that the government provides an infrastructure 
that the private sector `would not have provided' may have an impact on the 
following advantage analysis of its operation. To put it differently, should the fact 
that the infrastructure is subsequently run according to market logic, and that the 
market price is paid for the access to it, lead us to forget that - but for governmental 
intervention - the infrastructure itself would not have seen the light, at least on the 
circumstances of the case? 
The doubt is that the exclusion of any advantage should require that an assessment 
be carried out not only at the level of the operation of the infrastructure, which, as 
seen, need to occur according to market logic, but also at the previous level of its 
construction. 
The crucial question is: what does `the market would not have provided' actually 
mean? 
It is difficult to distinguish between those situations that are within the market and 
those that are beyond it. Hypothetically, although costly, it is not impossible to 
create an infrastructure, irrespective of its extensiveness. On the premiss that the 
lack of private initiative does not depend on a market failure, should we therefore 
test the conduct of the government against a market benchmark? Or, rather, 
having identified a market failure (such as lack of competition in an industry which 
is not a natural monopoly), should we establish whether the government has 
derogated from its general infrastructure poluy? 339 
If the answer to either question is that the government has granted an advantage by 
creating the infrastructure, this may have an impact on the following analysis of the 
operation of the infrastructure. 
119 This criterion is analysed more in depth in the next section. 
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A note may be used to nicely conclude this paragraph on a modern approach to 
infrastructure under State aid rules. 
The attentive reader has certainly noted that the focus of the debate has shifted to 
its natural location. Before being an issue of specificity, infrastructures are an issue 
of advantage. This is indeed an important conceptual clarification. 
The regulation of infrastructure under WTO subsidy rules 
It is interesting to assess whether the general approach proposed in the EC context 
can be applied also here. 
The exclusion of general infrastructure' 
The starting point is one of the forms of financial contribution under Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii). This provision refers to those cases where 
a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure .... 110 
The intention seems to be that general infrastructure should not be covered by 
subsidy rules. 
The argument whereby general infrastructures belong to the responsibilities of 
Member States and should thus be sheltered from the application of subsidy law 
should be immediately dismissed. Even sovereign prerogatives, such as the power 
to tax, find limitations in WTO law, for example in subsidy rules. 
Two other explanations deserve more attention and focus on the already noted 
ambivalence of the term `general'. 
The seemingly accredited reading is that `general' should be viewed as referring to 
the fact that the infrastructure at issue should not be specific, ie that it should not 
apply to the exclusive advantage of a `specific enterprise or industry or group of 
"0 Emphasis added. 
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enterprises or industries'. McGovern (1995: 11.31-4) accordingly observed that the 
mention `seems unnecessary in view of the general requirement in Article 2 ... that 
subsidies must be specific'. It could be noted that, since the determination of 
whether the use of infrastructures is specific or generally available is notoriously 
difficult, the legislator might in fact have preferred to cut it short and put the issue 
immediately outside the reach of the SCM. 
Another possible explanation of the exclusion of general infrastructures from 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM is that, being general, infrastructures would not be liable to 
confer any advantage. `General' is thus intended in its alternative meaning, ie as 
opposed to exception. In other words, only infrastructures that do not derogate 
from the general (infrastructure) policy of the government, and are hence `general', 
should fall outside the scope of the law. It is worth repeating that this is the case 
not because they are not specific but because they do not confer an advantage in 
the first place. 
This reading may be original. It can however be nicely reconciled with the wording 
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM for two main reasons. First, unlike the prevailing 
interpretation, which reads the phrase `other than general infrastructure' as a 
pleonastic (read: useless) anticipation of the specificity test, it attempts to give the 
phrase, and within it, the term `general', its own meaning. Secondly, the 
interpretation is the one which recognised that the more natural context of the issue 
of infrastructure is the advantage analysis. In this regard, we would interestingly see 
an anticipation of the advantage analysis at the level of the assessment of the 
financial contribution, which is not rare. See the next section on tax measures under 
Article 1.1(a) (1) (ii) SCM. 
Between traditional and modern approach 
Drawing inspiration from the previous analysis under EC law and the current trend 
of market liberalization and market logic expansion, two crucial remarks should be 
made. 
First, the interpretation of general that has been suggested is premised on the fact 
that the infrastructure is provided by the government because of a market failure. 
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This is partly in line with the traditional approach to infrastructure (which sees 
them as naturally non-economic) but is increasingly put into question by the more 
and more significant role that, for various reasons, the private sector plays in the 
provision of infrastructures. 
More fundamentally, it has been seen that the main indication of the expansion of 
market logic is that, once you have an infrastructure, irrespective of whether it is 
economic or not, this should be run economically, ie for profit. From the 
standpoint of the advantage analysis, this means that the operation of the 
infrastructure, that is the provision of its services, should be tested against market 
criteria. 
The crucial legal question is whether these remarks can be taken into account in the 
construction of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM which still seems to essentially reflect the 
old approach towards infrastructure. 
This depends on the answer to two important questions. 
First, does `provision of infrastructure' also refer to the services supplied through it? 
A positive answer might find confirmation in the immediate context of 
subparagraph (iii): `a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure' which does not seem to exclusively confine the `infrastructure' to its 
physical or static dimension but may well extend to cover its main function, ie the 
provision of services. 
If the answer to the first question is positive, can `general' be construed so as to 
include also those cases where the provision of the infrastructure is in line with the 
general market norm? Although this might require a bit more of interpretative 
inventiveness, an approach in this direction cannot be completely excluded. 
Conclusive remarks on the case-studies: the interplay between two forces 
After the examination of the complexities and difficulties inherent in commercial 
decisions and in their reviews, this section has analysed a particular element of 
complexity: the public intervention in the economy. 
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The two-case studies have shown that the interplay between the public intervention 
in the economy and the market is multilayered. 
At a still superficial level both case-studies highlight that the mere fact that the 
government intervenes in the economy can make the market advantage analysis 
more difficult. 
It is only at a deeper level, however, that the most intriguing and critical finding can 
be made. The background is the actual context of redefinition of the roles of 
public and private actors in the economy caused by the ongoing trend of market 
liberalization. The finding is the existence of two forces currently at work and 
partly moving in opposite directions. What the two case-studies do is to explain the 
relationship between public intervention in the economy and market advantage 
analysis from the respective viewpoint of either force. 
The first case-study focused on the public intervention in the economy in its 
various forms and highlighted the impact of this `public' force on the market 
advantage analysis, ie how it can make the identification of market benchmarks, 
whose applicability is not challenged in principle, particularly complex in the instant 
case. 
What emerged from the second case-study is not only the confirmation of the 
significant impact of the public intervention in the economy but, more radically, the 
expansion of the market logic. This `private' force is somewhat in opposition to the 
`public' force. In the previous case it was the public intervention in the economy 
that produced an impact on the advantage analysis. Now, it is the `market tide' 
which does profoundly influence the legal position of the public intervention in the 
economy in the first place (and consequently also the advantage analysis thereof). 
Crucially, as shown by the example of infrastructure, public conduct, whose status 
was previously at the very least ambiguous and substantially sheltered from the 
market and its rationale, is being redefined in the current liberalization scenario, it is 
more and more likely to be classed as economic, and finally subject to the market 
logic and its benchmarks. 
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As in any story, there has been a final twist. The writer has highlighted how, when 
there is a public presence in the economy, this cannot be ignored and may in turn 
have an impact on market logic. 
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3. The step forward: from difficulty to criticism 
Drawing inspiration from the difficulties that have emerged so far, this closing 
section concentrates on two sets of arguments that make a step forward, by 
challenging the legitimacy - in terms of possibility and consistency - of using the 
market and its criteria to test the public intervention. 
The two criticisms are strictly intertwined insofar as they both underline the risk of 
discriminating public actors towards private ones. 
First criticism: the fallacy of the market paradigm 
The criticism and its refutation 
This criticism does not concern the dculty but, more radically, the possibility of 
using the market principle and its benchmarks. 
The argument is that the conduct of public bodies in the market may not be 
assessed against any benchmark since it would not be possible to identify with 
precision the rules that guide private entrepreneurs. Market benchmarks are purely 
abstract. Malinconico (1999: 92) argues that it is difficult to say how a private 
investor would behave in a given situation as entrepreneurs do not necessarily 
behave in the same manner. The core is that every businessman is a person and 
persons are unique. Repeating a recurring observation, Parish (2003: 71) notes that 
[f)inance is not a science; it is not even an imprecise one, as it is based on 
predicting events whose occurrence depends upon people, whose conduct can 
never be formalised in a set of rules no matter how much data one has. ... 
Risk 
aversion is a quality that varies wildly from one investor to another. Even 
discounting different perceptions of risk, different investors may allow 
themselves to be motivated by a variety of different factors which are not strictly 
financial. 
Even discounting personal differences, Malinconico (1999: 92) provocatively 
observes that if a rule in the market should be found this would be represented by 
uncertainty and lack of transparency. Predictions would not always be confirmed 
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according to a regular causal nexus since it is well likely that `proprio l'improbabile 
costituisca la fortuna o la roving di un investimento'. 
With a caustic expression, Tarullo (1987/1987: 570-579) advances that the reference 
to a market standard would be just an exercise of mimicry. Ultimately, the imposition 
of an abstract standard of behaviour would result in a sort of diri, girme `capace di 
mortificare l'impresa pubblica a fronte dell'impresa privata'. 341 
Therefore, the core of this criticism is that the market paradigm is in fact fallacious 
and, since it cannot apply to private investors, its imposition to public investors is all 
the more liable to discriminate them. 
The fundamental nihilism of these critical arguments is too extreme. It seems clear 
that i) it is possible to talk of the market as a principle and of its underlying rules, 
and that ii) the reference to them is the most natural way to assess the public 
intervention in the market. 
Although it is sometimes difficult to find or apply a precise benchmark, the conduct 
of private actors certainly follows certain principles resting on the fundamental 
premiss of economics, focussing on the rational, self-interested and profit- 
maximising homo oeconomicus. This premiss is often put into question. It is 
underlined that entrepreneurs not always behave rationally or with an individualistic 
goal. Parish (2003: 71 and 75) argues that a `strong case can be made that private 
investors have regard to "social, regional-policy and sector considerations" ... as 
much as public investors' and that wealth increase is not necessarily the motive 
guiding investors. 
This may well be true in some, if not many cases. The writer is aware of the huge 
debate concerning the very basic assumptions of economics, those that can be 
found in the first pages of any university textbooks, that agents in the market are 
self-interested, utility-maximising and rational players. Behavioural decision theories, for 
example, tend to criticise these assumptions and suggest that individuals may be 
motivated by a broader range of reasons. There is nonetheless considerable 
(empirical and common sense) evidence supporting the presumption that normally 
rationality is adhered to as well as that profit is the main motivator of economic 
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agents. Although sometimes difficult to uncover, criteria and benchmarks, which 
refer to the behaviour of a typical, and certainly to some extent idealized, economic 
operator set in that particular set of circumstances, can be found and developed. 
Truly, as with any idealization, adjustments may be needed but even factors such as 
uncertainty and lack of information can be duly taken into account in the 
application of these criteria. 
Since the market has its rules, the conduct of economic actors operating within it is 
judged accordingly. If an undertaking does not behave in a commercially sound 
way it is punished. The company may lose shares to competitors and, in the most 
extreme cases, it is driven out of the market. The management may be put into 
question by shareholders and even dismissed. Now, it seems natural and logical 
that if a public body decides to enter the market it should follow its rules and its 
conduct should be reviewed on the basis of these rules. 
Ultimately, this in not only natural and logical but also justified by the need not to 
discriminate private actors. The scrutiny according to these rules is particularly 
important for two reasons that specifically relate to public agents. On the one side, 
public bodies may well draw from considerable financial resources which may 
enable them to better withstand the misfortune of a commercial venture. On the 
other side, the kind of accountability in case of bad or simply unlucky public 
investments is less clear. Some stakeholders (consider the constituency of the 
region where an ailing industry heavily subsidised is located) may well support the 
investment despite its inconsistency according to commercial logic. These two 
concerns about a particularly deep pocket and the lack of commercial accountability 
may be partly addressed by the trends towards increasing budgetary constraints and 
more efficient use of public money which, for political and cultural reasons, seem 
be gaining more and more success in the recent years. The fact remains that, from 
a commercial perspective, the liaison between the government and the market is 
dangerous. Thus, more transparency with respect to the financial relations of 
governmental bodies (a good example is the EC Transparency Directive and its 
various requirements) and special scrutiny of the public intervention in the market 
is much needed. 
341 Malinconico (1999: 92); see also Kuyfis (2003: 413). 
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In conclusion, despite its shortcomings, a market benchmark can be found and 
used. The writer also tends to a have a more positive attitude than those, such as 
Smits (2005: 78), that accept it but consider it as `la moires mauvaise des solutions'. 
He is certainly more in line with her subsequent remark that `[p)lutot que de le 
supprimer, il conviendrait de le clarifier'. In this regard, a general suggestion is put 
forward in the next paragraph. 
The solution of flexibility 
Far from radically negating the existence of market rules, the concerns about a too 
abstract and rigid approach, which constitute the substance of the criticisms 
deployed against the market principle, can be addressed by using the necessary 
degree of flexibility in the identification and application of the appropriate 
benchmarks 
With words equally applicable to EC law and WTO law, the Commission noted 
that 
the Commission realizes that [the] analysis of risk [which is demanded by any 
investment] requires public undertakings, like private undertakings, to exercise 
entrepreneurial skills, which by the very nature of the problem implies a wide 
margin of judgment on the part of the investor. Within that wide margin the 
exercise of judgment by the investor cannot be regarded as involving State aid... . 
[i]t is not the Commission's intention to apply the principles in this 
communication (in what is necessarily a complex field) in a dogmatic or 
doctrinaire fashion. It understands that a wide margin must come into 
entrepreneurial investment decisions. The principles have however to be applied 
when it is beyond reasonable doubt that there is no other plausible explanation 
for the provision of public funds other than considering them as State aid. 
342 
Although consistently repeated, this principle has not always been followed. 
In the already cited Bremer Vulkan decision, the Court defended the need for a 
flexible approach and criticised the Commission for having considered, without 
342 1993 Communication, paragraphs 27 and 29. 
1) 1) 1 Výrr Lý 
adequate explanation, the stock market price as the sole determining factor in 
valuing shares, and noted that 
that view is too formal, rigid and restrictive. To apply that criterion absolutely 
and unconditionally, to the exclusion of all other elements, constitutes a purely 
mechanical exercise which can scarcely be reconciled with the system of the 
market economy and the economic choices made in the present case by 
undertakings of substantial size guided by prospects of profitability in the longer 
term. 343 
The use of `average benchmarks' provides an interesting illustration of the possible 
ambiguity of the notion of flexibility. At first glance, the use of `average' indicators 
seems to represent a straightforward application of the principle. A closer look, 
however, reveals that `average' criteria are by definition inelastic. Average 
benchmarks have thus been criticised as too restrictive since they inevitably become 
minimum standards and thus outlaw any conduct which, albeit below average, would be 
acceptable to some private actors. 344 Hufbauer and Shelton Erb (1984: 101) ironically 
underline that 
This is a fairly rigorous test since, at any given time, approximately half the 
industrial firms in the country will be earning less than the average return on 
equity. 
If used correctly, a flexible application of market criteria allows taking into account 
all the circumstances of the case and make the necessary accommodation. A couple 
of examples concerning public actors can be useful. 
One common critique against the possibility of using market benchmarks to public 
entrepreneurs is that, even if a rule guiding private operators is found, there would 
be inherent economic differences between public and private undertakings, mainly 
" Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95, paragraph 36. 
«The issue has recently come into prominence in the EC with the judicial review of a Commission decision 
which applied an `average rate of return' test. The decision of the CFI in joined Cases T-228/99 and T- 
233/99 WettLB is not fully clear in dealing with the issue (see, eg, paragraph 258 of the judgment). See 
Hansen, Van Ysendyck and Zühlke (2004: 207); Stints (2005: 63-65). 
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dependent on the (allegedly) unlimited financial resources of governments. 3'S A 
flexible application of market criteria should arguably allow taking these peculiar 
economic features into due consideration and permits for the necessary 
adjustments. 
Another interesting problem. Suppose that the government manages to practice 
better conditions than those prevailing in the market, or to provide products or 
services that are not available in it. The doubt may be that this does not depend on 
superior efficiency, that is ability, of the agent but rather on its public status. 
However, the possibility that a public agent not only matches its market 
competitors (which is usually tested in the `market' advantage analysis) but is in fact 
doing better than them cannot be ruled out. Although the numerous critics of 
public entrepreneurial and managerial potential might almost instinctively dismiss 
this possibility, as a matter of principle, it cannot be excluded. A non-abstract and 
non-dogmatic application of the market principle should represent a useful tool to 
analyse these situations. 
This issue could have been tackled in the Canada - Export Credits dispute with 
respect to a particular type of equity guarantees. A little digression into the facts 
may be useful. Brazil argued that first loss deficiency guarantees (that is 
government guarantees to protect an equity investor from the risks inherent in the 
equity market), which had allegedly been provided by the Government of Quebec 
to favour Canadian regional aircraft industry, `quintessentially' conferred a benefit 
because they were not available in the market. Quite regrettably (from an academic 
perspective), the Panel did not address the interesting issue of whether or not, as a 
matter of law, the provision by a government of support not available in the market 
necessarily confers a benefit, because it eventually found that market equivalents 
did in fact exist. 346 
" Hansen (2004: 203). 
Paragraph 7.341. 
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Final gloss: advantage analysis and distortion 
This paragraph can find a nice conclusion with the analysis of another line of 
criticism of market criteria since this provides an interesting opportunity for 
reconsidering the role of the advantage analysis. 
The critique leads to the conclusion that to say that an advantage is conferred 
because the conduct at issue is at odds with what market logic would require would 
rest on a simple, or simplified, idea of distortion of the market functioning. 347 
This may well be true but it is perfectly in line with the role of the element of the 
advantage in the broader context of the definition of subsidy and State aid. 
Although there is a clear link between the determination of an advantage and a 
possible negative effect on the market (we may recall the Appellate Body's finding 
about the `trade-distorting potential' of conduct deviating from market logic), as 
chapter 5 will show, the assessment of whether a distortion has actually taken place 
should be carried out at a subsequent stage of the analysis. What the determination 
of an advantage, in the form of a derogation from normal commercial practice, 
does is just to provide an indication, certainly significant but not final, that a 
('potential') distortion of competition and trade may have occurred. 
'47 Berutah (2001: 263). 
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Second criticism: the inconsistency of the market paradigm with the 
public interest 
The second criticism - which, it may be immediately said, does not seem to have 
much following anymore - highlights another aspect of alleged discrimination of 
public investors since the use of the market paradigm - whose soundness, in 
principle, is not challenged - would not take into account the crucial determinant of 
public intervention in the market, ie the pursuit of the public interest. The presence 
of public policy objectives would impede a parallel with private investors that by 
definition pursue purely individualistic goals. The 'private investor' criterion should 
therefore be substituted for a more comprehensive 'public investor' criterion, 
modelled on the public role of governments. 348 
Generally speaking, two issues need to be addressed. The first is a question of pure 
policy. Does the regulation at issue protect public policy objectives? If the answer 
is positive, the second question is more - albeit not exclusively -a technical matter. 
At what stage of the analysis these objectives should be considered? In particular, 
should their examination already occur at the level of the assessment of whether the 
conduct is commercially sound, ie of the advantage analysis? 
It can be anticipated that the answer to the first question is positive. It is therefore 
useful to concentrate on the second issue which touches one of the leit motifs of this 
work, ie the interplay between scope and justification in the regulation of subsidies 
and State aids. 
The reader might recall the Appellate Body's finding in Canada - Aircraft that the 
market should be the appropriate basis for comparison in the advantage analysis of 
the economic conduct of the government because of its ability to identify the 
`trade-distorting potential' of the financial contribution. 
This finding led the writer to formulate a broad hypothesis, ie that the advantage 
analysis of economic activity (in both WTO and EC law) should be based on those 
economic considerations that may signal a distortion to the competitive process and 
that any other consideration that might not be indicative from this perspective 
'8 For this line of argument with respect to the GATT and the EC see, respectively, Coccia (1991: 148 et 
seq), and Lesguillons (1991: 153 et seq). 
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should be excluded. A measure deviating from market practice would clearly 
suggest a potential of distortion of the market. The further implication was that 
public policy objectives could find with difficulty a place at this stage of the analysis. 
The time has now come to test that potentially far-reaching hypothesis in both 
WTO and EC law. 
WTO law 
The public intervention in the economy is normally justified by public policy 
considerations. Legally, it is important to determine the role played by the public 
interest, particularly in the context of the definition of subsidy. The issue is not 
new. Already in 1961 a Panel attempted to consider the `reasons for subsidies' 
under Article XVI GATT but, as emerges from the report, this attempt was 
abandoned. Consequently, Jackson (1969: 387) seemed to conclude that 
the purpose of the study of a subsidy is not relevant to the question of whether it 
falls within the terms of Article XVI. 
The `reasons of subsidies' were discussed during the Tokyo Round and the ensuing 
Subsidy Code deals with them, although ambivalently. 
Articles 8.1 and 11 simply recognise the possible opposite effects of subsidies 
(which may distort competition and trade and at the same time pursue important 
and legitimate socio/economic objectives). However, none of the provisions 
provide any indication on how to assess these effects, and, most importantly, how 
to balance them and solve any conflict. These provisions are thus more descriptive 
(of the ambivalent reality of subsidisation) than prescriptive (of how this 
ambivalence should be regulated). 
The issue of subsidy objectives came out prominently in one of the last GATI' 
disputes, US - Carbon Steel I where the Tokyo Subsidy Code was the relevant law. 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis (2003: 267) note that the report was 
unadopted because the issues were negotiated in the context of the SCM 
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Agreement, and also suggest that the report had an impact on those negotiations 
(they particularly refer to the financial contribution). 
For these reasons, and for the interesting statements contained therein, an attentive 
examination of the Panel report is justified. 
The definition of subsidy in the Tokyo Subsidy Code and public policy 
objectives: the US - Carbon Steel I dispute 349 
The case concerned the imposition of countervailing duties by the US on certain 
steel imports from the EC. 
The EC argued that the standard of 'reasonable private investor' used by the US 
DOC to assess the provision of equity capital was contrary to the term `subsidy' 
referred to in Article 4.2 of Part I of the Tokyo Subsidies Code because it failed to 
consider that governments often invest in pursuance of public policy objectives. In 
sum, `government motives for investment, and therefore benchmarks for 
governments, [are] different from investment by private individuals' with the 
consequence that the appropriate standard should thus be that of a `reasonable 
public investor'. This standard allows for the balancing of commercial factors and 
public policy objectives, considering that, unlike private investors, governments do 
not necessarily aim to achieve a maximum return on their investment. The test 
would not be met when the equity infusion is made `for social reasons only and without 
any serious chance of breaking even in the long run' (emphasis added). 
The US responded that `public policy objectives [are] irrelevant to a determination 
of whether or not the provision of equity capital by a government [is] a subsidy'. 
The EC's reasoning was `circular' since it `could be used to rationalize any provision 
of equity capital by a government'. Moreover, the US claimed `that the "reasonable 
public investor" criterion proposed by the EC was without logic in that from the 
standpoint of a government all subsidies could be said to be "reasonable"'. The 
quite blunt conclusion was that the `EC was simply proposing an alternative test 
without explaining why the Agreement [ie the Tokyo Subsidies Code] required such 
a test'. 
228 
The importance of the interpretative issue was immediately recognized by the 
Panel: `the rationale of the EC's argument was potentially applicable to a wide range 
of forms of government intervention'. Thus, `the argument of the EC raised the 
more general question of whether or not, for the purpose of the determination of the 
existence of a countervailable subsidy, public policy objectives pursued by 
governments are to be taken into account by investigating authorities' (emphasis 
added). 
The Panel analysed the overall Tokyo Subsidy Code for guidance. The learned 
reader may recall that a big interpretative issue raised by the Tokyo Code was 
whether Part I (on countervailing duties) and Part II (on international obligations) 
featured the same notion of subsidy. 350 
The Panel found nothing in the provisions of Part I to indicate that public policy 
objectives should be taken into account in order to determine whether a given 
measure constitute a countervailable subsidy. Although noting that a reference to 
the objectives of the subsidies was expressly made in Part II (in Articles 8.1 and 11), 
the Panel crucially noted that, even in that context, while recognizing the right of 
signatories to use subsidies in pursuance of various public policy objectives, Article 
11 did 
not provide that such policy objectives are relevant to a determination of 
whether a particular practice constitutes a subsidy. Under Article 11, the 
existence of a subsidy and the public policy objectives pursued with that subsidy 
are separate matters. 351 
The important conclusion was that, under both Parts of the Tokyo Subsidies Code, 
the determination of whether or not a particular practice constitutes a 
(countervailable) subsidy does not require the consideration of the public policy 
objectives eventually pursued by the government. Consequently, only market 
considerations are relevant when determining whether a subsidy exists. 
The relevant paragraphs of the report are from 434 to 451. 
ýý0 Point which is now positively solved by the SCM Agreement: see Articles 1.2 and 10. 
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The benefit requirement in the SCM and public policy objectives 
The conclusion reached with respect to the Tokyo Subsidy Code may be quite 
easily transposed into the context of the SCM Agreement. 352 Not only is it now 
clear that only one definition of subsidy is applicable, but, most importantly, the 
fairly descriptive and inconclusive language of Articles 8.1 and 11 of the Code has 
been fully developed in the SCM Agreement to achieve a more prescriptive result. 
The SCM Agreement provided for separate provisions for the definition of what 
constitutes a subsidy - and within it a benefit - on the one hand, and what subsidies 
are non-actionable because they pursue public policy objectives on the other. The writer 
used the past, `provided', because the category of non-actionable subsidy expired in 
the year 2000. It does not seem however that this may affect the conclusion as to 
the role of public policy objectives and alter the structure of the SCM Agreement as 
it was designed. The only consequence of this lapse is that, at least for now, one 
important limb is missing. This issue is analysed below in chapter 5. 
EC law 
The restrictive approach towards the role of public policy objectives in the context 
of the definition of aid was laid down in the mid-eighties in the Meura case. The 
Court found that the comparator of the public investor must be a private one 
which, in similar circumstances, takes a decision to invest 
having regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, 
regional policy and sectoral consideration. 353 
In the Hytara, Advocate General Jacobs observed that aid is granted whenever a 
State makes available to an undertakings funds which in the normal course of events 
would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria 
151 Paragraph 448. 
35' See, for example, Panel, US - Softwood Lrmbrr III, paragraph 7.16. 3S3 Case 234/84 Meura, paragraph 14 (emphasis added). 
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and disregarding considerations of a social, political or philanthropic natur. 'Sý The Court 
concluded that it is necessary to distinguish the obligations which the State must 
assume as owner of the share capital of a company and its obligations as a public 
authority. 355 
This is the current state of the law. It is however useful to analyse two cases where 
the issue of whether a different test should apply to public investors was thoroughly 
discussed. This analysis will also provide the opportunity for a parallel with the 
GATT. 
In Alfa Romeo the Court drew an important distinction between ordinary investors 
and holdings or groups of companies, by highlighting that these may pursue 
different objectives in their investment decisions. In ENI-Lanerossi the Court 
accepted that a parent company may decide to cover the losses of one subsidiary for 
a limited period in order to enable it either to reorganise it or to close down under 
the best possible conditions, and in doing so it 'may be motivated not solely by the 
likelihood of an indirect material profit but also by other considerations, such as a 
desire to protect the group's image or to redirect its activities'. Nevertheless, in both 
cases the Court underlined that injection of capital that disregard any prospect of 
profitability, even in the long term, should be regarded as aid. 356 It is interesting to 
note that the Court's reasoning makes reference only to factors, such as profitability, 
restructuring plan, overcapacity, image, etc, that are inherently economic. 
Advocate General Van Gerven took a more open approach in his two Opinions. 
In ENI he underlined that, although both private and public undertakings should 
always be guided by `the laws of the market place', even a private investor, and 
particularly if a large holding company, would not be wholly uninfluenced by considerations of 
a social nature or of regional or sectoral policy. Quite clearly, this would a fortiori apply to 
public holding companies. 357 
35' See Joined Cases 278 to 280/92 Hytaca, paragraph 28 of the Opinion. 
ass Ibid, paragraph 22. 
356 Alfa Romeo, paragraph 20; ENI, paragraph 22. 
ist Paragraph 14. 
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In Alfa Romeo he developed his thought and introduced the concept of reasonable 
investor. 358 
This would include ordinary and stable private investors. However, while the 
ordinary investors would not be interested in a shareholding significant enough to 
influence the management of the company, stable investors, such as holding 
companies, would possess, or in any event wish to possess, shareholdings large 
enough to influence the governance of the undertaking. Both would be guided by 
considerations of profitability. Stable investors however would consider a longer 
period of time, and - quite interestingly - would also have regard to considerations of 
employment and economic development in a given region or sector. A passage of the Opinion 
deserves a full quotation because it attempts to explain where the balance between 
profitability and other objectives is set. 
In shifting the emphasis from the `private' to the `reasonable' investor, I am not 
suggesting that the requirement of profitability may be left out of account. The 
reasonable investor or holding company (whether from the private or public 
sector) must, in order to act responsibly, secure a normal return on its 
investments, even it in so doing it may have regard to a wider social and 
economic context and over a longer time span. It is above all in the case of 
public holdings that the profitability requirement must be underlined, since they 
are under less pressure than private holding companies to make profit for 
shareholders who (directly or indirectly) are `ordinary' private investors, given 
that the risk capital of public holding companies is directly or indirectly financed 
by public funds. 359 
It is now interesting to make a step backward and compare the criterion of the 
`reasonable investor' suggested by Van Gerven (which was not supported by the 
Commission and was rejected by the Court of justice) and the position that the EC 
(ie the Commission) took in the GATT in the US - Carbon Steel I dispute where they 
sponsored a `reasonable public investor' test. 
Leaving linguistic differences aside, the substance is remarkably similar, if not 
identical. Suffice rehearsing the test advanced in the GATT dispute to realize this. 
The `reasonable public investor' standard would allow for the balancing of 
ls' See paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Opinion. 
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commercial factors and public policy objectives, on the premiss that, unlike private 
investors, governments do not necessarily aim to achieve a maximum return on 
their investment The test would not be met when the equity infusion is made `for 
social reasons only and without any serious chance of breaking even in the long 
run'. 
The balance between the profit imperative and public policy objectives is just the 
same. One could then ask whether the adoption of an apparently more lenient 
approach towards public investment in the GATT as compared to that embraced in 
its internal system is justified. 
In the writer's view, the answer should be positive, and this for various reasons. 
The political and litigation context comes immediately into prominence. In US- 
Carbon Steel I the EC is `defending' the conduct of its Member States. In Alfa Romeo 
and ENI it is closely scrutinising it. 
The difference between the two situations can however be found at another, 
properly legal, level. It can be noted that the `reasonable investor' test of Advocate 
General Van Gerven is universal inasmuch as it applies to both public and private 
investors. The `reasonable public investor' test put forward by the EC is contrasted 
to the `reasonable private' test defended by the US. It draws a clear distinction 
between private investors and public investors and aims to apply only to the latter's 
conduct in the market. 
We come to the core of the issue. The more lenient approach towards public 
investors adopted by the Commission in the GATT context can be understood by 
properly considering the fundamental structural difference between the two legal 
frameworks - the Tokyo Subsidy Code on the one side and EC Treaty on the other. 
The former represented a regulation of subsidies at a still very embryonic stage. The 
regulation of public policy objectives, and their relative weight in the balance with 
the distortions produced by subsidies, was totally unclear. The inherent 
ambivalence of subsidies (distortive but legitimate) could not find a sufficiently 
prescriptive regulation which could provide equilibrium as well as clarity. By 
contrast, the EC Treaty already displayed a more mature legal framework since the 
359 Paragraph 12. 
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beginning (1957), with specific provisions addressing the public interest 
justifications (Articles 87(2) and (3) and Article 86(2) EC), clearly separate from the 
general definition/prohibition of distorting State aid and administered through a 
centralised and supranational system of control. Interestingly, a similar situation 
was present in the SCM Agreement before the expiry of the non-actionable category 
(which was expressly modelled on EC law). 
Consequently, in EC law the distinction between economic and public policy 
considerations is clearly embedded in the idea that the concept of State aid is 
objective and its assessment is effect-based and that causes and aims of the measure are not 
relevant. 360 
It is interesting that all the cases where these principles were laid down involved tax 
measures, that is a form of and inherently public (and hence non-economic) conduct. 
The definition of the role of public policy objectives in the advantage analysis is 
particularly complex in this area. The government is by definition acting in the 
public sphere and the various public motives are difficult to disentangle. Those 
strong statements, which are formulated in general terms, are all the more significant 
when it comes to assess the economic activity of governments where the distinction 
between commercial and public interest considerations should be more apparent. 
In conclusion, if the action of the government confers an advantage and also 
pursues policy objectives, it seems that these should not be considered at the stage 
of the definition of State aid, and in particular at the level of the advantage analysis. 
The crucial factor is that the system already provides specific provisions where the 
public interest should be taken into account. 
The loci c4usici are Case 173/731i4 v Commission, paragraph 13; Case 78/76 Skinike, paragraph 21; Case T- 
67/94 Ladbroke, paragraph 52. 
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Conclusions: distinction between market and public interest 
One left motif, two scenarios 
It has been seen that one of the recurring themes of this thesis is the analysis of the 
interplay between scope and justification in the regulation of subsidies and State 
aids. This issue enquires the role played by the public interest in the various stages 
of the legal analysis. 
Generally speaking there are two possibilities. Under the first, there is no advantage 
because the measure pursues a public objective. Crucially, the public conduct falls 
outside the scope of application of the definition and hence of the rules. The 
alternative is that an advantage is established (in the case of economic activity, 
because the conduct is not commercially sound). If the other requirements of the 
definition are fulfilled the rules apply and in some cases the conduct is also 
prohibited. However, the public interest may come into play at a second stage and 
the measure may eventually be justified. 
The state of the law: distinction 
The `political and legal' distinction of the two scenarios can already be appreciated 
but becomes naturally vivid when it is applied to the two legal systems under 
examination. 
In the WTO it makes a great difference to hold that a measure does not constitute a 
subsidy in the first place or to consider it a subsidy which is (was) non-actionable. 
Whilst in the former case the measure falls outside the scope of application of the 
SCM Agreement altogether (and, if any, may be governed by other provisions), in 
the latter it is still subject to the SCM Agreement and to obligations, controls, and 
actions thereunder (notification, surveillance, and, quite crucially until - and 
provided that - the category of non-actionability is resurrected, to unilateral and 
multilateral actions). Not only the substantive but also the procedural, institutional 
and constitutional implications of this distinction cannot pass unnoticed. 
The situation in the EC is similar. The case where the measure does not confer an 
advantage and hence cannot be a State aid is very different from that where there is 
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a State aid which is in principle prohibited but is eventually `compatible with the 
common market'. As above, this difference does not only concern the substantive 
rules that are applicable (in the first scenario State aid rules do not apply, in the 
second case they do). Most significantly, it has an impact on the procedural, 
institutional and eventually constitutional setting of the EC system of State aid 
control. It should be recalled that, in the EC system of State aid control it is only 
for the European Commission to authorise planned State aid measures. This is 
done through a complex balancing between distortions of competition and other 
positive effects in the public interest. 
The examination of WTO and EC law in the previous paragraphs indicates that the 
first scenario seems to be prevailing. The advantage analysis of market activity 
requires a distinction between market logic and public policy objectives. It is natural that the 
advantage analysis of the economic conduct of the public investor is tested against 
the market and its benchmarks. Although this assessment should be flexible, this 
cannot go so far as to forget commercial logic in favour of public policy objectives. 
In a word, both systems seem to endorse, at least with respect to the assessment of 
the economic activity of governments, a distinction between scope (which is defined by the 
market paradigm) and justification (which is defined by the public interest). 
The critics of a too harsh treatment towards public investors and the public interest 
might be reassured by saying that the story so far is not about irrelevance but of 
distinction. 
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4. A word of conclusion: the redemption of the market paradigm 
We have seen difficulties, complexities and criticisms of the market paradigm. Not 
only has it been advanced that the identification and application of market 
benchmarks may be complex and their review a difficult exercise. It has more 
fundamentally been argued that the use of the market as a comparator is neither 
possible nor legitimate. 
Mainly in analysing the criticisms against the market principle, the writer has 
attempted to offer some solutions which could take stock of the difficulties and 
concerns and reach a balanced view of the utility of the market logic and its 
benchmarks in the advantage analysis of the economic activity of governments. 
The two key propositions have been i) that a flexible approach is needed in the 
application of the complex market criteria, especially at the level of the review of 
business decisions, and ii) that, albeit legitimate, public interest considerations should 
be distinguished from the market analysis and should not be considered at the level of 
the advantage analysis (and, more generally, of the definition). 
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IV. Non-economic activity and normative benchmarks 
In this section the analysis focuses on the advantage analysis of those forms of 
action, such as taxation and regulation, that are inherently public inasmuch as they 
are naturally non-economic. 
The analysis mainly focuses on tax measures, ie on all those measures whereby 
governments exercise their authority to impose and levy monetary payments (eg 
direct and indirect tax, social contributions). 
This depends on two reasons. On the one hand, unlike regulation, this form of 
conduct straight falls under the rules. Further, fiscal policy is increasingly becoming 
one of the most common means to grant assistance, thus providing a great wealth 
of cases and issues to concentrate on in both systems. 
On the other hand, the observations made in the tax context are of more general 
validity and could certainly be extended to regulation, should this be caught by the 
rules. This is true also for the remaining candidate for non-economic activity, 
public goods, and in particular infrastructures, an area currently subject to 
redefinition. 
The separate analysis of WTO and EC law is followed by a closing section for 
comparative and critical remarks. 
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1. WTO law 
Tax measures 
A methodological premiss: the advantage analysis between financial 
contribution and benefit 
The starting point of the advantage analysis for tax measures in WTO law should be 
the interpretation of the phrase 'government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected' in Article 1.1(a) (1) (ii) SCM. 
Since it would appear more natural to concentrate on the concept of benefit under 
Article 1.1(b) SCM, rather than on one of the forms of financial contribution, it is 
important to justify this choice immediately to make it clear that the writer is not 
attempting to drop one of the two criteria (notably the benefit) or to conflate them. 
In general, although financial contribution and benefit are different requirements 
and in principle should be interpreted according to their own criteria, they can 
certainly represent part of the relevant context of each other. This is particularly so 
in this case where the form of financial contribution under Article 1.1(a) (1) (ii) is 
clearly linked to the benefit analysis in various respects. 
To understand this point, it is useful to compare the assessment required by the 
phrase 'otherwise due' in subparagraph (ii) with the analysis of governmental 
activities in the market under the `benefit' requirement. 
In an already quoted passage in Canada - Aircraft the Appellate Body held: 
[w]e also believe that the word "benefit", as used in Article 1.1(b), implies some 
kind of comparison. This must be so, for there can be no "benefit" to the 
recipient unless the "financial contribution" makes the recipient "better off' 
than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution. 361 
In the US - FSC dispute the Appellate Body construed the phrase 
'government 
revenue that is otherwise due is foregone' in Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) SCM as follows: 
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[i]n our view, the 'foregoing" of revenue "otherwise due" implies that less revenue 
has been raised by the government than would have been raised in a different 
situation, or, that is, "otherwise".... We ... agree with the Panel that the term "otherwise due" implies some kind of comparison between the revenue due 
under the contested measure and revenues that would be due in some other 
situation. 362 
The language of the two passages is strikingly similar and the analogy is particularly 
interesting. 
First, both terms `benefit' and `otherwise due' would `imply some kind of 
comparison'. This comparison is between the actual case and another benchmark 
situation that would have occurred 'otherwise' (respectively, the `marketplace' and 
the appropriate `tax rules'). 363 
Secondly, the language of both cases, in a more or less direct way, hints at the fact 
that this derogation from the relevant benchmark may confer an advantage. 
Indeed there is a difference in the two passages because there is more emphasis on 
the favouring effect of the measure in the first case (the financial contribution is 
expressly said to make the recipient `better off) than in the second (where the 
foregoing of revenue otherwise due logically implies that `less revenue' is raised). It 
could not have been any different if it is considered that the former case concerned 
the interpretation of the `benefit' requirement. Nevertheless, this difference is 
arguably more a matter of formulation rather than of substance as the collection of 'less 
revenue' than would have occurred otherwise not only alludes to but almost 
invariably gives rise to a benefit for the exempted subject. 
The analogies (and the difference) that we have just found can be explained by 
considering both the fabric and position of the advantage analysis. 
311 Appellate Body, Canada - Aircraft, paragraph 157. 
Appellate Body, US -FSC, paragraph 90. 
m See Appellate Body, Canada - Aimaft, paragraph 157; Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 
90. 
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The fabric and the position of the advantage analysis 
Conceptually, it is possible to divide the advantage analysis into two steps. The first 
is whether the measure at issue provides a derogation from a given benchmark. The 
second is whether this deviation operates to the advantage of the undertakings at issue 
The position of these two steps in the definition of subsidy in the SCM Agreement 
is different in the advantage analysis of respectively economic conduct and taxation. 
Whereas in the case of market conduct they are both located in the context of the 
benefit requirement under Article 1.1(b) SCM, in the case of tax measures they can 
already, and mainly, be found at the level of the financial contribution. 
Subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1), which regulate governmental 
economic activities, merely identify the form of the conduct of the government 
(transfers of funds, provision of goods and services, procurement of goods) but are 
quite neutral with respect to both i) its derogating character and ii) its favouring 
effect, in a word to its advantage, thus completely leaving this determination to the 
following and separate analysis of the benefit requirement under Article 1 (b) SCM. 
On the other hand, the identification of the form of financial contribution under 
subparagraph (ii), which refers to the case of 'foregoing' or 'non-collection' of 
government revenue 'otherwise due', is not neutral but already includes a test which 
inquires i) whether the conduct of the government derogates from a benchmark 
situation (as it is hinted by the 'otherwise due' language) and - to a large extent - also 
i) whether it favours the tax payer (as it is suggested, as a matter of logic, by the 
'foregoing'/'non-collection' language). 364 Indeed in these cases the subsequent 
analysis of the benefit under Article 1.1(b) is usually straightforward. Once it has 
been established that government revenue, otherwise due, has been foregone or not 
collected, the existence of a benefit can be safely assumed. 365 
In sum, what we substantially see in the case of tax measures is the anticipated insertion 
(under paragraph (ii) of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM) of the (two steps of the) advantage 
It is amusing to ask whether it is possible to formulate the conduct of (preferential) fiscal treatment in a 
more neutral way similar to that of market conduct. If one wants to reach some precision, it is not possible 
to phrase subparagraph (ii) differently. As soon as mention is made to theforrgoing or aox colkckox of revenue, 
the inevitable implication - which does not need to be expressly worded - is that revenue that was `otherwise 
due' has been waived to the `advantage' of the tax payer. 
MS Cf Panel, US - FSC, paragraph 7.103; Panel, US - FSC (21.5 EC), paragraph 8.46. 
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analyrir which is usually carried out under the benefit of Article 1.1(b) SCM. It is 
this anticipation that in the writer's view justifies the examination of the first 
provision in this context. 
Case study: the US - FSC dispute 
The construction of the 'otherwise due' requirement under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) SCM 
was one of the crucial issues in the celebrated US - FSC dispute. 
The significant findings of the Panels and the Appellate Body makes this dispute an 
excellent case-study to analyse the various tests and benchmarks used to determine 
whether the measure at issue is liable to confer an advantage and constitute a tax 
subsidy under WTO law. 
Introduction 
Traditionally under US tax law income earned outside the country is taxed if there is 
an effective connection with a trade or business in the United States (principle of 
world-wide taxation). 
The FSC legislation introduced an exemption from taxation on a portion of the 
'foreign trade income' of certain companies established outside the United States 
(Foreign Sales Corporations, or FSC). 366 The FSC tax exemption was adopted by the 
US to replace its predecessor DISC to comply with a 1981 Understanding which 
ended the impasse over the Tax legislation cases. 367 With this Understanding the 
parties crucially accepted that 'economic processes located outside the territorial 
limits of the exporting country need not be subject to taxation bj the exporting country and 
should not be regarded as export activities' (emphasis added). Two conditions had to be 
366 Various requirements had to be met for the definition of both 'foreign trade income' and FSC. The law is 
thoroughly exposed by the Panel at paragraphs 2.1 to 2.8. 
367 With the expression 'Tax legislation cases' reference is made to the four disputes (US - DISC, &gum - Incomt' 
Tax, France - Income Tax and Netherlands - Income tax) decided 
in 1977 with four panel reports. These reports 
concluded that the US DISC tax exemptions on the one side and the application of the territorial systems of 
taxation of France, Belgium and the Netherlands on the other constituted export subsidies. The required 
unanimity to adopt the reports could not be found until a settlement was finally agreed with the 1981 
Understanding which was adopted by the Council. On the DISC cases and the FSC legislation there is an 
extensive literature. See, eg, Jackson (1978); Hufbauer & Shelton Erb (1984: 57 to 63), Gray (1985); klabbers 
& Vreugdenhil (1986/1987); Weizmann (1987); Qureshi and Grynberg (2002); Hudec (1993: 53 to 100) and 
id (2003). 
242 
fulfilled: that the exemption be limited only to foreign economic processes (ie sales 
activities taking place outside the government's territory) and to foreign-source income 
(which would have been ensured by calculating the exempt income on the basis of 
arm's length pricing). 
Leaving aside the debated issue of the legal effect of the 1981 Understanding, 
according to most observers, the FSC tax exemption did not in any event meet the 
conditions set out above. The FSC legislation required very little genuine foreign 
economic activity and that the pricing rules' percentages did not comply with the 
arm's length principle. 368 Eventually, the EC alleged a violation of inter alia the 
SCM Agreement and in 1997 filed a complaint with the WTO. 
One of the debated points in the FSC dispute, which directly concerns the 
advantage analysis in taxation, concerned the interpretation of the 'otherwise due' 
requirement under Article 1.1 (a) (1) (ii) SCM. 
The 'but for' test between simplicity and inadequacy 
The Panel- the choice for simplicidy 
After underlining that the reference benchmark in the interpretation of the 
'otherwise due' requirement must be found in the tax regime of the defending 
Member State, 369 the Panel put forward a test which should be used in determining 
whether revenue otherwise due has been foregone. In a repetitive passage it noted: 
[i]n accordance with its ordinary meaning, we took the term 'otherwise due' to 
refer to the situation that would prevail but for the measures in question. It is 
thus a matter of determining whether, absent such measures, there would be a 
higher tax liability. In our view, this means that a panel, in considering whether 
revenue foregone is 'otherwise due', must examine the situation that would exist 
but for the measure in question. Under this approach, the question presented in 
this dispute is whether, if the FSC scheme did not exist, revenue would be due 
which is foregone by reason of that scheme. 370 
Cf Hudec (1993: 95 to 98); id (2003: 180). 
49 Panel, US - FSC, paragraph 7.43. 
370 Ibid, paragraph 7.45. 
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The Panel interpreted the 'otherwise due' phrase as referring to the situation that 
would prevail but for or in the absence of the measure in question. The inherent 
'instability' of this 'but for' test (and, more generally, of the 'otherwise due' language) 
371 is evident. In particular, the problem in the `but for' approach is that it does not 
offer any solid indication about the benchmark against which the measure has to be 
tested. 372 This lacuna was acknowledged by the Appellate Body when it underlined 
the need to refer to 'some defined, normative benchmark'. 373 
The risk of this uncertainty is that the test be interpreted in a mechanical fashion by 
limiting the assessment to the form of the tax system without going beneath its 
surface. 
This danger was highlighted by the EC that were arguing that the 'but for' test was 
too much 'formalistic' and that they would have preferred a different test giving 
more consideration to 'substance' rather than to 'form'. 374 What was necessary was 
to identify 'a deviation from or exemption to the generally applied rate or basis for 
collection' of taxes (emphasis added), 375 which corresponds to our `derogation test'. 
This would occur when the exemption or exclusion from taxation is 'not based on 
neutral and objective criteria, ie, the exemption or exclusion is special or 
programmatic'. 376 
Despite heavily criticising this test (and, in particular, the complexity of identifying 
general rules and exceptions, and the risk of confusion with the specificity test), the 
US did not propose any clear alternative test but generally shared the view as to the 
'desirability of avoiding results that exalt form over substance' and 'the need to have 
clear rules'. 377 
371 Benitah (2001) page 188. 
372 Using a mathematical jargon, 'saying that an exemption amounts to "foregone revenue that is otherwise 
due" has no meaning if we do not have a universal reference set in which this exemption appears as a 
departure from the general regime', Benitah (2001: 188). The problem is that it is possible to identify 
different universal reference sets in any given case with the consequence that the assessment of the 'otherwise 
due' requirement may well lead to different results (ibid, 188 and 189). 
373 Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 90. Using the mathematical language of the previous note, we could 
describe the defined normative benchmark as the appmphak universal reference set. 
374 ibid, paragraph 4.1063. 
371 ibid, paragraph 4.591. 
na Panel, US - FSC, paragraph 4.1057. 
377 ibid, paragraphs 4.1095 to 4.113. 
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The Panel acknowledged that there was a certain degree of convergence between 
the 'but for' test and the 'derogation test' as, in all probability, in many cases the 
same result would have been generated. 378 It nonetheless underlined that the 'but 
for' approach seemed more 'grounded in the actual text of the SCM Agreement' 
than the 'derogation' test. 379 
The conclusion that the 'but for' test is more in line with the wording of Article 
1.1 (a) (1) (ii) SCM than the 'derogation' test is however arguable. 
The main reason for the adoption of the 'but for' approach was that it has never been 
really controversial that the FSC exemption constituted a tax subsidy. The 
application of the 'but for' test was therefore sufficient to show in the case at hand that 
in the absence of the measure in question there would have been a higher tax 
liability. 
In this context, the risks of excessive formalism that could derive from the counter- 
factual analysis of a 'but for' test (which had been hinted at by the EC) were not as 
concrete as the complexities of the more sophisticated search for general rules and 
exceptions of the derogation test (which had been exhaustively warned against by 
the US). 
In short, the Panel opted for the route that, under the circumstances of the case, 
was the more straightforward and economical. It was thus mainly a choice for 
simplicity. The judicial philosophy underlying this choice is that simple cases require 
simple solutions. 
The Appellate Body: the recognition of inadequacy 
The doubts about the inadequacy of the 'but for' test and, in particular, about its risks 
of excessive formalism emerged more prominently at the appellate level. 
The Appellate Body made it immediately clear that the 'otherwise due' phrase 
requires the identification of some defined, normative benchmark against which a 
comparison can be made between the revenue actually raised and the revenue that 
`8 ibid. paragraph 7.46. 
379 ibid.. 
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would have been raised 'otherwise". 380 In a passage which nicely combined the 
principle of sovereignty of Member States in tax matters with the principle that 
WTO obligations must be respected, it quite generally stated that this benchmark 
must be found in the domestic tax rules of the Member State in question. 381 
The moment came to assess the 'but for' test 
the Panel found that the term 'otherwise due' establishes a 'but for' test, in terms 
of which the appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether revenues 
"otherwise due" is "the situation that would prevail but for the measures in 
question". In the present case, this legal standard provides a sound basis for 
comparison because it is not difficult to establish in what way the foreign source 
income of an FSC would be taxed 'but for' the contested measure. 
In line with the previous remarks about the simplicity of the characterisation of the 
FSC exemption, the Appellate Body thus approved the use of the 'but for' test 'in 
the present case' because of its lack of difficulty. It could have stopped there. The 
world trade court, however, decided to go on to comment about the general 
applicability of the 'but for' test in other situations. 
After underlining that it had 'certain abiding reservations' about applying any legal 
standard such as the 'but for' test 'in the place of the actual treaty language' (and 
thus rejecting the possible suggestion that the `but for' test was no more than a nice 
rephrasing of `otherwise due'), it noted 
we would have particular misgivings about using a 'but for' test if its application 
were limited to situations where there actually existed an alternative measure, 
under which the revenues in question would be taxed, absent the contested 
measure. It would, we believe, not be difficult to circumvent such a test by 
designing a tax regime under which there would be no general rule that applied 
formally to the revenues in question, absent the contested measures. 382 
380 Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 90. 
3"1 Ibid. 
M= Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 91. In the implementation phase (US - 
FSC (Amick 21.5 EC) 
paragraph 91) the Appellate Body repeated the same concept: 'in identifying the normative benchmark, there 
may be situations where the measure at issue might be described as an 'exception' to a "general" rule of 
taxation. In such situations, it may be possible to apply a "but for" test to examine the fiscal treatment of 
income absent the contested measure'. 
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The (un)expected conclusion was therefore that 
although the Panel's 'but for' test works in this case, it may not work in other 
cases. 383 
The risks of excessive formalism of the 'but for' test which had been simply hinted 
at by the EC before the Panel (and partly acknowledged also by the US) were now 
directly addressed by the Appellate Body which, interestingly, did so e. v officio as 
none of the parties had advanced any criticism to the Panel's interpretation. 384 
The warning was that the advantage analysis should not rely only on a mechanical 
process of exclusion which could work only if there is a clear alternative in the system 
which would formally have applied in the absence of the contested measure. 
This was the case of the FSC exemption where it was not difficult to establish that 
the `foreign-source income of an FSC would be taxed "but for" the contested 
measure'. 385 In other cases, however, the application of a formalistic and 
mechanical 'but for' test may be unreliable. Its adoption could even create an 
incentive on Member States to design their tax system in a way to render it difficult 
to identify an alternative measure and thus easily circumvent the test. 
Despite a tenuous hint at the `derogation test' (which emerges from the solitary 
reference to an alternative `general rule' at paragraph 91), the Appellate Body did not 
proceed further by suggesting an alternative test for those cases where the 'but for' 
approach is not provide a useful tool. 
The original proceedings thus finished with new doubts, those on the alternative 
test(s) that should replace, or at least complement, the 'but for' test. 
383 Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 91. 
3' Ibid. 
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Preliminary conclusions: the 'but fog' test is insufficient 
The original proceedings of the US - FSC dispute show that the biggest difficulty of 
the 'otherwise due' requirement is the determination of the appropriate 'normative 
benchmark' against which to test the tax measure at issue. 
Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body provided a comprehensive explanation of 
how the 'otherwise due' requirement operates. They generally stated that the basis 
of comparison is constituted by the 'rule of taxation that each Member, by its own 
choice, establishes for itself but failed to show how to determine what is the actual 
'normative benchmark' against which to test the measure. 
The 'but for' test has not passed the test. It did not prove to be fully dependable as 
it seemed to work only in the more straightforward cases being ineffective in more 
complex ones. 
What would be required is a more sophisticated theoretical framework able to tackle the 
inconveniences of a too formal test. It is only by going beneath the surface that one 
is able to explore the mechanism of the tax system and to determine whether the 
measure at issue confers an advantage and is a tax subsidy. 
Along this path, both the Panel and the Appellate Body made an interesting effort 
of elaboration in the implementation phase where they indicated new standards of 
assessment. 
More sophistication: derogation test and comparative test 
Panel (Article 21.5 DSU): a derogation test in disguise? 
The implementation Panel took note of the caveat of the Appellate Body and 
accepted that the interpretation of the 'otherwise due' requirement cannot rest on a 
'purely mechanical' or 'formalistic' exercise. 386 
Nevertheless, it did not formulate in a clear fashion the test that was to be applied. 
The theoretical apparatus deployed is rather sibylline 387 with the result that the 
Appellate Body, US-FSC, paragraph 91. 
'Panel, US - FSC (Article 21.5 EC), paragraphs 8.14 and 
8.15. 
With statements like '[t]hc key is to apply critical judgment to the facts of the matter' (paragraph 8.17); 
`while the enquiry cannot be inherently presumptive or speculative, neither can it be so exacting or confining 
? 48 
ultimate suggestion is the usual but inconclusive finding that 'the key point [which 
in fact is merely the 'starting' point] is that the tax rules applied by the Member in 
question are the basis for the comparison'. 388 
Leaving aside the declarations, the examination of the Panel's analysis of the 
implementing ETI legislation is more revealing. The clear impression is that the 
Panel is implicitly resorting to a derogation test, focused as it is on the affirmation of 
the exceptional character of the new implementing legislation. 389 The Panel 
continues to underline the 'several stringently selective qualitative conditions and 
quantitative requirements' that must be satisfied for the income to be excluded from 
taxation. 390 
As Professor Hudec observed in one of his last works, the most illuminating 
paragraph in this regard is number 8.29. To better appreciate this reading the writer 
thought it appropriate to report the passage together with Professor Hudec's 
ingenious bracketed suggestions on the underlying references to the concepts of 
`general' and `specific'. 
... Indeed, discerning what might be described as 'the prevailing domestic 
standard' for a particular tax regime may be a particularly exacting exercise. In 
more common usage, it might be rather difficult to discern what is the 
exception, as it were, and what is the [general] rule ... 
[W]e are not, in this 
dispute, presented with a situation of such complexity. The dispute does not 
involve a debatable call as to whether the glass is half-full or half-empty. As 
outlined above, we have looked at the essential shape and the rationale that is 
exhibited. In examining that, we have weighed such considerations as the 
degree of conditionality [general-specific? ], the range of limitations [general- 
specific? ] and the manner in which the measure at issue related to the overall 
regime [general-specific? ]. Taken together, they enable us to assess the nature 
of the relationship of the measure at issue and the overall regime [general- 
specific? ]. That is precisely [? ] how one is in a position to arrive at the judgment 
required by the terms of the SCM Agreement. 391 
that it is necessary to attain the level of establishing a mathematical deductive relationship between the 
contested measure and the default situation' (paragraph 8.18), 'sound basis for exercising reasonable 
judgment' (paragraph 8.19). 
Panel, US - FSC (Article 21.5 EC), paragraph 8.18 (emphasis in the original text, the comment between brackets is of the writer). 
' See Panel, US - FSC (Ar6rk 21.5 EC), paragraphs 8.21 and 8.30. 390 Ibid, paragraph 8.21. 
"I Ibid, paragraph 8.29. See Hudec (2003: 196). 
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The first preliminary observation is that this analysis shows the intriguing overlap 
between advantage and specificity analysis which is indeed a recurring theme (for an 
explanation of the interplay between and distinction of these two concepts see 
below the section on EC law). 
Most importantly for the current analysis, as Hudec (2003: 186) underlines, it shows 
the theoretical framework of the participants in the FSC case, whereby national tax 
laws seems to be perceived as being organised on the basis of genera! principles or rules. 
392 In this framework, a measure amounts to a subsidy because it constitutes an 
exception to or a deviation from a general rule operating to the advantage of the 
undertakings concerned. 
Although this framework is not the only possible reading of the 'otherwise due' 
requirement, it can easily be applied to its counter-factual analysis. This derogation 
test consists in assessing whether the measure at issue deviates from the regime or 
rule that would otherwise have applied because of its general character. This would give 
substance to the 'otherwise due' requirement, providing the interpreter with a useful 
tool to avoid the inconveniences of the more simple version of the 'but for' test 
(such as the excessive formalism and risk of circumvention, or the lack of 
consideration of the general or exceptional nature of the measure in question). 
Admittedly, the derogation test is not free from difficulties. The search for general 
rules and exceptions may be a particularly complex exercise, which explains the 
reluctance to expressly adhere to it (cf in this regard the Appellate Body's remarks in 
the implementation report). 
Its force of persuasion and its utility have however been impliedly recognised by the 
implementation Panel which has implicitly but clearly based all its reasoning on it. 
392 The author points out that these general principles are at different times referred to by the Panel or the 
Appellate Body as'prevailing standards' or 'general rules'. By contrast, the term 'normative benchmark' does 
not seem to be necessarily limited to general rules. 
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Appellate Body (Article 21.5 DSU): the `new' comparative test 
The story did not find an end in the ambiguous application of the derogation test by 
the implementation Panel. The Appellate Body suggested - this time expressly -a 
different route by formulating the following test: 
... we 
believe that panels should seek to compare the fiscal treatment of 
legitimately comparable income to determine whether the contested measure 
involves the foregoing of revenue which is 'otherwise due', in relation to the 
income in question. 393 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis (2003: 268) consider this as the expression of 
the 'essence of the legal test' underlying the 'otherwise due' phrase. This 
'comparative' test is based on the general principle of equality and the related 
prohibition of non-discrimination: similar situations must be treated in a similar 
way. The reference in the general introductory findings in the original proceedings 
to 'some kind of comparison' between revenues due under the contested measure and 
those that would be due in some other situation, 394 is specified by requiring a 
comparison between the fiscal treatment of comparable incomes. Interestingly, a 
similar approach has been recently taken by the Court of justice which, with respect 
to an energy tax, noted that: 
[t]he only question to be determined is whether, under a particular statutory 
scheme, a State measure is such as to favour [certain undertakings] ... in 
comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that 
is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question. 395 
The comparative test is an attempt to combine two aims: the overcoming of the 
inadequacy of the 'hut for' test and the reluctance to fully accept a derogation test based, as it is, 
on the identification of general rules and exceptions. 
393 Appellate Body, US - FSC (Article 21.5 EC), paragraph 91. 
3" Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 90 X95 Case C-143/99, paragraph 41. 
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On the one hand, the Appellate Body intends to design a flexible test which 
certainly gives more importance to the substance of the tax system rather than to its 
form, and arguably gets over the insufficiencies of the 'but for' test (and especially the 
risks of a too formalistic and mechanical interpretation). 396 By requiring the 
comparative analysis of comparable situations the new test aims to assess the 
measure in question closely and to consider its position within the tax system. 
At the same time, however, the Appellate Body does not seem willing to fully 
endorse the derogation test. The expressed reason for this reluctance lies in the 
inevitable complexities of the quest for general rules and exceptions. 397 The 
Geneva-based body noted: 
[w]e do not ... consider that 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) always requires panels to identify, 
with respect to any particular income, the "general" rule of taxation prevailing in 
a Member. Given the variety and complexity of domestic tax systems, it will 
usually be very difficult to isolate a "general" rule of taxation and "exceptions" to 
that "general" rule. 398 
Despite proposing the comparative test as an alternative, the Appellate Body does 
not provide much guidance with respect to the criteria to follow in the complex and 
flexible assessment of comparable situations. 399 No guideline is given regarding the 
factors (that is the factual and legal common denominators) that permit to consider 
two situations as comparable, or those to be taken into account when it has to be 
determined whether there is an equal or discriminatory treatment 
The vagueness of the comparative test (but this may well be predicated for the 
reasoning of all reports) might well have been intentional. 400 The motive for not 
developing clear tests depended on the will to avoid, in the sensitive area of 
taxation, the creation of findings that could be viewed as precedents applicable to 
396 Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 91. 397 Appellate Body, US - FSC (Article 21.5 EC) paragraph 91. 391 Ibid. 
3 Cf Appellate Body, US - FSC (Article 21.5 EC), footnote 66 to paragraph 
91, where it was recognised that 
this assessment requires a certain degree of fle)ibility. The Appellate Body gives just two examples by saving 
that it might not be appropriate to compare taxation for sales income with taxation of employment income 
(paragraph 90), or taxation in the hands of a domestic corporation with taxation of income in the hands of a 
foreign corporation (paragraph 92). 
°° Hudec (2003: 200 and 201, cf also 197). 
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the countless tax systems that were not subject to scrutiny, and thus to allow more 
flexibility in the future. This reservation of flexibility, however, coincides With a 
lack of direction which inevitably perpetuates the uncertainty of the advantage 
analysis in this field. 
Dcja-vu: is the comparative test really alternative to the derogation test? 
What should now be asked is whether the comparative test is really alternative to the 
derogation test, or whether we are in fact confronted with the same substance in a 
different shape. The reader might have a dejä-vu since this issue has been briefly 
addressed in the introductory section already. 
While stopping short of expressly accepting the derogation test, the writer's 
proposition is that the Appellate Body has inevitably pointed out towards that 
direction. 
The comparative test requires the comparison between comparable situations. The 
goal is clearly to determine whether comparable situations are treated similarly or 
not. The derogation test enquires whether the measure at issue is in line with the 
appropriate general rule or deviates from it. Now, there is a clear link between these 
two tests since a general rule is such insofar as it applies to all comparable situations. 
Although the two tests seem to share the same mechanics, they interestingly 
emphasise different steps of the analysis. The comparative test is clearer in defining 
the appropriate benchmark, that is the norm that is applicable to comparable 
situations. The assessment of the (equal or otherwise) treatment of comparable 
situations is more directly expressed by the derogation test which highlights that the 
logical process to establish an advantage is whether a deviation from the appropriate 
norm has occurred. 
The difference in emphasis in the two tests corresponds to a different contribution 
to the clarification of the working of the advantage analysis. Eventually, the 
objective and the substance are the same, ie the search of whether the measure at 
issue is an exception to what can be viewed as the relevant general rule. It is useful 
to refer again to the observations of Professor Hudec who noted that 
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[the] unstated assumption [would be] that a tax law governing a 'legitimately 
comparable' kind of income gives some indication of how the exempt income 
itself would have been treated, especially if that tax law happened to be a general 
rule or 'prevailing standard'. In other words, looking at the treatment of 
comparable income could have been a back-door way of looking at how the tax- 
exempt income itself would have been treated under the general principles of the 
defendant's tax law. 401 
The author then cleverly concluded that 
[i]n effect, this would be a back-door version of the 'but for' test, one that could 
not be blocked by tax laws that try to sever all formal links between the subsidy 
and the applicable general principles of the defendant's tax systems'. 402 
In conclusion, it seems that we are in the end always confronted with the task of 
identifying the general rule and determine whether the measure at issue is in line or deviates 
from it. Although the Appellate Body tried to distance its comparative test from the 
identification of general rules and exceptions, quite ironically, the specific 
contribution of its formulation is exactly to indicate how to define a general norm 
(and consequently to anchor any test to the latter). Once the benchmark is 
identified, the process is to determine whether the Member State is discriminating 
between comparable situations (comparative test version), or is deviating from the 
appropriate general rule (derogation test version). Although the substance is the 
same, it is the derogation test that is more determined in indicating the underlying 
logical process of the advantage analysis. 
The heart of the advantage analysis is the idea that, once a country has adopted a 
certain rule or regime in its tax legislation, it should not be allowed to amend it and 
to introduce exceptions to favour certain undertakings when such need arises. 4°3 
The distinction and interplay between what is norm and what is exception 
corresponds to the 'common sense' idea of subsidy and captures the sense of 
401 Hudec (2003: 198). 
402 Ibid. 
403 Cf Hudec (2003: 191). 
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advantage which any subsidy should confer. As Professor Hudec (2003: 191) noted, 
the derogation from rules based on general principles may be felt as a particularly 
sharp 'departure from existing tax policy' and thus involve a 'more tangible sense of 
gain to a taxpayer'. 
Some applications 
The implications of the findings of the FSC case study are now considered through 
the analysis of two issues, one concerning Member States' sovereignty in tax matters 
(and its constraints), the other the role played by the objectives in the derogation 
test. 
The share of sovereignty in tax matters: foreign economic processes and 
local taxation 
The subject of this paragraph is the analysis of two cases that should not be 
considered as involving the 'foregoing of revenue of revenue otherwise due', and 
hence as conferring an advantage, because they are based on a similar rationale 
concerning the share of sovereignty in tax matters. Using the derogation test jargon, 
they both seem to represent general rules or principles. 
The taxation of foreign economic processes 
The first case focuses on an issue that emerges from the FSC dispute, ie the status 
under WTO subsidy rules of the taxation of foreign economic processes. 
Territorial and world-wide taxation: economic and legal considerations 
A tax system may operate on the basis of two different principles. It adopts a 
principle of territoriality if it taxes all income earned (by residents and non-residents) 
in its territory. Accordingly, income earned outside the country's territory is not 
taxed, and no more than a `token' tax is imposed on the proceeds of such foreign 
earnings when they are remitted to the home country. Many European countries 
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biva- 
adopt a principle of territoriality in their tax law systems. In the context of 
multinational groups, the beneficial effects of the limited scope of application of 
territorial tax systems may be maximised if investment is made in low-tax 
jurisdictions and if transfer pricing is used to shift as much income as possible to 
those countries. 
Conversely, a tax system operates under the world-wide principle if it taxes all world- 
wide income earned by residents. The US adopts such a system by taxing all income 
earned by US corporations irrespective of whether that income has been earned in 
the US jurisdiction or abroad. Moreover, it also taxes all income that, although not 
produced by residents, is 'effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or 
business within the United States'. 404 
From an economic perspective, the wider scope of application of world-wide systems, 
with the connected disincentive to exploit the opportunities of low-tax jurisdictions, 
seems to involve that US groups comparatively face a handicap if compared with 
EC groups in their international activities. It is allegedly to tackle this disadvantage 
that the US introduced the DISC legislation first and the FSC/ETI legislation 
afterwards by exempting from taxation a portion of foreign trade income related to 
exports. 
As emerged from the DISC and US - FSC disputes, however, the situation is 
different legally. Exemptions of portions of foreign trade income are not consistent 
with the GATT/WTO subsidy rules inasmuch as they derogate from the otherwise 
prevailing rule of taxation. As far as the definition of subsidy is concerned, it is 
immaterial that the derogation concerns export-related income, foreign income 
unconnected to exports, or domestic income. The crucial factor is that there is an 
exemption from the general tax system adopted by the Member State. 
The Appellate Body made it clear that if the general policy decision is to tax all 
foreign source income (see the world-wide principle), Members are not permitted to 
carve out an exemption from the system. Once they have made their 'sovereign 
choice' with respect to the general features of their tax system (it is repeatedly said 
404S. 882(a) Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 
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. m. 
that Members are sovereign to shape their tax systems as they wish), they are subject 
to the obligations under WTO law, and in particular the SCM Agreement. 4°5 
By contrast, it may well be argued that the decision to exclude from taxation all 
foreign source income should not be regarded as a subsidy. The issue was not 
under the examination of the Dispute Settlement Body in the FSC case and, to be 
sure, the Panel underlined that its findings should not have been taken as a 
suggestion that other systems of taxation, and in particular the territoriality principle, 
were consistent with WTO subsidy rules. 406 
This issue has however been subject to litigation in the Tax legislation cases, and in 
particular in the counter-complaints filed by the US against Belgium, France and The 
Netherlands. The Panels eventually condemned these laws on the premise that they 
exempted processes originating in the country. These conclusions were however 
harshly criticised and were reversed by the 1981 Understanding which accepted the 
lawfulness of tax exemptions concerning 'economic processes located outside the 
territorial limits of the exporting country' (and introduced, at the same time, the 
requirement of the compliance with arm's length pricing to avoid possible abuses). 
The common interpretation of this understanding, which reflected the wide 
consensus of GATT Members on the issue, 407 is that it expressly authorised the 
effect of territorial tax systems and that, quite probably, it also had to be interpreted 
as precluding more limited tax exemptions such as those provided by DISC or FSC 
measures. 
Both the Panel and the Appellate Body eventually concluded that, although in 
principle as a `decision' under Article XVI(1) WTO the 1981 Understanding could 
provide guidance, this was not the case because of the fundamental differences 
between Article XVI: 4 GATT (which was interpreted by the Understanding) on the 
one hand and the discipline on export subsidies of the SCM Agreement on the 
other hand. 408 
405 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis (2002: 272). 
406 Paragraph 7.123. Both the Panel (paragraph 7.122) and the Appellate Body (paragraph 179) generally 
noted that it is not the choice of a given system of taxation as such - be it world-wide or territorial - which 
is 
under scrutiny but the compliance of its rules with WTO obligations. 
407 Hudec (1993: 92). 
40 Panel, paragraph 7.79-7.85; Appellate Body, paragraphs 104-119. 
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Although, strictly speaking, this may be true, it is here argued that the significance of 
this decision for the sake of the current analysis depends on the fact that it reflected 
the : vide consensus of GATT Members on what principles of international taxation 
may be legitimate (and, probably, also those that are not legitimate). In the writer's 
view, it accordingly offers an important indication of the characterisation of the 
principle of territoriality under subsidy rules. 
We can now attempt to explain the difference in legal treatment between two 
practices that apparently lead to the same economic effects. 409 
What can be suggested is that the exclusion from taxation of all income earned 
abroad inevitably deriving from the principle of territoriality should not constitute 
the 'foregoing of revenue otherwise due' because, unlike the FSC and ETI 
mechanisms which were based on pronouncedly targeted exemptions to an 
extensive principle of world-wide taxation, it represents a clearer and, most 
importantly, definite choice with respect to the general scope of application of the tax 
system, one that seems to correspond to both a neutral and convenient share of 
competence in international taxation. 
Border tax adjustments: a confirmation 
This point becomes in our view particularly clear if a parallel is made with the 
treatment of so-called border tax adjustments (`BTAs'). 
Border tax adjustment rules identify which taxes may be rebated on exports and 
imposed on imports. 410 In this regard, an important distinction is that between 
taxes on undertakings (ie direct taxes) and taxes on products (ie indirect taxes and 
import charges). 411 Whereas it has always been clear that the exemption of direct 
taxes in relation to exports amounts to a subsidy (good examples in this regard are 
offered by the DISC and FSC/ETI litigation), 412 the situation is different with 
respect to the exemption or remission of taxes on products for export where a 
subsidy occurs only when there is over-compensation. Note 1 to Article 1.1(a)(ii) 
40 See Hudec (2003: 188-192). 
410 Hufbauer & Erb (1984: 51). For a clear explanation of border tax adjustments see Jackson (199^: 218- 
221). See also Hufbauer & Erb (1984: 10-11; 51 et seq). 
411 For a definition of direct and indirect taxes cf footnote 58 of the SCM 
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SCM accordingly qualifies the form of financial contribution involving the foregoing 
of government revenue otherwise due by underlining that the exemption of an 
exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for 
domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in 
excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy. 413 
The traditional consensus on the permissibility of this rule of border adjustment for 
indirect taxes and other import charges in the event of exportation is recognition of 
the principle of destination whereby it is deemed as appropriate that a product should 
be subject to taxation only in the country of importation. 414 Despite some criticism 
on the economic rationality of having a different treatment between indirect and 
direct taxes, 415 there has been no serious attempt to modify the law and, in 
particular, to consider as permissible also exemptions of direct taxation in relation to 
exports. 416 
The writer has suggested that the general tax exclusion of foreign-source trade is not 
a subsidy because it seems to depend on an acceptable sovereign choice in 
international tax matters that involves a permanent (and convenient) share of 
competence. 
It is now argued that the functioning of territorial systems can usefully be compared 
with border tax adjustments. 
412 Cf items (e) and (f) of the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies. 
413 The reference to 'duties or taxes borne by the like product' should be read as referring to final stage 
indirect taxes (such as value-added or sales taxes). The principle is reaffirmed in the Illustrative List on 
Export Subsidies and, in particular, in item (g), and also in items (h) and (). 
414 Hufbauer & Shelton Erb (1984: 10-11) note that they BTAs rules 'permit the producer to realize 
approximately the "world" price for its exports and to acquire traded inputs at their "world" prices for use in 
export production'. Jackson (1997: 220) explains that the belief underlying BTAs rules is that the different 
tax burden of indirect taxes would be shifted forward to the purchaser, thus making taxation at destination 
appropriate. This would not apply to direct taxation which would be shifted backward to the producer. 
4'S Hufbauer & Shelton Erb (1984: 54- 56), Jackson (1997: 219- 221); Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 
(2003: 479-480). The criticism is that the traditional assumption concerning the tax burden of direct/indirect 
taxation is not always correct with the result that a different regulation of indirect taxation (for which 
adjustment is possible) and direct taxation (for which it isn't) would put those countries that depend more on 
the latter at a disadvantage. In this regard see Tarullo (1984: 73). 
416 Before the WTO Hufbauer & Shelton Erb (1984: 62-63) suggested that the DISC legislation was a 'first 
step' towards the full acceptance of the principle of destination of border adjustments for direct taxes 
whereby countries could rebate all direct taxes and other social charges incurred in the production of goods 
for export, and impose those same direct taxes on importr. 
The oddity of this suggestion is that it is difficult to fully juxtapose a system devised for products to 
undertakings. An example may help to understand the point. If a principle of world-wide taxation is 
adopted, what about direct taxes on the forrign income deriving from foreign sales which cannot however be 
classed as txportt (because, for example, they are produced abroad)? 
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While subjecting to taxation the income earned in the territory, the principle of 
territoriality exempts (in principle without any exception) all foreign-source income. 
This seems to parallel the logic of competence allocation in tax matters that 
underlies the rule of border tax adjustment. The outcome is that, in the case of an 
international activity, only one country, and the one where the taxable activity takes 
place, is competent to tax. It is not argued here that this result is the most efficient 
from an economic perspective, but that it may represent, as border adjustments 
rules for indirect taxes, a reasonably satisfactory outcome. 417 
The fact remains that, from a legal perspective, the neutrality implied in the strict 
adherence to a territoriality approach, which defines the international competence in 
direct taxation in a clear and permanent way, is more likely to be consistent with 
WTO subsidy rules in comparison with the endorsement of a more extensive world- 
wide principle which is then adjusted with more or less comprehensive exemptions 
that progressively redefine the boundaries of the said competence to the advantage 
of some undertakings or sectors. 
If the above is correct the ultimate finding would be that subsidy rules do introduce 
a significant constraint on the often repeated sovereignty of Members in tax matters 
by creating an incentive to adopt territorial approach and, conversely, a deterrent 
towards a world-wide principle of taxation. 
Local taxation 
An additional confirmation of the previous reading of the legal status of taxation of 
foreign income is offered by the treatment of so-called local taxation. 
The starting point of the analysis is Article 2 SCM which defines the requirement of 
specificity, ie that a subsidy must be 'specific to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting authority'. 
Article 2.2 provides that 'a subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located 
within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting 
417 As regards BTAs, Jackson (1997: 221) underlines that'perhaps the present rule 
is as good a rough 
approximation of equity as can be found, and it is at least administrable'. See also Matsushita, 
Schoenbaum 
and Mavroidis (2003: 480). 
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authority shall be specific'. The same provision hastens to add that 'it is understood 
that the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of 
government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the 
purposes of this Agreement'. 
Although this provision is set in the context of the specificity analysis, it is argued 
that it has more significance with respect to the advantage analysis because it 
represents an example of a measure that does not confer an advanta(ge in the first place. 
This is again an example of the intriguing interplay between specificity and 
advantage analysis, which has recurred several times so far and is thoroughly 
addressed below. 
A local tax measure adopted by a local authority which extends to all undertakings in 
the relevant local jurisdiction does not confer any advantage at all because it derives 
from one of the main general features of the constitutional system of the Member State 
at issue. In other words, the measure does not constitute an exception but rather a 
general tax measure which is the expression of a general constitutional rule. 
The analogy between international and local taxation under subsidy rules 
If we now juxtapose the treatment of international and local taxation under subsidy 
rules we can find an interesting analogy. 
The exclusion from taxation of all foreign economic processes and the competence 
of local authorities to impose and collect taxes seem to represent two sides of the 
same coin. They are both examples of a share of (international and internal) tax 
sovereignty that is held to be - for practical, political and legal reasons - proper under 
subsidy rules. This substantially depends on the fact that these arrangements can 
be considered both general and permanent. 
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Derogation test and objectives: a preview of the scope /justification debate 
The aim of this paragraph is to provide the reader with a brief analysis of a crucial 
issue which is discussed at length in the context of EC law and whose findings are 
fully applicable in WTO as well. 
The core of the advantage analysis underlying the `otherwise due' phrase is to 
determine whether the measure at issue constitutes discrimination or, better, 
derogation with respect to the appropriate general tax rule. This has been dubbed 
as the `derogation test'. 
In tax law, we have many situations which are treated differently. Nov, the crucial 
issue is that, in order to determine whether this differential treatment does in fact 
constitute a derogation and hence an advantage, it is necessary to analyse the 
objectives of the tax measure and/or of the tax system. 
Like any public measure, any tax may pursue various objectives. In the context of 
the advantage analysis, what is fundamental is to distinguish between objectives. As 
the EC experience shows, this is a difficult but crucial exercise. The presence of an 
objective that is in line with the logic of the tax or the tax system excludes that any 
advantage element from the differential treatment. This is not the case for those 
objectives that are externally assigned to the tax, ie are not directly linked to the 
purpose of the tax and/or the tax system, but rather pursue d ferent policy objectives. 
This distinction between internal and external objective is the fundamental divide to 
determine whether a tax measure which provides for a differential treatment is 
ultimately a tax subsidy or not. Further, it is crucial to correctly approach the 
recurring problem of the distinction between scope and justification. 
An interesting example of measures that do not imply the 'foregoing of revenue 
otherwise due', because any apparent differential treatment is in fact justified by the 
logic of taxation, is that of technical rules. 
Normally, these rules do not confer any advantage because, borrowing from an EC 
law jargon, they define the parameters of the general tax system. In the last analysis, 
the issue is whether the measure is in line or not with the inherent logic of the system. 
Most of these measures are accordingly justified by the need to shape the system in 
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accordance with generally acknowledged principles, such as that whereby a tax 
should accord to the 'ability to pay' of the taxpayer. 
As reported by the US - FSC Panel (at paragraph 4.591), clearly drawing from the 
internal State aid law experience, the EC was arguing that determination of general 
tax rates, depreciation rules and rules on loss carry-overs, are a clear applications of 
this principle. Admittedly, the same conclusion should be reached with respect to 
rules to prevent tax avoidance or double taxation, provided that these measures 
merely address these goals and do not provide any advantage to certain categories of 
undertakings. 
An interesting example is that of the rules aimed at preventing double taxation. 
Footnote 59 to the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies provides that 'paragraph (e) 
is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double 
taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of 
another Member'. Although this provision merely exclude that the conduct at issue 
be considered as an export subsidy, it may well be argued that, if the measure at 
issue does not confer an advantage, it should be considered as not being a subsidy in 
the first place. 
The writer believes it important to repeat the point of the importance of this 
exercise of identification and distinction of the objectives of the tax measure and 
system when carrying out the advantage analysis of a tax measure. This eventually 
depends on the proper definition of the relation between what is scope and what is 
justification under subsidy rules. 
The previous analysis has certainly brought to the attentive reader's mind an 
intriguingly similar debate in another area of GA'T/WTO law, that of the rule of 
national treatment with respect to internal taxation and regulation. Reference is 
made the `aims-and-effect' controversy, is whether the role of the objectives 
pursued by the measure should be taken into account when determining whether 
two products are `like' under Article III: 2 or 4 GATT, or whether there is `less 
favourable treatment' under Article III: 4 GATT, or rather whether ans' such 
objective should only be considered at the subsequent stage of the general 
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exceptions under Article XX GATT. 418 Time and space constraints preclude a 
more in-depth, and certainly fruitful, analysis of the issue and indeed a comparison 
with the `objective - scope/justification' debate in the context of subsidy rules. 
This item will certainly be put on the future research agenda. 
This paragraph has been entitled as `a preview of the scope/justification debate'. 
The underlying intention was two-fold. At a very simplistic level, the writer just 
wanted to give a flavour of an important debate which is fully present in the EC 
context. A more prophetic meaning of the word preview is that it is only a matter 
of time before these issues about objectives and their distinction, and the underlying 
interplay between scope and justification, with respect to tax measures will be 
debated before the Dispute Settlement Body. 
Regulatory measures 
The previous chapter has shown that, under certain conditions, also regulatory 
measures may be covered by the SCM Agreement since they constitute a form of 
financial contribution or of income/price support. 
Thus, for instance, the non-applicability of collective labour agreements and 
minimum wage levels might be covered by subparagraph (ii) insofar as it might 
involve a loss of government revenue in the form of social contributions. The 
imposition of minimum prices might, by contrast, be covered by subparagraph (iv), 
as it might be the result of an order or entrustment to a private party to transfer 
funds, or by Article 1.1(a) (2), being an income or price support. 
In these cases, since the governmental conduct is by definition non-economic, the 
advantage analysis should be carried out by using the derogation test. The measure 
will be held to confer an advantage if it derogates from the appropriate general rule. 
418 In the WTO era, the main disputes that have resurrected the `aims-and-effect' debate are Japan - Taxer, 
Chile - Taxes and EC- Asbestos. 
The scholarship has perused these cases and approached the overall issue 
very attentively. For an excellent overview see Trebilcock and Howse (2005: chapter 3). See also the classic 
paper of Hudec (1998); Verhhoessel (2002); Horn and Weiler (2003); Regan (2003); Roessler 
(2003). Porges 
and Tracthman (2003). 
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Public goods 
The conceptual debate on public goods and their current redefinition has been 
analysed at length previously. 
In this section, the assumption is that we are indeed confronted with a true public 
good since there is a market failure which makes the provision of the relevant good 
or service non-economic and justifies the public intervention. 
The most important example of public goods which may be covered by the SCM 
Agreement is that of some infrastructure and, probably, also of the relevant services. 
It has been seen that the third subparagraph of Article 1.1(a)(1) SCM provides that 
there is a financial contribution when 'a government provides goods or services other 
than general infrastructure, or purchase goods'. 
As happened with subparagraph (ii), this provision offers interesting indications 
with respect to the advantage analysis. In the section on economic activity, two 
possible readings of the term `general' have been given. 
The prevailing line of interpretation is that the exclusion of `general infrastructure' is 
in fact pleonastic since it wouldn't do but repeat what is already said under Article 2 
and its specificity test. 'General' would underline that infrastructures that are not be 
specific in their application, ie that do not apply to the exclusive advantage of a 
certain undertakings. 
The writer has advanced an alternative reading of the phrase. The suggestion is that 
the term 'general' would refer to' the fact that the provision relevant of the 
infrastructure (and service) falls within the general infrastructure policy of the 
government. Consequently, the conduct is general inasmuch as it is not derogatory 
from this policy. 
In the context of the advantage analysis, it is therefore crucial to properly define the 
benchmark, in particular the meaning of `general infrastructure policy'. 
In this regard, a crucial role is played by the proper identification of the plan of the 
government with respect to infrastructures and their relevant services. 
Two brief remarks can be made. 
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Should the infrastructural plan be viewed in a static or dynamic way? 
There is indeed a risk in referring only to the existing plans only, that of creating an 
obstacle to the country's infrastructure development. It can thus be advanced that 
his criterion should be viewed in a prospective way. From another perspective, the 
government concerned is certainly entitled to update and improve its general 
infrastructure policy without its generality being defeated. 
It is clear that the issue becomes very much a question of evidence. Although its 
determination is not always easy, the (express or inferred) intention of the 
government may play a role in this context by clarifying whether the government's 
plan is truly characterized by a general and neutral aim or rather aims to provide a 
more specific favour. 
At the other side of the spectrum there is also another issue: how far can this 
flexible approach to the definition of general infrastructural policy go? Is there any 
risk that the interpreter is actually led to impose its view of what a general 
infrastructure policy should be? 
The previous examination has just drawn a sketch but has certainly shown that the 
determination of whether the provision of an infrastructure or service is general or 
not is far from an easy exercise. 
The advantage analysis under the Agreement on Agriculture 
As regards the Agreement on Agriculture, there seems to be little doubt that 
regulatory measures may indeed be covered by some of those provisions, such as 
Article 9.1(c) which generally refers to 'payments financed by virtue of 
governmental action'. 
The Agreement on Agriculture does not contain a definition of the term subsidy. 
Although the Appellate Body drew, as context, upon the definition of subsidy in 
Article 1.1 SCM, 419 as we have seen in the previous chapter, Article 9.1 seems to 
regulate forms of (export) subsidy that cannot be limited to those fulfilling the 
requirements of financial contribution under Article 1.1 SCM. 
419 Appellate Body, Canada - Dairy, paragraph 87; Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 136. 
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The contextual interpretation under Article 1.1 SCM may however be useful with 
respect to the determination of whether a benefit exists. In this regard the 
Appellate Body has drawn inspiration from the market 4'0 and non-market 
benchmarks 421 as construed under the SCM Agreement. 
There are no reasons for reaching a different conclusion with respect to those 
regulatory measures which are not covered by one of the forms of financial 
contribution under Article 1.1 SCM and which may nonetheless fall within the 
scope of the AoA. 
With respect to the crucial issue of the advantage analysis, since we are talking of a 
regulatory conduct, the test should be the usual derogation one. 
120 Appellate Body, Canada - Dairy, paragraph 87. 
421 Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 140. 
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2. EC law 
Tax measures 
This section examines test and benchmarks used in EC law to determine whether a 
tax measure confers an advantage. The difference with respect to WTO law is that 
the fact that the assessment rests on a derogation test (ie on a derogation from the 
general rule or norm) is virtually undisputed in EC law. The emphasis of the 
analysis thus inevitably shifts towards the operation of the test in this area and to its 
problems. 
The derogation test in taxation 
The essence of the advantage analysis lies in the idea, a true paradigm, that a State 
aid involves a 'derogation from the appropriate norm'. When the government 
activity is economic the appropriate norm is the market and the test is whether the 
conduct is in line or not with market rules. If the government acts qua public 
authority, for example by imposing taxes, the test is whether the government 
derogates from the general rule otherwise applicable in the relevant field. 
Both the Commission and the Court have endorsed this approach. 
Expressly drawing inspiration from the OECD's definition of 'tax expenditure' as 'a 
departure from the generally accepted or benchmark tax structure, which produces a 
favourable tax treatment of particular types of activities or groups of taxpayers', the 
Commission clarified the relevant test on various occasions which consistently 
emphasise the ideas of normality and derogation therefrom. In the 1998 Notice on 
Direct Taxation we find that 'the measure must confer on recipients an advantage 
which relieves them of charges that are normally borne from their budgets' 
(paragraph 9, emphasis added). Even more explicitly, the 2004 Report reads: 
to determine whether a tax scheme derogating from the normal system may 
constitute state aid, it must be established whether the resulting tax burden is 
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lower than that which would have resulted from the application of the relevant 
Member State's normal taxation method. 422 
The Court has consistently referred to the idea of derogation since its very early 
decisions. Two classic examples, which are endlessly repeated in the case-law, can 
be cited. The first is the seminal 1961 decision in Case 30/59 Steenkolenmijnen which 
includes the oldest case law definition of aid, and which unmistakably links the 
notion of aid to the existence of a derogation from the normal course. 423 
The Court laid down the more elaborate definition of the derogation test -a 
veritable standard - in 1974: 
the partial reduction of social charges pertaining to family allowances devolving 
upon employers in the textile sector is a measure intended partially to exempt 
undertakings of a particular industrial sector from the financial charges arising 
from the normal application of the general social security system, without there 
being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general 
scheme of the system'. 424 
This formulation clearly indicates the three steps of the test to determine whether 
there is a derogation: the identification of the general rule (the `normal application 
of the general social security system'), of the differential treatment (the `exemption' 
from the latter) and of the ingrained justification `on the basis of the nature or 
general scheme of the system'. 
The broad acceptance of the derogation test with respect to governmental taxation 
does not mean that there is no variety of views surrounding it. 
Sometimes, far from being regarded as the core of the advantage analysis, as it is 
submitted here, it is seen as an additional requirement to the notion of State aid, that 
is independent from the advantage element. 425 Most interestingly, both practice 
and case law consistently consider it as part of or in any event together with the 
"'Box 1, page 6, emphasis added. 
'v A full quotation of the relevant finding can be found in the introductory section of the chapter. 
424 Case 173/73 ha# V Coermirrion, paragraph 15. 
425 See Bacon (1997: 297). 
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specificity test, confusing, in the writer's view, two steps of the analysis - advantage 
and specificity - which conceptually should be kept separate. 
Despite these nuances, the citizenship of the test in the form of derogation from the 
appropriate general tax rule is unanimously acknowledged in EC law. Before 
concentrating on the operation of the derogation test which, like its application in 
the field of economic activities, present its own complexities, it is first necessary to 
fully analyse a conceptual and methodological problem concerning its proper 
location in the context of the advantage analysis. 
A conceptual gloss: advantage analysis, derogation test and specificity 
The derogation test (and in particular the justification of the differential treatment 
on the basis of the inherent logic of the system) is often considered in the context 
of the specificity analysis. More generally, the advantage analysis itself is often not 
clearly distinguished from the specificity test. 
The examples are copious in the practice, case law and literature. In the Notice on 
Direct Taxation, the Commission noted that the 
selective nature of a measure may be justified by the "nature or general scheme of 
the system" 426 
The Court recently found that 
a measure which, although conferring an advantage on its recipient, is justified by 
the nature or general scheme of the system of which it is part does not fulfil that 
[?! ] condition of selectivity. 427 
Along these lines, the scholarship recently observed that, where the State is 'acting 
in the exercise of public powers, such as in the areas of taxation, social security, etc', 
4M Paragraph 12. 
427 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien, paragraph 41. The punctuations mark are of the writer. 
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the test which should be used to establish the existence of a State aid is whether the 
measure is "selective" or "specific" (sic! ). 428 
As has already been repeated many times, this confusion may derive from the 
ambiguity of the word `general' which is used in the context of both advantage and 
specificity analysis. A measure may be considered general because it objectively 
represents the norm in the relevant field (and thus be opposed to the concept of 
'exceptional'). From the perspective of its subjective application, a measure is general 
since it does apply to every person across the board (otherwise, it would be denoted 
as 'specific' or 'selective'). Whereas the first meaning of general is the one relevant 
to the analysis of the advantage, the second pertains more directly to the specificity 
test. 
It is however important to keep the two levels of analysis separate as they address 
fundamentally different questions. 
The derogation test, based as it is on the assessment of general rules and exceptions, 
aims to determine whether the measure at issue departs from the relevant 
benchmark and thus confers an advantage. As will be explained, the analysis of 
whether any differential impact of the measure is justified by the `nature' or `scheme' 
of the `general system' is an integral part of this test. The specificity test, in 
contrast, focuses on the different issue of whether that measure - which grants an 
advantage - applies selectively, that is whether it is specific to certain undertakings. 
Admittedly, in practice, in most of the cases the fact that the measure confers an 
advantage and is specific are two sides of the same coin since it is clear that a 
measure satisfies at the same time both requirements. A possible practical overlap 
does not however justify an ongoing conceptual confusion, if not a conflation. 
This is particularly so if, even in practice, there may be measures that confer an 
advantage but are not specific in their application, and measures that, conversely, are 
specific but do not confer an advantage. A couple of examples may illustrate this 
possibility. 
Example 1. A measure that introduces differential tax rates, and may consequently 
affect certain undertakings more than others, may well be justified in terms of the 
42$ Hansen, Van Ysendeck & ZWcke (2004: 203, note 6). 
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logic of the tax system, for example by the need to tackle tax avoidance. 49 Despite 
selective, this measure would not confer an advantage. 
Example 2. A Member State may decide to reduce the tax burden related to certain 
production costs (such as research and development, environment, training, 
employment). The Commission recognises that these measures may well not be 
selective 'inasmuch as they apply without distinction to all firms and to the 
production of all goods'. 430 This does not mean, however, that they are not apt to 
confer an advantage on the recipient undertakings. 431 A non-specific advantage 
may thus be granted. 
The operation of the derogation test and the (crucial and critical) role of 
objectives 
The derogation test in tax law follows the usual three-step pattern. The first step is 
the identification of the benchmark, that is the general tax rule applicable in the case 
at issue. 432 In the light of the general rule, it should then be determined whether ii) 
there is a differential treatment in favour of the situation at issue and, crucially, iii) 
whether this differential treatment is in fact justified by the `nature or general 
scheme of the system' thus excluding the possibility of a derogation from, or, using 
a different jargon, a discrimination in light of the general rule. 
It should be emphasised that, far from being strictly separate and consequential, 
these stages are often overlapping in the analysis with the result that all three issues 
may influence each other. 
In this regard, it is important to immediately underline that objectives play a crucial role 
in this complex process, particularly at the level of the definition of the general rule 
and of the enquiry of the justification. 
429See below. 
130 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 13. 
431 Schön (1999: 927). Using a language that will become apparent in the following paragraphs, to target 
factors of production cannot be considered as pertaining to the 'ability to pay' of the taxpayer as it reflects 
considerations that seem to be external to the proper functioning of the tax system, that is the pursuit of the 
government's policy objectives. This measure does not meet the requirement of specificity but is certainly 
advantageous. 
+u Cf the 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 16. 
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This role is also critical. As the etymological origin of the word, the Greek verb 
krinein, suggests, this requires not only to judge but also to separate. In many areas of 
the law, and in various legal systems, the consideration of the objectives in order to 
establish whether there is a justification gives rise to a crisis, causing a decision and a 
distinction. The distinction between objectives is of fundamental importance for 
the construction of State aid rules too, and is linked to one of the leitmotifs of this 
thesis which is the difficult quest for a legal separation between what is covered and 
what is justified. 
What a general (tax) rule is? 
Like in the WTO, the due premiss, based on the recognition of the sovereign 
prerogative of the Member State to decide the fundamental aspects of the domestic 
tax system, is that the appropriate benchmark must necessarily be found in the 
general tax system of the Member State. 433 
Various attempts have been made to define what constitutes a general rule. 
As the WIC) debate shows, this is not a matter of form or label but of substance. 
Clearly, however, it is not enough to say that it is necessary to go beneath the 
surface and assess the substance of the tax system if no principle to use in this 
assessment is suggested. 
Some definitions view as the key factor the fact that the measure is open to all economic 
agents operating within a Member State. 434 The subjective breadth of application, 
however, has more to do with the concept of specificity or selectivity rather than 
with the conceptually different - and inner - issue of whether the measure represents 
the norm in the relevant field. In practice, the broadness of the application of the 
measure may indicate that the measure is the general norm but this circumstance is 
by no means conclusive. It is an answer to a different question. 
Another definition seems more useful. In the Maribel case Advocate General La 
Pergola suggested that 'a measure is general when it is aimed at achieving equality 
433 Cf Schön (1999: 923-924). 
434 This is the definition in the 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 13. For a similar definition see 
Bacon (1997: 298). 
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between businesses'. aas Leaving aside the proactive tone, the idea of equal treatment 
is a valuable point of reference. It leads us back to the previous analysis of the 
formulations of the test of the advantage analysis based on a comparison between 
`comparable or like situations' which both the Appellate Body (US - FSC) and the 
Court of Justice (Adria-Wien) adopted. 
Taking stock of the reflections on those tests, the suggestion then was that a general 
rule is one that applies to all comparable situations. 
A further effort of elaboration is now required. The ensuing proposition is that a 
rule is general because it consistently applies to all situations that, in the light of the 
inherent objective of that rule, should be subject to it. 436 In other words, the objective 
is the unifying principle underlying the general rule, the one that leads to regulate 
comparable situations similarly. 
Having found an intellectually satisfying definition, which is embedded in the idea 
that the core of any general rule or system is given by its principal goal or objective, 
it is now necessary to make this workable. 
If we move to tax law, the principal, obvious goal of any tax is to raise revenue. It is 
generally accepted that each tax should do so according to the ability to pay of the 
taxpayer. 437 This ability can be measured with respect to each tax by different 
indicators, such as income, wealth or consumption. 438 We can thus have general 
tax rules which respectively use income, wealth, consumption etc, as their defining 
objectives. 
The main purpose of the tax may not be that of collecting revenue but rather to 
create a specific incentive or a disincentive to perform a certain conduct. Energy taxes, 
for example, have a clear objective other than raising revenue which is to 
disincentivize or, conversely, to incentivize activities that respectively have a more 
or less harmful impact on the environment. 439 
435 See Case C-75/97, paragraph 8 of the Opinion. 
436 This seems to be meaning of the two-stage test suggested by Nicolaides (2001: 332-335) which aim to 
detect both the 'revealed potential targets' and the 'revealed potential scope'. 
4' Cf Schön (1999: 925-927). See also Advocate General Stir-Häckl in Joined Cases C-128-129/03 AE. 1I, 
paragraph 18 of the Opinion, and Joined Cases C-266/04 to C-270/04 NaZairdü, paragraph 52-53 of the 
Opinion 
'38 Ibid. 
439 Renner-Loquenz (2003: 24). 
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The lesson is that the different objectives of the tax should be reflected in the 
criteria used to determine what is the general tax rule that pursue that objective and 
whether the measure at issue is in line with the general objective of that tax. 
What a derogation (or discrimination) is? 
The divergence between the objectives of the measure and the genera! rule 
One of the most delicate step in the derogation test is the determination of whether 
the exemption or, with a different expression, the differential treatment flowing 
from the measure under scrutiny is in fact in line with the objectives of the relevant 
general rule. What is required is in fact a parallel between different objectives, those 
of the measure at hand and those of the appropriate general rule. The establishment 
of an advantage ultimately depends on the determination of a divergence (rather than a 
convergence) between them. 
It must immediately be pointed out that the existence of a differential nature or 
impact of the measure at issue is not per se conclusive evidence that the measure at 
issue is derogation from the relevant general rule. The exemption may in fact be 
justified by the objective of the general rule. 
This important point was laid down by the Court in the definition of the derogation 
test in the seminar Italy v Commission decision quoted above. 44OWhat is necessary to 
assess is whether the measure that introduces a differential treatment may in fact be 
justified 'by the nature or general scheme of the system' or, using a different 
language, 'by the logic of the system'. If this is the case, there would be a 
convergence of objectives between tax measure and general tax rule, and hence no 
derogation or discrimination and ultimately no advantage. 
The scrutiny of the objectives of the tax measure and of the tax system seems to run 
counter to the consistent case law of the Court whereby the notion of aid is 
'objective' 441 since Article 87 'does not distinguish between the measures of State 
440 Case 173/73 Ita1# v Commw on, paragraph 15. 
441 Case T-67/94 Ladbroke v Commission, paragraph 52. 
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intervention concerned by reference to their causes or aims but defines them in 
relation to their effects. 442 
Quite interestingly, it is this same Italy v Commission case that has planted the seeds 
of controversy by introducing the 'logic of the system' justification. On the one 
side, at paragraph 15, the Court says that a State aid is defined in relation to its 
effects and not to its causes or aims. On the other, at paragraph 33, the Court 
seems to acknowledge that those aims may indeed become relevant to determine 
whether the differentiation previously detected may in fact be justified on the basis 
of the nature or general scheme of the system. 
The next paragraphs attempt to show that there is no contradiction between these 
findings which can in fact be reconciled with each other, at least at a theoretical 
level. The practice is another thing. 
The distinction among objectives 
The tension between the seemingly contradicting dicta of Italy, v Commission can 
arguably be eased off if consideration is given to the distinction laid down by the 
Commission in its 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation with respect to the justification 
on the basis of the logic of the system (which may well apply to any type of tax and, 
arguably, also to any other form of 'regulatory' conduct). 
It is suggested that the 'objectives which are inherent in the tax system itself should 
be differentiated from the 'external objectives assigned to a particular tax scheme (in 
particular, social or regional objectives)'. 443 
The practical implication of this distinction between inherent and external objectives is 
not spelled out expressly. 
Pinto (2003: 145) 146-148) argue that there would be no practical impact and all 
objectives should be treated similarly in the `logic of the system' exercise. 144 It 
seems however clear to the writer that this distinction must have consequences. 
u3 Case 173/73 Italy V Commission, paragraph 13. 
443 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 26 (emphasis added). 
4440n account of the fact that'this distinction is not made workable in practice by identifying practical 
criteria', this author eventually finds that the logic of the system should be assessed 
by taking into 
consideration the 'policy objectives' of the measure, be they internal or external. 
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The only plausible explanation for it is that only measures that pursue objectives 
inherent in the tax system should be justified on the basis of its logic whereas 
objectives externally assigned to the system should not be considered when it is 
necessary to determine whether the measure constitutes a State aid. 
Some direction on the objectives that are inherent in the tax system is found in the 
1998 Notice on Direct Taxation where the Commission specifies when the 
justification on the basis of the nature or general scheme of the system applies. The 
measure would be justified when 'exceptions to the system or differentiations within 
that system ... 
derive directly from the basic or guiding principles of the tax ystem' or where 
the 'economic rationale' of the measures 'makes them necessary to functioning or 
effectiveness of the tax ystem. 445 
Other interpretative efforts can be found in the scholarship. For example, Bacon 
(1997: 301) underlines that certain rules would be in line with the logic of the tax 
system since they define its `parameters'. Schön (1999: 926) suggests that only those 
objectives that relate to the 'structural component' of the tax and are accordingly 
necessary to implement its fundamental structure are inherent in the tax system, and 
may thus be used as justification. By contrast, the objectives that are externally 
assigned to a tax concern the 'tax expenditure component' which consist of the 
provisions by which government spending objectives are carried out through the tax 
system. 
`Navigating between the poles '. " the risk of conflating scope and justification 
The system of State aid control in the EC seems to revolve around two poles. Each 
one has its own substantive, procedural, institutional and constitutional characteristics. 
The first pole is represented by Article 87(1) EC. From the substantive point of 
view, it can safely be assumed that this provision is based on an essentially technical and 
objective analysis, aimed at capturing those deviations from the general norm that are 
liable to confer an economic advantage on certain undertakings and thereby distort 
competition across the border. The `human' factor is there, as the analysis of the 
"5 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraphs 16 and 23 (emphasis added). 
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complexities and criticisms of the market paradigm has clearly shown. But, the 
imprinting seems to be substantially denoted by an inevitable objectivity. 
The second pole is constituted by various norms, notably Articles 87(2) and (3) and 
Article 86(2) EC. These provisions feature a more political, discretional and hence 
subjective nature. Although, as the current State Aid Action Plan seem to require, this 
pole too is increasingly subject to more discipline and objectivity, the focus shifts 
from the distortions on competition to the pursuit of socio-economic objectives, be 
they efficiency or equity related, which by definition require high political choices to be 
made. Despite any injection of transparency, predictability and efficiency, the stamp 
of these rules seems to be ineludibly subjective. 
The different operation of two poles from the substantive point of view is echoed 
by the procedural, institutional and constitutional arrangements. 446 Generally speaking, 
these are centred on a clear separation of roles between Member States, ie national 
courts, and the EC, ie the Commission. National courts may interpret the notion of 
State aid under Article 87(1) EC in order enforce the standstill and notification 
obligations under Article 88(3) EC by ordering the recovery of aid granted illegally, 
that is not notified and authorised by the Commission. It is only for the 
Commission though to assess whether the justifications under Articles 87(2) and 
87(3) EC are satisfied and the measure is `compatible with the common market'. 
The evaluation of the Commission, which requires a complex economic and social 
assessment, is normally considered as rather flexible. While not touching the 
fundamentals of this arrangement, the current modernization trend does seem to 
introduce a bit more of coherency and-efficiency in the system. A full exposition 
and appraisal is however left to chapter 5. 
Now, the interpreter is navigating between these two poles. To him it is of crucial 
importance to understand where he should direct his ship for a safe harbour. The 
maps at his disposal are not however always fully clear. The data on which they are 
based may be faulty but, more simply, it may well be that they have been badly 
drafted. 
To fully appreciate this point an analysis of the landmark decisions in the case-law may be sufficient. See, 
eg, Case 730/79 Philip Momr, Case C-354/90 Salmon-, Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste. 
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In the scholarship there seems to be agreement that the separate issues of scope 
(what is covered) and justification (what is permitted) should be not be conflated at 
the stage of the advantage analysis. 447 
Attempts to further complicate an area which is already in great need for legal 
certainty should not be warranted. For example, a few years ago, Bacon (1997: 305- 
211) suggested the idea of introducing a `third' category whereunder a derogation 
from the general systems should be justified in consideration of the `special 
characteristics' of the undertakings concerned with the result there would be no aid 
in the first place. 448 
It is submitted that, although the task of the interpreted may be at times difficult, 
the choice should be a black or white one. We either have a derogation or not. If 
these `special characteristics' cannot be accommodated in the logic of the system, 
they should be considered at the level of the justifications. For the sake of 
transparency and legal certainty. Despite its intellectual flair, the idea of `justifiable 
derogation' risks muddling the waters further with the final result that scope and 
justification are again unduly merged at the level of the advantage analysis. 
Despite all the argumentation deployed, the distinction between inherent and 
external objectives is not fully sorted. Far from being (merely) conceptual, the 
problem is also eminently practical. 
The example of English Courts is a good one. Bacon (2004: 350-351) reports the 
two most common errors encountered in the application of the justification on the 
basis of the logic of the system: first, 'to regard the general system as the aid measure 
itself, and to state that because that measure is objectively justified, or based on solid 
policy reasons, the measure is not aid' and, secondly, 'to import into the concept of 
aid the possibility of an "objective justification" analogous to that employed in the 
field of free movement'. 
This example highlights the risk of an incorrect application of the derogation test, ie 
the conflation of scope and justification. With the result that the advantage may be 
" Cf, eg, Ross (2004); Bacon (2004); Biondi and Rubini (2005). 
' These `particular characteristics' would, for example, be present for the manufacturing industry, services, 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry, banking, insurance, oil, SMEs, special exemptions from en ironmental taxes 
for energy-intensive industries. 
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charged with generally public interest considerations that are in fact extraneous to its 
analysis. In the previous section a similar risk has been found in the assessment of 
the advantage of non-economic activity. This risk is however particularly high in 
the context of non-economic activity of governments where we are completely in 
the public domain. 
An assessment of the case-law 
The argument that any differential impact is inherent in the logic of the system is 
very attractive to governments and is often raised. However, both the Court and 
the Commission have been so far quite reluctant in accepting it. 
In its 2004 Report on Direct Taxation, the Commission expressly indicated that it 
adopts a rather restrictive approach to this justification, even suggesting that it 
might apply only `in exceptional circumstances'. 449 
The writer has focused particularly on the case-law. He has analysed sixteen cases, 
mostly recent, taken them from a broad range of factual sets in order to provide a 
significant sample. The aim is to provide a more detailed account of the treatment 
of the `justification on the basis of the logic of the system'. This paragraph sets 
forth the general results. Some of the most interesting cases are analysed separately 
below. 
The cases are grouped in three categories where both the correctness of the outcome and 
the soundness of the reasoning are taken into account. 
a) Correct reasoning and correct outcome 
In some cases the reasoning is clear and this results into a correct outcome of the 
case. The defence is accepted because it is clearly founded on objectives that are 
inherent in the system. This is the case for tax avoidance in Gil Insurance450 which is 
analysed at length below. 
See, for example, the Report on Direct Taxation, paragraph 76 and ibid, Box No 7, page 10. 
ýS0 Case C-308/01. 
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Similarly, although there is no express reference to the `logic of the system' 
language, essentially the same reasoning seems to underlie the positive assessment 
of the tax arrangements of reserves of nuclear stations in the recent Stadtwerke case. 
451 
Arguments on the basis of the logic of the tax system are often put forward, and - 
albeit sometimes with a different emphasis and sometimes without an express 
reference to the logic argument - in general accepted, in order to justify the 
autonomous tax powers of regions according to their national constitutions. 452 
In other cases, although the objective may in principle qualify as inherent in the 
logic of the tax system, the defence is rejected because the Court subject the 
measure at issue to a close scrutiny with respect to its necessity and/or 
proportionality to reach that aim (see MINAJ). 453 Finally, in many cases the claim 
is not accepted because the measure clearly pursues an external objective (see Heiser, 
454 Cassa di Risparmio di Ftren. Ze, 455 Air Liquide 456 ) 
b) Unclear reasoning but correct outcome 
In other cases, although the final decision made by the Court seems correct, the 
reasoning leading to it raised some doubts. 
The Maribel decision is a good example. 457 Although from the case it emerges that 
the main motive for this increased reduction was the higher exposition of those 
151 Case T-92/02. Crucially, the Court was satisfied about the objective of the reserves and its 
proportionality. The fact that they were not `earmarked' did not constitute an obstacle for considering them 
as granting an undue advantage. For two comments on this important case, one before and one after the 
decision, see Reich and Helios (2002); Reich (2006). 
452 See, eg, Case 248/84 Germany v Commission, paragraph 17. More recently, Cases T-127/99; T-129/99 and 
T-148/99 Temtorio Histörico de Alava, paragraphs 142 and 146; Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00 Ter itorro Histörico 
de Alava, paragraph 57; Cases T-269/99, T-271/99 and T-272/99 Territorio Hi törrco de Gu: /» <coa, paragraph 
56; Cases T-346/99, T-347/99 and T-348/99 Timtorio Hi törico de Älava [2002] ECR 11-4258, paragraphs 52 
and 62. See also the recent Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission, in 
particular paragraphs 48 to 72. 
4s3 Case C-159/01, Netherlands v Commission, paragraphs 42 to 47. 
4 Case C-172/03, paragraphs 43-49; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, paragraphs 48 and 
49. See D'Ormesson and Bouin (2005) for a note. 
455 Case C-222/04, paragraph 137; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, paragraphs 104 and 105. 
An interesting case note which also broadens the picture showing the interesting connections with the law on 
free movement is Biondi (2006). 
456Case C-393/04. Although no defence in this regard is raised by the defending authorities, the point is 
analysed and dismissed by Advocate General Tizzano, paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Opinion. 
07 Case C-75/97. 
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industrial sectors to international competition, the Belgian government put forward 
a different reading. 
The reduction of social contribution at issue was a `choice of economic policy, 
consisting in a decision to promote the creation of jobs in industrial sectors 
employing mostly manual workers earning low wages owing to their low 
qualifications' and this particularly occurred in those sectors that were `most 
affected by redundancies and restructuring'. 
Interestingly, before reaching the conclusion that, on the facts of the case, the 
measure was in fact pursuing a different objective, the Court spent considerable 
energy in considering the alternative explanation. 
However, the finding whereby the said reduction `does not at first sight appear to 
derogate from the nature and scheme of the general system of social. protection' 458 
does not find in the remainder of the reasoning an intellectually satisfying 
explanation. 
What the Court should have clearly explained - and it did not - is the alleged nexus 
between i) the said reduction of social contributions (which finance the social 
security system) and ii) the convergence of the objectives of the measure and of the 
social security system. In a word, what is missing in the reasoning of the Court is 
the explanation of the intriguing link between social security protection and job creation. 
In case of a positive finding, the Court should then have had to subject the measure 
at issue (ie the reduction of social contributions in certain sectors) to a close scrutiny 
in terms of necessity/proportionality to reach that concurrent aim. 
In Adria-Wien 459 we see a similar phenomenon. Although the conclusion of the 
Court is sound, the reasoning does not always support it. The reader can 
immediately be assured that we do not have a speculative problem as complex as the 
one in Maribel. Nonetheless, again, there are some important inaccuracies. 
Again, like in Maribel, it emerged from the file that the measure at issue, an 
exemption from an energy tax in favour of undertakings of the manufacturing 
sector, was aimed to preserve the competitiveness of that sector in the Community. 
'58 Ibid, paragraph 36. 
u9 Case C-143/99, see in particular paragraphs 49 to 52. 
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As usual, other justifications have been put forward by the defending government. 
Being an energy tax, differential treatment based on ecological rationales would be a 
good candidate. The fact that this objective is in line with the logic of the energy tax 
is accepted by the Court which however underlines that, at the same time, 
distinctions between undertakings supplying services and undertakings supplying 
goods cannot be made in this regard as `energy consumption by each of those 
sectors is equally damaging to the environment'. 
So far so good. The Court however also addresses another argument, noting that 
no evidence had been produced to show that the manufacturing sector would have 
been disproportionally affected from the tax from the financial standpoint. 
The problem is that this economic argument seems to sit uneasily with the logic of an 
energy-tax, resembling much more to an objective which external to it rather than 
inherent in it. If so, instead of positively addressing it, the Court should have more 
simply dismissed it as irrelevant. 
Two more recent cases (Italy v Commission and Unicredito) raise again the issue of 
what objectives may be included in the logic of the tax at issue or more generally of 
the overall tax system. 
What was at issue was a tax exemption in favour of Italian banks. The clear aim was 
again to improve the competitiveness of certain undertakings, this time at a certain 
stage in the development of the sector. 4,60 The Court thus had no difficulty in 
dismissing the allegation. 
Having found the real aim of this measure, in the same paragraph, the Court 
interestingly added that the tax reduction is not justified by the nature of the tax in 
question because `it is not an adaptation of the general scheme to the particular 
characteristics of banking undertakings'. This argument, which finds support also in 
the Commission's quarters 461 and in part of the scholarship, «2 whereby differential 
measures for certain sectors (such as agriculture and fisheries, insurance, banking, 
oil, gas and SMEs), would be in line with the logic of the system, cannot be 
accepted without strong reservation. 
"0 See Case C-148/04 Unicndito, paragraph Si; Case C-66/02 Itch v Commission, paragraph 101. 
461 See, eg, the 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraphs 26 and 27; Report on Direct Taxation, paragraphs 
32 to 42. 
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;: 
The writer is of the view that, in most of these cases, arguments about the 
`particularities' of certain undertakings or sectors, which would put them at a 
disadvantage if the normal rule were applied, are simply misplaced and cannot be 
justified in terms of the logic of the tax at issue or, more generally, of the general tax 
system. 463 Normally, the proper place for take `specificities', disadvantages and 
redistributive rationales into account is that of justifications. 
c) Incorrect reasoning and incorrect outcome 
A very recent case provides for an example - to be fair a rare one - where the Court 
got it wrong. An incorrect reasoning leads to and incorrect decision. External 
objectives are accepted as part of the logic of the tax system with the result that the 
measure does not constitute an aid. A good example of an incorrect decision where 
scope and justification are conflated is the AEM decision. 464 
Some applications 
We can now examine three areas which have increasingly seen a reference to the 
logic of the system exception, ie technical rules, local taxation and eco-taxes. 
Technical rules 
Some rules directly reflect the ability to pay of the taxpayer. Accordingly, even 
though they may have a differential impact, they are held to immediately derive 
from the logic of the tax system and they are not considered to create any 
advantage. 
Reference is made to technical rules, those that 'define the parameters of the 
system', for example by determining what a 'corporation' is for corporation tax 
purposes. 465 According to the Commission, other examples are those setting of the 
rates of taxation, those concerning depreciation of assets, loss carry-overs, and the 
462See, eg, Bacon (1997); Quigley (1988); id (2004); Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot (1999: para 2.32). 
For similar arguments see Schön (1999: 926 and 929). 
Cases C-128-129/03. For a commentary see Maier and Werner (2005). 
See Bacon (1997: 301-302). 
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prevention of double taxation or tax avoidance. 466 We could add those provisions 
that ensure tax neutrality, 467 the efficiency of tax collection (some special measures 
for SMEs are sometimes justified in terms of lower collection costs for the treasury), 
and the principle of progressiveness. These rules are generally considered as 
examples of measures falling within the logic of the tax system. They would be 
necessary to implement the fundamental structure of the relevant tax thus belonging 
to its 'structural component'. With an illuminating metaphor, Schön (1999: 926) has 
compared them to the 'fine print' of the general decision of a Member State to levy 
a given tax. 
That is the theory. In practice, however, it may be controversial whether a 
provision containing a technical rule simply measures the 'ability to pay' of the 
taxpayer or rather provides him with a tax incentive. 
For example, rather than taking into account the ordinary life of an asset, in 
accordance with the good commercial practice, a depreciation rule may go beyond 
the objective determination of the financial situation of the taxpayer, thus creating 
an incentive to invest in certain assets. 468 In this regard, Bacon (1997: 300) shows 
how accelerated depreciation rates, which allow the undertakings concerned to 
postpone a proportion of their tax liability and thus confer on them an advantage, 
may be used to created an incentive for investment in research and development, 
for adopting equipments serving environmental goals or serving social purposes. 
Another interesting case reported by Schön (1999: 927) is that of carry-back and 
carry-forward of losses that, although are normally used to measure the ability to 
pay by disregarding the artificial limits of the respective accounting periods, may 
become an instrument of subsidisation of risk-taking industries. 
These are however policy objectives that are external to the rationale of depreciation 
and losses carry-back and carry-forward rules and do not belong to the logic of the 
tax system. These measures should be considered as aid which may be declared as 
compatible with the common market if they fulfil, for example, the conditions of 
exemption for research and development or environmental aid. 
' Cf 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 13. Cf also the Report on Direct Taxation, paragraph 16. 
. For an interesting example see the Report on Direct Taxation, paragraph K. 
4'8 Schön (1999: 927); Bacon (1997: 301). See, eg, Case T-86/96 Hapag Loyd, paragraph 61. 
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An interesting example of these difficulties concerns the setting of tax rates. 
Leaving aside the debate about its rationale (redistribution? ), 469 the progressiveness 
of the tax scale is generally considered as pertaining to the logic of the tax system, 
the introduction of different tax rates (for reasons unrelated to tax progression) may 
sometimes raise some controversy. A typical example is that of eco-taxes which 
may provide different rates according to the more/less polluting effect. 
In this regard it is useful to examine a recent case where the Court found that the 
adoption of a differential rate of tax on insurance contracts was not an aid because it 
was justified by the need to achieve an objective linked to the good functioning of 
the tax system, the prevention of tax avoidance. 
Gil Insurance 
In Gil Insurance 470 the Court was called to examine an English tax whose 
categorisation had already been subject to the scrutiny of the English Court of 
Appeal in the Lunn Poly, case. 471 The Finance Act 1994 had introduced the 
Insurance Premium Tax ('IPT') on insurance contracts which was charged at a rate 
of 2.5 per cent (later increased to 4 per cent). That uniform rate was subsequently 
replaced by the Finance Act 1997 by two different rates: a standard rate of 4 per 
cent and a higher rate of 17.5 per cent, the latter applying to insurance contracts 
connected with the provision of certain services (notably domestic appliances, 
motor cars and travel). 
The initial decision to introduce IPT and, subsequently, a higher rate for connected 
insurance contracts - which equalled that of VAT - was intended to counteract 
'value shifting'. With this practice a low profit margin was set for the principal 
product (in Gil Insurance domestic appliances, in Lunn Poly holiday packages) which 
attracted VAT at a rate of 17.5 per cent. By contrast, a high margin was set for the 
469 See 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 24. Contra Schön (1999: 929). 
470 Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance. 
471 In Rv Cxrtoau and Excise Commiuiontrs, ex parts Lunn Poy Ltd and another [ 1999] ELRev 653 the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the differential rates of tax on travel insurance constituted State aid under Article 
87(1) 
EC. For a note see Bacon (1999). 
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connected insurance contract which was exempt from VAT, 472 and only subject to 
the much lower IPT rate (as said, 2.5 or 4 per cent). The end result of this price 
manipulation was a loss of VAT receipts for the treasury. 
One of the issues before the Court in Gil Insurance was whether the differential rate 
amounted to State aid. 473 With a standard application of the derogation test, the 
Court accepted the justification put forward - the need to tackle tax avoidance - and 
concluded, at paragraph 78 of the decision, that 
... even on assumption that the 
introduction of the higher rate of IPT involves 
an advantage for operators offering contracts subject to the standard rate, the 
application of the higher rate of IPT to a specific part of the insurance contracts 
previously subject to the standard rate must be regarded as justified by the nature 
and the general scheme of the national system of taxation of insurance. The IPT 
scheme cannot therefore be regarded as constituting an aid measure within the 
meaning of Article 87(1) EC. 474 
A gloss should be made to this passage. In its analysis (notably at paragraph 74), the 
Court had considered that, from the perspective of value shifting and the relevant 
price manipulation, the 'higher rate of IPT and VAT form part of an inseparable 
whole'. It is with this qualification in mind that the reference to the justification on 
the basis of the 'national system of taxation of insurance' should be understood. 
The issue of negative aid 
Another important issue that comes out from Gil Insurance is whether there is room 
within the scope of Article 87(1) EC for the concept of so-called 'negative aid'. 
In other words, the question is whether the imposition of a burden, in the instant 
case in the form of a tax, on certain undertakings can amount to an aid to other 
472 Article 13(B)(a) of the Sixth VAT Directives provides that insurance transactions are not subject to VAT. 
The Court reports that, as a result of this exemption, there was also a trend towards replacing service 
contracts for the repair and maintenance of domestic appliances (which were subject to VAT) with insurance 
contracts (which, as we have said, weren't). 
473 The other questions, which focused on the Sixth VAT Directive precluded the introduction of a tax such 
as IPT were answered in the negative. 
14 Along these lines, see the Commission 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 13. Cf also Bacon 
(1999: 388). 
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undertakings that are not subject to it (obviously, what is at issue here is whether 
such practice may confer an advantage and not whether it may be sufficiently 
selective). 
The views differ sharply. Some, as the UK government in the case in question, 475 
argue that the general definition of State aid only includes the idea of positive benefit. 
476 Accordingly, the introduction of a tax disincentive can never be held to confer an 
advantage on non-taxable persons. 477 Considering the broad coverage of the 
notion of State aid in the EC others by contrast believe that there are no reasons for 
excluding these forms from the notion of State aid. 478 These measures 
undoubtedly grant an advantage on those that are not subject to the tax. 
In the decision the Court did not address the point expressly (which, as seen, was 
raised by the UK government). At paragraph 78, quoted above, the Court 
considered, by way of assumption, that the introduction of the higher rate could 
involve an advantage for operators offering contracts subject to the standard rate. 
However, most of the other findings, which significantly echo the Opinion of the 
Advocate General that expressly addressed the issue and concluded in the negative, 
479 seem to lend considerable support to the traditional view. 480 
Generally speaking, and considering the broad language of Article 87(1) EC (we may 
recall that Article 87(1) EC covers 'any aid in any form whatsoever'), the first 
impression is that it should not be excluded that the imposition of a burden or a 
disadvantage could be considered as a State aid. To put it differently: in many cases 
it seems indeed that advantage and disadvantage are really two sides of the same 
"I Reported at paragraph 57 of the decision. 
476 Schön (1999: 930). See Lasok (2000) who was counsel to the UK government in the case. An additional 
argument that is used in support of the traditional view is that when a higher tax is imposed it would be 
difficult to detect a transfer of State resources. Cf Bacon (1999: 386 to 388). 
41 Schön (1999: 930). 
478 Bacon (1997: 318; id (1999: 386-388). 
419 See paragraph 51 et seq of the Opinion. Advocate General Geelhoed found the specific distortions caused 
by the imposition of a burden can never be regarded as the grant of aid in favour of the market participants 
coming under the general measure under Article 87 EC but should be tackled under Articles 96 and 97 EC. 
The Advocate General expressed his view also extrajudicially. See Geelhoed (2005). 
"0 When considering whether the differential rate was justified by the nature of the tax, the Court underlined 
that the higher rate should be considered as a detetent (to the conclusion of connected insurance contracts) 
and that accordingly it was not intended to confer an advantage to those operators who offer contracts subject to 
the standard rate (paragraph 75 of the judgment). The standard rate did not constitute a derogation from the 
general system of insurance tax as it was introduced to compensate for the fact that insurance is not subject 
to VAT (paragraph 76 of the judgment). These arguments were the same put forward by the Advocate 
General who opined that the higher rate (as any imposition of a burden) could not give rise to aid. 
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coin and the same measure can be construed as either providing the former or 
imposing the latter. 
If however the theoretical framework of the derogation test is applied to the 
concept of negative aid, it seems that we cannot escape the following incongruous 
result. 
Consider the case of a country that introduces two different tax rates for polluting 
cars (higher rate) and non-polluting cars (lower rate). Admittedly, the former could 
be viewed as a disincentive to use polluting vehicles, the latter as an incentive to use 
more environmental friendly cars. 
Unless the disciplines of the two cases is perfectly the same, with the result that it is 
difficult to determine what is the general rule and what is the exception, two 
possibilities can be envisaged. On the one hand, the higher rate could be regarded 
as the prevailing rule and the lower rate as the exception. This is the classic example 
of State aid and there is no need to deploy the concept of 'negative aid'. On the 
other hand, the imposition of the burden, ie the higher rate, could be viewed as the 
derogation from the lower rate which would then constitute the general rate. 481 It 
could now be argued that it would be rather odd to consider that, although the 
allegedly benefited undertakings are subject to the application of the general rule, they 
should nonetheless be regarded as advantaged by the exceptional unfavourable 
treatment reserved to other undertakings. 
Local taxation 
A very topical example of tax rules that may be considered consistent with the logic 
of the tax system are those that in some jurisdictions recognise the fiscal autonomy 
of local authorities. 
Along these lines, it would be necessary to distinguish between tax measures 
concerning a certain region that are instituted by central governments, which even if 
extending to the whole of the relevant local area would constitute a selective aid, 
48' It should be recalled that the existence of a derogation does not necessarily mean that this is abvayt 
favoxwbk to the relevant undertakings. Once it has been established that the measure at issue deviates from 
the general scheme, it is still necessary to determine that this exception is advantageous. 
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and tax measures adopted by local authorities which extend to all undertakings 
within the relevant territory and would not amount to aid. 
It could be asked why State aid rules should distinguish between these two 
situations. 
Arguably, within the context of the Member State at issue, which is principally 
responsible for the compliance with State aid rules, even local taxes adopted by local 
authorities can be viewed as a differential treatment within its (ie of the Member 
State) jurisdiction. It could further be observed that, from the point of view of its 
distortive impact, there is probably no difference between whether the same tax 
measure is adopted at a central or local level. Aid measures with local scope 
produce similar effects irrespective of whether they originate and/or are funded at 
central or local level. 
These remarks lead us to considering the commonly accepted rationale for justifying 
the differentiation inherent in local taxation, which is constitutional since it relates to 
the internal share of competence within the jurisdiction of the Member State in 
question. So far, it seems that the Court has generally accepted this principle (see 
the cases discussed above). A case currently pending before the Court directly 
addresses this issue. 482 It has sparked a lively debate - in and outside the 
courtroom. It will hopefully provide a comprehensive final word on the issue. For 
now, it offer us good food for thought (and speculation). For now we only have the 
Opinion of the Advocate General who underlined that true fiscal autonomy should 
exist only if it occurs at three levels: institutional, procedural and economical. 483 
Interestingly, the Commission argues that, unless there is complete symmetry in tax 
autonomy within the country (which means that every local authority has the same 
powers), there is specificity. 
I Case C-88/03 Pom(ga/v Coxxim on. For a commentary see Nicolaides (2006). 
"3 It is worth underlining that, in the WI O, McGovern (1995) argued that economical autonomy is not 
necessary under Article 2.2 SCM. 
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Environmental taxes 
The increasing attention to the protection of the environment has a considerable 
impact in shaping government's policies and laws. 
Its importance is expressly sanctioned in Articles 2 and 6 EC. According to Article 
174(2) EC, EC environmental law is inspired and moulded by some principles that 
admittedly play an important role also in the context of EC State aid regulation. 
Among these principles, a particularly significance is played by the 'polluter pays' 
principle that requires that all environmental costs should be absorbed (internalised) 
in production costs. 484 As Advocate General Jacobs clearly explained, in the 
context of the definition of State aid under Article 87(1) EC, this principle is 
used as an analytical tool to allocate responsibility according to economic criteria 
for the costs entailed by the pollution in question. A given measure will 
constitute State aid where it relieves those liable under the polluter-pays principle 
from their primary responsibility to bear the costs. 485 
Other principles that could arguably play a role in the definition of State aid are the 
principles of precaution, prevention, and that damage should be rectified at source. 
Member States increasingly make use of tax systems to pursue environmental 
objectives, for example by encouraging or discouraging certain activities in 
accordance with their impact on the environment. 
In some cases these taxes, directly or indirectly, differentiate between various 
situations and undertakings and fall within the scrutiny of the tax and State aid 
provisions of the EC Treaty. 486 As regards tax rules, reference should be made to 
Article 90 EC. This provision prohibits discrimination with respect to internal 
taxation between imported and `similar' domestic products. It further prohibits the 
imposition on imports of `any taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect 
4" The premiss is that, inasmuch as they are not internalised in production costs, environmental costs 
represent a so-called 'negative externality', that is a loss to society (and not to its producer). The 'polluter 
pays' principle aims to tackle this market failure by requiring that the producer of the damage should also bear 
its costs. The important role played by the 'polluter pays' principle in EC State aid law is explored b) 
Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Case C-126/01 GEMO, paragraphs 66 to 7 7. 
"5 Ibid, paragraph 69. 
See, generally, Van Calster (2000); Facenna (2004). 
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protection to other products'. The reader has certainly noted the striking similarity 
of this provision with Article 111: 2 GATT, which admittedly constituted its model. 
It has also been seen that the debate of the role of objectives at the level of the 
prohibition of Article III GATT is very lively. 
In the EC, it is worth mentioning the important Outokumpu decision 487 where the 
question was whether differential tax rates between domestic and imported 
electricity which, overall, were disadvantageous toward the latter could be justified 
by an environmental objective. Adopting a strict approach, the Court denied that 
this kind of justification be advanced at the level of Article 90 EC. 
In State aid law the issue is whether the measure at issue provides for a derogation 
from the general scheme of the tax. As with respect to Article 90 EC, the important 
question here is whether any differential treatment can in fact be find a justification 
in the environmental logic of the tax. 
The fundamental issue becomes whether the environmental objective of the tax is 
sufficient to define its general nature. The starting point of the analysis has already 
been expressed previously. 
Renner-Loquenz (2003: 24) has rightly observed that energy taxes differ from the 
majority of other taxes because they have a clear objective other than raising revenue. As 
seen, this is an incentive/disincentive effect with respect to the environmental 
impact of a given activity. This lack of ambiguity with respect to the objectives 
pursued should make the reference to the 'logic of the system' justification easier 
and at the same time reduce the possibilities of abusing it. 
Precious guidance can be offered by the polluter pays principle cited above. 
The justification should be acknowledged for those tax measures that, in line with that 
principle, aim at internalising environmental costs and accordingly induce a certain 
environmentally-friendly conduct on the targeted undertakings. A tax shaped in this 
way seems also to be consistent with the principles of precaution, prevention and of 
rectification of environmental damage at source. 
«' Case C-231/96. 
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By contrast, other differential taxes does not seem to be in line with the environmental 
objectives of the tax but rather to run against them. Tax concessions inserted within 
the environmental tax and based on economic or financial considerations seem to 
be external to the inherent logic of the tax. It is for example common to provide 
relief for, respectively, energy-intensive industries or undertakings using or 
producing recycled material. This is motivated by the fact that the normal 
application of the environmental tax to the relevant undertakings would be financially 
too burdensome. 
Bacon (1997: 308) asked whether this relief should be regarded as not constituting 
aid in the first place, on the ground of the disproportionate costs borne by these 
industries as a consequence of the considerable use of energy and production of 
waste required by their production processes. The writer is not persuaded. This 
measure clearly constitutes a derogation from the general logic of the environmental 
tax since it is at odd with the 'polluter pays' principle and its disincentive effect. It 
therefore confers an advantage and, if all the other conditions of Article 87(1) EC 
are fulfilled, should be regarded as an aid, although it may be eligible for exemption 
under Article 87(3) EC. 
It is in this light that the two recent decisions of the Court in Adria-Wien and 
MINAS (cited above) should be read. A differential treatment justified by the 
environmental objective of the tax should in principle be regarded as pertaining to 
the logic of the tax. What is however always necessary is to subject the measure to a 
close scrutiny to ascertain the necessity and proportionality towards the stated 
objective. A good example of this exercise is the MINAS decision. 
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Regulatory measures 
This paragraph should begin by recalling the main finding of the previous chapter. 
Although many regulatory measures are potentially covered by Article 87(l) EC, 
under the current state of law many of aren't. The writer has however argued that 
the net should be cast wider. This justifies a brief exposition of the working of the 
advantage analysis of regulation. 
Generally speaking, this closely follows that carried out with fiscal measures. It 
should however be immediately anticipated that in many cases the judgment cannot 
be so neat. It is not fully clear whether the conduct should be classed as economic 
or not, and which test should thus apply. 
That said, the normal test for regulation is whether the measure at issue favourably 
derogates from the general regime or rule otherwise applicable by 'lowering' the 
degree of regulation in the relevant case. Three cases are examined in detailed in the 
next brief sub-paragraphs, those concerning the (de)regulation of employment, 
environment and debt. 
Deregulation of employment and environmental standards 
If the departure from the normal application of the regulation of the employment 
relationship involves a decrease of the level of contractual or legal protection for 
employees, this form of 'deregulation' necessarily confers an advantage for the 
relevant employers in terms of lower labour costs. 
In the Sloman Neptun case the partial non-application of German law to foreign 
crews of vessels flying the German flag but enrolled with an international register 
meant that the ordinary collective agreement, with its pay and social security level, 
did not apply to the relevant employment relationships. The Court found that this 
measure did not constitute a grant of aid to the ship owners. 
Irrespective of whether this form of public intervention should be caught by the 
rules, the measure at issue did derogate from the normal rule of German 
employment law and thus conferred an advantage to the relevant ship owners. That 
was the stated intention of the legislator, ie to provide the undertakings concerned 
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with a lower pay and social contributions burden. Albeit with an ambiguous 
language, this was also recognised by the Court (see paragraph 21). 
What is interesting to ask at the level of the advantage analysis is whether this 
differential treatment could in fact be justified by the logic of the measure. 
In this regard, the most interesting argument was put forward by Advocate General 
Darmon who opined that the measure at issue did not derogate from the system but 
'set the limits' to the application of German Law, enabling in particular individuals 
faced with an 'extraneous factor' (the seafarers were non-resident) to choose the law 
applicable to agreements between them. An extensive comparison of the laws of 
other Member States was carried out to support this conclusion (cf paragraphs 86 to 
96 of the Opinion). As Bacon (1997: 315-316) rightly observes, however, this 
exercise may be useful only in part since the benchmark of the derogation test - the 
general rule - should be found in the laws of the Member at issue. Upon closer 
scrutiny of German law, the measure at issue did represent a derogation from what 
would have applied otherwise. Quite simply, the international register was not a 
general system since it did not apply to all ship owners. Further, it is questionable 
that the fact that a differentiated protection be provided for workers on ships 
included in these register is a universal phenomenon. 488 
Similar observations should be made for the Kirsammer Hack case where the 
exclusion of small businesses from a legal regime requiring payment of 
compensation in the event of unfair dismissals was not considered an aid to the 
businesses concerned. As seen in chapter 2, this finding is based on arguments 
remarkably similar to those underlying the Sloman Neptun decision. 
If we now concentrate on the advantage analysis it seems clear that the non- 
application of the normal rules on liability for unfair dismissal relieved the 
employers concerned of one cost normally borne by SMEs. What is interesting is to 
consider the justification for this derogation that the Court seems to have hinted at 
when it referred to the aim 'to avoid imposing on those businesses financial 
constraints that might hinder their development'. Advocate General Darmon 
heavily relied on this aspect, and in particular on the other characteristics of 
`8 See Bacon (1997: 316) 
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employment relationships within SMEs (such as their personal character and the 
'material impossibility of being able to offer the worker another post within the 
same structure'), to expressly justify this measure on the basis of the logic of the tax 
system. `+s9 
Arguably however both the Court and the Advocate General got it wrong, at least 
with respect to the 'SME' argument. 
The argument of the Advocate General seem to be beside the point. What was at 
issue in the case was not a provision concerning reinstatement into the workplace but 
rather providing compensation in the event of unlawful dismissal. Although more in 
line with the rationale of the measure at issue, the Court's argument, tries to prove 
too much. The measure at issue should be considered as a derogation from the 
normal law of remedies for unfair dismissal. The special problems of SMEs which 
would justify a limitation (or, indeed, exclusion) of compensation should not be 
considered at the level of the definition of aid and, in particular, of the advantage 
analysis, but a later stage. It is indeed known that due to the particular problems 
they face, and the important role played in the economy, SMEs enjoy a special 
treatment when the compatibility with the common market of aid measures 
benefiting them is under scrutiny under Article 87(3)(c) EC. 
Similar remarks could be made with other cases of employment de-regulation such 
as Vircido where the Court found that the departure from the ordinary rule 
concerning the open duration of employment contracts, which enabled the Italian 
Post Office to recruit personnel on a fixed-term basis, did not constitute a State aid. 
Leaving aside the 'cost to government' argument, which has already been examined 
in the previous chapter, and concentrating on the advantage analysis, the measure 
clearly deviated from the ordinary rule and guaranteed to the Post Office a higher 
level of flexibility. 
All the cases of 'employment de-regulation' examined above do confer an advantage 
to the undertakings concerned since they undoubtedly derogate from the applicable 
general rule. Importantly, the examination of the arguments based on the logic of 
the system shows how this justification is difficult to apply. 
' Cf paragraphs 64 to 67. 
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For the same reasons indicated with respect to tax measures, the exclusion of these 
measures from Article 87(1) EC seems to disrupt the proper application of State aid 
rules falling into the 'trap of conflation'. 
Should they be covered by State aid law, similar considerations apply to the 
measures of deregulation of environmental standards. 
Undertakings are subject to the various laws and regulation that in each jurisdiction 
fix certain environmental standards for carrying out certain activities. For example, 
a certain conduct, such as the adoption of technologies or equipments, may be 
required in order to lower, or indeed exclude, the emissions of polluting substances 
into the environment. 
Environmental costs belong to the costs normally included in the budget of 
undertakings but the compliance with these regulations is sometimes costly. The 
government may therefore decide to improve the competitive position of these 
undertakings by 'de-regulating' these standard. Now, inasmuch as this deregulation 
amounts to a derogation from or exception to the general rule, the conclusion is 
that there is an advantage. 
In the previous part of the analysis it has been seen that, economic and financial 
considerations concerning the financial burden of compliance with regulations, 
should not be considered as an appropriate justification based on the logic of the 
measure but rather an external objective. 
The regulation of debt 
With the expression `regulation of debt' the writer refers to all those forms of 
regulation that affect the liability of an undertaking for its debts. 
Before briefly examining some examples, two general remarks can immediately be 
made. 
First, in general, the approach adopted by the Court with respect to these measures 
seems to show less deference towards Member States' prerogatives as compared to 
that concerning the cases of 'social de-regulation' analysed above. 
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Secondly, this is a grey area of the law from the point of view of the advantage 
analysis where we see an interesting conceptual interplay between what is non- 
economic and what is economic, and hence between what seems to be subject to a 
normative derogation test and what is subject to a market test. 
Three main examples of forms of regulation of debt can be found from the case- 
law. First, we have special bankruptcy and insolvency rules that exempt certain 
undertakings from the ordinary regime. Secondly, there may be rules that provide 
an explicit guarantee or coverage of losses by the State, either unconditional or 
depending on certain circumstances (such as the acquisition by the State of a 
holding in a company which entails, in certain cases, unlimited liability). Thirdly, 
the conduct of the government as public creditor when its debtor is in default in 
the payment of taxes or social contributions. 
Commencing from the first case, it seems clear, from the advantage analysis 
perspective, that rules that exempt certain undertakings from the ordinary 
bankruptcy and insolvency regime should normally be held to constitute a 
derogation. In its 1999 Notice on Guarantees, the Commission regards these 
measures as aid in the form of a guarantee (see paragraph 2.1.3). 
The two main authorities in this field are Ecotrade and Piaggio where the Court held 
that, on condition that it entailed an additional burden for public authorities, 490 the 
application to large undertakings in difficulties of a system derogating from the 
rules of ordinary law relating to insolvency (and providing in particular the absolute 
prohibition of individual actions for enforcement and the suspension of interest on 
all debts owed by the undertakings in question, and the correlated reduction in 
creditors' profits) could be regarded as a State aid. 491 
The second category of forms of regulation of debt is more complex for its 
ambiguity. This mainly depends on two reasons, partly intertwined, the 
determination of the appropriate benchmark - normative or market - and the fact 
that in many cases what are at issues are general rules which are applicable also to 
private agents. 
'90 See, however, chapter 2 above for the serious ambiguity on the point - arguably a Freudian slip - of the 
conclusion and operative part of the relevant decisions. 
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With respect to those rules that provide an explicit guarantee or coverage of losses 
by the State, reference should be made to the German system of guarantees to 
publicly owned banks which ensured an open-ended guarantee against their 
liabilities and thereby afforded them cheaper funding. 492 After a lengthy, 
negotiation with the Commission, which regarded these measures as a guarantee, 493 
the German government agreed to phase out the system. 494 
Interestingly, it seems that the benchmark applicable to both the `maintenance' 
obligation (which obliges the supporting entity to guarantee the stable economic 
basis of the bank) and `guarantee' obligation (which obliges the supporting entity to 
guarantee the claims of creditors of the bank) is a market one. 495 
In any event, with a language which echoes a possible justification on the basis of 
the logic of the German (public) corporate system, Schneider (2001: 371) has argued 
that `financing and liability rules are a structural element of the law of public 
corporations' with the result that the said obligations should not be regarded as aid. 
As regards to the second case, when the acquisition by the State of a holding in a 
company entails, in certain cases, unlimited liability, it is necessary to mention the 
IOR and EFIM decisions of the Commission. The provision at issue was Article 
2362 of the Italian Civil Code which provides that, in case of insolvency of a limited 
company, the benefit of limited liability is lost for those debts incurred when there 
was only one shareholder (that shareholder being thus liable for all the company's 
debts during his sole control). According to the Commission, when that 
shareholder is a public authority this unlimited liability is in effect a guarantee. 496 
This case is paradigmatic to show the ambiguity explained above. On the one 
hand, this is a general provision of company law applicable to any company and to 
any shareholder. On the other hand, the Commission thought that a public 
investor cannot shelter itself behind this provision and its apparent inevitability. 
X91 For a commentary on the so called `Prodi law', and its subsequent amendments to make in EC law 
compliant, see Roberti (1999); Conte (1999); Cirenei (1999). 
X92 A very good discussion on the complex legal problems raised by these German guarantees can be found in 
Ehlermann and Everson (2001: 177 et seq). 
03 See 1999 Notice on Guarantees, paragraph 2.1.3. 
494 See Thirty-First Report on Competition Law (2001: 108 and 110). 
495 See Koenig (2001: 242,244-245). 
4A discussion on the problems raised by Article 2362 of the Italian Civil code is present in various papers 
of the second part of Ehlermann and Everson (2001). See, in particular, Roberti (1999). 
299 
What should be considered is whether, on the circumstances of the case, a private 
investor would have reached the insolvency stage or rather, in the knowledge of its 
possible unlimited liability, would have taken alternative steps, such as filing 
liquidation. The fact remains that the presence of this rule, when applied to a 
public shareholder, might have distorted the functioning of the capital market by 
increasing the rating of the borrower. 
Despite the sweeping statements in the 1993 EFIM Notice, and also in the 1993 
Communication on Public Undertakings (paragraphs 24 and 38.2) and in the 1999 
Notice on Guarantees (paragraph 2.1.3), reading the two Commission original 
decisions the impression is however that the real problem is not with the general 
provision of the civil code, but rather, and more appropriately, with the overall 
conduct taken by the public shareholder under the cover of that provision. 
Finally, we can approach the third example of regulation of debt which occurs 
when the conduct of the government as public creditor when its debtor is in default 
in the payment of taxes or social contributions. It seems that these cases too escape 
from the `non-market' area since they are consistently assessed on the basis of 
market criteria. The test is not that of private investor but rather that of a public 
creditor which, as has been explained previously, aims at recovering its credit. This 
distinction, which has been laid down first by Advocate General La Pergola in the 
Tubacex case, 497 has recently been reformulated in a clear fashion by Advocate 
General Maduro in the Grupo de Empresas Alvarez case. 498 
The conduct of a diligent creditor has been analysed in various cases, where the 
various courses of conduct of the public authority - and its possible alternatives - 
have been subject to close scrutiny. 499 The fact that the debt is public since it 
concerns tax and social contributions arrears does not seem to be relevant. The 
principle seems undisputed. Once the public law relationship has arisen, the public 
authority is on a par of a private creditor in similar circumstances. It should 
therefore be tested accordingly. 
497 C-342/96. 
498 C-276/00. 
4" See, eg, C-342/96 Tubaax, C-480/98 Magefesa; C-256/97 DMT; C-276/02 Grupo de Emprrrar Alvan 
T- 
36/99 La#xg. In the literature see Atanasiu (2005); Nicolaides and Kekelekis (2005); Criscuolo (1999). 
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Like in the previous example on Article 2362 of the Italian Civil Code, it seems 
however that, normally, the focus is not a given piece of legislation but rather the 
exercise of the conduct by the public authority. Thus, the Commission observed in 
Magefesa that what was at issue in the case was not the Spanish legislation but `rather 
the systematic non-payment of certain debts'. 500 
However it is, this is another nice example of expansion of the market logic to an 
area of public activity. 
Public goods 
This paragraph merely sums up the previous findings on the problem of definition 
of public goods in the context of the advantage analysis, and refer the reader to the 
relevant analysis. 
The first important finding is that public goods are quite rare. Consequently, the 
relevant conduct of the public authority should normally be regarded as economic 
and tested against economic criteria. It is only in those cases where the provision 
of the good or service at issue should be considered to constitute a true public good 
that the conduct would be qualified as non-economic and the derogation test would 
apply. The analysis made previously in the context of WTO law is fully 
transposable here too. 
S0° C-480/98, Paragraph 14. 
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3. Bringing WTO law and EC law together 
This section on non-economic activity and normative benchmarks has seen a great 
degree of convergence between the two systems. 
We can briefly sum up the main findings. 
First, it may be difficult to determine whether the conduct at issue is economic or 
non-economic. There is a probably inevitable grey area (see the `public goods' 
issue) where it is not clear whether the conduct is inherently public and could, even 
hypothetically, be carried out by the private sector. This lack of clarity leads to the 
ambiguity of the test - economic or normative - to actually use in the advantage 
analysis. 
Secondly, mainly as a direct and indirect consequence of the current 
liberalization/privatization trend, we see an expansion of market logic. Many 
areas which were traditionally considered public reserves are more and more open 
to the private, the market and its logic. Again, the example of infrastructure and 
public goods has been significant. But, probably, also the analysis of certain forms 
of so-called regulatory conduct have raised this point. 
Thirdly, with respect to the application of the derogation test, the intersection 
between the two systems in terms of language and substance has been remarkable. 
Whereas the identification of the actual test for non-economic activity, as the US - 
FSC dispute shows, is more accentuated in WTO law than in EC law, the 
subsequent difficulties in determining what is a general rule and what is an 
exception is a recurring theme. 
Fourthly, the role of objectives to determine whether a differential treatment is in 
fact an exception has also proved to be an important issue (common in the EC, and, 
it can be predicted, soon common in the WTO). In this regard, the topic of the role 
played by the objectives of the measure shows that in both systems there is an 
irresistible force of attraction between scope and justification. In other words, it 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish between what is covered by the discipline on 
the one hand and what is justified by the latter on the other. It has been argued, 
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however, that under both systems there are good - conceptual and practical - 
reasons for keeping the two levels separate. 
In the coda of the chapter we analyse a case which intriguingly raise the question of 
whether we are assisting a conflation of scope and justification. The status under 
State aid law of public service financing has been very topical for a while. Again, it 
can be predicted that it has the potential of becoming so also in the WTO. 
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V. Case Study on the Financing of Public Services: Quasi-Market 
Transaction or Disadvantage Compensation? 
The examination of one of the most important themes of this chapter - the role of 
public policy objectives in the advantage analysis - may result in an interesting coda, 
ie a brief case study on the impact of State aid and subsidy rules on the financing of 
public services. One further reason for putting it at the end of the chapter is that it 
may concern both market and non-market conduct of public entities. 
1. Public services: their mission, their problem, their relationship 
with State aid/subsidy rules 
The provision to all citizens of certain services that present an element of general or 
public interest is one of the main duties of the Welfare State. 501 
This is expressly and emphatically recognised in EC law, for example in Article 16 
EC, which is placed among the `Principles' of the EC Treaty and recognises that 
`services of general economic interest' belong to the `shared values of the Union' 
and fulfil an important role in `promoting social and territorial cohesion'. This 
special status is confirmed also in the would-be Constitution for Europe, currently 
under ratification process in the various Member States. 502 
The protection of public services is also becoming a topical issue at the international level, 
as it is currently demonstrated by the heated debate surrounding the impact of the 
international law, particularly the GATS, on their regulation at the domestic level. 503 
Concerns are voiced from various quarters about the interference of international 
trade law, and in particular its push towards liberalization, with the safeguard of 
domestic prerogatives in regulating public services, and, more generally, the need to 
maintain certain standards of protection. Borrowing from the title of a recent 
S' See generally Szyszczak (2001); Krajewski (2003a). 
-'02 See, eg, Articles 11-96 and 111-122. 
S03 See, for example, Krajewski (2003a) where there are ample references. See also Adlung (2006); Benitah 
(2005); Costamagna (2005); Krajewski (2004); Munari (2004); Sinclair and Grieshaber-Otto (2002). To fully 
comprehend the importance of the debate, it is also useful to look at official documents. See, eg, OECD 
(2001b), WTO (2001), WTO and WHO (2002); CIN HR Commissioner (2002); UNCTAD (2(N)5) 
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much-acclaimed essay of the Nobel laureate Professor Stiglitz, this discussion is part 
of the wider debate on `globalization and its discontents'. 504 
Having said that, the supply of public services is affected by an inherent economic 
problem. Their performance, particularly if certain standards of quality and 
accessibility have to be maintained (which, in the EC jargon, are summed up in the 
concept of `universal service'), may not be viable from a financial perspective 
because of the d culty of covering the relevant costs. 505 In other words, private actors 
may find it unprofitable to invest in these services, or at least to provide them at 
certain, required conditions. The intervention of the government to financially 
support the provision of these services may thus be needed, and it often (although 
not always) takes the shape of direct subsidisation to the suppliers. 506 
The interesting question, which has expressly come out in the EC and has recently 
raised a hot debate, is whether the financing of public services (which is clearly 
motivated by a public policy objective) should be regarded as a State aid, which 
could be justified by the specific provision of the EC Treaty dealing with the 
performance of services of general economic interest (ie Article 86(2) EC), or 
whether, more radically, if certain conditions - mainly of transparency, proportionality 
and fciency - are fulfilled, it should not be held to be a State aid in the first place. 
This is the issue that we will deal in the first part, focussing on the recent decision of 
the Court of Justice in Altmark, and, in particular, on its impact on the distinction 
between advantage analysis and public policy objectives assessment that we have sketched 
above. 
Although, in the WTO, the law of subsidies with respect to services is not as 
developed as that concerning goods, it is natural - not only from an academic but 
also from a more practical perspective - to enquire whether a similar issue can be 
envisaged in the context of GATS too. We will in particular analyse whether, as the 
law now stands, and in the context of the current Doha Round negotiations under 
Stiglitz (2002). Political correctness requires citing the response to this book which came in Bhagw"ati 
(2004). Interestingly, both academics teach at Columbia University, N V. 
5Q5 See Nicolaides (2003a) page 188. 
There are indeed various methods of financing public services (such as direct subsidies, grant of exclusive 
rights, consumer vouchers) which may be chosen by governments on the basis of the different economic and 
managerial impact, in particular in terms of costs and incentives, they wish to produce. 
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Article XV GATS, some inspiration can be drawn from the EC discussion and 
settlement 
2. The financing of public services under EC State aid rules: the 
Altmark decision 
The stakes and the clash 
As we have anticipated, a lively debated has recently sparked off in the EC on 
whether support given by the State to enable undertakings entrusted with services of 
general economic interest (SGEIs or, more simply, public services) to discharge 
their public service obligations (PSOs) should be considered as State aid. The crux 
of the matter is the risk that, far from merely compensating the costs of PSOs, the 
recipient undertaking may redirect the resources intended to finance the SGEIs to 
support other activities open to competition. This was the economic concern. At the 
political and legal levels, the worries were represented by the risk of excluding a whole 
set of potentially troublesome measures of support from the scrutiny of the Commission 
on the one side and from substantially conflating the - admittedly separate - issues 
of scope and justification thus emptying the bifurcated system of rules provided for by 
the EC Treaty (Article 87(1) versus Article 86(2)). 
These questions have produced a jurisprudential clash between the Community 
Courts and also between Advocate Generals -a true clash of the Titans -, and also 
a wide discussion at the political level. 
For their significance for the current analysis, we will mainly concentrate on the two 
that are more recent Ferrirsg and Altmark cases, and in particular on the findings 
relevant to the issue of the role of public policy objectives in the advantage analysis. 
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The Petting and Altmark decisions S°' 
Two main approaches (compensation approach and State aid approach) have traditionally 
been adopted when analysing the classification of financial compensation of SGEIs 
under State aid law. 
The compensation approach considers that financial assistance that merely compensates 
a PSO does not constitute a State aid. The underlying concept is that that financial 
compensation is a mere contropartie for the public service rendered to the extent that 
it matches the extra costs incurred by the operation of the SGEI. -508 Under the State 
aid approach the financial compensation of a PSO is always considered as a State aid 
in the first place which can then be justified under Article 86(2) EC. 509 
The Court of Justice was called to decide on the issue in Ferring. 510 This case dealt 
with tax concessions granted to wholesale distributors of medicines. These tax 
exemptions were made because of the specific public obligations that distributors 
had to bear (stocking at all times a quantity of medicines sufficient to satisfy the 
needs of regular customers and to deliver within a 24 hour period any medicines 
required to any location in their distribution area). The Court found that this 
exemption could be regarded as compensation for the services thus not constituting 
State aid. In that case, Advocate General Tizzano noted: 
the fact that such measures do not confer any real advantage on an undertaking 
entrusted with a service of general interest and therefore are not likely to alter the 
conditions of competition appears a decisive argument to me. ... 
In other words, 
the imposition of the obligation and the provision of compensation cannot be considered as 
separate matters as they are two sides of the same public measure which is intended, as 
a whole, to guarantee that public interests of primary importance are satisfied'. 511 
Thus, these measures did not confer `any advantage' and hence could not distort 
competition the compensation intended to offset the additional costs of the PSO 
was not a State aid. 
507 This paragraph and the next one partly draws on research already published in Biondi and Rubini 
(205). 
The relevant parts are the result of the personal research of the writer. 
S08 See Case 240/83 ADBHU. This approach has been followed by the Commission's subsequent practice. 
This has been followed by the CFI in Case T-106/95 FFSA and Case T-46/97 SIC. 
510 Case C-53/00 Ferrixg. 
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The Ferring decision has been subject to some criticism. The official critique came 
from the Advocate General in Altmark, a case that concerned the granting of 
licences to operate regular bus services through public subsidies. 
In his two Opinions, Advocate General Leger strongly criticised Ferrrng, arguing that 
it was liable to undermine the structure and logic of the Treaty provisions in respect 
of State aid, and reaffirmed the State aid approach. 512 He put for ward various 
arguments. 
First, State aid must not be defined on the basis of its aims but of its effects. It is an 
objective concept which focuses on a notion of 'net' (in contrast to 'gross') aid. 
What matters under Article 87(1) EC is whether the measure at issue is capable of 
conferring a selective advantage that distorts competition and affects intra- 
Community trade. The compensation approach confuses two distinct legal issues, 
the classification of the measure as State aid and its possible justification. 
Secondly, Article 86(2) would be deprived of any meaningful role in the field of 
State aid. If compensation would not constitute aid, over-compensation, as was 
expressly recognised by the Court under Ferring, could not be justified under Article 
86(2) because it would not be proportionate. 
Finally, as a result of the compensation approach, the surveillance role of the 
Commission in controlling measures financing public services would be diminished. 
Advocate General Jacobs expressed his view in this debate in GEMO. 513 In his 
Opinion, on the issue of whether the public financing of animal carcass disposal 
undertakings constituted aid, he presented what has been dubbed as the 'quid pro quo 
approach', or also 'differentiated compensation approach'. 514 
The Court should distinguish between two types of situations. Where there is a 
direct and manifest link between the State financing and clearly defined PSOs (such 
as a public tender procedure), the sums paid by the State would not constitute State 
aid under Article 87(1) EC. In his view, the financing would represent a mere 
Paragraphs 60 and 61 of the Opinion (emphasis added). 
Sie First Opinion delivered by Advocate General Leger on 19 March 2002 in Case C-280/00 Altmark. Cf also 
the second Opinion, delivered on 14 January 2003 as a consequence of the Fining decision and the Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-126/01 GEMO. 
s'3 Case C-126/01. 
S14 Cf Nicolaides (2003a) page 196. 
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contropartie of the PSO, almost as if the government were paying for the public 
service. Where by contrast there is no such direct and manifest link or the PSOs are 
not clearly defined, the sums paid by the public authorities would constitute aid. 515 
The Court passed its decision in Altmark on 24th July 2003.516 The question 
referred to the Court was whether subsidies granted by Germany to an undertaking 
in order to operate a regular bus service in a specific region had to be considered aid 
or merely a compensation for the services offered. 
The Court held that such compensation did not confer an advantage for the 
undertaking concerned and therefore could not be considered State aid. In 
particular, no advantage could be established where a State financial measure must 
be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient undertakings 
in order to discharge public service obligations. 
However, so that such compensation does not provide any advantage, it should 
satisfy four conditions. First, the recipient company must have actual public service 
obligations to discharge and those obligations must be clearly defined. Secondly, 
the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. Thirdly, the 
compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs 
incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the 
relevant revenue and a reasonable profit. Fourthly, and finally, when the company 
is not chosen through a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation 
must be determined in relation to an analysis of the costs that a typical company in 
the sector would incur (taking into account its revenues and a reasonable profit for 
the discharging of the obligations). 
The scholarship has generally welcomed Altmark. 517 This decision can be regarded 
as a desirable fine-tuning of Ferring on the basis of some of the arguments that 
emerged in the debate that followed the latter decision. 
sis Along the same lines see Advocate General Stix-Hackt in Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Eniriforre. 
516 Cf note 512 above. 
sn Biondi and Rubini (2005); Szyszszak (2004); Biondi (2004); Nicolaides (2003b); Thouvenin and 
Lorneux 
(2003). Cf also the 2004 Commission Staff Working Paper - Report on the public consultation on the 
Green 
Paper on Services of General Interest. For a recent application of Astmark by the Court see 
Case C-451 /03 
Comm rca/icti, paragraphs 54 et seq., where, however, the Court was able to find that only the 
first two 
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It seems indeed that the Court, in adhering to the compensation approach, has been 
particularly receptive of the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in GEI MO and its 
differentiated compensation approach based on the dividing criterion of the direct 
and manifest link between financing and clearly defined public service obligations. 
More fundamentally, however, the four conditions of Altmark represent a rather 
successful transplant, after the necessary adjustments, of the main requirements of 
Article 86(2). 518 That is evident with respect to the entrustment of particular tasks 
of public service obligation, but is also true with regard to the concepts of necessity 
and proportionality and the underlying idea that distortions are to be kept to the 
minimum possible. 
The Altmark conditions clarify Ferring by ensuring i) the adoption of a transparent 
process ii) to compensate only those costs that are necessary to execute the SGEI. 
In this regard, apart from the requirement that compensation be linked to an explicit 
PSO and does not exceed the latter's cost (paragraphs 89 and 92), two new 
important conditions have been introduced. First, at paragraphs 90 and 91, that the 
parameters on which the compensation is calculated must be established 
'beforehand in an objective and transparent manner'. Significantly, the 
determination of the compensation ex ante should prevent operators from passing all 
of their commercial risk to the State and avoid ex post rescue of inefficient 
undertakings. Secondly, that in any event compensation is not supposed to cover 
any cost claimed to be 'extra' or 'additional' but only those costs that satisfy 
objective, market-based benchmarks and are determined after certain procedures 
(see paragraph 93). As Nicolaides (2003a) noted, this is an important recognition 
that the cost of SGEI cannot be determined if the costs of other potential providers 
are not considered. 
It has indeed been argued that the main finding of Ferring, whereby mere 
compensation of the `additional costs actually incurred' by undertakings entrusted 
with SGEIs is not State aid, far from restoring the level playing field would end up 
conditions were satisfied, leaving the assessment of the remaining two to the national court. 
sie This tendency is not new. See, for instance, Case C-387/92 Bairn Exterior de Espana, paragraph 21 where 
the Court refers to the possibility that an aid is 'capable of falling outside the scope of application of Article 
[87] by virtue of Article [86(2)] of the Treaty' (emphasis added). See also Case T-106/95 FFSA paragraph 
16. 
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strengthening anti-competitive advantages. Nicolaides, S19 in particular, highlighted 
that the Ferring decision did not clearly require the necessity and the suficiency of the 
compensation. 
The proposed solution to these two problems was to auction the obligation to 
provide the relevant services. 520 By creating a market to obtain the services in 
question, the public authorities would succeed in not favouring any firm and in 
keeping the subsidy to the minimum necessary. 521 The idea that an open and fair 
tendering procedure would exclude the existence of any advantage and hence of a 
State aid is not new. 522 
The Court has taken account of these arguments. The most significant 
advancement in Altmark is that only the compensation of those costs that are 
necessary to discharge the public service do not constitute State aid. To determine the 
right amount of financing, the Court clearly indicated its preference for public 
procurement procedure. Possibly considering the argument that it would be 
disproportionate to require them, 523 it however stopped short of imposing them and 
put forward an alternative benchmark. 
The interplay between scope and justification: separation or conflation? 
One of the main critiques of Advocate General Leger towards Ferring was that it did 
not distinguish between the characterisation of a measure as State aid on the one 
519 See id (2002a), (2002b), (2003a), (2003b). 
520 Nicolaides (2002a: 195 et seq. ) 
Set The creation of competitive pnrrure on public undertakings is not new in the case law. Two examples come 
immediately to the mind. On the one hand, the Article 86 case-law which put pressures on monopolists that 
are not manifestly able to provide a service (see, eg, Case C-41/90 Höfner) or the case-law which puts the 
necessity of the breadth of the monopoly itself into question (see, eg, Case C-320/91 Corbeaa). Another 
example comes from the internal market, and notably from the `healthcare services' cases (Cases C-157/99 
Smits and Peerbooms, C-368/98 i'anbraekel, C-385/99 Müller-Faun). For a similar reading of these internal 
market cases, which underlines the competitive pressure caused by the Court's decisions, see Biondi (2004). 
su See, for example, Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-126/01 GEMO, paragraphs 119 and 129 of the 
Opinion. Se also the Commission Non-Paper on Services of General Economic Interrst and State Aid (12 November 
2002), paragraphs 84 to 89. For a thorough analysis of the interplay between public procurement procedures 
and State aid see the very recent work of Bovis (2005). 
S23 See Advocate General Stix-Hackt in Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enririsorse, paragraph 157; see also 
the second Opinion of Advocate General Leger in Case C-280/00 Altmark, paragraph 9'. 
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hand and its justification on the other. With another expression, the compensation 
approach would conflate the separate issues of scope and justification. 
It is argued that this is not the case. Provided that the compensation satisfies the 
conditions laid down in Almark, these cases very much resemble purchases where 
the compensation is a mere contropartie of the PSOs. It is as if the government is 
paying for the public service. 
Advocate General Tizzano in Ferring already hinted at this logic when he noted that 
the PSO and the compensation 
cannot be considered as separate matters as they are two sides of the same public 
measure. 524 
It was Advocate General Jacobs, however, that drew an express parallel between 
public service compensation and a purchase transaction. He observed that a comparison 
should be drawn to the situation where a State buys something and pays the price. 
It seems indeed immaterial that the service is not provided to the State but to the 
collectivity. According to Jacobs 
the same global analysis must prevail where the link between State funding and 
the clearly defined general interest obligations imposed is so direct and manifest 
that financing and obligation must be regarded as a single measure. 
525 
Consequently, there will be aid only if, and only as far as, the price paid exceeds the 
market price. 
Following the thread of this reasoning, we might consider a compensation, which 
fulfils the conditions of transparency, proportionality and efficiency of Altmark, a 
quart-market transaction. As such, being comparable to an operation which is 
consistent with commercial considerations, it should not be regarded as constituting 
See paragraph 61 of the Opinion. 
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a State aid. It should be noted that to accommodate this conclusion to both 
possible courses of public conduct, be they economic or non-economic, financing 
public services, the language of `quasi market transaction has been used. 
Most crucially, contrary to Advocate General Leger's argument, there would be no 
intrusion of public policy objectives in the advantage analysis which would solely 
rest on an economic assessment aimed at getting the service done at the lower, ie most 
efficient, cost/price. 
Altmark cannot be said to conflate scope and justification but is rather in line with 
the often repeated finding whereby under State aid rules the measure at issue is 
mainly defined on the basis of its effects and not its causes or aims. 
The compensation of public services should thus be distinguished from the other 
measures that are aimed at compensating market failures and disadvantages. Whereas 
the former seems to largely depend on a purely technical assessment, where there is 
no significant role for the consideration of the public nature or aim of the measure, 
those cases involve socio-economic assessments which should be properly 
addressed i) under the separate provisions that in the system allows for 
justifications, and ii) by the Commission that bears legal and political responsibility 
for its decisions. 
Quite similarly, cases involving the compensation of the costs borne by 
undertakings entrusted with PSOs should be distinguished from those other cases 
where normal regulations of business introduced to meet various, even social or 
public, objectives (such as consumer, safety, health or environmental protection) 
impose extra-costs on undertakings. It seems indeed that, should governments 
decide to compensate these undertakings for these costs, the financial assistance 
would undoubtedly constitute a State aid, irrespective of its proportionality with the 
costs. The distinguishing element seems to he in the consideration that, whereas 
these costs are normally, borne by the undertakings operating in the relevant market, 
costs for discharging PSOs, which are specifically entrusted by Member States on 
S25 Case C-126/01 GEMO, paragraph 122 of the Opinion. 
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certain undertakings, do not present the same characteristics of normality, but - as 
seen - present a more marked quid pro quo nature. 
3. The financing of public services under WTO subsidy rules: the 
GATS 
Public services in an international context: between increasing 
concerns, diversity and official recognition 
It has been already anticipated that the issue of public services has come out 
prominently in the agenda of the world trading system in the recent years. 
Many concerns are raised about the possible - negative - impact that further 
liberalisation, which would allegedly be requested by the WTO rules (and notably 
the GATS), would have on the access to these services. The ultimate worries are 
undue interference with domestically, made societal choices and with standard lowering. 
Two important remarks are however necessary at this point. 
First, the more we leave a rather integrated and culturally quite coherent community 
such as the EC, the actual definition of what would constitute a public service, and 
even the perception of its essentiality, tend to inevitably blur. 526 Whereas in some 
societies, especially of the developed world, public services are considered as 
fundamental (in some cases, even inherent in the rights arising from the concept 
itself of citizenship), 527 in other countries, mainly in the developing part of the 
world, we do not have any concept or recognition of what, in other jurisdictions, are 
called public services. 
Secondly, this degree of diversity inevitably requires the use of basic concepts when 
defining public services and their contents. From a lawyer's perspective, the 
progressively diffused perception of the cruciality of these services and of the access 
thereto, which is evidently linked to the developing human rights discourse, is 
' Cf Munari (2004). 
See, eg, France. 
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embodied in many documents from international organizations which increasingly 
recognise the importance of public services and define minimum standards of protection. 528 
It is with these remarks in mind that the current debate on the safeguard of public 
services and the liberalisation of trade can be properly understood. We can now 
concentrate on the GATS and its current impact on public services, focussing, in 
particular, on the main issue of this section, that is the interplay between subsidy 
rules and financing of public services. 
The current state of the law (and the prospects for the future) 
It should immediately be said that the GATS may apply to public services. 
In particular, the interpretation of Article 1.3(b) ("`services' includes any service in 
any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority') and 
(c) ("`a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority' means any service 
which is supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or 
more service suppliers') seem to indicate that many services, particularly in those 
Member States where there has been or there currently is a liberalization process, 
are covered by the GATS. 529 The construction of the provision above, and in 
particular of the exception as it result from the combined reading of letter (b) and 
(c), according to the canons of the Vienna Convention, would lead to conclude that 
only those services that are not provided for profit (that is not `on a commercial 
basis') and are supplied from (public) monopolist (that is not `in competition with 
one or more service suppliers') would be excluded from the scope of application of 
the GATS. 
It is worth repeating a point that has been briefly hinted before. The fact of 
whether a certain service is subject to the GATS substantially depends on the degree 
of internal liberalization of the Member State at issue, that is on a general political choice 
of the latter (although, admittedly, this choice may not be completely autonomous 
but may well be influenced i) by prevailing general ideological and cultural trends and, 
S28 See, eg, OECD (2001b), WTO (2001), \\TO and WHO (2002); UN HR Commissioner (2002); UNCTAD 
(2005). 
S29 Krajewski (2003a: 347-359); id (2004: 106-107). 
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most importantly, ii) by political decisions made supranationally - such as is occurring in 
the EC - with the result that the ultimate decision of whether to liberalise or not a 
service would partly fall outside the control of the country at issue). 
Krajewski (2004: 107), one of the main experts of the topic, clearly expressed the 
interplay between domestic and international liberalisation decision when he 
underlined that `internal liberalisation can therefore generate and reinforce external 
liberalisation' (emphasis added). 
Before passing on to analyse the impact of the GATS subsidy provision on the 
financing of public services, it is important to underline the peculiar regulatory 
approach of the GATS. 530 
The GATS features two different categories of obligations. On the one hand, there 
are the general obligations and disciplines which apply to all Members and to any service 
subject to the Agreement (including that on Subsidies, Article XV). 531 On the other 
hand, there are other obligations, and in particular those on Market Access (Article 
XVI) and National Treatment (Article XVII), which concern specific commitments 
inasmuch as they apply only if, and within the limits which, the Member at issue has 
committed itself in its schedule. In absence thereof, that is if there are not specific 
commitments, the service under scrutiny shall not be subject to those specific 
obligations. 
This way of operation, which shows an inherent flexibility, is often summed with 
expressions such as `bottom-up approach' or `opting in'. 
All this makes all the more important the drafting of the specific commitments by 
Members. 532 The `bottom-up approach' highlights one important fact. that, 
although the content of the schedule's commitments will result from the bargaining 
exercise of the negotiating process (and the inherent pressures to liberalise), the 
53° For a specific treatise on the the GATS see Krajewski (2003b). A general outline of the Agreement can be 
found in the mainstream textbooks. See, for instance, Jackson (1997: 306 et seq); Lowenfeld (2003: Chapter 
6); Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis (2003: Chapter 11); Trebilcock & Howse (2005: Chapter 12). 
S31 Reference can, for example, be made to Article II (MFN principle), Article III (Transparency), Article 
VI 
(Domestic Regulation), Article VII (Recognition), Article VIII (Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers), 
Article XIII (Government Procurement), Article XI\' (General Exceptions) and, finally, as said, Article XV 
(Subsidies). 
532 The US - Ga rbkxg dispute has 
been a good reminder of this... See Krajewski (2005). 
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ultimate responsibility for the commitments towards liberalisation of that particular 
service lies with the Member that has accepted them. 533 
Having determined that the GATS may apply to certain public services, and 
explained its particular working, the analysis may now focus on the whether as issue 
similar to that debated in the context of the EC (does the compensation of public 
services constitute a State aid? ) can be envisaged with respect to the GATS 
provision on subsidies. In this regard, Article XV, which is among the `general 
obligations and disciplines', reads: 
Members recognize that, in certain circumstances, subsidies may have distortive 
effects on trade in services. Members shall enter into negotiations with a view to 
developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive 
effects [footnote on work programme omitted]. The negotiations shall also 
address the appropriateness of countervailing procedures. Such negotiations 
shall recognize the role of subsidies in relation to the development programmes 
of developing countries and take into account the needs of Members, particularly 
developing country Members, for flexibility in this area. For the purpose of such 
negotiations, Members shall exchange information concerning all subsidies 
related to trade in services that they provide to their domestic service suppliers. 
Any Member which considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy of another 
Member may request consultations with that Member on such matters. Such 
requests shall be accorded sympathetic consideration. 
Even a brief reading of this provision shows that the GATS does not feature any 
substantial discipline on subsidies. In the absence of any discipline, the issue of the 
d finitron of subsidy would become largely redundant. In this context, to ask whether 
a `compensation approach' similar to that adopted by the Court of Justice in 
Altmark with respect to the financing of public services may seem to be a bit 
speculative, if not pretentious. 534 
In the context of the specific commitments, a provision that already `bites' with 
respect to the issue of the financing of public services, is Article XVII. 
Suppose that a Member that has specifically committed the public service at issue to 
commitments, without any express `condition or limitation', grant a subsidy 
533 See Krajewski (2004: 113); Munari (2004: 1035). 
534 On national treatment and services see Mattoo (1997). 
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exclusively to domestic suppliers in order to discharge that public service. Does this 
amount to a breach of national treatment? If this is so, how should that Member 
accord a treatment `no less favourable that that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers'? Admittedly, it could fulfil its national treatment obligation in 
two ways: either by extending the subsidy to the foreign service supplier(s), or by 
ceasing to subsidize its domestic supplier(s). This example further demonstrates the 
importance of schedule commitments drafting. 
Two remarks can however be made with respect to posing the issue of the status of 
public service compensation in the context of subsidy rules, one concerning the current 
situation and one more focussed on future prospects. 
First, albeit rather soft, some sort of discipline is provided in the second paragraph 
which refers to the possibility of holding consultations in the event that one 
Member is adversely affected by a subsidy of another Member. Now, the necessary 
logical and practical premiss of this exercise is the definition of the concept of 
subsidy and it is in this regard that, as it has occurred in the EC, the issue of how to 
consider the compensation of public services obligations may arise. 
Further, the text of Article XV might arguably provide some support to the 
distinction we have made above between advantage analysis - merely resting on an 
economic assessment - on the one hand and the assessment of public policy objectives on 
the other, and thus open the way to an argument similar to the EC compensation 
approach. Reference is made to the separate mention to the distortive effects on trade 
on the one side and to the development programmes of developing countries and more 
in general to the needs for flexibility on the other. 
Secondly, if not in the spotlight now, the issue may gain relevance in the near future. 
Article XV refers to negotiations about the development of a more substantial 
regulation of subsidies in the service sectors, which are currently under way. 
Admittedly, they do not seem to have produced many results so far. 535 The WTO 
Trade Report released in July 2006 however reports that `several delegations have 
recently suggested that an acceptable approach [to subsidy discipline] might be to 
use the SCM Agreement definition of subsidies, appropriately, modified, as a 
535 See, eg, \X'all and Dunbar (2005: 11-14); Benitah (2005); %VrO (2006: 194-195). 
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working basis upon which to carry forward the negotiations'. 536 Other indications 
in this direction can be found in Wall and Dunbar (2005: 13). 
This reference to the SCM Agreement, which includes a fairly sophisticated 
definition of subsidies, cannot but be good news. The appropriate definition of subsidy 
is also crucial with respect to the legal status of the financing of public service 
obligations. Similarly, the issue of the interplay (in terms of separation or distinction) 
between scope and justification will result important as well, as it is partly indicated by 
the general guidelines that Article XV put to the attention of negotiators. 537 
S-16 WTO (2006: 195). 
s37 Benitah (2005: 21) reports that many WTO Members were of the view that `there is a need to exempt 
from general subsidy disciplines those subsidies that are necessary to achieve certain public policy objectives'. 
Three categories are indicated, namely economic development, environmental, and social 
development (the 




I. Scope of the Chapter 
We have seen in chapter 3 that it is an inherent, and crucial, feature of the definition 
of both State aids and subsidies that they should confer an advantage. 
Whereas in the next chapter we will see how this advantage may negatively alter the 
conditions of international competition and trade, or positively cope with market 
imperfections, this chapter ideally follows the previous one by focusing on the 
beneficiaries of the advantage. 
Among the various issues that may arise, we will in particular deal with two of them. 
The first issue is the identification of its beneficiaries, ie of the persons that should be 
regarded as benefiting from the financial assistance granted through the subsidy or 
aid. The subjective impact of the measure may be particularly wide and complex as 
the same measure may affect the economic and financial position of various 
persons. What matters for State aid and subsidy rules is to establish that an 
advantage is granted, directly or indirectly, to an undertaking. 
The second issue concentrates on the interpretation of the specificity or selectivity test 
which is present in both systems. Both EC State aid law and WTO subsidy law are 
only interested in measures that solely benefit 'certain' undertakings or sectors. 
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II. The identification of the beneficiaries 
1. Introduction 
This section examines the issue of the identification of the beneficiaries, ie the persons 
that benefit from the advantage granted through the subsidy or State aid. 
As in the previous chapter, the Canada - Aircraft dispute provides a useful starting 
point. The Appellate Body noted that 
a 'benefit' does not exist in the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by 
a beneficiary or a recipient. Logically, a "benefit" can be said to arise only if a 
person, natural or legal, or a group of persons, has in fact received something. The 
term 'benefit', therefore, implies that there must be a recipient. 538 
Thus, it is a 'person, natural or legal, or a group of persons' that will be the 
'beneficiary' or 'recipient' of the subsidy of State aid. Now, to produce a distortion 
the advantage needs to affect the business activity of the undertaking, ie the 
production of goods or services for consideration. 
The identification of the beneficiaries plays an important role at various levels. 
First, it plays a crucial role to determine whether the measure falls within the scope 
of application of State aid or subsidy rules since the beneficiary must be an 
enterprise or an undertaking. To put it simply, it must be engaged in an economic 
activity, ie in the provision of goods or services for consideration, and, quite often, 
in competition with other undertakings. If the measure benefited only employees or 
consumers, persons that are clearly not involved in any economic activity, there 
could be no State aid or subsidy. 
Secondly, the identification of the beneficiaries of the measure is one of the main factors 
to consider in the analysis of the advantage. The identification of a given 
undertaking or industry as recipient of financial assistance is certainly of relevance 
when it comes to determine whether market conditions are satisfied. Similarly, the 
S38 Appellate Body Report, Caxada - Ainmft, paragraph 154. 
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process to establish whether a certain measure is a derogation from the general rule 
certainly depends considerably on the definition of the interested parties. 
The proper determination of the beneficiaries is also instrumental to the definition 
of the markets affected by the measure and of the effects produced by it 
Finally, the question of who stands to benefit from the intervention has also 
significant implications from the procedural standpoint, and in particular the 
application of the remedies. State aid or subsidy granted unlawfully could be 
withdrawn or recovered. In such cases, it is evident that the definition of who is 
going to be the target of such withdrawal or recovery is important. The issue of the 
recovery of (past) paid aid is crucial in the EC, but is also relevant in the WTO, at 
least with respect to the category of prohibited subsidies whose withdrawal should 
include their retrospective repayment. 
Further, in the specific context of the WTO law, countervailing duties may be 
imposed unilaterally on those products that are held to be subsidised. From this 
perspective, too, the importance of the identification of who benefits from the 
subsidy is clear. 
As a matter of fact, an advantage may affect the economic position of various 
individuals. Therefore, it is not possible to concentrate only on the first or more 
direct recipients of the financial assistance as the advantage may be also (or 
exclusively) conferred in an indirect way to other persons. A distinction is 
accordingly usually made between direct or indirect subsidies. 
That said, undertakings can be - more or less directly - benefited in various ways. 
For example, through the reduction of their production costs (benefits to 
employees, assistance to research, input subsidies), the increase of their sales 
revenue (consumer subsidies and benefits to final producers), the provision of 
capital (aid to investors), the sale of a company or business at particularly favourable 
contractual conditions, especially as regards price (sale of companies /privatisations). 
322 
2. Two case-studies 
There are also two notable cases where the buyer is the indirect beneficiary of the 
measure of financial assistance and which are worth of further examination. 
The first is the case of so called 'upstream' or 'input subsidies'. The second is the 
case arising out from the sale of companies or businesses that had previously 
received a subsidy. In both cases, many interesting issues come out from the 
existence (or not) of a 'pass-through' of the benefit previously granted (as the case 
may be to input producers or to the company/assets under sale). 
Input subsidies 
A particularly interesting case of indirect subsidies is that of so called 'upstream' or 
'input' subsidies. 
These cases derive from the interdependence of the various levels of production 
which substantially flows from one of the most popular axioms of economics, ie the 
division and specialisation of work. In these cases the direct benefit is conferred on 
the producer of the input (ie upstream in the productive process) and the question is 
whether this benefit is, totally or partly, passed through downstream to the producer 
of the final product, for example in the form of a lesser price. As the Panel in US - 
Softwood Lumber IV generally put it, the 'core of the pass-through issue is the notion 
of subsidization of a product, ie, in respect of is manufacture, production, or export. 
Where the subsidies at issue are received by someone other than the producer of the 
investigated product, the question arises whether there is subsidization in respect of 
that product'. 539 
The issue is, of course, to determine when the benefit granted to the input 
manufacturer passes through to the downstream producer, which is not always 
straightforward. 
"9 Panel Report, paragraph 7.85. 
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Although it has often been underlined how particularly complex this determination 
is, 540 we can start with simple remarks. Most of them have been partly elaborated 
from considerations that can be found in the seminal work of Beseler & Williams. 
541 
It first seems to be quite fair to commence with the finding that the subsidisation of 
inputs does not per se constitute subsidisation of the final product. As we will see, 
one important principle is that no (irrebuttable) presumption can be introduced in 
this respect. Admittedly, any particular share of the burden of proof can affect the 
substantive rights to be proven. Accordingly, the introduction of presumptions (in 
one direction or another) cannot be of any relevance as they may (even significantly) 
shift the burden of proof. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that a legal system introduced a presumption that the 
benefit has passed through, it is of crucial importance to allow the rebuttal of this 
presumption and to do so on reasonable terms (for example, by permitting the 
proof of significant circumstances). In other words, the share of the burden of 
proof must be balanced in the sense that it should genuinely lead to the 
determination of whether the benefit has passed through. 
We could tentatively provide some examples of the principles above. Being 
reasonable to assume that the seller will attempt to maximise its profit, there should 
be no benefit if the two producers are unrelated and thus really operate at arm's 
length with each other. Quite similarly, no pass through should be established when 
the input is eventually sold at a market price and under normal market conditions. 
542 (Generally, speaking it might therefore be argued that, in presence of certain 
circumstances, such as arm's length transactions at normal commercial conditions, it 
is easier - although by no means conclusive - to presume that no benefit has passed 
through. This will clearly be explained by the jurisprudence on privatisations of 
previously subsidized undertakings. ) 
540 Beseler & Williams (1986: 126) who underlined that GATT experts have considered the issue since 1982 
(NB: the authors were writing in 1986) without being able to arrive at definitive conclusions. The issue was 
also subject to extensive debate during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
$'t Beseler & Williams (1986: 125 to 127). 
54= The authors underline, however, the difficulties of those cases when there is no benchnmark, for example 
because the only domestic sales of the product are those which are subsidised. In these cases, it is noted, it 
would be important to consider the price of imports. 
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The case could however be different, with a conclusion that there is passing 
through, when there is a clear evidence thereof, like when there is a governmental 
requirement to pass the benefit on. 
In any case it is however important to underline that the specificity test, which 
requires that the benefit must favour only certain undertakings or industries (and 
which we will thoroughly analyse below), must always be satisfied (and, as has been 
rightly underlined, this should be done twice: first at the level of the input subsidy 
and secondly for the pass through of the benefit). (It may be useful to refer to a 
similar specificity problem which occurs in the importantly debated case of 
governmental provision of favourably priced natural resources, such as basic energy 
products: petroleum, petrochemical products, and natural gas. There is a crucial 
difference, however, between upstream subsidies and natural resource subsidies as, 
for the latter, by definition we do not have any subsidy issue at the upstream level. ) 
543 
The case of input subsidies, which was debated during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, was the subject of important disputes in the GATT and in the WTO. 
The US -Pork dispute 
In the GATT US - Pork dispute 544 subsidies had been granted to Canadian swine 
producers. The US had consequently imposed countervailing duties on imported 
pork processed from swine. The whole question in the case was whether the 
benefit of the subsidies to swine had translated into, or, in any event, could be 
considered as, a benefit to its pork, the product processed through swine, for 
example in the form of reduced swine prices. From another perspective, the whole 
issue could be summarised in whether we were confronted, as US law provided, 
with what should have been called as a direct subsidy to pork producers, or, on the 
contrary, whether what was undoubtedly under discussion was direct subsidy to 
swine producers with a possible indirect subsidy to pork producers. 
543 The issue of whether specificity should be required for upstream and natural resource subsidies 
has been 
subject to a certain debate, especially in the US. See, for instance, Bars}' (1984); Hubauer & 
Shelton Erb 
(1984) 
GATT Panel, US - Pork from Canada. 
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Before exposing the main allegation of the US, and the findings of the Panel, it is 
however advisable to outline briefly the main provisions of US law applicable at the 
time. 
US law had a specific provision for upstream subsidies (Section 771A of the Tariff 
Act 1930). This provision required a thorough analysis of whether the upstream 
subsidy had in fact passed through to the downstream producer. What, in 
particular, had to be established was that the upstream subsidy conferred a 
'competitive benefit' on the downstream product and that this had a 'significant 
effect' on the cost of manufacturing or producing the merchandise. 545 
A new piece of legislation ('Section 771B') was introduced to avoid the strictures of 
these requirements in some cases. 546 Section 771B provided that, in the case of an 
agricultural product processed from a raw agricultural product, a subsidy to the 
latter should be deemed to have been granted to the former, provided that two 
conditions were fulfilled: first, there should have been a substantial dependence of 
the demand for the input product on that of the output product, and, secondly, only 
a limited value should have been added in the production of the input into the 
output. 547 In other words, according to Section 771B, the two separate economic 
processes were fictitiously merged and the subsidy to the input producer was legally 
regarded as if directly granted to the output producer. 
On the basis of this amendment, the US were arguing that in the instant case they 
were dealing with just one single production process. Being confronted with what 
in their view was a direct subsidy, it was not necessary to prove the strict 
requirements (of 'competitive benefit' and 'significant effect') provided for upstream 
subsidies. 
The Panel disagreed. In particular, it first found that, under Article VI: 3 GATT, a 
countervailing duty could be imposed on pork only if it is determined that a subsidy 
has been bestowed on the production of pork. (It can be recalled that the relevant 
part of Article VI: 3 reads: 'No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product ... 
in excess of an amount equal to the estimated ... subsidy 
determined to have been 
S4S For a commentary see Benitah (2001: 269-272). 
546 Section 771B was introduced into the Tariff Act of 1930. 
S47 See 19 USC § 1677-2. 
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granted, directly or indirectly, in the ... production ... of such product. 548 ) In the 
case in issue, however, although it was not disputed that a subsidy had been granted 
to live swine, what was under discussion was precisely whether, in the light of Article 
VI: 3 GATT, this subsidy could be considered as granted to pork. 
The Panel thus focused on the conditions set by Section 771B to determine whether 
they were - on their own - sufficient to conclude that, under Article \1I: 3 GATT, a 
subsidy granted to swine producers should have been deemed as granted to pork 
producers. Starting from the obvious consideration that, in the instant case, there 
were two separate industries operating at arm's length, and two different products, 
the Panel fully recognised the importance of the price effect in upstream subsidies 
cases. 549 In particular, it explained that the determination that a downstream 
industry had been subsidised by an upstream subsidy necessarily required an 
examination of the impact of the price of the subsidies on the input product. 550 
Consequently, in the case in issue, the existence of an indirect subsidy could be 
established if 
subsidies granted to swine producers had led to a decrease in the level of 
prices for Canadian swine paid by Canadian pork producers below the level 
they have to pay for swine from other commercially available sources of 
supply and that this decrease was equivalent to the full amount of the 
subsidy. 551 
The Panel made it clear that the two factors provided by Section 771 B (the 
substantial dependence of the demand and the limited value added in the 
production) were not enough to establish that the subsidies to swine had led to a 
decrease in price in pork. It was underlined that it was necessary to consider various 
factors to determine whether there was a pass through of the benefit (such as, in the 
-48 Emphasis added. 
S19 At the same time, however, the Panel quite intriguingly noted that 'subsidies need not in all cases, 
particularly in cases involving only one industry, have a price effect to be countervailable' (see paragraph 4.9 
of the Panel report). The assumption seems to be that, in such cases, the subsidy effect, which 
does not 
affect the price of the product, does have an impact on, say, its quality. In such cases, the artificial advantage 
granted by the subsidy would nonetheless allow a determination of material injury to be made and 
countervailing duties to be imposed. (For the various issues on the effects of State aids and subsidy see the 
next chapter. ) 
sso Panel report, paragraph 4.9. 
sst Panel report, paragraph 4.10. 
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instant case, the degree to which swine were internationally traded, and the per unit 
cost of producing additional output of swine that the subsidies might have caused). 
552 
From the standpoint of US domestic law, the consequence of the Panel's finding of 
inconsistency with Article VI: 3 GATT (and its distinction between direct and 
indirect subsidies) was that the admittedly more stringent requirements of the US 
provision on upstream subsidies could not be by-passed. 553 Before imposing 
countervailing duties on imported pork on the ground that it was subsidised the US 
should have proved the existence of a 'competitive benefit' on the downstream 
product and a 'significant effect' on its cost of production 
There are two teachings from this case, which can indeed be generalised to other 
cases where there is a similar question of 'pass-through'. There is first a clear 
reaffirmation of the important GATT(WTO)-based distinction between direct and 
indirect subsidies. Generally speaking, the existence of a subsidy to producer A 
cannot too much easily, or even automatically, be presumed to have passed through 
to producer B. This passage has to be established. Further, there is recognition that 
the working of the passing through mechanism may be particularly complex and, 
accordingly, a thorough analysis of all the factors of the impact of the input or 
upstream subsidy on the downstream level of production may be required. 
The US -Softwood Lumber III and IVdisputes 
The previous findings have been confirmed in the W'FO era, particularly in two 
recent disputes: US - Softwood Lumber III and US - Softwood Lumber IV. 
The factual background of these cases, which concerned the review of the US 
preliminary and final countervailing duty determinations on softwood lumber from 
Canada, is particularly instructive of how complex the production chain of an 
industry may be. Although the subsidy had originally been conferred on standing 
timber harvesters, logs were processed, quite often at various stages, to produce 
5S2 For a clear explanation of the relevance of these factors see paragraph 4.10 of the Panel report. 
553 Benitah (2001: 210 to 211), however noted that Section 771B still exists in US countervailing duty 
legislation. It is therefore interesting to know how this provision could now be construed in order to ensure 
GATT/WFO consistency. 
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softwood lumber and other products. 554 There could accordingly be many subjects 
(eg harvesters/loggers; sawmills; re-manufacturers) who subsequently acquired the 
products as inputs for further processing. If these subjects were independent from 
each other (ie not vertically integrated), issues of the passing through of the relevant 
benefit could, at least hypothetically, arise out from various separate arm's length 
transactions. 
Focusing now on the US - Softwood Lumber III dispute, the important question which 
was under scrutiny was whether it is possible to use presumptions in the benefit 
analysis, or, more specifically, whether, in certain cases, it is possible to avoid a pass- 
through analysis altogether. 
The issue was whether the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) was required to 
examine whether, in certain transactions covered by the investigation, some or all of 
the alleged benefit to the holders of harvesting rights was passed through to the 
producers of the subject merchandise exported to the US, in the instant case 
softwood lumber. 555 What emerged from the record was indeed that in some cases 
the USDOC had not carried out an analysis of the passing-through of the benefit 
either i) because it considered that there was no evidence of arm's length 
transactions between lumber producers and loggers as, in the large majority of cases, 
they were allegedly not independent from each other, or ii) because, even in cases of 
arm's length transactions, all undertakings were producers of the same merchandise 
and the calculation of the countervailing duty was conducted on an aggregate (vs a 
company-specific) basis. 556 
With respect to the first argument, having found that there was evidence of arm's 
length transactions, the Panel in US - Softwood Lumber III crucially reaffirmed that 
assumptions or presumptions cannot be used to establish that a benefit has passed 
through: 
554For an exhaustive explanation of the various stages of this industry see Appellate Body, US - Softwood 
Limber IV, paragraph 124. 
555 Panel report, paragraph 7.69. 
51' Panel report, paragraphs 7.64 to 7.67. The possibility of imposing countervailing duties on an aggregate 
basis can be found in Article 19.3 SCM. 
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we are of the view that an authority may not assume that a subsidy provided 
to producers of the 'upstream' input product automatically benefits unrelated 
producers of downstream products, especially if there is evidence on the 
record of arm's-length transactions between the two. Rather, we consider 
that in such circumstances the investigating authority should examine 
whether and to what extent the subsidies bestowed on the upstream 
producers benefited the downstream producers. 557 
We have already seen that, in principle, it is not possible to presume that an upstream 
subsidy has necessarily transposed into a benefit at the downstream level. The 
transmission mechanism of the benefit may in fact be so complex that 
presumptions of this kind do not easily fit in. As said, what seems to be necessary 
in the case at issue is a more thorough, one would even say empirical, analysis of 
whether the upstream benefit may have passed through downstream. As hinted by 
the Panel, this is particularly so when there are some significant factors, such as the 
existence of an arm's length transaction which, under certain circumstances such as 
the presence of normal market conditions, may in fact lead towards the opposite 
conclusion (ie that no pass-through has occurred). In this regard, the Panel 
interestingly cited the US - Carbon Steel II dispute where the Appellate Body 
concluded in the different context involving subsidies provided to entities 
subsequently privatized (which we will thoroughly analyse in the next section), that 
an entity other than the original recipient of the subsidy should not be deemed to 
have received a benefit when an arm's-length price was paid to acquire the entity 
that had received the subsidies. 558 
The Appellate Body in the US - Softwood Lumber IV case vigorously and extensively 
reaffirmed the analysis of the Panel, on the need to determine the existence the 
pass-through of the benefit, when the subsidy has been granted on an input and the 
countervailing duty is to be imposed on a processed product, and on the connected 
impossibility of using presumptions when there is an arm's length relationship 
between upstream and downstream producers. 559 (Returning to the GATT (IS - 
Pork case, and irrespective of the correctness of the requirements of a 'competitive 
551 WFO Panel, (. TS - Softwood Lumber 111, paragraph 7.71. Similar findings were made 
by the Appellate Body, 
US - Softwood Lumber IV. See, for example, paragraphs 141,143 and 146. 5Sb ibid. 
ssv See paragraphs 129 to 147 in particular. 
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benefit' on the downstream product and the 'significant effect' on its cost of 
production provided for by the US provision on upstream subsidies, all this seems 
to be in line with the often repeated need to carry out a comprehensive analysis of 
the effects of the input subsidy before reaching a conclusion that an advantage has 
passed on. 560) 
As regards the calculation of the subsidy on an aggregate basis (ie on a country-wide 
as opposed to a company specific basis), the US - Softwood Lumber III Panel also 
confirmed that, in presence of arm's length transactions, it is necessary to carry out a 
pass-through analysis. 561 In this regard, it is interesting to refer to what the 
Appellate Body said clarifying the relationship between determination of the 
existence of subsidisation on the one hand and imposition of countervailing duties 
on the other. In US - Softwood Lumber IV the Appellate Body admitted that Article 
19.3 SCM, with the support of Article 19.4, authorises Members to perform an 
investigation on an aggregate basis. 562 However, any definition of the rate of 
subsidisation for countervailing duty purposes, be it on a country-wide (read: 
aggregate) basis, or on a company-specific basis can logically take place only after the 
investigating authority has, inter alia, established the existence of a subsidy. 
Referring to the case in issue, the Appellate Body thus underlined that 
before being entitled to impose countervailing duties on a processed product, 
for the purpose of offsetting an input subsidy, a Member must first 
determine, in accordance with Article 1.1 [SCM], that a financial contribution 
exists, and that the benefit conferred directly on the input producer has been 
passed through, at least in part, to the producer of the processed product. 563 
The Appellate Body made also it clear that it is in the nature of the imposition of a 
country-wide (aggregate) rate under Article 19 SCM that the rate of subsidisation 
560 See Benitah (2001: 269-272) for a very interesting, critical assessment of these requirements and their 
rationale. 
561 See Panel report, paragraph 7.77 in particular. 
562 With respect to the aggregate-based calculation of countervailing duties, Article 19.3 SCM inter aha 
provides that 'countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a nox- 
ditmiiirinato y basis on imports of such product from all soums found to be subsidized and causing injury ... 
(emphasis added). Article 19.4 SCM reads: 'No countervailing duty shall be levied on any import product 
in 
excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization per unit of the 
subsidized and exported product' (emphasis added). 
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does not necessarily match the precise amount thereof benefiting a specific 
shipment or, even, that a particular shipment of the subject merchandise is not 
subsidised at all. 564 The SCM Agreement itself, however, gives a remedy, providing 
for specific expedited review of the countervailing duty, if any, to be imposed on the 
exporter not investigated individually. 565 
Input 'State aids' in EC law 
If we now look at EC law, we can quite simply conclude that considerations as to 
the pass-through of the benefit in the case of input or upstream State aids similar to 
those examined above can be made also in the EC. 566 
Even there, in particular in the context of the analysis of the effects of the State aid, 
it is particularly important to carry out a comprehensive economic analysis which 
involves the markets involved by the subsidy and a thorough analysis of its effects. 
As said, the identification of the beneficiaries plays an important role in this respect. 
567 
As far as we are aware no cases on input or upstream subsidies have been in the 
spotlight in the EC. Nevertheless, should it be necessary, we believe that a 
comprehensive approach, substantially similar to that adopted in the WTO, would 
be used for determining the impact of input or upstream subsidies. 568 In other 
words, what can be safely concluded is that in both systems the establishment of a 
'pass-through' of the advantage should only be based on a thorough analysis of 
various economic factors involved and that, in this context, the use of 
assumption /presumptions should be made with particular care. 
563 Appellate Body, paragraph 154. 
564 Ibid, paragraph 153. 
s6s Article 19.3 SCM provides that'[ajny exporter whose exports are subject to a definitive countervailing 
duty but who was not actually investigated ... shall 
be entitled to an expedited review in order that the 
investigating authorities promptly establish an individual countervailing duty rate for the exporter. ' 
'Cf. in general, Roberti (1997). 
For a comprehensive analysis of the market impact of State aid see Fingleton (2001). 
'" Such a similar analysis is carried out by Roberti (1997). 
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Sale of companies or assets 
Interesting issues concerning the identification of beneficiaries have come out also 
in the context of the sale of undertakings which previously received subsidies. This 
question has mainly come out in the context of privatisations or of reorganisations 
of companies in difficulties. 
Like in the previous case of input subsidies, one of the issues here is whether, 
following the sale of the company, of its assets or of an entire business, any 
advantage has passed through to the buyer. As we will see, however, this category 
raises also other issues on the residence of the advantage which may concern the 
seller (which, depending on the cases, may be the company or its owners). 
The pass-through of the benefit: the position of the buyer between the 
use of presumptions and the market 
We commence our analysis by considering whether, following the sale of the 
company or the business, the benefit 'passes through' to the buyer. 
As we are essentially dealing with a 'pass-through' problem, many issues that have 
come out in the relevant WTO disputes are very similar to those dealt with in the 
'input' subsidy context. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the issues, it may be useful to clarify an 
important distinction between various sale transactions. On the one side, in share 
deal cases what is sold is the firm or the company (we use the two terms indifferently 
without referring to any particular legal form of enterprise). The identification of 
the beneficiary is particularly complex in these cases as they involve the presence of 
three subjects, the company, the owners/sellers and the owners/buyers. On the 
other side, we could distinguish between asset deal and business deal cases. Whereas 
the former concern the sale of all or part of the assets of a firm, the latter regard the 
sale of a productive operation as ongoing concern and, as such, they may normally 
include the transfer of the liabilities of the unit. In these cases the identification of 
who stands to benefit from the transaction is generally easier as only two subjects 
(the company/seller and the buyer) are involved. It is therefore natural that in the 
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subsequent analysis we will particularly concentrate on share deal cases because of 
their bigger complexity. (It should finally be noted that when we simply use the 
term sale we generally refer to any sale transaction without distinguishing between 
share, asset or business deals. ) 
Having set forth this distinction, we may analyse an interesting issue which focuses 
on the possibility of using presumptions. We can, hypothetically, think of two kinds 
of presumptions which admittedly go in opposite directions. First: following the 
sale, may we presume that the benefit has simply passed through? Or, secondly (and 
to the contrary), should it be presumed that the sale at certain conditions (and, notably, 
an arm's length transaction for a fair market value and in compliance with normal 
market conditions) always extinguishes any benefit? Although we will mainly analyse 
WTO law, we will attempt to draw a comparison with EC law. 
Presumption of pass-through of the advantage: against automatism 
With regard to the first presumption, which is similar to the blunt - and irrebuttable 
- assumption that an input subsidy should always pass through downstream, both the 
Panel and the Appellate Body rejected this possibility in the US - Carbon Steel II 
dispute. In that case, that concerned leaded bars imported into the US and subject 
to countervailing duties, the issue was whether the subsidies originally bestowed on 
an undertaking (BSC) could still be regarded as been granted to its successors (UES 
and BSplc/BSES). Two specific transactions were under examination: the sale of a 
productive unit to UES and the privatisation of BSC. 
The premiss of the US' argument was that the productive operations of all those 
companies were essentially the same, and thus there was no need to distinguish 
between them. This substantially derived from the assumption that, under WTO 
law, the beneficiary of the subsidy is not a person manufacturing a product but rather 
the production operations themselves. 569 On the basis of this argument, the US put 
forward an irrebuttable presumption that the benefit of a non-recurring (ie provided 
on an irregular basis) and untied (ie provided on a company basis and not directed at 
specific products) subsidy continues to flow, even after changes in ownership. 
'69 As seen above, this allegation was based on note 36 to Article 10 SCM and on Article N'1: 3 GAIT. 
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Both the Panel and the Appellate Body commenced with the premiss that 'logically' 
a benefit can only refer to a person that has received something (and not simply to 
its productive operations). 570 They then confirmed that it cannot always and simply 
be presumed that, in the case of change of ownership of the company or of its 
assets, the benefit of a subsidy previously granted has passed through to the new 
owner. 571 In other words, while presumptions that an advantage continues to flow 
may be used these can never be irrebuttable. Thus, a change in ownership, and in 
particular the special circumstances surrounding it (such as the compliance with 
commercial considerations), may require an examination of whether a benefit 
continues to accrue to the buyer. 572 
The findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body are clearly sound for two reasons. 
First, as a matter of general proposition and as is confirmed by various provisions of 
the GATT and the SCM Agreement, 573 it is always necessary to prove the existence 
of a benefit for a subsidy to be deemed to exist and to counteract against it. This is 
particularly so when we are not talking of a direct but rather of an indirect 
mechanism of transmission of the advantage which occurs when we have a change 
in ownership. 
Secondly, as we have seen analysing the impact of input subsidies above, the 
determination of any pass-through effect quite often requires a sophisticated 
analysis. Irrespective of the rules on the share of the burden of proof, which in any 
event should respect a balance between the parties, this assessment should properly 
take into account all the factors concerned, and in particular the effects of the 
financial contribution at issue and of subsequent events, such as a change in 
570 Panel, US - Carbon Steel II, paragraph 6.78; Appellate Body, ibid, paragraph 58. The principle was laid 
down by the Appellate Body in Canada - Aircaft, paragraph 154. 571 Panel, US - Carbon Steel II, paragraph 6.71; see also the Appellate Body in the same dispute, paragraph 62. 
572 See Panel, US - Carbon Steel II, paragraph 6.70: Appellate Body Report, ibid, paragraph 62. It is however 
worth noting that the Appellate Body distinguished the scope of this requirement depending on whether 
what is in issue is an original investigation (Article 11 SCM) or only an administrative review (Article 21 
SCM). See Appellate Body, ibid, paragraph 63. 
573 In the first place by, for example, the definition of benefit in Article 1.1(b) SCAT ('a benefit is thereby 
conferred', emphasis added). This is also confirmed by the various provisions on the definition and purpose 
of countervailing duties which clearly imply that such a measure is only there to counteract an existing 
subsidy (see, for example, the last sentence of Article ß'I: 3 GATT which is reprised by word in footnote 36 of 
Article 10 SCM). This reading is also definitely supported by the uncontroversial language of Article 21.1 
which says that '[a] countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to 
counteract subsidization which is causing injury', emphasis added. This reasoning is substantially upheld by 
the Appellate Body, US - Carbon Stiel If, paragraphs 60 to 62. 
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ownership and the circumstances surrounding it. The automatist of a presumption 
that an advantage - quite simply and always - continues to flow or in any event has 
passed through to the new owner does not seem to sit easily in this context. 
It cannot be disputed that a similar conclusion should be reached in EC law as well. 
As we have shown with respect to input subsidies, there cannot be any irrebuttable 
presumption that, following a change in ownership, the previously conferred benefit 
continues to exist. This continuance has to be established and often requires a 
thorough analysis. 
Presumption of exhaustion of the advantage: the market and the government 
intervention 
The more interesting debate, however, is that concerning the second presumption 
whereby an arm's length sale for a fair market value and in compliance with normal 
market conditions should be held to extinguish the benefit. 
What we see here is an intriguingly evolving reasoning of the WTO jurisprudence. 
In the US - Carbon Steel II the issue was whether the fact that a 'fair market value' 
had been paid for the 'productive assets, goodwill, and all other factors' 
subsequently used by the successor companies in the production of the products 
imported into the US excluded the existence of a benefit for the new owners. 
The focus of the Panel and the Appellate Body was different from the US' one 
being more concentrated on the change in ownership (of the company and/or the 
production units) and its conditions, and in particular on their compliance with a 
market benchmark, rather than on the continuance of the productive operations. Having 
found that the pass through of the benefit cannot simply be presumed but has to be 
established, both the Panel and the Appellate Body relied on the often repeated 
finding that the term benefit implies a comparison with the marketplace. On this 
basis, they concluded that the payment of a 'fair market value', in the context of an 
'arm's length' transaction and in full compliance with 'commercial considerations' (as 
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has occurred in the instant case with the sale of assets to UES and the privatisation 
of BSC), excludes that the buyer has 'benefited' from the transaction. 574 
The same principles seem to apply in the EC where the sale of a company at market 
price is held to extinguish (on the part of the buyer) any advantage accrued from a 
previous aid. The Court thus held that 
where an undertaking that has benefited from unlawful State aid is bought at 
the market price, that is to say at the highest price which a private investor 
acting under normal competitive conditions was ready to pay for that 
company in the situation it was in, in particular after having enjoyed State aid, 
the aid element was assessed at the market price and included in the purchase 
price. In such circumstances, the buyer cannot be regarded as having 
benefited from an advantage in relation to other economic operators. 575 
In US - Carbon Steel II the Appellate Body seemed however to express some caution, 
restricting its finding on the inexistence of a pass-through of the benefit to 'the facts 
of the case. ' 576 
This caution can be explained if the more recent US - Countervailing measures dispute 
is considered, where one of the motives underlying this qualification could be 
summarised by the following questions. Is the price of an enterprise which is 
undergoing a privatisation and which is determined by the market always a reliable 
indicator in a 'pass-through' assessment? Does the fact that one of the main actors 
in a privatisation process is the government somewhat have an impact on this answer? 
We have already examined these findings in the previous chapter but, considering 
their importance, it is worth repeating them. 
The Panel found that 
privatizations at arm's length and for fair market value must lead to the 
conclusion that the privatized producer paid for what he got and thus did not 
574 Panel, US - Carbon Steel II, paragraph 6.81; Appellate 
Body, ibid, paragraph 68. 
S' Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraph 80; Case C-390/98, HJ Banks, paragraph 77. Cf also Case C-305/89 Ital v 
Commission, paragraphs 39 and 40. 
SU Appellate Body Report, US - Carbon Steel II, paragraph 74. This restriction was recognised 
by the 
Appellate Body itself in US - Coxate ig Meatxns, paragraph 93. 
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get any benefit or advantage from the prior financial contribution bestowed 
upon the state-owned producer. 577 
The Appellate Body highlighted the special role played by governments in the 
functioning of market economies and, in particular, their ability to direct events and 
processes, in the instant case privatisations, towards certain, desired directions. The 
Appellate Body accordingly qualified the finding that privatisations at arm's length 
and for fair market value always exclude that the benefit is passed through. In 
particular it pointed out that 
the Panel's absolute rule of 'no benefit' may be defensible in the context of 
transactions between two private parties taking place in reasonably 
competitive markets; however, it overlooks the ability of governments to 
obtain certain results from markets by shaping the circumstances and 
conditions in which markets operate. Privatisations involve complex and 
long-term investments in which the seller-namely the government-is not 
necessarily always a passive price taker and, consequently, the 'fair market 
price' of a state-owned enterprise is not necessarily always unrelated to 
government action. In privatisations, governments have the ability, by 
designing economic and other policies, to influence the circumstances and 
the conditions of the sale so as to obtain a certain market valuation of the 
enterprise. 578 
This ability to direct privatisations so as to 'influence the circumstances and the 
conditions of the sale' inevitably affects the reliability of some indicators such as the 
'market valuation' (ie the price) of the enterprise. The Appellate Body thus 
concluded that 
the Panel erred in concluding that '[p]rivatisations at arm's length and for fair 
market value must lead to the conclusion that the privatised producer paid 
for what he got and thus did not get any benefit or advantage from the prior 
financial contribution bestowed upon the state-owned producer. ' (emphasis 
added) Privatisation at arm's length and for fair market value may result in 
extinguishing the benefit. Indeed, we find that there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a benefit ceases to exist after such a privatisation. 
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily do so. There is no inflexible rule requiring 
577 Panel, US - Coa, rtenvvikng Measkrrs, paragraph 7.82 (emphasis added). 
578 Appellate Body, US - CouxurnaiAng Measarrs paragraph 124. 
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that investigating authorities, in future cases, automatically determine that a 
'benefit' derived from pre-privatisation financial contributions expires 
following privatisation at arm's length and for fair market value. It depends 
on the facts of each case. 579 
The main implication of this qualification is, again, an important warning against the 
possibility of using presumptions, and in particular those that automatically - that is 
without any possibility of rebuttal - tend to produce a solution to the case. 
Although it may be assumed that privatisations at arm's length and for fair market 
value should extinguish the advantage, the Appellate Body clearly shows that this is 
not always and necessarily the case. It is not a hard and fast rule. Once again (as 
the case of input subsidies shows), everything depends on a thorough empirical 
analysis of the facts of the case. 
Another implication of the Appellate Body's warning, which we have already 
examined in the previous chapter, is the difficulty of defining market criteria, 
especially when the government intervenes in the market. This qualification does 
not however detract from the fact that, absent any (significant) interference from 
the government, the price produced by the market is normally a reliable indicator to 
determine whether any advantage has passed through to the buyer. It is accordingly 
argued that the importance of commercial criteria should generally be confirmed. 
Again, there are no reasons to believe that the economic and legal remarks of the 
Appellate Body are not of more general application and could not be used in the EC 
too. The fact that the government is not like any other agent in the market, but 
could rather play a predominant role therein, should be duly recognised when it is 
necessary to determine the reliability of market indicators. 
An interesting issue of the reliability of prices set by the market has come out in the 
EC. When the price is determined taking into account the possibility that the buyer 
might be called to repay the aid, it is likely the latter's value may not be fully 
incorporated in that price. The intriguing issue is whether, under these 
S'9 ibid paragraph 127. 
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circumstances, such contemplation may imply that part of the benefit should really 
be considered as passing through to the buyer making him liable. 580 
The distinctions between the company and its owners and between share, 
business and asset deals 
We have just assessed the position of the buyer, as possible indirect beneficiarr" of 
the sale, and the role that market considerations may play in determining whether a 
benefit passes through or not. We will now seek to widen the discussion by 
considering the distinctions between share, asset or business deals on the one side 
and, in the context of share deals, between the firm and its owners on the other. 
Although we will examine WTO law and EC law separately, we do not renounce to 
drawing parallels. 
WTO law 
The first step of our analysis will move from an intriguing argument strongly put 
forward by the US in both the US - Carbon Steel II and US - Countervailing Measures 
dispute. 
According to the US, the benefit resides in the legal person of the firm, or, better, in 
the production operation, and continues to accrue to it even if its ownership 
changes, and can be terminated only with the amortization over time of the subsidy 
(which centres on the average useful life of the subsidised assets) or its 
reimbursement. 
We have seen that, within the context of the determination of whether the benefit 
had passed through, in US - Carbon Steel II the focus of the 
Panel and the Appellate 
Body was different from the one put forward by the US and was more concentrated 
on the change in ownership (of the company and/or the production units) and its 
conditions (and in particular on their compliance with the market) rather than on the 
continuance of the productive operations. 
580 See Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraph 79. 
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In US - Countervailing Measures, the Panel, which was asked whether, in the context of 
the sale of a firm, a distinction should have been made between the 'benefit to the 
owners of the company' and the 'benefit to the company itself, 581 rejected the 
distinction between the company and its shareholders as put forward by the US. 
On the premiss that 'when someone purchases a company for fair market value, the 
purchase price includes the value of the benefit conferred to that company', and, 
taking into account the relationship between a company and its owners (especially 
following a privatization where the latter seek to maximize their return through the 
investment in the company), the Panel crucially noted that, for the purposes of the 
SCM Agreement, there should be no distinction between the advantage conferred to 
the company or to its owners as, when reference is made to the recipient of the 
benefit, this should mean both of them together. 582 To support its reasoning, the 
Panel also quoted the findings of the Panel in US - Carbon Steel II, whereby 'it would 
be misleading in the extreme to suggest that the price paid by the owners of the 
privatized company is not ultimately paid by the privatized company itself. 583 
On appeal, the US reiterated their argument. In their view, irrespective of the 
commercial conditions of the transaction, the benefit always resides with the legal 
entity of the firm. 584 In particular, the conclusion that the privatisation (NB: even 
following market considerations) should always extinguish the benefit is founded on 
a 'basic economic misconception' since the privatisation does not move the supply 
curve to where it has been and thus does not affect the continued existence of the 
subsidy. 585 In other words, the company that has received the subsidy, being the 
legal entity that continues to operate on the market, will continue to benefit from it 
irrespective of its ownership and the relevant market will continue to be distorted by 
the subsidy. 
The Appellate Body confirmed that the benefit should be determined with reference 
to the market (as we have seen, above, it nonetheless underlined the difficulties of 
the application of this test). The Appellate Body also explained that a benefit may 
591 Panel, US - Coxxtavaikng Mearunr, paragraph 7.40. 
592 ibid, paragraphs 7.51 to 7.54. 
su panel, US - Carbon Skei paragraph 6.82. 
584 Appellate Body, US - Coxnlsrvaiknn mea cares, paragraph 88. 
SIS Ibid, paragraph 99. 
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be provided indirectly to a firm via its owners. 586 It thus rejected the strict distinction 
between company and owners as put forward by the US whereby the only relevant 
consideration for a pass through analysis would be the continued existence of the 
same legal person and the position of the owners would be completely irrelevant. 
The Appellate Body, however, also qualified the broad finding of the Panel, 
whereby a firm and its owners are, for all purposes of the SCM Agreement, virtually 
the same, underlining that there may well be cases where - from the perspective of 
the pass through of the benefit - the distinction between the firm and its owners is 
indeed relevant. 587 
We fully agree with the findings of the Appellate Body on the use of market criteria 
and on the relevance of changes in ownership to determine the pass through of the 
advantage. 
The crucial point of the analysis should be represented by the previous remarks on 
market criteria. What is important to do is to distinguish between utility value and 
market value of the equipment that the undertaking has acquired with the subsidy. In 
the determination of whether a benefit continues to exist, it is the latter that should 
constitute the focal point. 588 We have seen that if the market price is paid the buyer 
of the company cannot be considered as a beneficiary. Insofar as that price also 
includes the value of the subsidy it is as if the buyer had purchased the shares, which 
incorporate that value, on the market. From this perspective, therefore, no 
advantage has passed through. 
If we adhere to this premise, the focus of the identification of the beneficiaries 
should therefore shift from the buyers to either the firm as legal entity or to the 
actual sellers (the shareholders). 
With respect to the allegation that the firm as a legal entity, and in particular its 
productive operations, would continue to benefit from the subsidy and, by going on 
to operate on the market, the latter would continue to be distorted, we find this 
5861bid, paragraph 113. 
58' ibid, paragraphs 116-119. In particular, the Appellate Body seemed to hint that in other cases (where, 
for 
example, a benefit is conferred through a recurring financial contribution, or where the seller retains a 
controlling interest in the firm) it may be necessary to distinguish between the company and its owners (bid, 
paragraph 117). The finding of the Panel should thus have been limited to the 'very narrow' set of 
circumstances at issue in that dispute. 
' See Appellate Body, t US - Coxxhrvcikxg Mea urcr, paragraph 102. 
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argument also in the EC. 589 On its face, it seems rather persuasive. The changes in 
the ownership do not affect the lines of production of the undertaking which 
continue to benefit from the granted subsidy. As the US put it, the supply curve is 
not moved back by privatisation and the market will continue to be distorted by the 
subsidised operations of the firm. 
We however believe that, although the company should be held to benefit from the 
transaction if it sells itself the productive operations at market conditions (as we 
would have a mere exchange of assets for consideration), in the case of privatisation 
through sale of shares, it is not generally possible to distinguish between the 
position of the company and that of its new owners. In this regard, we concur with 
the US - Carbon Steel II Panel that 'it would be misleading in the extreme to suggest 
that the [market] price paid by the owners of the privatized company is not 
ultimately paid by the privatized company itself 590 thus, we would add, relieving the 
latter of any advantage. 
The focus of the analysis of the beneficiaries should accordingly shift from the new 
owners and the company as legal entity to those who sold their shares being the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the sale transaction and of the increased value of the company. 
We should further ask whether we can really talk about a (persistent) distortion on 
the part of the company when its shares have been paid the market price (or, in 
other words, whether we are faced with distortions or misallocations of resources 
that are relevant for the SCM Agreement). 591 The firm certainly still enjoys the 
utility value of the (previously subsidised) assets and operations that are currently 
used in the production but, after the privatisation at arm's length and for fair market 
consideration, it is really as if it had purchased them on the market. 
In the EC context it has been argued that this position may create some difficulties. 
592 We could mention the case of a public company floated on the stock exchange. 
If the shares are sold on the market, and the relevant price is by definition the 
market price, we could envisage that any sale transaction may involve an aid element 
5" See, for example, Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraph 81; see also in the same case Advocate General Tizzano, 
paragraphs 82 to 86 of the Opinion. 
59° Paragraph 6.82. 
59' Panel, US - CoxatenkriGxv Measunr, paragraph 7.42. 592 For these arguments see Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-277/00 SM I, paragraphs 84 and 85. 
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for the seller. However, the difficulty of recovering the aid from several hundreds 
(if not thousands) of seller can be easily imagined. It is also underlined that the 
shareholders/ sellers may not be involved in any economic activity with the result 
that they could not distort competition in any way. 
It has, however, to be underlined that also the other position, whereby the firm as a 
legal entity, and not its owners, should be liable presents some inconveniences. The 
Appellate Body has, for example, pointed out to the risk of undermining the SCM 
Agreement by enabling governments to circumvent it by giving benefits directly to 
the firm's owners rather than to the firm itself. 593 
In sum, we are inclined to consider that the compliance of the transfer with market 
criteria is liable to exhaust any benefit and hence any distortion (which may be 
relevant under subsidy or State aid rules) with respect to the buyer and the firm. 
Conversely, inasmuch as the market price incorporates the value of the subsidy, the 
ultimate beneficiary of the share deal transaction, and any other possible distortion, 
should be found among the (former owners/)sellers of the firm. Following this 
reasoning, with respect to asset deal transactions following market considerations we 
tend to believe that it is the firm, as the owner and seller of the assets or the 
productive operations, that should be considered as the beneficiary. 
As regards what we have labelled business deal cases, when the sale transaction 
involve a productive unit as ongoing concern it is interesting to ask whether an 
argument put forward in the EC context (see below), whereby the transfer would 
include both assets and liabilities with the result that the buyer might be held liable 
for the repayment, might be used also in the WTO. In this regard, two remarks are 
necessary. First, the buyer would be liable not because it is the beneficiary but 
because it has taken over the liabilities of the business (including that of repayment). 
Secondly, it seems that, if accepted, this conclusion would be valid only as far as the 
obligation to withdraw the subsidy is concerned. As regards the exposure to 
countervailing duties, the crucial consideration is not whether the person is liable for 
the subsidy but whether it benefits from it. We therefore tend to think that the 
argument would not touch the buyer as, in case of a market transaction, no benefit 
113 Appellate Body, US - Coxxltivailrxg Mearxrct, paragraph 115. 
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passes through. It cannot pass unnoticed, however, that this conclusion would be 
particularly odd as the persons liable would be different depending on the 
(multilateral or unilateral) remedy concerned. 
EC law 
After having analysed the position as it mainly stands in the WTO, we may, now 
expose the situation that can be found in EC law. 
With respect to asset deal cases (where, as said, the sale concerns the assets of the 
firm benefiting from the aid), if the transaction has taken place under commercial 
conditions, the liability clearly belongs to the seller, ie the company. 594 
By contrast, in the case of business deals, where the transfer regards an ongoing 
concern (with usually encompass both assets and liabilities), it has been maintained 
that the buyer might be held liable. 595 As already said with respect to WTO law, it 
is worth repeating that, in such cases, the buyer would be liable not because it is the 
beneficiary of the aid but because it is the party that has taken over the liabilities of 
the business. 596 
As regards share deal cases, we have seen that the buyer's liability is excluded when 
the share price reflects the market price. 597 With respect to the identification of the 
actual beneficiary Advocate General Tizzano in the recent SMI case observed that 
the Court seems to oscillate between two positions, requiring the repayment of the 
aid either by the company itself or by the sellers of the shares, ie the owners (when 
the share price reflects the value of the aid granted) 598 
The former position, which echoes that advanced by the US government in the 
Carbon Steel II and US - Countervailing Measurer disputes, is well represented 
by the 
following very recent findings (April 2004) in the SMI decision: 
594 Ibid, paragraph 98. 
595 See Advocate General Geelhoed in Joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM v Commission, 
paragraph 82 of the Opinion. 
S" This distinction was correctly made by Advocate General Van Gerven in Case C-305/89 A4a Romeo, at 
paragraph 23 of the Opinion. 
S97 See note 575 above. 
59" Case C-277/00, paragraphs 82 of the Opinion. 
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the undertaking to which unlawful State aid was granted retains its legal 
personality and continues to carry out, for its own account, the activities 
subsidised by the State aid. Therefore, it is normally this undertaking that 
retains the competitive advantage connected with that aid and it is therefore 
this undertaking that must be required to repay an amount equal to that aid. 
599 
This liability of the company should be distinguished from the doctrine of the single 
economic unit that can also be found in the EC. According to this theory, companies 
belonging to the same group (for example, controlled by the same holding) would 
be regarded, from an economic and legal point of view, as a single 'undertaking' for 
the purposes of State aid rules with the consequence that the obligation to repay the 
aid would concern all of them. 600 (It may however be argued that the application of 
this principle is often more dependent on needs of simplicity of proof and 
effectiveness of the recovery rather than on its soundness with respect to the actual 
determination that the benefit has passed through. ) 
As regards the latter position of the Court, whereby the repayment of the aid is 
required by the sellers of the shares, we can refer to the Banks decision where it was 
made it clear that 
where a company which has benefited from aid has been sold at the market 
price, the purchase price reflects the consequences of the previous aid, and it 
is the seller of that company that keeps the benefit of the aid. In that case, 
the previous situation is to be restored primarily through repayment of the 
aid by the seller. 601 
We have already explained in the WTO context our preference for this reading 
whereby it is not the company but the shareholders /sellers that should be held 
liable. We believe that the same arguments would support the same conclusion in 
EC law. 
5" Ibid, paragraph 81 of the decision. The Court followed the persuasive reasoning of Advocate General 
Tizzano in paragraphs 83 to 85 of the Opinion. See also Case C-303/88, ENI Laarrossi, paragraph 57. 
600 See Case 323/82 Intermi! lr, paragraph 12; see also Advocate General Geelhoed in Joined Cases C-328/99 
and C-399/00 Itay and SIM v Commission, paragraph 79 of the Opinion. 
601 Case C-290/98 Banks, paragraph 78. See also joined Cases C-74/OOP and C-75/OOP Fakk, paragraph 180, 
Case C-350/93 ENI Laaemss II, paragraph 22. This is also the conclusion arguably reached by the Court in 
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The case of circumvention of the repayment 
We will now reconsider the position of the beneficiary, and in particular of the 
buyer, in those cases where it is alleged that the sale transaction is designed to 
circumvent the (obligation of) repayment of the subsidy. 
We have said that, when the sale transaction takes place under normal market 
conditions, the buyer is generally safe since he is not considered as benefiting from 
the aid and thus cannot be required to repay anything. 
There are however cases where it has been advanced that the buyer is not relieved 
from the obligation to repay the subsidy. This issue has come out especially in the 
EC, where, particularly in the case of the reorganisation of groups in difficulties or 
even on occasion of bankruptcy procedures, all the assets - including the benefit 
deriving from the subsidy - were transferred to a new company, thus leaving the 
liabilities - including the duty to repay the subsidy - to the original beneficiaries. 
Quite often, in these cases, the allegation is that there seems to be an attempt to 
circumvent the duty to repay an unlawful or incompatible aid. 
EC law 
We may commence our analysis with few general remarks on the importance of the 
obligation of repayment in the EC system which will prove important when we 
draw a parallel with WTO law. 
In the EC the obligation to repay any aid that is unlawful or is considered by the 
Commission as incompatible with the common market is one of the cornerstones of 
the system of State aid control inasmuch as it guarantees its effectiveness. 602 EC 
law has thus been construed to provide both these obligations of repayment. With 
special regard to the recovery of so-called 'unlawful' aid (ie aid unlawfully granted 
before the Commission has authorised it) this depends on two obligations provided 
for under Article 88(3), that is the notification obligation (whereby any plans to 
the recent joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Sekco, paragraph 85, although the reasoning is rather 
ambiguous fluctuating between an obligation of the company and of the owners/sellers. 
' As regards the recovery of unlawful aid and the effectiveness of the standstill obligation see Case 
C- 
354/90 Salmon, paragraph 16; Case C-39/93 SFEI, paragraphs 45 and 69. See also Case 7O/ 2 
Commijsiox v 
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grant aid should be notified to the Commission) and the standstill obligation 
(whereby the relevant measures shall not be put into effect until the procedure 
before the Commission has resulted in a final - positive - decision), and is reinforced 
by the direct effect before national courts of the last sentence of that provision. 603 
That prohibition gives rise to subjective rights in favour of individuals that national 
courts are bound to safeguard. In particular, national courts must offer the certain 
prospect that all the necessary inferences will be drawn, in accordance with their 
national law, as regards the validity of measures giving effect to the aid, the recovery 
of financial support granted in disregard of that provision, and possible interim 
measures. 604 
The need to remove in any way the distortion on competition caused by the aid is 
consistently repeated by saying that the repayment seeks to re-establish the 
previously existing situation. 605 It may be useful to underline that this is only 
apparently constrained by the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member 
State in the recovery of the aid inasmuch as such autonomy should always guarantee 
that the remedies at issue (apart from being equivalent to those used to protect 
national rights) are effective to safeguard Community law. 606 
Against the particular background of the EC system, where we have the preventive 
centralised control of the Commission and where the repayment of unlawful or 
incompatible aid is the rule, we can appreciate the fears that through artificial 
company reorganisations the obligation of repayment could be circumvented. From 
this perspective, the question becomes whether legal formality should prevail - thus 
impeding the recovery of the aid from the transferee - or whether the economic 
Germany, paragraph 20 where the Court sanctioned the power of the Commission to order the recovery of 
incompatible aid. This power is clearly of crucial importance for the functioning of the system- 
I The Court has made it clear that the 'recovery of unlawful aid is the logical consequence that it is unlawful' 
(see Case C-142/87 Tubemeuse, paragraph 66. It has also been quite early recognised that the standstill 
obligation in that provision is directly effective. See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, page 596; Case 120/73 Lorrný, 
paragraph 8. 
'" Case C-354/90 Salmon, paragraph 12. 
60 See, for example, Case C-382/99 Netherlands v Commission, paragraph 89; more recently, see joined Cases 
C-238/99 and C-399/0011ay and SIM v Comwbiion, paragraph 65. Cf also Case C-350/93 Commission v Italy, 
paragraph 22, and Case C-277/00 Germany v ComaissioR, where the Court held at paragraph 76 that'the main 
purpose of the repayment of unlawfully paid State aid is to eliminate the distortion of competition caused by 
the competitive advantage afforded by the unlawful aid'. 
See Case 120/73 Long paragraph 9; see also Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-126/01 Germ, 
paragraph 44. 
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substance of the situation should be looked at - thus allowing the recovery from the 
transferee. 
We are however of the view that if the buyer has to be held responsible this has to 
occur only in limited and well defined circumstances. This is particularly so if the 
buyer has paid the market price so that he should in principle be held to be safe 
from any liability. 607 Moreover, from the perspective of the creditors (including the 
Member State seeking the recovery of the aid) of the undertaking in bankruptcy 608 
the sale of shares or assets at the market price is not liable to prejudice their position 
inasmuch as it does not remove resources from the bankrupt undertaking's assets. 
609 
We have said that it is sometimes alleged that the buyer should be held liable in 
cases of fraud or circumvention of the law. 610 It has however to be noted these 
concepts are inherently elusive and difficult to define, in particular as far as the 
proof of their subjective element - the intention to circumvent the law - is 
concerned. It could be advanced that the presence of certain objective elements 
concomitant with the transfer transaction, such as the opening by the Commission 
of a procedure of control under Article 88 EC, might show the presence of a 
fraudulent intention. However, certain elements, such as the fact that the 
transaction has taken place at market conditions or that, in the context of insolvency 
proceedings, the transaction was carried out by administrators or under judicial 
supervision, G11 may in fact lead to the conclusion that no circumvention has been 
perpetrated. In short, the reality is that the burden of proof concerning the intention 
607 Cf Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraphs 80,86 and 92. It should be noted that it has been argued that the 
'market' price would not be an appropriate indicator as it would be particularly low because of the situation of 
difficulty of the seller and would thus allow part of the advantage of the subsidy to pass through to the buyer. 
This is particularly clear in the case of bankruptcy proceedings. See Advocate General Geelhoed in Joined 
Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Jta and SIM v Commission, paragraph 82 of the Opinion. 
6 It may be recalled that it is commonly accepted that the re-establishment of the previous situation and the 
elimination of the distortion of competition resulting from the unlawfully paid aid may, in principle, be 
achieved by registration of the liability relating to the repayment of the aid in question in the schedule of 
liabilities, and that such registration would be sufficient. See Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraph 85. See also 
Case 52/84 Comm/mon v Be/gixm, paragraph 14; Case C-142/87 Tubenreuse, paragraphs 60 to 62. 
60 Case C-277/00, SMI, paragraph 92. 
aio Li (2005) page 221; Rehbinder (2004) page 129; for the argument whereby repayment might 
be ordered 
to the buyer even if there is no fraud see Levi, ibid, pages 221 and 222, who relies on recital in of 
Reg 
794/2004. 
61' See Case C-277/00 SMI, paragraphs 92 and 93. 
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to circumvent the duty to repay is not easy to discharge, as it is shown by the case 
law on the abuse of right doctrine. 
612 
This difficulty does not detract from the fact that (even) Member States may indeed 
be found to have devised mechanisms to circumvent the obligation to recover. The 
Court has thus very recently found that legislation permitting the transfer, without 
any consideration, of the personnel and the most profitable assets of an airline, free 
of all the company's debts, to a new company, and making it impossible to recover 
the former company's debts from the new firm constituted an obstacle to the 
repayment of the aid and to the effective implementation of the Commission's order 
of recovery. 613 
WTO law 
It could now be asked whether this issue that has come out in the context of the EC 
could also be relevant in the WTO. This question will provide us with the 
opportunity to focus on the general features of the WTO system of subsidy control. 
It should immediately be recalled that, in the context of WTO law, the importance 
of the identification of the beneficiary of the subsidy has a double relevance at the 
remedial level inasmuch as it could be the basis of a withdrawal of the subsidy or of 
the imposition of a countervailing duty. Clearly, the issue of the circumvention 
could arise in either context. For the sake of the comparison with EC law, in our 
analysis we will however concentrate only on the possible withdrawal of the subsidy. 
It is indeed known that, according to the Australia - Leather 21.5 Panel, the 
withdrawal of subsidies should include their retrospective repayment, at least with 
respect to the category of prohibited subsidies (the state of the law with respect to 
actionable subsidies is still uncertain). 614 Despite the lack of success of this 
doctrine in the following disputes, 615 it could however be argued that also in the 
6"z This is another case where a difficult concept is rarely applied. Despite affirming the abuse of right 
doctrine in principle, the Court has thus always been quite reluctant to follow this line of argument. We can 
for example refer to the interesting case law on the establishment of secondary seats of companies. 
613 See Case C-415/03 Commission v Grwce, paragraphs 32 to 34. For other more recent cases where the claim 
has been rejected by the Court see Case T-324/00 CDAI; Case T-138/00 Freu taat ThIrinnrn. 
614 See Panel, Aistmlia - Axtomotinr LealherArtick 21.5, paragraph 6.22. 
6t5 The A,. rtra/ia - Axtomotizv Leather implementation Panel report was the 
first ruling to recommend a 
retroactive remedy in WTO law. Although its impact for the development of WTO law might be 
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WTO legal system the fraudulence of company reorganisations to elude the 
effectiveness of the remedy could be relevant in these cases and the buyer could be 
held liable of the repayment of the subsidy. Even more so, when it is established 
that a benefit has in fact passed through in favour of the buyer because, for 
example, market conditions have not been followed. 
At the same time, however, the different emphasis in the two systems with respect 
to the retroactivity of the remedies seems to provide an opposite argument 
It is indeed known that remedies in the WTO are generally prospective (ie are 
effective only as far as future conduct is concerned) and only rarely (and, quite 
interestingly, in some GATT countervailing and anti-dumping duties cases) a 
retroactive effect has been recognised. 616 Clearly, however, this temporal limitation 
would have a significant impact on the possibility of drawing a comparison with EC 
law where the retroactivity of the repayment is the rule. It has however rightly been 
noted that 'purely prospective remedies hardly constitute a deterrent effect against 
potential violators', 617 as is indeed witnessed by the experience in the EC and by the 
case law of the Court of justice stressing the importance of the repayment of 
unlawful and incompatible aid. 
Finally, the weakness of the remedies is accompanied by the known relative 
flexibility in the compliance of DSB's decisions. Although full compliance with the 
rulings and recommendations of the DSB, which usually requires the withdrawal of 
the measures found to be inconsistent with WTO law (see Article 3.7 DSU) is the 
first objective of the dispute settlement system, the regime provides for other paths, 
in the form of compensation or suspension of concessions, that, at least in theory, 
should only be temporary solutions (ibid). A similar flexibility cannot be found in 
the EC system where compliance with the decisions of the Court of justice can even 
be enforced with penalties (see Article 228(2) EC). 
considerable, it seems that Panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes have carefully avoided 
applying that drastic remedy. Cf, for example, Panel, Canada - Aircraft Article 21.5, paragraphs 5.47 and 
5.48; 
Appellate Body, US - FSC, paragraph 178. 
61a For a comprehensive account on remedies in WTO law see Mavroidis (2000). 
617 Ibid, page 790. 
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The weakness of the remedies (as compared with the EC) is coupled with another 
general factor that may weaken the scope of the obligation to recover unlawful 
subsidies, that is the laxity of the system of control of subsidies. 
The procedural and institutional frameworks of EC and WTO law are obviously 
different with the latter still lagging behind the complexity of the former. In 
particular, WTO law does not provide yet for a preventive system of authorisation 
carried out by a supranational body in all cases of planned aid. Notification 
obligations are of more limited scope, usually concerning aid already granted or 
maintained (Article 25.2 SCM), the only notable exception being that of non- 
actionable subsidies (Article 8.3 SCM). 618 Moreover, we do not have a true and 
comprehensive authorisation system, the more stringent control being provided for 
non-actionable subsidies in the two forms of review under Articles 8 and 9 SCM. In 
short, it seems that the procedural and institutional system of control of subsidies is 
less rigorous than that in the EC. 
Eta Non-actionable subsidies have to be notified in advance of their implementation to the 
Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In default of notification the subsidy may 
be considered as 
actionable or subject to countervailing duty investigations until its non-actionable status 
is ascertained (see 
note 35 of the SCI! ). 
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III. The idea and analysis of specificity 
1. Introduction 
Both EC law and WTO law require that a State aid and a subsidy be specific 
inasmuch as it should confer an advantage only on certain economic subjects. 
Article 87 EC provides that State aid should distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. As chapeau to a more elaborate 
provision, Article 2 SCM defines the concept by referring to a subsidy specific to 
certain enterprises, ie to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or 
industries. 
Two remarks can immediately be made. 
First, the immediate impression is that this requirement is clearly intended to 
operate as a tool to limit the measures that are regulated by State aid or subsidy rules. 
Secondly, its underlying rationale is. not fully clear. Better, it is not clear whether 
there is any or indeed more than one. 
We will commence our analysis by attempting to answer these questions: does the 
specificity idea have a rationale underlying it? If so, what is/are it/they? The 
identification of the justification(s) of the concept of specificity is crucial to 
approach confidently the second part of the analysis, which focuses on some of its 
most interesting applications. Only by following this process, we will be in the 
position to assess whether the operation of the specificity test is in line with its 
alleged justifications and, eventually, whether our first impression that it is a sieve is 
in fact validated. 
2. The justification of the idea of specificity 
The idea of specificity has generally found two broad types of rationales, economic 
and non-economic. 619 We will analyse them in turn. 
619 There is a wide literature on the issue, particularly American, since it 
is there that the test flourished. Sec, 
eg, Barcelö (1977); Bello and Holmer (1984/1985); Cameron and Berg (1985); Sussman 
(1986). Panzarella 
(1986); Alexander (1989); Ragosta and Shanker (1994). 
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Economic rationales 
The common proposition that economists make to justify the use of a specificity 
test is that specific measures would be, or at least would have the potential of being, 
more distortive than general ones. 620 
This is sometimes linked to the idea of comparative advantage. 621 It is in particular 
said that specific subsidies would particularly interfere with the allocation of 
resources domestically - and hence internationally - thus shifting artificially 
comparative advantages between countries. 622 
In particular, subsidies may alter the comparative advantage for two reasons: first 
because they are liable to reduce the costs of the recipient, secondly because the)' 
attract resources towards the recipient market. 
Presumably, the impact on competition and competitors would be particularly 
noticeable when competitive advantages are not well defined (which occurs when 
the economies of the two countries and of the two industries are close) and when 
there is consequently a lot of intra-industry trade in the good or service at issue. 
Along these lines, with a dangerous reasoning a contrario, Benitah (2001: 258) 
critically conclude that 
[t]his type of "distortion" would not have taken place had the subsidy been 
generally available to all industries. In such a case, these industries would have 
been on equal terms for obtaining scarce productive resources and the 
mechanism described above could not have taken place. 
That said, the fact that more specific interventions would be more distortive than 
generic ones is often criticised. 
See, eg, Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 5 and 45); OFT (2005: 35); OFT (2004: 22 and 29); 
Frontier Economics (2004: 15 and 16). 
621 For a general introduction on the theory of comparative advantage cf Trebilcock & Howse (1999); 
for a 
more detailed analysis see Krugman & Obstfeld (1999). 
' This is, for example, the argument put forward by Harper and Schwartz (1972: 840) which seems to 
imply 




In this regard, the writer cannot resist citing an anecdote. It is reported that, at a 
Committee's meeting of the 25th October 1990 during the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations, the representative of the United States - the cradle of the specificity 
test - observed that 
it had no economic justification. ... 
Obviously, the specificity concept was still 
embedded in US law and regulations. However, the United States had concluded 
that the concept, which it had created and promoted, did not have the degree of 
attractiveness once attributed to it. The United States had the intellectual 
honesty to so admit, and it would seek to convince others in the proper 
negotiating forum of that change of view. 623 
Leaving the diplomatic arena to turn to economics again, it is commonly conceded 
that general measures of interventions are less likely to involve rent-seeking (ie the 
hunt to get the government to intervene so as to make one's business more 
profitable). 624 There is on the contrary some disagreement on whether they are 
more likely to be targeted at - and hence effective at solving - failures (ie 
imperfections) of the market. 625 
That said, it is however increasingly argued that general measures too may alter the 
comparative advantage of countries (which are for example increasingly linked to 
social investments in health, education, law and order, basic research, and physical 
infrastructure) thus distorting competition and trade. 626 
According to OECD (2001: 29- 30), this may in particular occur when the relevant 
product or service markets are broader than the national boundaries. Even if the 
measure at issue apply to all firms within the country (and hence is considered as 
general) it will still be capable to affect the position of those foreign firms that 
compete with (read: that operate in the same relevant product or service market of) 
national firms of the benefited industries. 
A notable recognition that general measures too might distort competition can be 
traced back to the very roots of the European Community, the Spaak Report, which 
GATT Doc No SCM/M/48,15-16. 
Trebilcock & Howse (2005: 289); OFT (2005: 35); Besley and Seabright (1999: 20). 
For the positive Besley and Seabright (1999: 20); for the negative see, eg, OFT (2005: 35-36). 
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laid down the basis for Articles 96 and 97 EC (on the approximation of laws to 
tackle distortions of competition). 
One traditional argument in defence of general measures is that they would 
generally be neutral as any distorting effect would be compensated by other macro- 
economic factors. It is thus observed that, in the context of a floating exchange-rate 
world, the effects of general measures would be quite minimal because they would 
be adjusted by exchange rate mechanisms. 627 Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 289) 
have however recently noted that in an international environment where exchange 
rates are increasingly determined by international capital flows rather than good 
flows the said adjustment becomes more difficult. It should further be noted that, 
at least in the context of the EC, this argument can by no means be predicated with 
respect to those countries that share a common monetary policy whose central 
element is the adoption of a single currency, the Euro. 
Also the argument that the distortive effect of general interventions would be 
decreased, or even eliminated, because any advantage arising from them would 
normally be financed, at least partly, by the same beneficiaries of the measures is not 
far-reaching as there is not necessarily any such symmetry between the financing of 
the measure and its anti-competitive impact. 
Assuming that also general measures may be distortive, the paradoxical nature of the 
specificity criterion is often highlighted. 
Lowenfeld (2002: 237- 238) pragmatically observed that, from the perspective of the 
competitors, it is indeed irrelevant whether they are the only ones to be injured or 
whether other sectors of the economy are distorted as well. 
Along this path, on the assumption 'the wider the more distortive', it is even argued 
that it cannot possibly be understood why individual or sectoral subsidies would be 
caught by the regulation whereas measures of wider scope would be permitted. 
This is the suggestive argument put forward in the EC by Advocate General 
Capotorti in Buy Irish where he noted that 
' See Trebilcock and Howse (1999: 289). 
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quite apart from the wording of Article [87 EC], it is perfectly justifiable to 
speak of a general principle of the prohibition of public aids to domestic 
products. 628 
What the previous exposition shows is that the economics underlying the concept 
of specificity is not unambiguous. Although the impact of specific subsidies is quite 
probably more apparent than those of general measures, the specificity test can at 
most be grounded on what has been termed by Benitah (2001: 256 et sec) a simple 
idea of distortion. 
The insufficiency of economics to fully justify the idea of specificity cannot however 
lead to conclude that the latter 'stands as a surrogate for an efficiency analysis'. 629 
This is not correct for two reasons. 
First, as chapter 5 will show, an analysis largely based on efficiency considerations is 
(or should be) carried out in both the EC and WTO at a subsequent stage, when the 
negative and positive effects of the measure at issue are assessed and balanced with 
each other. In this light, as has been argued with respect to the use of market 
criteria in the advantage analysis, the fact that the specificity test would be based on 
a `simple' idea of distortion is not per se a minus. Neither the advantage nor the 
specificity have the duty to tell us whether there is a distortion or a correction of a 
distortion. 
Further, although conceding that the economics underlying the concept of 
specificity is not fully clear, some agreement can be gathered around the idea that 
the specificity criterion may reasonably capture those measures that are more easily 
liable to distort efficient market outcomes. 
In the absence of a clear theoretical rationale for judging the welfare implications of 
a greater or lesser degree of specificity in a subsidy intervention, Low (2001: 114 and 
120) has accordingly acknowledged that specificity should be considered as a 'valid 
rule of thumb' for focusing on those subsidies that are likely to be more distorting. 
6=' Jackson (1997: 297); Beseler & Williams (1986: 138). For the EC, see also the Spaak Reporl (1956). 
6s Case 249/81, page 4031. 
6" Tarullo (1986/1987: 560). Cf, along this same line of argument, Ahlborn and Berg (2004: 54-55)'s 
allegation that, under EC law, that there is not necessarily any direct link between the distortion underlying 
the specificity criterion and the effects of the subsidy. 
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630 For example, certain forms of intervention that are especially likely to distort 
competition, such as support to failing firms, are usually discriminatory inasmuch as 
they are given only to firms known to be failing. 631 
In short, we can conclude this paragraph by underlying that, although it would be 
too radical to conclude that the specificity requirement does not have any economic 
justification (as the US attempted to do at the end of the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations), economics alone does not explain its rationale. As Professor Jackson 
(1997: 297) lapidarily put it 
economic arguments can only go part of the way toward explaining [its 
rationale]. 
Non-economic rationales 
Having concluded for the insufficiency of economics to exhaustively justify the 
requirement of specificity, in this paragraph we will enquire whether the analysis of 
non-economic considerations can contribute to define its justification. In particular, 
we will focus on arguments of political and practical nature. 
It is indeed often argued that the true rationale of specificity should be found in 
political or practical reasons. 632 
On the one hand, there are reasons of pragmatic order. Beviglia Zampetti (1996: 21) 
thus argues that the requirement that only measures concerning certain undertakings 
should be subject to the scrutiny of State aid and subsidy rules would avoid a 
'painstaking' review of too many governmental measures that may distort 
competition and trade. (This argument bears a significant resemblance with one put 
forward by Advocate General Jacobs in the context of the debate on the necessity 
of a transfer of State resources. ) 633 With another nice formulation Hufbauer and 
Shelton-Erb (1984: 92) noted that: 
610 Low (2001: 114 and 120). 
'31 OECD (2001: 19). 
.. 2 See, eg, Bello and Holmer (1984/1985: 308); Jackson (1997: 297); Barcelö (1977: 836-837); 
Berigha 
Zampetti (1996: 21); 
' See, Case C-52/97 Virado, paragraph 18 of the Opinion. 
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ý. ýaa 
[t]he special favor concept now appears to serve as Ockham's razor to eliminate a 
wide range of government programs from the sphere on international law. 
From this perspective, the specificity rationale would eventually he in a let 
parsimoniae, in a law of succinctness. In modern words, of administrative/judicial 
economy. 
It is also observed that subjecting general measures to the scrutiny of subsidy rules 
could lead to the imposition of countervailing duties on virtually every product 
entering international trade and could thus jeopardise the functioning of the 
international trading order itself. 634 
On the other hand, the selection operated by the specificity requirement would find 
a justification in considerations of more political order. General measures would 
require more deference and self-restraint. We have seen that, contrary to more 
specific measures, they are quite probably less distortive of competition and trade 
and are more easily justifiable in terms of legitimate public objectives. This could in 
turn more simply reflect the exercise of sovereign prerogatives. This argument is 
often formulated in terms of an 'everybody-does-so' rationale which would justify 
the need to eliminate from the scrutiny of State aid and subsidy rules certain 
measures. This argument is well explained by a passage of Jackson (1997: 297): 
[i]f we recognize the need to eliminate from the subset of subsidies called 
'actionable' the general activities that all governments undertake (such as 
societal infrastructure like police, fire protection, roads, schools, etc), the 
specificity test can offer a very useful method for doing so. Thus, it can be 
argued that part of the rationale for the specificity test is that it is useful as a 
tool of administration (albeit sometimes blunt) to get rid of a number of 
cases which really ought not be brought into a countervailing duty or other 
international rule process. 
''Jackson (1997: 293). See also Barcelo (1977: 836) and Hufbauer & Shelton-Erb (1984: 92)- 
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Interestingly, it is recognised that the specificity test can be blunt. This echoes our 
previous finding that, from an economic standpoint, specificity may be viewed as a 
reasonable approximation, a rule of thumb. 
As are about to explain, this lack of precision can be reconciled with the political 
economy rationale of the specificity test. 
A truly political economy justification 
We have seen that economics can only partly justify the specificity test, inasmuch as 
it constitutes, at most, a 'valid rule of thumb' to identify the most blatant distortions. 
We have also seen that this economic idea of simple or potential distortion should 
be coupled by important considerations of political and practical conveniency. 
Combining both lines of argumentation, it could thus be concluded that the 
requirement of specificity finds its grounding in the realm of political economy, ie in the 
place where the findings of economic theory (which are based on efficiency 
considerations) serve (only) as a basis for political choices. In other words, this 
term significantly draws attention to political motivation giving shape to economic 
policies and choices. 635 
There is a clear consequence deriving from this political economic rationale which 
can be summed up in a question: is specificity sufficiently specific? 
This question particularly refers i) to the flexibility/uncertainty, and ii) to the 
expansiveness that can both characterize the specificity analysis once it steps into the 
realm of political economy. 
On the one hand, as a direct consequence of the discretional nature of the 
requirement, which depends on its political/pragmatic rationale, it can be noted that 
specificity is a flexible tool. As an inevitable corollary, the prediction of the results of 
the assessment is often uncertain. 
On the other hand, as we will see below, the application of this requirement seems 
to show a trend towards expansiveness. 
63s Cf Black's Dictionary of Economics (2003: 358). 
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In this regard, a contradiction should be underlined. 
The chapeau of Article 2.1 SCM explains that the phrase 'certain enterprises' should 
refer to 'an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries' (emphasis 
added). On its part, we have seen that Article 87(1) EC regulates those measures 
that favour 'certain undertakings or the production of certain goods'. It has 
accordingly been observed that the language used by the two legal systems clearly 
indicates a limited scope of application (see, again, the article in the singular in 
Article 2.1 SCM). 
In other words, it seems that 'certain' should be construed as 'few' (if not, in the 
SCM, 'one' only). This conclusion seems to be confirmed if the traditional theory of 
comparative advantage is endorsed, which refers to the competitive position of well- 
defined industries. 
However, in many cases, the application of the test in the two systems seems often 
to indicate a wide reach which can in turn put into question the selectiveness of the 
specificity requirement. 
3. The application of the specificity test 
The specificity analysis and its test 
Whereas the GATT 1947 did not make any mention to any specificity analysis, the 
Treaty of Rome adopted a few years later already incorporated the short legal 
formulation of the specificity criterion of Article 87(1) EC (whereby the measure at 
issue should favour certain undertakings or the production of certain sectors) that 
has never been amended and has been developed in the practice of the Commission 
and in the case law of the Court. 
Over the years GATT/WTO faced an interesting evolution. Although not 
providing an express specificity requirement, various provisions of the Tokyo 
Subsidy Code (see, eg, Article 11.3) were already hinting at this test which was 
commonly used in the application of CV duties in many jurisdictions, including the 
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US and the EC. 636 It was not until the advent of the WTO, however, that the SCM 
Agreement expressly provided in Article 2 an elaborate specificity test constituted of 
three different progressive stages drawing inspiration from the test developed in US 
countervailing duty law. 
Despite a different historical development, the specificity analysis in both systems 
seems to be constituted of three different tests (or, from another perspective, three stages 
of the same . rpeczficity tesi). 
Although this is apparent in the sophisticated formulation 
of Article 2 SCM, Roberti (1997: 200-200) noted that this is essentially true also with 
respect to EC law. It is therefore justified to analyse the law of both systems 
simultaneously. 
The first, and most straightforward, step of the test is to determine whether the 
measure is expressly addressed to certain undertakings or sectors of the economy, 
which is usually defined as de jure specificity. This concept is enshrined in Article 
2.1(a) SCM which provides that the measure is de jure specific when 'the granting 
authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, 
explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises'. 637 
If this is not the case, it is then necessary to focus on the operation and impact of 
the measure to determine whether it is specific or not. The second step is thus to 
assess whether the financial assistance is granted on the basis of objective criteria or 
on a discretional basis. 
The fact that the measure is not explicitly targeted at certain undertakings and 
operates according to objective criteria, however, may not be sufficient to exclude 
the specificity of the measure if the latter is in fact (de facto) capable of conferring an 
advantage to certain undertakings or sectors. This is the third, and most difficult, 
step of the test. 
The following exposition includes a selection of some of most interesting issues 
arising from the application of the specificity analysis, in particular with respect to 
the second and third stages of the test. 
For the EC, see eg Adamantopoulos and Pereyra-Friedrichsen (2001); Van Bael and Beltes (2004: 555 et 
seq). For the US see eg Jackson, Davey and Sykes (2002: Chapter 18) and Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 275 
et seq). 
63' Emphasis added. 
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In the examination of these issues we will inter alia attempt to examine whether the 
specificity analysis carried out in the EC on the basis of the short sentence in Article 
87(1) EC can be compared with the analysis of the, at least apparently, more 
sophisticated WTO test. The difference in age of the two provisions may well play 
a difference, at least insofar as the amount of administrative, judicial and scholarly 
interpretation is concerned. In particular, the case-law on Article 2 SCM is still 
extremely limited. If necessary, this difference in experience can however partly, 
and reasonably, be redressed by considering the interpretations made in US 
countervailing duty law, which, as said, constitutes the direct model of Article 2 
SCM. 
The specificity test between limitation, flexibility, certainty and 
expansiveness 
It has been seen that, in both EC and WTO law, the specificity requirement appears 
to be a tool to limit the number of measures subject to the scrutiny of State 
aid/subsidy rules. 
We have however also seen that three inherent characteristics of the rationales 
underlying specificity often put into question this general objective of limitation. On 
the one hand, the political/discretional nature of the assessment often implies its 
f exihility and leads to uncertainty of results. On the other hand, one of the tendencies 
of the specificity analysis in both legal systems is its expansiveness. 638 As we will see, 
these inherent characteristics can be appreciated in various cases. 
The definition of 'certain' (how many is 'certain'? ) 
We have seen above that the expressions 'certain' undertakings or enterprises in the 
Article 87(1) EC and in Article 2.1 SCM immediately seem to point out to a limited 
' In the EC Ahlborn and Berg (2004: 51-54) refer to'an ever-expanding universe'. In %XTO law Matsushita, 
Schoenbaum and Mavroidis (2003: 271) note that the multiple tests of Article 2 SCM 
'demonstrate the will of 
the negotiators to include a priori as many subsidies as possible under the term "specific'". This is particularly 
evidence by the third step of de facto specificity. 
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scope of the concept of specificity. According to this reading, the impression is that 
under those provisions a measure is specific if benefits only few (if not only one) 
undertakings or sectors. 
However, even a superficial examination of the case law leads us to understand that 
this is not the case and that a measure is held to be specific even though it 
advantages several undertakings and sectors (to cover even the extreme case that all 
undertakings and sectors but one are touched). 
A brief review of the case-law of the Court of justice may be useful in this regard. 
According to the Court, aid for all exports, 639 for a whole sector of the economy or 
for a region is specific. 640 More recently, it was also made it clear that neither the 
high number of benefiting undertakings nor the diversity and importance of the 
industrial sectors to which those undertakings belong warrant the conclusion that a 
scheme constituted a general measure of economic policy rather than a State aid. 641 
Similarly, the Court of First Instance held that a Spanish scheme to assist in the 
purchase of commercial vehicles by natural persons, SMEs, regional public bodies 
and bodies providing local public services was specific because large undertakings 
were excluded. 642 It has even been assumed that financial assistance to the whole 
manufacturing sector can constitute State aid. 643 
This short review of EC law can be concluded with a very useful definition of 
Advocate General Roemer which nicely sums up the approach to specificity in the 
EC. Using a negative formulation, he once suggested that the specificity test would 
apply to any measure which does not apply generally to all the undertakings in a 
Member State. 644 
'39 See Joined Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v France, paragraphs 20 and 21, Case 57/86, Grren v Commiirion, 
paragraph 8. 
"0 See Case 248/84 Germany v Commission, paragraph 18. 
Case C-75/97 Maribel paragraphs 32 to 34; cf also Case C-143/9 Adria-Wien Pipekme, paragraph 48. 
Case T-55/99 CETM, paragraph 47. Cf also Case C-351 /98 Spain v Commirsion, paragraph 40; Case C- 
409/00 Spain v Commission, paragraphs48 to 50. 
Case C-143/9 Adria-lVien Pipeline, paragraph 55. It is interesting to make reference to the practice of the 
Commission, and in particular to the Irish Corporation Tax case where the Commission changed view on 
whether support for the whole manufacturing sector was specific. See Ahlborn & Berg (2004: 
52). 
Cases 6& 11/69 Commission v Framer, at page 552. 
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It is clear from these statements that a measure may have a quite broad scope of 
application and may nonetheless be considered as specific. Hypothetically, a strict 
application of the negative formulation of Advocate General Roemer would lead to 
consider as specific a measure that applies to all undertakings of the economy but 
one. 
A comparable comprehensiveness can be found in the WTO as well. Thus a 
subsidy to all undertakings in a region is specific (see Article 2.2 SCM). Quite 
similarly, for export subsidies (and the comparable category of local-content 
subsidies) specificity is presumed. 
This brief examination of the law in the two systems seems to confirm that the 
definition of specificity is quite wide and can capture many measures that, at an 
initial reading, seemed to fall outside the scope of the regulation. 
The examples of export and regional aid 
It may now be useful to examine two interesting examples of measures that are 
considered in both systems as specific measures. What will be interesting is to 
assess the rationale of these conclusion, which, so it seems, can very much be 
explained in terms of political economy. 
The first example is that of export aid. Export subsidies are considered in both 
systems as specific. Article 2.3 SCM expressly provides that prohibited subsidies 
(category which includes both export subsidies and local-content subsidies) are 
deemed to be specific. Quite similarly, in the EC, the case law of the Court has 
soon held that export subsidies are specific. 645 
This conclusion is sometimes criticised. Quigley and Collins (2003: 190) have thus 
wondered why is aid generally granted to all exporting undertakings and sectors 
regarded as specific, and, conversely, aid to all domestic undertakings is not specific. 
645 Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v Frame, paragraphs 20 e 21; Case 57/86, Gma V Commission, paragraph 8 
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As we will see when the effects of the subsidy are examined, export subsidies (and 
subsidies assimilated to them) are treated more harshly because they are considered 
more distorting and more dangerous. Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 276-277) have 
thus suggested that their intent is more clearly protectionist and, in contrast with 
domestic subsidies, they are more difficult to explain in terms of legitimate 
objectives. Further, they are particularly apt to create diplomatic and trade wars. 
This may all be true but it does not fully explain why they should be considered as 
specific. Once again, the serious candidate for their justification has to be found in 
a political decision. Export subsidies (et similia) are so dangerous (and difficult to 
justify) that specificity is somewhat assumed. 
The issue of whether measures targeted at certain regions should be considered as 
specific has always been rather controversial. The issue was for example subject to 
great debate in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 646 
It is in particular important to define regional specificity. The following remarks are 
made with respect to WTO but are similarly valid also for the EC. 
Article 2.2 SCM talks of subsidy limited to certain enterprises within the region. 
This language raises the doubt that, to be regionally specific, a measure should not 
target all enterprises within the region but only certain of them. This doubt is solved 
with a systemic analysis, by considering the rules on non-actionable subsidies where 
it is clear that regional measures, which are assumed to be specific within the 
meaning of Article 2 SCM, can be justified only if they are not specific within the 
region. It should further be noted that both in the WTO and in the EC regional 
measures can be justified only if they are not specific within the region. The 
underlying general idea is that the more specific is the measure the less difficult is to 
justify it in terms of positive externalities produced (which, as seen above, is 
controversial in economic circles). 
It is clear that regional subsidies are not as such targeted to specific enterprises 
operating in a certain sector or industry. 
647 As Matsushita, Schoenbaum & 
6" See, eg, MTN. GNG/NG/W/3, paragraph 1.1(b) and MTN. GNG/NG10/WY'/4, pages 10,11 and 12. 
647 Moreover, this category of aid is a good example of those measures that are not necessarily addressed at 
domestic undertakings. Systems of regional aid are often designed to provide incentives for domestic and 
foreign undertakings alike in order to relocate in the disadvantaged regions. 
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Mavroidis (2003: 283) clearly note, this could be the case if, for example, a declining 
region is associated with the production of one good, but, in general, this is not 
necessarily so. 
The tentative answer is that, quite probably, the underlying rationale is based, as 
Benitah (2001: 260) has suggested, on a simple idea of distortion. A regional 
subsidy would artificially interfere with the allocation of resources shifting them 
between regions. 
What has to be asked is whether the underlying idea is also the idea of comparative 
advantage and specialisation of countries/regions. However, Trebilcock and Howse 
(2005: 3-4) also noted that for an `unfortunate semantic legacy' from Ricardo's 
analysis we normally talk of comparative advantage of countries/regions. In fact we 
should be talking of firms. It seems therefore that this traditional economic theory 
is - again - particularly relevant is there is a coincidence between region and 
industry. 
Finally, it may be made reference to another distinction which is clearly founded on 
a political choice (according to our previous analysis in chapter 3, on a constitutional 
principle). The writer is alluding to the distinction between local measures with 
local impact on the one side (which should not be specific) and central measures 
with local impact on the other side (which should be specific). G48 This issue is 
currently a hot topic in the EC, being subject to the scrutiny of the Court in the 
Azores case. 
Specificity, objective requirements and discretionality 
According to Article 2.1(b) SCM, there is no specificity if the granting authority or 
the legislation establishes objective criteria or conditions on the eligibility for and the 
amount of the subsidy. These criteria and conditions must be 'objective', which 
means 'neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are 
economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as the number of employees 
' Cf Bacon (1997: 293; Benitah (2001: 260); Wishlade (Chapter 1). 
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or size of enterprise'. Moreover, they must be 'clearly spelled out in law, regulation, 
or other official document, so as to be capable of verification', their eligibility must 
be automatic and they must be strictly adhered to. 
A similar conclusion is generally reached in the EC. When aid is granted in 
accordance with objective, neutral and automatic criteria there is no specificity. 
Conversely, both legal systems converge in considering that the discretional grant of 
financial support satisfies the requirement of specificity. 649 
An interesting application of the objective criteria set forth above concerns the 
support for Small and Medium Sited Enter prises (SMEs). 
The controversy around the specificity of these measures is proved by the fact that, 
while in the WTO they are not specific, they are deemed to be so in the EC. 
Applying the criteria under Article 2.1(b) SCM, and considering in particular the 
reference to the number of employees and the size of the enterprise, 
Adamantopoulos & Pereyra-Friedrichsen (2001: 109) have correctly concluded that 
financial assistance to SMEs would not be specific whereas it would be so, although 
it could be authorised if it meets certain conditions, in the EC. 650 
Interestingly, the Court of justice was confronted with the argument that a measure 
favouring inter alia SMEs was not specific because it satisfied the criteria of 
objectivity of the SCM Agreement. 
The Court roundly rejected the argument 
the fact that the contested aid would not be considered to be a `specific subsidy' 
under the Agreement on Subsidies cannot reduce the scope of the definition of 
aid under Article [87(1)EC]. 651 
"9 The case law on the point is vast. A classic authority in this regard is Case C-256/97 DAMT, paragraph 27; 
for more recent applications, see Cases T-436-348/99 Teri torio Histörico de flluva, paragraph 51; Cases T- 
269/99, T-271-272/99 Terrtono Histdnco de GaipXzcoa, paragraph 55. 
'50 It is also interesting to speculate that, quite probably, under the SCM aid to large and very large 
undertakings is more likely to qualify as de, facto specific than aid to SMMEs. Everything however seems to 
depend on the structure of the market. 
6s' See C-351/98 Spain v Commi sios, paragraph 44 and Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission, paragraph 56. 
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The fact that the measure provides for objective criteria of eligibility does not 
preclude its classification as specific. The conclusion will be that we are not 
confronted with an individual aid but rather with an aid scheme or a general aid. 652 
It therefore seems that, in this regard, EC law is stricter than WTO law. 
The EC position is not however followed by everybody. Schön (1999: 929) 
criticized the conclusion that measures targeted at SMEs should be specific since it 
is not based on the activity of the undertakings but rather on their size. Clearly, this 
issue is independent from the fact that, due to their special role in the economy and 
their particular problems, aid to SMEs may find a special treatment when 
justifications are concerned. 
Admittedly, the explanation of the classification of these measures as specific remains 
open. Indeed no recognisable economic foundation can be found. Similarly, there 
does not seem to be any noticeable pragmatic or political justification, apart from the 
will to subject these measures under the scrutiny of EC State aid law. This is a good 
example where the discretional element of the specificity assessment - and its 
expansiveness - comes out prominently. 
De facto specificity 
The most interesting step of the test is that of de facto specificity which is established 
when, notwithstanding the appearance of being generally available, the measure at 
issue is in fact limited to certain enterprises. Thus the de facto test does not focus on 
the legislation per se but on the actual disbursements made on the basis of that 
legislation. 
Article 2.1 (c) provides that 
if, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the 
application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are 
reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be 
considered. Such factors are: the use of a subsidy programme by a limited 
number of certain enterprises, the predominant use by certain enterprises, the 
6" Case C-409/00 Spaix v Commiuion, paragraph 49 
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granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, 
and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority 
in the decision to grant a subsidy. In applying this subparagraph, account shall be 
taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction 
of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during which the 
subsidy programme has been in operation. 
A footnote to this indent reads that particular consideration will be given to 
'information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are refused or 
approved and the reasons for such decisions'. 
This test, which also applies in EC law, 653 is often considered as a good example of 
the expansive trend of the concept of specificity. This may well be true, considering 
in particular the degree of flexibility required by this factual assessment. It should 
nonetheless be observed that this expansion seems to be justified if what matters is 
substance and not form. 654 
Difficulty of distinguishing between specific and generic measures 
One of the most significant difficulties of the specificity analysis, and in particular of 
de facto specificity, is that it is sometimes quite difficult to determine whether the 
measure should be regarded as a general measure (which is not a State aid or a subsidy) 
or as a . specific measure (which may 
be a State aid or a subsidy). To put the point into 
an interrogative form: how general is general? Or, conversely, how specific is 
specific? 
This difficulty depends on the fact that virtually all measures have a differential 
impact and affect the position of some subjects more than that of others. 
In both EC and WTO law, however, the existence of a differential impact, which is 
an inherent feature of almost all measures, does not suffice to conclude that the 
measure under scrutiny is specific. 
Thus the Commission repeatedly made it clear that the fact that some firms or 
sectors benefit more than others from some measures does not necessarily mean 
'3 Alhbom & Berg (2004: 51-54); Roberti (1997: 201). 
' See Ahlborn & Berg (2004: 51-54) 
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that they involve State aid. One of the classical examples concerns measures 
targeted at labour or capital factor. Measures to reduce labour taxation for all firms 
have a relatively greater effect for labour-intensive industries, while the reduction of 
taxation on capital tends to favour capital-intensive industries. In neither case do 
such measure constitute State aid. 655 
How to distinguish then? 
We have seen that the existence of a differential impact is not sufficient to conclude 
that the relevant measure is specific. 
The big interpretative issue is thus how to distinguish between those general 
measures, whose differential impact is accepted as an inherent feature, and those 
measures that, because of their difference in treatment, are sufficiently specific to 
satisfy the test. 656 
The attentive reader has certainly noted the similarity between advantage and 
specificity analysis and how the two concepts of general are here playing with each 
other. 
That said, the proposition is that various elements have to be taken into account in 
the analysis. We can now proceed to indicate those elements that should be taken 
into account in order to determine whether a measure is de facto specific or is rather 
general. 
It seems that the relevant analysis mainly requires two cumulative steps. 
The first step, which operates at an objective level, is the degree of the impact of the 
measure. In other words, the more concentrated is the effect of the measure the easier it 
will be to find it as specif C. 657 
Clearly, the difficulty of this step is where to draw the line. When does a differential 
impact, which, as we have shown, is virtually present in any measure, become so 
655 See 1998 Notice on Direct Taxation, paragraph 14; OECD (2001: 157). 
656 There are various controversial examples in the case law. In some cases, the Court found that apparently 
general scheme in fact produced a partial effect-. see Cases 6& 11/69 Commission v Framr, Case 203/82 
Commission v IM #. In WTO law, it is interesting to refer to the Panel, US - Softwood Lumber 11 
', paragraph 
7.114 et seq, and to the interesting definition of industry therein. 
6s' See Ahlborn and Berg (2004: 51). 
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significant that the measure should be considered as specific? Conversely, when 
that impact is not indicative and should not defeat the general availability of the 
measure? 
Whilst it is clear that it is not possible to define arithmetically well-defined ceilings, 
the foregone conclusion is that it is mainly a case-by-case assessment. In this 
regard, a valuable guidance may certainly be offered by the consolidation of the 
relevant practice and case law. 
The second step, which operates at a subjective level, is the assessment of the intent 
or objective of the measure. Although we are considering the factual impact of the 
measure, it is indeed generally recognised that the consideration of this subjective 
element may play an important role. 658 
The consideration of the intent of the measure may however be subject to two 
counterarguments. 
On the one hand, it may correctly be underlined that, insofar as we are here talking 
of a de facto, ie the factual, objective impact of the measure, the reference to its intent 
or its objective could seem to be extraneous and, in any event, more appropriate 
when the de jure analysis is carried out which is focused on the explicit purpose of 
the measure. 
Although what matters in the context of a de facto assessment is whether, irrespective 
of its intent, a given measure does produce a differential impact such as to favour 
only certain undertakings or industries, it cannot be denied that the examination of 
the more or less clearly stated objective of the measure may a useful additional element to 
consider when a complex assessment such as that of de facto specificity has to be 
carried out. 
In this regard, it is interesting to refer to the assessment made by the Appellate 
Body in Japan Alcohol in order to determine whether a differential in internal 
taxation (under Article 111: 2 GATT) is such `so as to afford protection'. The 
Appellate Body noted that 
See, eg, Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 266-268); Roberti (1997: 200). 
372 
although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, 
nevertheless its protective application can most often be discerned from the 
design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of the measure. 
Apart from being useful in determining whether there is derogation from the norm, 
and hence an advantage, in the first place, these criteria can certainly be looked at 
when the intent of a measure is to be analysed to establish specificity. 
On the other hand, what should be avoided - the leit motif of the thesis - is the risk 
of conflating scope and justification. 
This is indeed a recurring issue, and a recurrent risk, at virtually all levels of the 
analysis of State aid and subsidy rules, notably those of the advantage, the 
specificity, and the effects. We have already seen in the context of the advantage 
analysis the almost natural attraction to consider immediately the objective of the 
measure and justify it. 
In sum, the examination of the criteria considered in the de facto analysis has once 
again shown us that specificity is a flexible instrument. Political and discretional 
considerations seem to be paramount with the result that the test may well be 
regarded as blunt and at the same time uncertain in its outcomes. 
One final, interesting issue may be raised. We have seen that the de facto analysis is 
characterised by an almost inherent unstableness. What should the interpreter do if, 
after carrying out the previous analysis and assessing the above mentioned factors, 
he still doubts with respect to the generality or specificity of the measures? 
Considering that the burden of proving that an aid or a subsidy is specific is always 
borne by the complainant or the proceeding national or supranational authority, it 
seems fair to conclude that, in case of doubt, the measure should be regarded as 
general. Specificity is one of the constituent elements of the definition of State aid 
and, generally speaking, also of subsidy (see however Article 1.2 SCM1). This 
conclusion is in line with the consideration that the classification of a government 
measure of financial support as State aid or as subsidy may produce significant 
consequences in terms of constraint of governmental prerogatives and/or reaction 
against private undertakings. 
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In the EC, it has been suggested that a different conclusion should be reached from 
a procedural point of view. 
Relying on the duty of cooperation of Member States under Article 10 EC, Roberti 
(1997: 201) has argued that, in case of doubt as to whether the measure is a State 
aid, the Member State should notify the measure to the Commission and wait for its 
implementation. 659 
It is interesting to ask whether the same conclusion could be reached in the WTO 
and its different procedural and institutional framework. Transparency 
considerations may favour a positive answer. An obstacle to such conclusion may 
however derive from the risk that the notification might somewhat signal to the 
other Members the existence of a possible subsidy and trigger unilateral defensive 
actions against the beneficiary industry. 
4. Conclusions 
The specificity criterion has a mixed rationale. It is partly based on an economic 
grounding, partly on pragmatic and political considerations. To sum it up, it has 
been suggested that this is a political economy rationale. 
The ambiguity of the rationale results in the flexibility of operation of the specificity 
test with the end result that the latter is not sufficiently 'specific'. 
In both systems the filter is not really selective and the net is in some cases cast 
wide. Talking about WTO law, and in particular of the various tests of de facto 
specificity, it has wittily been suggested that 'these multiple tests demonstrate the 
will of the negotiations to include a priori as many subsidies as possible under the 
term "specific"'. 660 This intention is readily captured by Member States in their 
domestic application of CV duties. 661 
659 It is interesting to enquire whether this conclusion is in contrast with the recent reaffirmation by the 
Court 
in Case C-71/04 Xxxta de Galia that the concepts of aid under Article 87(1) EC and Article 88(3) EC are 
identical. For a commentary, and a positive assessment, on the point see Ehlermann and Vallery 
(2006: 710). 
"Q Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis (2002: 271). 
661 Thus, for example, the EC institutions tend to adopt a very broad interpretation of the notion of 
specificity: see Van Bael and Bellis (2004: 541). 
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Although in some cases the interpretations in WTO and EC law may be different, a 
similar impression derives from the interpretation of the idea of specificity in EC 
law. This - it may be remembered - has been masterly phrased by Advocate 
General Roemer and its negative formulation whereby the requirement of specificitY 
applies to any measure that does not apply generally to all undertakings in a Member 
State. 662 
Case 6& 11 /69 Commission v Frame, page 552. 
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Chapter 5 
Effects, control and remedies 
I. The scope of the chapter 
This chapter lays down the last efforts of this research. It builds up on the previous 
findings on the public intervention in the economy, the advantage and specificity 
analyses. The subject of the chapter is how the negative and positive effects that 
subsidies and State aid may produce are assessed and balanced. 
This is done in two steps. First, by considering how a model regulation would do 
this, and secondly by analysing - and evaluating - how the actual legal rules in the 
two systems do it. Attention is also paid to the two related issues of the systems of 
control of public subsidies and of the possible remedies against them. 
More than in the other chapters, the writer will rely on the, sometimes not fully 
clear, findings of other disciplines, particularly economics and political science. This 
analysis will provide good food for thought for the actual legal analysis of the 
current regulation of WTO subsidies and EC State aids and its critique. 
The exposition will follow this pattern. After a section introducing the main traits 
of the economics and politics of public subsidies, the analysis focuses on the rules 
on effects, control and remedies in the two legal systems. A final section will 
provide the conclusive remarks. 
The reader should immediately be warned however that he will not find a 
comprehensive analysis of the law on the effects in the two systems. The area is 
vast, particularly with respect to the regulation of the justifications. In the EC it is 
further currently subject to a major overhaul, of an intensity that the EC has 
probably never seen in his fifty years of life. What the writer aims to do is to go 
beneath the technicalities of all the (existing and in fiep) disciplines of the various 
justifications and detect the underlying trends. And, eventually, to assess them 
against the model theoretical framework of the first part. 
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II. The economics and politics of subsidies and State aids 
This section is truly interdisciplinary. When it comes to analyse the effects of public 
subsidies, their control and the remedies against them, the lawyer (and the writer is 
no more than that) needs to draw inspiration from the teachings of other 
disciplines, most notably economics and political science. 663 
The following paragraphs are the result of the personal synthesis - always through a 
legal lens - of what are regarded as the most interesting findings of these two 
sciences. Building up on these findings, and on those of the analysis of the previous 
chapters, the ultimate purpose is the attempt to lay down the main traits of what an 
appropriate -a model - regulation of public subsidies should be and to test the 
current WTO and EC rules against this model. 
It should be anticipated that, far from having the presumption of providing a ready- 
made solution, the writer attempts to draw from the debate on public subsidies in 
various circle. The stimuli derived from the dialogue with other experts and their 
personal perspectives are always thought-provoking and contribute to a better 
understanding of the subject. In this sense, with its curiosity and lure for 
exploration, a multi-disciplinary approach goes hand in hand with a comparative one. 
Unfortunately, despite these interesting wanders, the result is that, in many cases, 
the writer cannot offer more than tentative answers. The constraints posed by 
reality have further to be duly taken into account. Thus, quite often, second (and 
even third) best solutions are put forward. 
1. The concept of distortion 
One concept is crucial when it comes to talk of the effects of subsidies and State 
aids, of their control and of the remedies against them. This concept, which is one 
of the true paradigms in the field, is that of distortion. 
Which are sometimes considered together by the discipline of regulation. See Baldwin and 
Cave (1999: 1). 
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Before analysing it, it may be useful to begin with the brief examination of the 
difference, and interplay, between the three basic notions of market, trade and 
competition. 
Starting from the basics: the notions of market, trade and competition 
The market, which may be domestic or international, is the place where trade and 
competition occur. Whereas trade is about the circulation of productive factors, and 
in particular of goods and services within the relevant market, competition may be 
viewed as the process whereby those goods and services, and ultimately their 
suppliers, struggle with each other to strengthen and extend their position within 
that market. 664 
Firms, industries - and even countries - compete with each other through 
(international) trade. Without the possibility of trading, ie of putting products and 
services on the market (either domestically or by exporting to other countries), there 
would be no competition. 
In a word, competition occurs through trade in a market. 
The generally accepted opinion is that, through trade and competition, market 
forces would naturally lead to the best, in the jargon of economics most efcient, 
allocation of resources, thus maximizing the benefit - technically the welfare - of 
society. 665 More tangibly, this should be represented by lower prices, better 
products and services, wider choice and greater efficiency. This optimal result 
would derive from the unconstrained functioning of, even conflicting, market 
forces. This belief is exemplarily summed up in the image of the `invisible hand' 
forged by Adam Smith in the 18th century. 
The other side of the story is that all this may occur only in presence of certain 
conditions (such as an indefinite number of agents, perfect information and no 
"4This definition has been shaped by the writer. For similar notions see OFT (2004: para 3.4); Whish (2003: 
2). In fact various definitions of competition have been formulated. For an interesting review of the 
economic literature, and a proposal, see Nitsche and Heidhues (2005: 44-47). 
"S In the economics jargon, this situation, called `Pareto efficiency', is that in which no feasible change can 
raise anybody's welfare without lowering that of somebody else (Black's Dictionary of economics 
(2002: 343). 
For a clear exposition of `Pareto efficiency', and its implications for State aid law and policy, see 
Friedenszick, 
Röller and Verouden (2006: 12). 
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governmental intervention) which are rarely present with the result that the market 
often fails to deliver its promised benefits. In a word, it does not function 
efficiently. Further, even when market forces reach an fcient allocation of 
resources, this may not be considered equitable. 
Despite these failings, which are addressed by various forms of public intervention 
in the market (including public subsidies), the idea of competition remains an 
accredited paradigm. 
It is vital to appreciate how firms behave in the market. It is crucial to understand 
international trade, and the underlying rationale based on specialization and 
comparative advantage. 666 Finally, as the following of the analysis attempts to 
explain, it is pivotal to make sense of how firms may be advantaged or 
disadvantaged by public subsidies. 
Distortion of public subsidies: the `hunt' for a definition 
The Black's Dictionary of economics (2002: 125) define distortions as `economic 
situations in which the incentives facing firms and individuals fail to reflect true 
social opportunity costs'. For is part, a social opportunity cost is `the amount of 
goods which has to be forgone because resources are used to make some particular 
good. When any goods or services are produced, the resources used to make them 
are not available for other purposes'. 667 In simpler words, distortions create a 
misallocation of resources because they induce firms to act in a certain, undesired, 
way. When it finally comes to identify the causes of distortions, the conclusion is 
vague: `distortions can be created by externalities, taxes, or monopoly'. 668 
This concept of distortion itself is still very general. When applied to the public 
intervention in the economy it can even become ambiguous. Professor Jackson 
(1997: 298) noted that `in some sense, every governmental action that impinges on 
the economy creates a "distortion"'. 
6" See, inter alia, Sykes (1989: 209). 
"7Black's Dictionary of economics (2002: 434). 
"$Black's Dictionary of economics (2002: 125). 
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The distortions that may be produced by public subsidies may be various, and may 
substantially be summed up in various forms of inefficiency. 669 Economics and 
management science teach that public subsidies may lead to allocative inefficiency (if 
resources are not used in the best possible way), productive inefficiency (if goods and 
services are not produced at least cost), dynamic inefficiency (if firms are encouraged 
to undertake the wrong amount/type of innovation, for example research and 
development), and X-inefficiency (when public support induces opportunism in the 
firm's management and workforce and hence to reduced productivity). More 
prosaically, all this seem to result in a waste of public money. 
What has to be asked is whether, from the operative point of view, a more workable 
concept of distortion can be identified as the main catalyst of many, if not all, of the 
forms of economic inefficiency outlined above. This concept would be the direct 
and immediate focus of any regulation of public subsidies. 
Developing the definition: simple v sophisticated view 
A big debate on the basic notions, including that of distortion, arising from subsidy 
rules under the GATT took place in the North-American scholarship between the 
1970s and the 1980s. 670 More recently, Benitah (2001: 251-280), id (1996) has 
identified two ideas of distortion which would confront with each other in the 
GATT/WTO law and in the relevant doctrinal debate. Although this distinction 
has been predicated with particular regard to WTO subsidy rules, and especially in 
the context of a countervailing duty action scenario, his conclusions are of more 
general application. 
The simple view of distortion would rest on the subsidy's interference with the 
"natural" market mechanism governing the allocation of resources in the 
subsidizing country and subsequently with a disturbance of international economic 
669 The following exposition draws from various sources. Some references stand out: Roberti (1997: chapter 
5), Whish (2003: 2-4), Gore (2005). 
670 See, eg, Schwartz and Harper (1972); Barce16 (1977); Goetz, Granet and Schwartz (1986); Diamond 
(1989a); Sykes (1989a). The 1980s were closed by a Symposium of the Countervailing Duty Law at 
Georgetown University Law Centre in 1989. The relevant contributions touch the main concepts and 
rationale of subsidies and countervailing duty response. See Schwartz (1989); Diamond (1989b); 
Cass (1989); 
Eskridge (1989); Sykes (1989b); Trebilcock (1989); Jackson (1989). For three more recent contributions see 
Sykes (1997), Cass and Knoll (1997), Boltuck (1997). 
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relations. Clearly, the standard of proof of this simple view is not very demanding 
and many subsidies would be found to match it. 
There would also be more sophisticated views of distortion. One of the most 
accredited, which refers on the `effects on rivals', rely on the impact of the subsidy 
on the cost/revenue structure of the recipient. This would cause a change of the 
latter's behaviour and could lead to adversely affect the position of competitors. 
In the context of countervailing duty actions, this is phrased as harm to the 
`entitlement' of the competing industry. 671 Diamond (1989a: 784-785) lucidly 
explains this impact: 
[f]or a payment to have this effect, it must lead the [subsidized] firm either to 
increase the quantity of goods offered or to decrease the price it charges in 
[foreign] market[s]. Because the recipient firm will produce until marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost, a payment will only have such a detrimental impact 
if it either decreases the marginal cost of the foreign producer or increases its 
marginal revenue. Unless this occurs, the government payment may increase the 
profits of the foreign firm, but no need for a countervailing duty will exist. 
Leaving aside the reference to countervailing duty (the debate has to be set in its 
context: i) the interpretation of Tokyo Subsidy Code where, despite advances, the 
strongest track was still the unilateral one, and ii) in a country - the US - which 
have by far been the strongest users of countervailing duties), the economic 
proposition is clear. Since an efficient firm will produce only until marginal revenue 
equals marginal costs, we cannot talk about a distortion, and we should not be 
concerned, unless the subsidy favourably interferes with one of these two variables. 
Hence it should either reduce the marginal cost of the recipient (cost-saving 
subsidy), or increase its marginal revenue (revenue-increasing subsidy). 672 
671 The `entitlement' language has first been used by Goetz, Granet and Schwartz (1986: 18-19). It is useful to 
quote the relevant passage in extenso: We assume that American firms are entitled to that domestic market 
outcome which would have resulted from a "fair", competitive process, by which is meant one which has not 
been "manipulated" by foreign government subsidization. The idea then is to restore competition in the 
American market to its "but for" state by neutralizing the effect of the subsidy'. The `entitlement rationale' of 
countervailing duties has been developed by Diamond (1989a), (1989b), and criticized by those relying on 
efficiency arguments: see, eg, Sykes (1989b). For a more recent critical review of the `entitlement approach' 
see Trebi cock and Howse (2005: 287-288). 
672 The concepts of marginal cost and marginal revenue respectively refer to an additional increase in cost and 
revenue for an increase of an activity. Cf Begg, Fisher, Dornbush (1997: 98). 
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It is only this impact on the cost/revenue structure that is eventually liable to have a 
troublesome effect, in a word to distort competition, because it significantly 
interferes with the determinants of an efficient firm's conduct. In other words, any 
improvement of the market position of the recipient which does not produce the 
said impact but simply enhances it with respect to the situation before the grant of 
the subsidy cannot interfere with the behaviour of the recipient and hence with 
competition. 673 
Clearly, if compared with the simple approach, the sophisticated view of distortion 
requires a thorough case-by-case economic analysis of the impact of the subsidy and 
is consequently more demanding from the evidential perspective. This point is 
thoroughly examined below. 
It should be made it clear that the writer does not conclude that one view is better 
than the other. The assessment is more nuanced. 
Whereas the simple view of distortion is particularly suitable to explain certain 
elements of the definition of subsidy, such as the advantage or specificity analyses, 
which are there to merely capture the potential to distort, the sophisticated view is 
more appropriate when it comes to ultimately determine the economic impact of 
the subsidy, its system of control and any remedy to tackle it. At this level, it seems 
indeed that what should really matter is whether the subsidy actually produces an 
advantage for the beneficiary which is liable to negatively interfere with its 
competitors' positions. 
What is ultimately required is therefore a distortion of competition. 
The `quarry': distortion of competition 
The hunt has eventually found its quarry. The concern raised by public subsidies is 
that they may result in a distortion of competition. 
Although there is a significant debate about whether a competition assessment 
should also take into account of the interests of other stakeholders, particularly 
consumers and taxpayers, there seems to be a certain agreement that what directly, if 
673 Alhbom and Berg (2004: 49-50). 
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not exclusively, matters under a system of control of public subsidies is a significant 
interference with the competitive pence s between undertakings. 674 
Considering its importance, it is worth repeating the core of this economic (and 
legal) proposition, borrowing this time from a clear definition of Bevriglia-Zampetd 
(1996: 24) forged in the context of the WTO: 
What would be important to prove is that the subsidy has indeed provided the 
recipient firm or firms with an artificial competitive advantage, affecting its cost 
and revenue structures, and that this action has distorted the normal competitive 
process, resulting in injury to the domestic industry. 
A model regulation of public subsidies should principally aim to `control' these 
distortions of competition. What has to be ensured is that public subsidisation does 
not damage more efficient undertakings to the benefit of less efficient ones. 
It is finally worth noting that the standard to assess the distortive potential of public 
subsidies underlying this reasoning is constituted of `a pragmatic notion of "normal 
competition" or the "normal competitive process"' 675 or, with another expression, 
`a prosaic theory of workable competition'. 676 
Although these formulations are a realistic recognition that conditions of perfect 
competition are rare to be found, they should be distanced from the blurry concept 
of `fair competition' which is often used to justify subsidy rules, and in particular the 
unilateral reaction to them (ie countervailing duties). 677 As private interest theories, 
such as `public choice', 678 would probably explain, the blurred notion of `fair' 
competition is the evocative - often more voiced than explained - mantra of 
lobbying industries seeking protection. The problems come when it is necessary to 
674 With some inevitable differences in emphasis, this is substantially confirmed by a review of the, mostly 
economic, literature. See, eg, Aihborn and Berg (2004); Benitah (2001); Beviglia Zampetti (1996), 
Fingleton, 
Ruane, Ryan (1998); Frontier Economics (2004); Gore (2005); Low (2001); Friederiszick, Röller and 
Verouden (2006: 12); Nitsche and Heidhues (2005: 44-47); OFT (2004: pars 3.4); OFT (2005). 
67S Beviglia-Zampetti (1996: 24). 
676 Whish (2003: 14). 
See Messerlin (1999: 181) who suggests that the `adverse effect approach' of the SCM Agreement would 
rely on this notion which would not correspond to the test of distortion of competition of the 
EC Treaty. 
67° This theory emphasize the force of private interests in capturing governmental 
decisions. A nrce 
exposition has been made by Baldwin and Cave (1999: 21-25). 
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make this concept operational and to give it substance. 679 This distinguishes the 
concept of `fair' competition from those of `normal' or `workable' competition that 
combine realism with a more solid anchorage to theory. 
The crucial step in this chapter will be to assess whether and how this economic 
proposition does, or could, find support in the actual regulation of public subsidies 
in the EC and in the WTO. 
Distortions across the border 
From an international perspective, subsidies should matter only if they produce 
distortions or externalities across the border. 680 Accordingly, any supranational 
regulation of public subsidies should target only those measures that are liable to 
produce such distortions. 681 
This `across the border' effect can generally be proved quite easily for export 
subsidies. There is indeed a general acceptance that this aggressive measure of 
industrial policy, which cannot be easily justified but can easily create international 
tensions, reduce global efficiency. A potentially troublesome international impact 
can also be produced by domestic subsidies which may have the same effect of a 
tariff or a quota and empty trade liberalization, although the proof of an externality 
across the border may be more demanding. 
An economic reality which should be taken into due account is that, in an 
increasingly liberalized and globalized economy, it is easier that a public subsidy - 
and indeed any public or private economic action - produce a distortion across the 
border. This is simply the result of the widening and integration of markets, ie of 
the places where competition and trade occur. Further, the distorting effect of 
subsidies is magnified as other governmental distortions are eliminated. From a 
679 A comprehensive critical overview of the `fairness rationales' of countervailing duty laws is made by 
Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 283-285). 
680 Besley and Seabright (1999: 21); Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 22); Jackson (1997: 299); 
Pelkmans (2001: 241). 
01 Although rare, it is worth noting that there are examples of domestic control of public subsidies where the 
distortions under scrutiny are by definition limited within the boundaries of the national jurisdiction 
(this is 
the case of Denmark: see OECD (2001: 21-22, and 93-124 for a detailed exposition of the Danish model); 
see also http: //www. ks. dk/english/stateaid/, last visited on 13th July 2006). Generally, there is an increasing 
awareness on the national role in the design and control of any public subsidies. For the example of the 
UK 
see OFT (2004: chapter 5) and Vickers (2005) who lapidarily suggests that 'scrutiny should begin at 
home'. 
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political economy perspective, this purely economic justification may be reinforced 
by objectives such as the creation or strengthening of an internal market. 682 
What is however clear is that the determination of whether there are distortions 
across the border should eventually rest on the assessment of the actual impact of 
the subsidy on competition. 
The assessment of the impact on competition 
The crucial finding so far has been that the determination of a distortion of 
competition which produces cross-border externalities is the core of the analysis of 
the negative effects produced by public subsidies. 
It has been underlined that this distortion should be interpreted in a sophisticated 
manner, which focuses on the effect of the subsidy on the conduct of the recipient, 
which usually depends on an impact on its cost/revenue structure, and on the 
subsequent effect in the relevant market. 
It has also been anticipated that this assessment may be particularly complex. 
Two main dimensions need to be considered, first the subsidy, characteristics, secondly 
the relevant market characteristicr. 683 
Subsidy characteristics 
The subsidy characteristics refer to the type and amount of the measure of financial 
support and to its impact on the said cost/revenue structure of the recipient With 
respect to the latter element, it has been said that generally reference is made to 
marginal costs. As Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 287) noted `measuring marginal 
costs is a notoriously difficult exercise, exacting in its data demands and inherently 
error-prone'. 684 Consequently, the proxy of variable costs is often used, but in many 
cases this does not yield accurate results. 685 
69= Evans (1997: 80 and 105-106); Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 26-27); 
U3OFT (2004: paras 3.33 and 3.34). See also Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 44-47) who mention 
as a separate element the procedural aspects of the granting decision. 
In this regard see also Frontier Economics (2004: 35). 
Frontier Economics (2004: 35); Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 287). 
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The assessment of costs is a difficult exercise. Leaving aside the issue of their 
accuracy, variable costs (such as labour and raw materials) directly affect pricing and 
output (as well as entry and exit) decisions of firms since these depend on the level 
of production. 
It is not only variable costs that should be taken into account however. Although to 
a lower degree, a reduction of fixed costs, which do not depend on output, may also 
distort competition because it may enable the firm to continue in the market. 686 
Fixed costs (eg factory, machinery) do not affect pricing and output decisions but 
they have an influence on entry decision, and, in the long run, may act on exit 
decisions. 687 
To complicate things further, it is recognized that it is often difficult to distinguish 
between variable and fixed costs, and to identify whether a subsidy will affect fixed 
or variable costs. 
Market characteristics 
The assessment of market characteristics is complex too. It should be immediately 
noted that a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for the public subsidy at issue 
being liable to produce a distortion to competition is that the market is neither 
monopolistic nor perfectly competitive. 688 
Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 45-46) suggests a list including factors 
such as the size or market share of recipient; the asymmetry of market shares; 
barriers to entry; the degree of product differentiation; the complementarity with 
neighbouring markets; the segmentation of markets between Member States; the 
tradability of the goods and impact on location choices. 
Finally, a crucial prerequisite of the market analysis is the previous definition of the 
relevant product and geographical market. Although inspiration can be drawn from 
other areas of the law, such anti-trust law, where such an exercise is usually made, 
Fingleton, Ruane, Ryan (1998); Ahlborn and Berg (2004: 48-49). 
07 If they are not sunk. See Frontier Economics (2004: 18-20); Gore (2005); Nitsche and Elcidhucs (2005); 
OFT (2004: paras 3.14-3.24). 
6" For a clear explanation of this point see Besley and Seabright (1999: 21); Pellcmans 
(2001; 242). 
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economic literature underlines that this issue is different in the case of public 
subsidies and the necessary adjustments should be made. 689 
Counterfactual and de minimis 
We can conclude the analysis of the competitive assessment with two remarks 
(which have more a political and legal rather than economic flavour). 
First, the counterfactual that may be used to determine whether the subsidy 
produces a negative effect is based on the competitive situation before the public 
intervention. 
This crucially means that the assessment of the negative effects produced by 
subsidies should not take into account the fact that they tackle a disadvantage or any 
another distortion in the economy (this point is discussed further below when we 
analyse the positive effects of subsidies and their balance with the negative ones). 
At a more general level, this is a recognition of the limited role played by a regulation 
of public subsidies which do not aim to approximate the different regulatory 
frameworks and the relevant competitive advantages /disadvantages of the various 
countries. All this should be discounted from the assessment, which simply focuses 
on whether, under the existing economic conditions, the public intervention is such 
as to interfere with the costs/revenues of the beneficiary firm or industry and to 
damage more efficient competitors. 
The second remark is that many legal systems, including WTO subsidy and EC State 
aid rules, feature a concept of de minimis, which operates as a sieve to exclude from 
the scrutiny those distortions that are considered to be minimal. Although blunt, 
from a pragmatic perspective, this tool may be appropriate, particularly, but not 
only, when the system of control is centralized and preventive. It is a useful 
instrument to dispose of the petty distortions and concentrate the limited 
administrative and judicial resources to tackle the most troublesome ones. 
U9 See Alhborn and Berg (2004); Fingleton (2001); Fingleton, Ruane, Ryan (1999), id (1998). 
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A legal finale: State aid and subsidy rules as competition regulation 
In this paragraph, the writer returns for a moment to familiar territory. The issue 
discussed here is inherently a legal one. 
The interesting consequence of the previous reasoning is that, not only State aid 
law, but also WTO subsidy law should be regarded as a competition, rather than a 
trade, regulation. 
This is not only a recognition that the policies of trade liberalization and competition 
are inextricably linked with each other. 690 It is not even a recognition of the 
increasing convergence, even in language, between trade and competition ruler 
which we assist in both legal systems. 691 
It has, for example, been underlined that the `rule of non-discrimination in WTO 
law (effectively a free-trade rule) contains a clear undistorted-competition element'. 
692 Reference is made to Article III GATT on national treatment and to its 
interpretation as a legal tool aiming at `equality of competitive conditions'. 693 
If the attention is now moved towards one of the partial equivalents of the GATT 
provision in the EC Treaty, Article 28 EC, it does not need much effort to find 
statements which go towards the same direction. Biondi and Eeckhout (2004) have 
advanced that the `emphasis on market access may lead to references to undistorted 
competition' and what is a required is `but a small step'. In this case, the authority 
suggesting this `step' has been Advocate General Jacobs' analysis in Leclerc-Siplec 
where he mentioned the guiding principle 
[t]hat all undertakings which engage in a legitimate economic activity in a 
Member State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community 
market, unless there is a valid reason for denying them full access to a part of that 
market. 694 
60 Ehlermann (1992: 257) has thus clearly underlined the interplay between EC competition policy and 
Internal Market policy. 
" See, eg, Biondi and Eeckhout (2004); Mortelmans (2001); O'Keeffe and Bavasso (2000). 
692Biondi and Eeckhout (2004: 105). 
'"' Appellate Body, Japan - Taxer, id, EC - Asbestos, paragraph 97. 
Case C-412/93 Lectkr-S$c, paragraph 41 of the Opinion. 
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Two other notable examples of the convergence between the two areas of EC law 
can be made. One is the Tobacco Advertising Directive case where the Court, in 
interpreting Article 95 EC, which empowers the Council to adopt harmonization 
measures for the establishment or function of the internal market, found that such 
measures must genuinely contribute to such objective. In particular, they must 
either contribute to eliminating obstacles to free movement or they must purport to 
eliminate an appreciable distortion of competition. 695 As a result, the removal of 
distortions of competition is one of the bases for adopting legislation under Article 
95 EC. 
The other is the Wlouterr decision which has clearly shown a convergence between 
Articles 81 and 82 EC on the one side and free movement rules on the other, 
particularly at the level of the operation of the justification. 696 
More specifically with respect to State aid law, the analysis of the case-law on the 
relationship between free movement and State aid rules, has led Biondi and 
Eeckhout (2004: 108) to formulate this sweeping conclusion: 
[t]he assumption upon which the entire reasoning is based is the recognition that 
both sets of rules are pursuing an identical aim, namely that of ensuring the free 
movement of goods under normal conditions of competition. 697 
This powerful language that reveals the (alleged) identity of aims between State aid 
and internal market law has been taken on board by Friederiszick, Röller and 
Verouden (2006: 27). 
Another important common denominator between trade measures and State aid is 
that their actor is public and a public policy objective is always the underlying 
rationale. 698 
Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council. 
6" C-309/99. This case has sparked a lively debate. Cf, eg, Monti (2002). 
Emphasis added. 
The intriguing issue of the role played by public policy objectives under Article 81 and 82 EC 
has come 
out prominendy in the Woulers case where the crucial point was the fact that, in substance, there 
has been a 
delegation of public regulatory powers to the Dutch Bar. 
389 
In our view, however, strictly speaking, it is better to talk of compkmentarif)' rather 
than identity. Generally, both sets of rules are clearly going in the same direction, 
that of the liberalisation of the economic forcer of the market. As O'Keeffe and Bavasso 
(2000: 543) noted 
the aim of creating an internal market constitutes a unifying thread or, at least, an 
interface between EC internal trade law and EC competition law. 699 
If the target is the same, the duties are different. As advanced at the beginning of 
this chapter, competition occurs through trade in a market. Reformulating the finding of 
O'Keeffe and Bavasso (around the three emphasised terms), the goal of creating a 
place (ie the market) where competition and trade could occur is certainly the 
connecting link between the two disciplines. 
That said, however, the writer's understanding is that, like free trade is the 
prerequisite of competition, so, conceptually speaking, trade law should be 
distinguished from competition law. 
What however leads the writer to propound for distinguishing is a stronger 
operational divergence. There is indeed a crucial difference in the working of these 
two forms of regulation. Unlike trade rules, competition rules are largely based on 
an assessment of the effects of the private or public conduct at issue on 
undertakings and on the market. This analysis enquires the impact of competitive 
relationships and significantly (and increasingly) rests on economic analysis. 
As it is indicated by their language and by their position in the EC treaty (in Chapter 
I of Title VI on the 'rules on competition'), State aid law is admittedly a competition 
regulation. It focuses on the effects on competition of State subsidisation and is 
largely, and increasingly, grounded on economic analysis. 
Some doubts could be raised with respect to WTO subsidy rules. Subsidies are 
generally regarded as obstacles to trade. Moreover, it is generally observed that, 
apart from some notable exception (see, for example, the Articles VIII and IX 
GATS), WTO law would not substantially include competition provisions. 
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It is however submitted that, whereas it may be true that subsidies and State aids can 
also be viewed as barriers to trade, and that WTO law does not (yet) provide for any 
traditional antitrust law (ie for a regulation of the anti-competitive conduct of 
private undertakings), if we consider the distinguishing element between trade and 
competition regulation suggested above - the execution of an effect based analysis 
of the measure relying on a thorough economic analysis of its impact on 
competitive relationship -, it seems that WTO subsidy law is more appropriately 
regarded as a competition rather than a trade regulation. 700 
At the end, more than a conceptual nicety, it is a practical difference that matters. 
Case-study: the effect on trade between free movement and State aid in EC 
law 
EC law provides us with an interesting debate which, for its obvious link with the 
previous paragraph, the writer believes appropriate to anticipate here. 
O'Keeffe and Bavasso (2000: 544) have detected the `common ancestry of 
competition and free movement' in the fact that both rules are `subject, albeit in 
different forms, to an assessment of the effect on trade between Member States'. 
Whereas this element, expressly worded in competition (both antitrust and State aid) 
rules, has traditionally been interpreted as a jurisdictional test, the effect on trade 
would obviously represent the substance of free movement rules. 
The writer's proposition, however, is that the effect on trade should be interpreted 
both as a substantive and as a jurisdictional test not only with respect to free movement, 
as has been convincingly explained by O'Keeffe and Bavasso (2000), but also in the 
area of State aid. 
It is known that the requirement of an effect of trade between Member States under 
Article 87(1) EC has also been quite easy to prove. More interestingly, it has often 
happened that this element has been treated together, somewhat merged, with the 
distortion of competition test. The simplified competition analysis has thus 
' Emphasis added. 
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inevitably meant a simplified effect on trade test. A fundamental step in this 
direction has been made by the Court in the Philip Morris case. 701 The crucial 
finding is that, once the position of an undertaking active in Community trade is 
`strengthened', an effect on trade should almost invariably be assumed. 
There is indeed an inevitability in considering the distortion and effect on trade 
together. This argument pertains to the substantive nature of the effect on trade. It 
has been seen that, from an economic perspective, an appropriate discipline of 
public subsidies should be concerned with the actual effects created by the latter. In 
this regard, the execution of a full, and sometimes complex, economic market 
analysis is required. Since we are dealing with a supranational regulation of 
subsidies, the concern should the detection of distortions across the border. 
It is argued that, in the context of Article 87(1) EC, this is the substantive role played 
by the effect on trade element. This has been implicitly recognised by a recent work 
of Ehlermann and Vallery (2005: 711) where the link between the establishment of 
an effect on trade and a `market analysis' whereby the `relevant geographic and 
product markets must first be defined' has been expressly made. As has been clearly 
underlined, this however requires a serious analysis which should not rely on 
`negative' and `vague' statements such as that an effect on trade is `not 
inconceivable'. 702 
To repeat the point, at a substantive level, the element of the effect on trade is strictly 
linked to that of the distortion on competition because, to trigger the application of 
State aid rules, what has to be proved is that a distortion of competition across the 
border has occurred or is threatened. 
This is the first step to give full meaning to the effect on trade element. 
Although not fully separate from the distortion of competition from a substantive 
point of view, the effet utile of the effect on trade element would also be safeguarded 
in another way, ie by redefining its jurisdictional function. As suggested by 
70° Along these lines of reasoning it is interesting to note that, already the Tokyo Subsidy Code spelled out 
expressly that subsidies may `adversely affect the conditions of normal competition' (Article 11.2). 
This 
terminology did not have much success in the drafting of the trade-impact standards of the SCM Agreement. 
701 Case 730/79. 




Ehlermann and Vallery (2005: 712) this should be done by considering it as an 
`appropriate filter'. From an operational standpoint, this means that, even at the 
very preliminary stages of the investigation, it may immediately be apparent that the 
measure under scrutiny cannot have an impact going beyond the domestic borders 
and should therefore be immediately disposed of. 
Quite intriguingly, a similar argument has been put forward in the WTO context by 
Jackson (1997: 298-299) who suggested introducing a `distortion across the border' 
test as a `pre-requisite'. Its functionality, very similar to the `filter' image put 
forward in EC law, would be to dispose of the clearly non-troublesome subsidies at 
the preliminary stages of countervailing duty investigations. 
This redefinition of the effect on trade element leads us to reconsider the role of a 
de minimis test in State aid law. This filter is commonly used by the Commission and 
has recently gained a legislative recognition 703 The even recent case-law, however, 
seems to show a steady resistance to accept it, albeit often with some ambiguity 
(whereas the Council and Commission legal instruments are mentioned, they are 
either found to be inapplicable on the facts of the case or the traditional case-law 
position is reiterated without affecting the legal principle of de minimis). 704 
A parallel with the law on free movement may again be useful. The traditional 
approach is that there would be no de minimis rule. The Keck judgment has however 
kicked off a process of debate and rethinking about the rationale and working of 
internal market rules. 705 A landmark in this process is represented by the market 
access test proposed by Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Leclerc-Siplec 
which also features a de minimis test. This test has found some indirect support in the 
los See Council Regulation 994/98 (the so-called `enabling regulation) and the subsequent block exemption, 
Commission Regulation 69/2001. 
For the first type of cases (mention of de minimir rule but inapplicability on the facts) see, eg, Case 
C- 
382/99 Netherlands v Commission, paragraphs 37 to 39 where the Court analyses the compliance with the 
Commission Notice. Compare with Case T-453/99 Kuwait Petroleum, paragraphs 71 and 72 which, on 
essentially the same facts, they CFI do not address the de minimir point at all. 
The second type of cases, where the Court ambiguously mentions the de minimis instrument 
but at the same 
time reaffirm its own case-law without giving any judgment on the former, see, eg, Case C-280/00 
A/bwark, 
paragraphs 80 and 81; Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse, paragraph 28; Case 
C-172/03 Hrirer, 
paragraphs 32-34; Case C-71 /04 Xunta de Gall a, paragraph 41. 
For a commentary of the Heimr decision see D'Ormesson and Bouin (2005), of the 
Xunrta de Ga/tha decision 
see Ehlermann and Vallery (2005). 
705 Cases C-267-268/91 Keck. See Weatherill (1995). 
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case-law 706 and seems to increasingly gain support in the literature. This test is 
conceptually sound. It certainly may involve some practical difficulties but no more 
than those encountered in the antitrust field. 707 
The question that should be posed is: why is the Court still so reluctant in accepting 
it in State aid law? Our submission is that an acceptance of the de minimir test would 
also be in line with the rethinking of the proper role of the effect on trade test 
outlined above. 
A word of conclusion: the previous analysis involving i) a redefinition of the effect 
on trade requirement and ii) a defence of the de minimis rule, is fully in line with the 
current trend in EC State aid law and policy which aims to combine a more effects- 
based approach with an efficient administration of the rules. 708 
Three case-studies on the concept of distortion of competition 
Three case-studies are used to explore the complexities of the concept of distortion 
of competition. The first focuses on the issue of mobile investment and regulatory 
competition, the second on the compensation of regional location costs, and the 
final one on the relationship among public subsidies, competition and consumer 
welfare. 
a) Mobile investment and location competition 
In their both deep and accessible paper Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 
42-43) set forth four types of distortions of competition that State aid may cause. 
The first three can easily fit the previous analysis (i) reducing effective competition 
by supporting inefficient production, ii) reducing effective competition by distorting 
dynamic incentives, iii) reducing effective competition by increasing market power - 
706 See Case C-67/97 B/rrme. 
7070'Keeffe and Bavasso (2000: 552). 
' The more general reference is certainly the State Aid Action Plan (2004). Mention should also 
be made to 
the Decision and the Framework on the application of Article 86(2) EC to public service compensation 
(2005), and to the draft Communications for the assessment of lesser amounts of State Aid 
(LASA) and of 
State aid which has limited effects on intra-Community trade (LET) (2004). 
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exclusionary practices). The fourth is however the most intriguing: distorting 
production and location decisions among Member States. 
As the authors expressly clarify, whereas the first three `theories of harm' relate to 
the impact on competition between firms, the last one more specifically refers to the 
impact of aid on competition between Member States. 
This type of distortion refers to the cases where Member States grant subsidies to 
firms to influence their location decisions. Governments are, or may enter, 
somewhat in competition between them to attract mobile investment (capital is for 
example a mobile resource). 
The economic efficiency of this practice is hotly debated. It certainly involves a 
sophisticated approach towards the possible distortions that it may cause. 
On the one side, OECD (2001: 38: 30) 180) argue that these incentives would not 
create any problem in presence of certain conditions, particularly if they apply in a 
non-discriminatory manner (in other words, they do not discriminate according to 
location or ownership) and there are no barriers to the movement of firms. 709 In 
presence of these conditions, there would be no distortion to competition. 710 This 
conclusion is supported by referring to Besley and Seabright (1999: 36) who 
interestingly seem to argue with respect to `greenfield' investment (ie `new' 
investment). Finally, Groeteke and Heine (2004: 331) underline the benefits that 
locational competition may have on institutional rigidities, with the result that they 
end up talking of `institutional competition' between Member States. 711 
Others draw more clearly distinctions. Pelkmans (2001: 242) underlines that there is 
a difference between 'greenfield' investment and relocation of existing resources. 
Whereas aid to induce the latter would create negative cross-border externalities, the 
question would be more open with respect to the former. 
The position of the EC is traditionally negative and is concerned that competition 
between governments might endanger regional cohesion, and this naturally to the 
7 Cf also Hufbauer and Erb (1984: 105 and 107). 
710 OECD (2001: 170). 
"I In particular, far from being a justification for State aid intervention, the presence of `institutional 
rigidities' should be solved by opening up competition between Member States: Groeteke and 
Hone (2004: 
328-330). This point is discussed below when the justifications are dealt with. 
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detriment of poorer regions. 712 Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 18) argue 
that the `efficiency property' pointed out by Besley and Seabright (1999) works only 
in presence of certain circumstances, ie `when countries are not resource 
constrained. If this assumption is not fulfilled, poor countries will easily outbid 
reach countries. ' Speaking more generally (2006: 43), they highlight the risks of 
these incentives in terms of `inefficient production structure throughout Europe', 
`negative spill-overs for other Member States when the good or service is traded' 
with the possible consequence of `subsidy races'. 
Referring to tax competition, which is probably the one of the commonest examples 
of locational competition, Schön (1999: 919) highlights that we should talk of unfair 
tax competition in some cases. Referring to the Council Code of Conduct on 
Harmful Tax competition (1999) and the OECD Survey on Harmful Tax 
Competition (1999), he notes two elements of the problem, first when the tax does 
not reflect the true balance between taxes and public services, and secondly when a 
foreign investor is influenced to invest capital abroad without having to dispense 
with public services of high quality at home. 
What becomes crucial in these cases is to determine whether the `harmful tax 
practice' can also amount to a subsidy. If there is a preferential regime for foreign 
companies (ie derogatory and selective), there are good grounds for concluding so. 
713 With respect to the possible distortion created by these practices, OECD (1998) 
clearly considers that a tax incentive which discriminate in favour of foreign 
companies `distorts the allocation of resources'. 714 
Clearly, it is very difficult to provide an answer about whether location competition 
can cause distortion of competition. We attempt to suggest some conclusions. 
72 OECD (2001: 174) where the Commission raises its opposition; Evans (1997: 82 and 
85) who refer to Advocate General Darmon in Case 248/84 Germany v Commission, page 
4031 and to Case 730/79 Philip Morris. 
113 Schön (1999: 935). 
T" Reference should be made to the `Primarolo Group Report' (1999) which prompted the 
Commission to 
initiate in July 2001 a large-scale State aid investigation, concerning 15 tax provisions in 12 
different Member 
States (for a review see Pinto (2003: 166-190)). Probably the most known dispute is that on the 
Belgian co- 
ordination centres which provided special tax incentives for certain types of financing activities conducted 
through one of this centres. At the end of June 2006, the Court produced two decisions on these centres in 
Case Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Bem and Forum 187 v Commi siom, and Case 
C-399/03 
Co nºmisiion v Coxxcrl For an analysis 
396 
First, a certain degree of competition between Member States and regions is an 
inevitable consequence of the idea of trade liberalization itself. Factor mobility, 
particularly in terms of capital and establishment, should depend on the better 
conditions offered by the various jurisdiction. Further, the idea that a certain 
amount of competition between regions may represent a factor of change and be 
efficiency-enhancing for all has certainly some force. 
Secondly, it seems equally uncontroversial that there are less reasons to object to the 
attractiveness which one jurisdiction derives from its general tax, labour, 
environmental regulatory framework. 
Thirdly, specific measures (in the sense of both exceptional and non-generally 
available) makes things woollier as the potentials for distortions are higher. 
Fourthly; what emerges from the various positions seems that, legally speaking, the 
ground of contention concerns substantially the conditions (non-discrimination; 
certain equality in resource endowments among the regions; non-cumulation of 
benefits) which should be present for locational competition to produce its benefits 
and not being distortive. It is indeed at this level that subsidy and State aid 
regulation, and in particular their competitive assessment, should play their role. 
b) Offset of regional location costs 
The analysis now focuses on a case which is partly similar to the previous one. 
There are though two main differences which distinguish the offset cases from 
those examined above and which justify a separate treatment. The first is that in the 
cases where the offset of location costs is put forward there is a specific reference to 
a disadvantage. Consequently, at least in principle, the amount of the subsidy is 
merely limited to compensating these costs. 
The question is whether financial compensation that merely compensates the m as for 
locating in a disadvantaged or, in any event, less attractive area, can distort 
competition. In other words, assuming that there is an advantage, and this 
advantage is specific, does the measure also produce a distortion? Using the 
definition of distortion of competition formulated above, does this measure 
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produce a significant impact on the costs of the recipient so as to alter its 
relationship with its competitors? 
Some argue that, insofar as the subsidy merely compensates the cost for relocating, 
there would be no distortion. 715 Benitah (2001: 254) suggests that this is an 
example of a sophisticated approach to the concept of distortion, and that no 
distortion should be found. 
Goetz, Granet and Shwartz (1986: 23) are more specific. There is no problem only 
if the subsidy covers fixed costs and, crucially, is no related to production (this 
would be the case if variable costs were covered). 
Evans (1997: 83) is more sceptical. He begins underling that `in most cases it is 
doubtful whether the disadvantages of an area can be quantified with sufficient 
accuracy to fix aid at a level which exactly competes for them'. He then 
pragmatically adds that `[i]n practice, regional aid is usually set by Member States at 
so high a level that it provides firms with a positive financial inducement to locate 
and invest in certain areas'. 
These two arguments - the difficulty of quantification (of the disadvantage > cost > 
subsidy) and the need for amounts higher than mere cost offset to produce an 
incentive - seem to be crucial. The writer would also refer to another, already 
highlighted, difficulty, that of determining and distinguishing costs. 
All these uncertainties seem to lead towards a more negative attitude towards the 
alleged non-distorting effect of this type of subsidy. In a word, although this may 
be argued in principle, this conclusion seems to be more difficult to reach in 
practice. 
In the presence of so many uncertainties, there is one fundamental and more 
general doubt. 
If accepted, this reasoning - there is no distortion because we merely 
have a 
compensation of a cost/disadvantage - may be extended to many other 
interventions. 
715 Beviglia-Zampetti (1996: note 85); Benitah (2001: 254); Jackson (1997: 298-299). 
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Crucially, this would ultimately risk conflating scope and justification, a recurring 
theme which raises legal and political concerns. This may be better appreciated if 
reference is made to the counterfactual of the competitive assessment outlined 
above, which is the situation before the subsidy, and to the interplay between 
negative and positive effects, and the relevant cost/benefit analysis examined below. 
c) Consumer welfare: subsidies or competition? 
It is sometimes intriguingly advanced that, inasmuch as they result in the availability 
of cheaper products or services, subsidies are beneficial to consumers. 
In the context of countervailing duty actions, it is thus argued that from the 
perspective of the importing country the import of subsidized goods would be 
beneficial. 716 Truly, these may create some difficulty for the competing domestic 
industry but a comprehensive welfare analysis (ie an analysis considering the 
benefits and the costs for all stakeholders) would lead to conclude that the overall 
net effect for the importing country is positive, particularly if the benefits to 
consumers, which are in the position to buy cheaper products, are considered. 
Accordingly, levying a countervailing duty on imported subsidised products would 
simply mean imposing a higher price on consumers. With a powerful image, it is 
thus often suggested that what the importing country should do is simply to send a 
'thank you note' to the embassy of the government of the exporting country for the 
windfall received by its consumers. 
It seems however that the radicalism of this argument is mainly justified by its 
context, and in particular by the criticism of unilateral re-actions. In other words, 
the whole argumentation is deployed to reject the soundness of countervailing 
duties (which, far from eradicating the problem of subsidies, would introduce new 
distortions in the market and tensions in the political and diplomatic sphere). There 
is indeed some agreement that from a more general, one would say global, 
perspective, subsidies may be distorting and should be regulated. 
The writer's position focuses on the centrality of the process of competition. 
716 See, eg, Sykes (1989: 210 et seq); id (1997); Barcelo (1977); Trebilcock and Howsc (? º 
5 293; 
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The benefit of consumers should not be exclusively assessed on a short term basis - 
on the fact that they may immediately obtain goods at a cheaper price. The 
development of competition in the medium, and indeed longer term, is also, if not 
more, significant. 717 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that a similar distinction between short and 
long term consideration has come out also in the context of the so-called `essential 
facility' debate, and the relevant dilemma involving protection of innovation, 
property and competition. At paragraph 56 of the landmark Opinion in the Oscar 
Bronner case, Advocate General Jacobs warned about focussing too much on the 
benefits that a short term solution may seem to yield. 
Returning to our analysis on subsidized products and consumers' benefits, we 
cannot forget that, in most of the cases, the availability of cheaper products or 
services is just a perverse concomitant of the distortion of the competitive process. 
According to economic theory, only competition can substantially and lastly deliver 
benefits to consumers. It is the process of competition that is ultimately capable of 
yielding benefits to consumers in terms of more, better and cheaper products and 
services. This consideration seems to support our interpretation whereby subsidies 
should be prohibited whenever they interfere with competition, that is when they 
bring about an impact on competitors that are more efficient than the recipients. 
To put it in another words, subsidized competition cannot be equalled to competition 
on the merits. 
The substance of this point is fundamentally accepted also by some proponents of 
the 'consumer argument' above when they note that countervailing duties may be 
acceptable in two circumstances: when the subsidy is used as an instrument of 
predatory pricing and when the subsidy is demonstrably causing serious injury to 
competing domestic producers in the importing country. 718 
Now, it seems that both cases may well be construed with reference to the 
competitive assessment suggested above. Whenever the subsidy affects the 
cost/revenue structure of the recipient and thereby affects substantially the position 
717 See Whish (2003: Chapter 1). 
718 See Matsushita, Schoenbaum, Mavroidis (2003: 262). 
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of competitors the need for some form of response (not necessarily a countervailing 
duty) should be considered. 
Finally, the proponents of this radical position risk emptying the subsidy regulation 
of any distinct meaning and purpose, substantially equalling it to a safeguard 
discipline. 
The requirement to prove an injury to the domestic industry is not explained in 
terms of economic distortion but is justified in political terms, and in particular with 
the public choice theory. 719 Accordingly, it would operate as a buffer mechanism 
introduced to protect the interest of the well-organised domestic industry (as 
opposed to the diffuse interest of consumers) and would thus bring the subsidy 
discipline in line with a safeguard measure. 
The next step of this reasoning is easily predictable. By draining the injury test of 
any justification in terms of economic and distortion analysis, and by highlighting its 
buffering function, the substantial equation to a safeguard discipline is inevitable. 
Some thus suggest dropping the injury requirement altogether and/or reinforcing 
the use of safeguards, as the most natural instrument to deal with adjustment 
problems of the importing country. 
In the writer's view this is a bit over the top. 
X19 Sykes (1997). 
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2. Justifications 
About market and government failures, precision and predictability 
Subsidies are ambivalent because they may produce different effects, negative (ie 
distortions of competition) and positive (ie pursue market failures or other 
legitimate socio-economic objectives). Moreover, the resulting net effect may be 
uncertain as these effects are indeed difficult to disentangle and to balance with each 
other. In some cases, it may even be argued that the measure is not a distortion but 
rather as a correction of a previously existing distortion. 
The crucial idea is however that the market does not always deliver desirable or 
acceptable outcomes. This may be explained in terms of inefficiency or more 
simply of injustice. 
In these cases, the government intervenes to tackle the imperfection of the market. 
Various instruments may be used to reach these objectives, and public subsidies are 
amongst them. 720 The choice of the instrument, and its design, are important, and 
at this level economics may play an important role. 
However, this area is inherently normative, ie it is the place where political and policy 
decisions are made. This is particularly evident with respect to equity problems. 
Economists are more concerned about efficiency, ie about `making the cake bigger'. 
It is policy makers that are concerned about problems of inequality, ie about 
`sharing the cake fairly'. 
Market failure is not a clear concept. There are different taxonomies among 
economists. One of the most accredited is that of Stiglitz (2000: chapter 4) who 
lists six basic market failures, ie imperfect competition, public goods (such as some 
infrastructures and services), externalities (which can be divided into negative ones - 
such as pollution - and positive ones - such as research and 
development), 
incomplete markets (capital markets), imperfect information, unemployment and 
other macroeconomic disturbances (such as inflation and disequilibrium). 
70 Schwartz and Harper (1972); Barcelo (1977). 
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Sometimes, all these forms of imperfection are summarized into what are seen as 
the two main categories: public goods and externalities. 
Stiglitz (2000: 86 et seq) also refers to two other categories that, strictly speaking, 
cannot be explained in terms of inefficiency of the market but rather inequity, that is 
redistribution and merit goods (such as culture). 
It should be underlined that, in reality, market failures are not mutually exclusive. 
We may have situations where the market does not function for more than one 
reason. Further, in some cases, we have a mix of efficiency/equity problems. 
We have already said that economics may play a role in detecting a market failure 
and in indicating the most efficient instrument to tackle it. However, although this 
may seem easy and straightforward in principle, it may become very woolly at the 
practical level. 
The fact is that it is sometimes very difficult to identify the problem (as said there 
may be more than one imperfection in the market). Further, it may be difficult to 
quan ! bg it. Thirdly, and most importantly from the perspective of the justification of 
subsidies, it may be difficult to quantifil the amount of aid which is necessary to 
correct market failures. Fourthly, this quantification problem makes it difficult to 
balance the negative and positive effects of the measure to eventually make a 
decision on whether it should be legitimate or not. Finally, it should not be 
underestimated the risk of regulatory capture by rent-seeking lobbies. 
In a recent conference on the current State aid reform, Professor Ehlermann (2005) 
underlined this problem and referred to the conclusion of a roundtable held in 1999 
at the European University Institute in Florence. 721 It is worth repeating fully `one 
of the most disappointing conclusions' of that symposium: 
The general feeling among participants was that economists are not particularly 
well-equipped to help the Commission to discipline State aids through general 
guidelines, although their assistance in improving analytical tools for dealing with 
individual cases can be valuable. 
n1 The proceedings of this interesting conference are fully included in Ehlermann and Everson 
(2001 
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What immediately hits the eye of the writer is the distinction among guidelines and 
case analysis. This seems indeed to be the core of the problems when economists and 
lawyers talk with each other. Lawyers want to have rules, ie benchmarks which can 
ideally be applied repeatedly to various similar cases in the future. Economists 
seems to be more concerned with the specificities of each case which would require 
a case by case analysis and the use of complex analytical tools (which can be contrasted 
to the idea of guidelines). 
One of the big challenges is to combine the two perspectives. The effort, which 
underlies the SAAP in the EC, is the attempt to combine the predictabilityy, and certainly 
of legal rules with the soundness of economic concepts and tools. 
A very nice exposition of this effort has come from the former Chief Economist at 
the European Commission and two of his colleagues which produced an accessible 
but solid paper which attempts to show the role that economics should play in the 
new `effects-based' approach to State aid and its regulation. 722 
Interestingly, Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006) seem essentially to 
recognise the point that has emerged a few years ago in the hills around Florence, ie 
the contrast between guidelines and case-by-case analysis. In their words, the 
`architecture of state aid' should therefore denoted by `precision' (which their 
effects-based balancing test should be able to achieve) and `predictability' (which is 
the concern for legal certainty). 
What they, therefore, suggest is not to abandon the guidelines but to design them in 
a proper way. 
Their suggestions are very interesting - from a lawyer's perspective - and 
deserve 
attention. As they expressly state 
an economic approach does not mean a full assessment in all cases. The obvious 
solution - like in all other areas of competition policy, such as mergers and 
antitrust - has to be a sensible combination of safe 
harbour thresholds and 
prohibition thresholds and a more complete economic assessment for those cases 
(limited in number) which fall in between these two thresholds. 723 
7u Fnederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006). 
723 Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 50). 
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The safe-harbour thresholds should be constituted by the cases which are de minimis 
and by those `for which one is confident that no substantial distortions of 
competition and effects on trade will arise. These would be block-exempted'. 724 
At the other end of the spectrum we would have per se prohibitions. 
The most interesting area however is the intermediate one. Guidelines should be 
drafted and they 
[s]hould outline the analytical framework applied for an effects based, economic 
assessment of the individual measures. Within these guidelines, the Commission 
could make use of "soft" safe harbour regions, indicating, for instance, that 
below certain aid intensity thresholds or when certain specific criteria are met, the 
Commission would be unlikely, to take a negative decision on the aid measure. 725 
The writer's understanding is however that, at this intermediate level, a balancing 
approach, which is based on an analytical analysis of the case, would takes place. 
And, significantly, the burden of proof should lie on the Member State. It should 
therefore prove that there is a market failure or another objective of common 
interest, that the aid measure is an appropriate instrument to tackle the problem, 
that it produces the desired incentive effect, that its amount is necessary, and, 
eventually, that the overall balance is that the distortions on competition and the 
effect on trade are limited. 726 
In other words, it is necessary to establish that the subsidy, and that subsidy (in its 
form and effects), is an `optimal intervention' 727 and properly consider the 
government failures. Apart from the regulatory capture problem, common experience 
tells that, in many cases, public administrations are, for various reasons, inefficient. 
This might have an impact on the effectiveness of the subsidy as a tool to remedy 
the market failure. 
The writer believes that this theoretical framework goes in the right direction. 
12' Ibid. 
'u Ibid. 
726 For a full exposition see Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 3. et seq). 
n7 Low (2001: 107). 
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Further - hypothetically and ideally - it could be applied not only in the EC but also 
in a wider organization such as the WTO. Two main issues would have to be 
tackled in this regard: first, an institutional/procedural problem (that of a centralized 
and possibly preventive control of subsidies) and, secondly, from a more substantive 
perspective, the introduction of rules expressly acknowledging the positive effects 
produced by subsidies. 
Is there any distortion in the first place? 
An intriguing issue, with important conceptual and practical implications, is whether 
it is really possible to talk about a distortion of competition when the measure 
addresses and corrects a market failure. 
Pelkmans (2001: 242) has for example argued that `if the aid is paid to overcome a 
market failure, it is not distortive - indeed, it is to restore efficiency'. Similarly, after 
explaining the second-best theory, Evans (1997: 80) more clearly suggests that 
since competition requires efficient allocation of resources, aid which merely 
corrects inefficient allocation associated with market failure may not be regarded 
as distorting competition 
There is also another way of looking at it. Unlike the `first-best' theory which 
presupposes the possibility of the removal of the only existing distortion in the 
market to achieve full-efficiency, the `second-best' theory says that, if this is not 
possible, because there are more than one distortions, the solution is to introduce a 
new distortions to offset the distortions that already exist. 728 
Some illumination on this debate emerges from Nichte and Heidhues (2005: 109) 
who claim that the issue depends on the concepts of welfare and market failure - 
narrow or broad - that are adopted. 
Following Stiglitz (2000: chapter 11), and his idea of cost-benefit analysis, 
Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden (2006: 37-38) suggest that the idea of separating 
7'8 Begg, Fisher, Dornbush (1997: 247). 
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negative and positive elements, and assessing them with the said balancing exercise 
at the level of justification is a `more practical approach'. The writer would also add 
that this is also in line with the separation between scope and justification that has 
been repeatedly advocated in this work. 
The traditional approach is to separate the various effects and leave to the 
Commission to carry out the necessary full and complex assessment of the situation. 
Quite similarly, in the WTO we usually have a rather limited concept of net subsidy 
and we have (rectiur used to have) a specific category of subsidies that are not 
actionable and where the legitimate objectives of subsidies could be considered. 
Evans (1997: 80 and 83) has also underlined that, from a practical point of view, it is 
often difficult to determine whether an aid simply compensates a distortion. As 
seen above, for example, it is not often easy to determine whether a regional aid 
merely offset a disadvantage (and thus can be regarded as non-distorting) or rather 
creates distortions. 
Correction across the border or political trade-off? 
There is a final point which should be addressed before briefly reviewing the main 
features of the two legal systems. 
It may well be that the subsidy pursue a legitimate objective, by resolving a market 
failure or a situation of inequity, in the subsidising country. The crucial issue from 
the perspective of an international discipline of subsidies however is. What about 
the welfare and/or interest of the other countries? In particular, while producing 
positive effects at the local/national level, this measure may still produce significant 
negative externalities across the border. 
To be true, it is necessary to distinguish. In some cases, it is possible to identify 
measures that produce also positive effects, or externalities, across the border. A 
clear example comes from the EC where, in the case of regional aid, a distinction is 
made between those measures that relieve a disadvantage which is essentially 
considered national (and hence assessed against a national benchmark) and those 
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that tackle a problem that is considered of Community interest (and hence assessed 
against a Community benchmark). 
The fact remains that, at least in a direct and short term perspective, it may well be 
that the beneficial effect will be produce only at a local level and the distortions also 
at an international level. This asymmetry may well be accepted by the Members as a 
trade-off. In other words, the countries can consider that, if in some cases they lose 
from the game, in other cases the win. 
408 
3. Control and remedies 
On the premiss that the measure at hand produces an externality across the border, 
the final step of this section is to consider in brief - by mainly providing a list - the 
possible forms of control of and remedies against subsidies. 
Countervailing duties 
This is one of oldest remedies against subsidies. It focuses on the perspective of the 
importing country that sees its domestic industry somewhat damaged by the 
subsidised imports. To countervail this injury it may impose a duty on the imported 
products which should offset the undue advantage. 
Despite being very popular with importing governments and their constituencies, is 
the domestic industries, this type of reaction is increasingly criticized with various 
economic and political arguments. 729 
Countervailing subsidies 
Another possibility, which again is very old but still popular, is to directly subsidize 
the aggrieved domestic industry to level the playing field. Although Meicklejohn 
(1999: 31) argued that they are a better, ie more efficient, alternative than 
countervailing duties, 730 the big political and legal risk is that they could lead to a 
`subsidy war'. 
For this reason, at a legal level, they seems to be generally outlawed in both EC and 
WTO. This is a consequence of the rule of law and of the rejection of the principle 
of reciprocity. The Court in Steinicke made it clear that the grant of an aid cannot be 
justified by the fact that similar subsidies are granted by other Member States. 731 A 
similar principle has been soon affirmed also in the GATT, in the DISC Panel. 732 
T29 A comprehensive exposition of the arguments in favour and against countervailing duties can 
be found in 
Trebi cock and Howse (2005: 282-285). 
710 See also OECD (2001: 30, second paragraph). 
731 Case 78/76, paragraph 24. 
'u At paragraph 79. 
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Both systems seem to permit only certain remedies. In the WTO this is clearls- 
enshrined in Article 32.1 SCM (which reaffirms the rule of law by providing that `no 
specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in 
accordance with the provision of GATT 1994, as interpreted in this Agreement) and 
has been fully upheld in the US - Byrd dispute. 
Multilateral obligations and centralized controls 
One of the most interesting ways to deal with public subsidies which cause 
externalities across the board is to establish multilateral obligations and to set up a 
form of centralized control. 
The EC and WTO are two good, different examples of this way. 
It has indeed been argued in various quarter that the EC regime of State aid control 
represents a model that should be followed globally. 
Echoing the settlement adopted in the EC, Barcelo (1977: 838) suggested the 
need for a permanent GATT panel or working party to review domestic 
production subsidies for their efficiency effects, with GATT approval or 
disapproval turning on the outcome. 733 
The argument underpinning this suggestion is that a sound welfare analysis would 
require i) a larger perspective than a national one, ii) a case-by-case analysis, iii) a 
supranational authority. 734 
The same proponents of this model however recognize the difficulties of 
transposing it at an international level. Barcelo (1977: 838) for example shows that 
the proposed assessment would be difficult, especially when we are confronted with 
a non-efficiency objective. Here it is necessary to balance the prerogatives of 
sovereignty with economic interdependence. 
"' For a similar suggestion see also Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 290-291). 
734 Barcelo (1977: 838). 
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As we will see, this is what in principle occurs in the EC. Low (2001: 115) noted 
that this closer examination of the effects of subsidies would be difficult in the 
W ro. 
In other words, by subjecting to these obligations and centralised controls, Members 
accept the grant of aid or subsidies that may be detrimental to their interest. At the 
same time, however, they will themselves benefit from the same standard of 
assessment when they grant aid. This trade-off is the essence of the settlement. 
This will not however exclude controversies and clashes between the various 
stakeholders in the various cases. 
Negotiated reductions 
Another alternative is that of negotiated reductions of subsidies. This is the model 
followed by the Agreement on Agriculture. 
A final gloss: all the previous methods of control/remedy are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. We may therefore have systems which, albeit in different forms 
and degree, variously combine them. Their separate treatment has been required for 
the sake of conceptual clarity. 
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III. The current legal framework: a brief critical review 
In this final paragraph, taking stock of the previous analysis, we attempt to analyse 
the main treats emerging from the current legal disciplines of subsidies and State 
aids and assess them. We to this through cases which we consider exemplary. 
1. Negative effects 
With respect to the negative effects of the subsidy, it seems that both systems have 
often relied more on a `simple' or `simplified' idea rather than on a `sophisticated' 
one. 
We can provide two examples, one from each system. 
EC law: distortion of competition and effect on trade 
In the EC, for long time the paradigm of the assessment of the distortion of 
competition and effect on trade has been set by the Philip Morris case. 735 This 
decision merely requires the strengthening of `the position of [the recipient] 
undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community 
trade' to prove a distortion and an effect on trade. 736 Now, by definition, any form 
of financial assistance will strengthen the financial position of its beneficiary, and its 
position relative to its competitors that do not receive any money. This does 
necessarily mean that a distortion of competition in the sense explained above - 
impact on cost/revenue structure which damages more efficient competitors - has 
occurred. 
A corollary to this statement was that a market analysis, and the usual tools 
deployed for the other competition rules (Articles 81 and 82 EC) was not necessary. 
7'S Case 730/79. 
736 It is interesting to note that even stricter positions were present in the EC. In 1981, in its Annual 
Report 
on Competition Policy, the Commission essentially rejected the autonomy of the requirement of 
distortion of 
competition holding that any aid is liable to distort competition and hence it is not necessary to prove the 
effects (see point 176). A similar position was taken by Advocate General Capotorti in the 
Phthp ýýtorsil case 
where he said that a distortion of competition is presumed to take place. 
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Still, the Commission was to provide a statement of reasons of its determination of 
distortion and effect on trade, but, frankly, the standard seemed to be quite low. 73Y 
Another consequence, which is still resisting, was the rejection of any de minr17 s 
threshold. 738 Although it may be correct that, in presence of certain market 
conditions, even a small amount of aid may be liable to distort competition, this 
cannot be the rule, not even a presumption. 
Things seem to be partly changing now. First, there has been an increasing criticism 
(sometimes not limited to State aid law) that the Commission was not sufficiently 
concerned of the economics of the case. Secondly, the trend - which is strongly 
supported by the Commission with the SAAP and also by other National 
Competition Authorities 739 - is towards a more effect-based, ie more economic 
approach to establish the possible distortions on competition and the effect on 
trade. 
WTO: causality in the injury test 
If we now move to the WTO, we substantially note a similar situation, ie the 
adoption of a simple idea of distortion. 
The most paradigmatic example is given by the uncertainties still surrounding the 
injury test, and in particular the requirement of causality. 
Before commenting, it may be useful to briefly report the text of the relevant 
provision, Article 15 SCM and, in particular, paragraphs 1,2,4 and 5 thereof read 
a determination of injury ... shall 
be based on positive evidence and involve an 
objective examination of both (a) the volume of the subsidised imports and the 
effect of the subsidised imports on prices in the domestic market for like 
products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic 
producers of such products. 
With regard to the volume of subsidised imports, the investigating authorities 
shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsidised imports, 
either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the 
"37 Cases 296 and 318/82 Lsexwarder. 
'" See above. 
7" See OFT (2005); OFT (2004). 
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importing Member. With regard to the effect of the subsidised imports on prices, 
the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant 
price undercutting by the subsidised imports as compared with the price of a like 
product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is 
otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or to prevent price increases, 
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several 
of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. 
The examination of the impact of the subsidised imports on the domestic 
industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices 
having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential 
decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on 
investments, or utilisation of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual 
and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment; wages, 
growth, ability to raise capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, 
whether there has been an increased burden on government support 
programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors 
necessarily give decisive guidance. 
It must be demonstrated that the subsidised imports are, through the effects [as 
set forth in paragraphs 15.2 and 15.4]-740 of subsidies, causing injury within the 
meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between 
the subsidised imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on 
an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities 
shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidised imports which at 
the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and injuries caused by these 
other factors must not be attributed to the subsidised imports. Factors which 
may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of non- 
subsidised imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes 
in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition 
between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and 
the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry. 
Despite its high sophistication, the language of this provision is indeterminate. 
In particular, serious problems have arisen in the interpretation of the causation 
standard. It has been noted that 'there is no precise definition in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement of "cause", beyond a list of factors that may be examined, 
leaving the appropriate standard to the discretion of the investigating authorities'. "I 
Benitah (2001: 281) underlines that such indeterminacy depends on the fact that 
'each provision is drafted in such a way as to refer to another and this interrelation 
and interdependency forms an almost closed loop'. Indeed, all relevant provisions 
X40 The text between brackets appears in a footnote in the original text. 
741 Trebilcock and Howse (2005: 380). Cf also Benitah (2001: 281 et seq. ) 
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(Article VI GATT 742 and Article 15, paragraphs 1,2,4 and 5) attribute a language 
of causality alternatively to subsidised imports or to subsidisation. 
The most difficult issue is raised by the link between 'effects of the subsidy' and 
'paragraphs 2 and 4' made by footnote 47 in Article 15: 5 SCM. 
Two constructions of the causation standard seem possible. 
It may well be that a determination of injury to the domestic industry is made even 
though the adverse effects do not depend on the subsidisation but rather on 
imports' competition. Support of this reading has been found in the Panel Report 
in the Atlantic salmon dispute. Applying the virtually identical provisions of the 
Tokyo Subsidy Code, the Panel noted that the expression 'through the effects of 
subsidies' refers to the effects set forth in the paragraphs on volume increase, price 
effects and impact on industry. On this basis, it is then concluded that that 
expression does not require proof that subsidisation is the cause of the injury, but 
merely that the subsidised imports are the cause. 743 
However, 'injury to the domestic industry cannot be equated to distortion of 
competition. Injury to competitors is not the same as injury to competition. '744 
Indeed situations can be imagined where subsidised imports prove popular with 
purchasers, and therefore injure the domestic industry, for reasons other than price, 
for example quality. 745 
Beviglia Zampetti (1996) has thus suggested that, maybe through a progressive 
judicial interpretation, the injury test (as well as the other two types of adverse 
effects provided for in Article 5 SCM: serious prejudice and nullification and 
impairment of benefits) should be construed so as to guarantee what is seen as the 
underlying aim of the GATT/WTO system, the safeguarding of 'normal 
competition'. 
N2 Article VI: 3 GATT reads that `[n]o contracting party shall levy any .. " countervailing 
duty on the 
importation of any product ... unless 
it determines that the effect of .... subsidisation ... 
is such as to cause 
or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry'. 
713 Cf GATT Panel Report, US - h%gwdtioit of countervailing 
duties on imports of firsh and c hilkd Allami: sa! roR frvm 
NonvaXAtlantic salmon), SCM/153, adopted on 28 April 1994, paragraphs 328 et seq. 
71 Beviglia Zampetti (1995: 23). 
7`5 See McGovern (1995: paragraph 12.415). 
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Despite the difficulties in defining the purpose of the WTO system, and of subsidy 
rules in particular, this 'competition-oriented' interpretation seems to be in line with 
the wording and purpose of Article 15 SCM. 
The first sentence of Article 15: 5 SCM expressly sets out the object of the 
determination and, in doing so, it defines the relationship between 'subsidised 
imports' and 'subsidisation'. According to that passage, 'it must be demonstrated 
that the subsidised imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury within the 
meaning of this Agreement'. 746 It is indeed reasonable to require such causal link, 
as the object of the SCM Agreement is to regulate subsidies and responses to them. 
With respect to the latter, if there is no subsidy then there cannot possibly be any 
countervailing duty. 747 Article 21.1 SCM is clear on this point expressly stating that 
'a countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent 
necessary to counteract subsidisation which is causing injury. ' 748 
If therefore the injury depends on factors other than subsidisation no determination 
of injury should be made. Article 15.5 SCM accordingly requires the examination of 
'any known factors other than the subsidised imports which at the same time are 
injuring the domestic industry' and makes it clear that 'the injuries caused by these 
other factors must not be attributed to the subsidised imports'. Among these 
factors, 'competition between the foreign and domestic producers' is also included. 
This 'competition-oriented' interpretation would also contribute to safeguarding the 
system's coherence. Indeed, Article VI GATT and the SCM Agreement concern 
subsidies and responses to subsidised imports. As has already been argued above, the 
need to provide, under certain (exceptional) circumstances, 'import relief to the 
domestic industry should be addressed by safeguard mechanisms, 749 and not by 
subsidy rules. 
'46Art 15.5, first sentence SCM (emphasis added). Cf also Art 19.1 SCM. 
747 Cf Panel Report, US - Carbon Stec/11, paragraph 6.48 et seq. 
748 Emphasis added. Cf also Article N'1: 3 GATT and footnote 36 to Article 10 
SCE[ which read that 
countervailing duties are levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy. 
7" Article XIX GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards. 
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Simple idea of distortion in EC and WTO: a tentative explanation 
It can be argued that the endorsement of a simple idea of distortion in the EC 
which is fully consistent with the fact that the definition of State aid in Article 8; (1) 
EC was created in the context of the promotion of a common market. 750 In other 
words, a simplified idea of distortion is easy to prove and, by catching many 
measures within its net, may fully contribute to the integrationist aim of the common 
market. 
The use of a simple idea of distortion may find a different - and indeed an opposite - 
justification in the context of the GATT/WTO. 
A simplified concept of distortion could be in line with allegations based on not well 
defined ideas of fair competition since the relevant benchmark (what is fair? What is 
unfair? ) is difficult to identify. A particularly low evidentiary threshold would serve 
the objective to protect domestic industry injured by foreign imports. The inherent 
risk, however, is that a simple idea of distortion could end up being a particularly 
powerful tool in protectionist hands. This is particularly clear in the context of 
unilateral actions finalised at the imposition of countervailing duties. 
The conclusion. If the accepted objective of both systems is to address distortions 
of international competition (and this can be inferred also from the very general 
statements of the WTO disputes), the most appropriate approach to the definition 
of the trade-impact standards in the sophisticated view of distortion which requires 
a distortion of competition based on a specific impact on the cost/revenue 
structure. 
750 See the Commission' statements in OECD (2001: 173). 
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3. Positive effects 
Here the picture becomes more complicated, from both the substantive and 
institutional/procedural point of view. As in the previous section, the writer will 
merely sketch some issues which are considered as particularly significant. 
EC: from general clauses to block exemption, from discretion to 
precision and predictability 
The justifications of State aid in the EC Treaty are constituted with general clauses. 
The monopoly for their application has been for the Commission which has always 
been considered to enjoy a wide discretion in its complex economic and political 
assessment. In terms of normative development, the trend can be described as 
follows. We passed from general clauses to policy definition, to policy 
consolidation in the form of various soft law instruments (guidelines, 
communications, notices, frameworks, letters), to eventually reach the stage of hard 
law in the form of `block exemptions'. This latter stage has also a clear and 
significant impact on the institutional and procedural aspects. Although it cannot 
be compared to the modernization of Article 81 EC, it directly, albeit partially, 
involves national authorities and courts in the application of State aid `justifications'. 
The decentralization trend also concerns other more traditional instruments such as 
the Commission Decision and the Commission Framework in the area of public 
service compensation or the, for now draft, frameworks on LASA and LET. 
Decentralization and simplification means freeing human and administrative 
resources which the Commission could more valuably use in its still crucial 
monopoly in the control of State aid. 
Another important trend, which has partly been hinted at already in the previous 
section, is the increasing `effect-based' approach towards State aid scrutiny. This 
sits nicely with our previous defence for a more sophisticated notion of distortion at 
the level of Article 87(1) EC. 
At the moment DG Competition seems to be a powerhouse. In the light of the 
vision of the SAAP it is putting hands in any area of State aid policy such as 
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Research and Development and Innovation, Environment, Regional Aid, Rescue 
and Restructuring, SMEs. Various consultations are launched, draft documents 
come out. Clearly, this is not the right place for commenting them. What can be 
said however is that the at least intended left motif which is guiding all these initiatives 
is to substantially reform in a more transparent, predictable and efficient way State 
aid control and ultimately the grant of State aid. Whether these exercises are 
successful or not, only time - and further research - will tell. 
WTO law: the missing limb 
Under Article 8 and 11, the former Tokyo Subsidy Code included a broad 
recognition of the various public policy objectives that Members may wish to 
pursue through subsidies. 751 As the US - Carbon Steel I dispute has shown the legal 
effect of this recognition was far from clear. 
The WTO brought a big advancement. Drawing inspiration from the EC 
experience introduces a category of non-actionable subsidies. These categories were 
far more limited than those generally recognized in the Tokyo Subsidy Code but 
with a substantial difference. There was a (more) developed substantive and (less) 
developed institutional/ procedural discipline. 
It may be useful to summarize this discipline. Article 8.2 SCM refers to the 
following three categories of non-actionable subsidies: 
- subsidies for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or 
research establishments on a contract basis with firms if, in particular, the 
assistance does not cover more than given amounts depending on whether the 
activity is of 'industrial research' or 'pre-competitive development', and if it is 
limited to certain classes of costs; 
751 Article 11 for example mentioned: to eliminate industrial, economic and social disadvantages of specific 
regions; to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of certain sectors, especially where 
this has become necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic policies, including 
international 
agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade; generally to sustain employment and to encourage rc-training 
and change in employment; to encourage research and development programmes, especially 
in the field of 
high-technology industries; the implementation of economic programmes and policies to promote the 
economic and social development of developing countries; redeployment of industry 
in order to avoid the 
congestion and environmental problems. 
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- subsidies in favour of disadvantaged regions given pursuant to a general 
framework of regional development and non-specific within eligible regions 
provided that the region is clearly definable, it is considered as disadvantaged on 
the basis of neutral and objective criteria such as income or GDP per capita and 
the unemployment rate; 
- subsidies to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new ent7rnnmental 
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater 
constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the assistance is inter ulia 
a one-time non-recurring measure, limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation, 
directly linked to and proportionate to the plan of reduction of nuisances and 
pollution, and is available to all firms that can adopt the new equipment or 
production processes. 
From a procedural view, Article 8.3 SCM provides that, whenever a subsidy 
programme falls within one of the previous three categories, it should be notified 'in 
advance of its implementation' to the Committee. A system of yearly updates of the 
notifications, including, in particular, information on modification of the subsidy 
programmes, is also envisaged. Further, upon request of a Member, the Secretariat 
and the Committee should review the notifications to determine whether the 
conditions and criteria laid down above have been met. 
These subsidies are neither actionable nor countervailable because they serve 
economic and social objectives of overriding importance. 
Nonetheless, Article 9 provides that if a subsidy programme complying with the 
criteria above (and hence being in principle `non-actionable') is causing 'serious 
adverse effects' to the domestic industry of a Member, such as to cause damage that 
would be difficult to repair, consultations can be requested. If no mutually 
acceptable solution is reached, the matter is referred to the Committee that could 
recommend the modification of the programme to remove the effects. It has to be 
noted that the trade-impact standard under that provision is stricter than that 
provided for'actionable subsidies' (`serious adverse effects' vs `adverse effects). 
Together with the categories of prohibited and actionable subsidies, this category 
was an important limb of the SCM Agreement. This category however lapsed in the 
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year 2000 as it was not possible to reach a consensus to extend their application 
according to Article 31,752 mainly because of developing countries' concerns about 
the alleged imbalance of those provisions in favour of developed countries753. It is 
regrettable that those provisions could not be extended, even for a limited period of 
time, to allow further experience on their application to be gained and consideration 
of possible amendments to address developing countries' concerns. The risk of 
letting those provisions lapse was however underlined as, after that, it would havr 
been extremely difficult 'to resurrect the key concept of non-actionability, ' and, in 
any event, to start again from scratch. 754 
This was a good prediction. The current Rules Negotiations in the context of the 
Doha Round have produced little discussion with respect to the issue of subsidy. 
We can find just few rare submissions concerning the possibility of resurrecting this 
category, particularly from developing countries. Indeed, the Doha Ministerial 
Conference expressly noted 
... of the proposal to treat measures 
implemented by developing countries with a 
view to achieving legitimate development goals, such as regional growth, 
technology research and development funding, production diversification and 
development and implementation of environmentally sound methods of 
production as non-actionable subsidies, and agrees that this issue be addressed in 
accordance with paragraph 13 below. During the course of the negotiations, 
Members are urged to exercise due restraint with respect to challenging such 
measures. 755 
In the next chapter, it will be seen that some proposals in this sense have also been 
put forward in the Council for Trade in Services. 
752 The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 
9 shall apply for a 
period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
Not later than 180 
days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the operation of those provisions, with a vi wr 
to determining whether to extend their application, either as presently drafted or 
in a modified form, for a 
further period'. 
75' See the minutes of the regular meeting of the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures held 
on 1-2 November 1999 (G/SCM/M/24) and of the special meeting held on 20 
December 1999 
(G/SCM/M/22). 
75, The representative of the Canadian government warned about the risk of 
'throwing the baby out With the 
bath water'. 
Iss See Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns Decision, paragraph 10.2. 
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It remains to be seen, however, whether Canada's prediction was a good one. This 
is true at least for now, since, at the time of writing, the negotiations have been 
suspended. 756 
A parallel between EC and WTO law 
Any parallel is necessarily based on the assumption (or condition) that some form of 
justification rules will be reintroduced in the future in the WTO. 
What we can do now is simply to draw a comparison with the former `non- 
actionable' category. 
The first interesting remark is that, very much like for the definition, the \X TO 
seems to have started very fast. It has been said that there was a clear inspiration 
from the EC regime of justifications. The fact remains that, like for the definition, 
the three categories of non-actionable subsidies, far from being general clauses, were 
fairly sophisticated. This probably depended also on the procedural/insti tutional 
arrangement. The kind of review/control exercised in the WTO was certainly not 
comparable to that of the EC in terms of transfer of powers. To put it bluntly, the 
Committee on Subsidies was not the Commission. Another important element of 
differentiation is given by the particular constitutional arrangement in the EC. It 
has been seen that EC law has direct effect into the national systems. This means 
that national courts actively participate and cooperate with the Commission in 
discharging its duty of control. The division of duties is clear. Whereas national 
Courts ensure that the procedural obligations of notification and non- 
implementation provided for under Article 87(3) EC are respected, the Commission 
devotes its energies to look at the substance of the measure to determine whether 
they are compatible or not with the common market. 
Another noticeable difference is given by the limited categories of justifications 
provided for in the SCM Agreement. 
That said, there were also many similarities which seemed to take stock 
from the 
suggestions of those commentators that, already in the 1970s, thought that, 
despite 
756 An official press release from the WTO announced the stop of the negotiations on the 
24 July 2000 
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difficulties and possible adjustments, the EC regime of State aid control was a 
model to follow also at the international level. 
The fact remains that the WTO system of subsidy control has now a trussing limb. 
IV. Conclusive recommendations 
Some conclusive remarks can be formulated. We will expressly draw inspiration 
from both sections of this chapter, the first on the economics and politics of 
subsidies, the second on the legal rules. These remarks are sometimes formulated in 
terms of recommendation. Taking into account of the different level/purpose of 
integration of the two legal systems, they are expressed in terms of feasibility, 
commencing from the easier to implement. 
1. The first recommendation is that both systems should adopt more clearly a 
sophisticated view of distortion in all their trade-impact tests. This would require a 
comprehensive analysis that a distortion of competition has actually occurred as a 
consequence of the State aid or the subsidy. An ancillary suggestion would be that 
WTO somewhat simplifies the trade-impact standards for actionable subsidies (do 
we really need three of them? ) 
2. The second group of recommendations will be divided according to the 
addressee: 
a) Along the lines of a more `effects-based' approach, the EC should follow the path 
indicated by the SAAP. With one caveat: that more precision is really combined 
with predictability. On the one hand this means that the right balance should be 
found between economics and law. On the other hand, so far, it is not still clear 
that the hard work of DG Competition in terms of quantity of proposals is a 
healthy process of re-regulation or more simply of creeping over-regulation. 
b) Apart from the clarification of some provisions, this research, with its recognition 
of the ambivalent role of subsidies, and the leit motif of distinguishing 
between 
scope and justification, makes evident that one of the most important step to make 
in the future is to resurrect the idea of non-actionability. The forms and content 
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may well differ (although our personal tendency would be to expand the former 
categories to other policy objectives, such as the restructuring of undertakings, and 
to follow a trend similar to that indicated by the SAAP). What is important is just to 
revive it. 
3. The third set of suggestions, which concern the type of governance of subsidy 
control, should again be individually addressed to each system: 
a) In the EC, it is necessary to continue with the process of codification initiated 
with the block exemption, and probably to involve national competition authorities 
further (it should not be forgotten that there are already - at least one - national 
competition authorities that deal with State aid problems on a day-to-day basis). 
b) We would probably make an opposite recommendation to the WTO. Should 
justifications be re-introduced, it would be necessary to strengthen the system of 
control and make it more effective, maybe enhancing is authorization function. 
4. The fourth recommendation mainly concerns the international dimension and is 
necessarily to be viewed in a longer perspective. It partly overlaps the previous 
suggestions: 
- reinforcement of justifications 
- reinforcement of the multilateral track 
- eventual elimination of unilateral remedies 
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Chapter 6 
Going back: Few Conclusive Thoughts 
The writer is embarrassed for having called this a `chapter'. It is not. 
It is more the recollection of the experience of these years of research in such a 
challenging area and topic. 
`It is an even swap'. It is true. A lot has been learned by comparing two dynamic 
and sophisticated systems such as the EC and the WTO. The writer has also been 
lucky enough to do his research in a period of great debate, many disputes and 
promising changes in the area of public subsidies. 
The analysis of EC and WTO law has shown the existence of several similar, if not 
identical, issues. Indeed this was one of the first methodological steps of the 
comparative approach, ie to identify two sets of rules that pursue the same function. 
Quite remarkably, many similarities in the solutions have been found. At the same 
time, surprising and important differences have emerged. Each system has its 
strengths and weaknesses. Each system has to learn something from the other. 
All this has provided food for thought, and together with brief wanderings in other 
non-legal areas, has provided the writer with some ideas and beliefs about some of 
the characteristics that an international discipline of public subsidies should have (or 
should not have). 
One of the recurring themes has been the idea that - so far as possible - there 
should be a distinction between what is scope and what is justification. Even 
economic analysis, with its distinction between costs and benefits, seems to have 
supported this view. 
One - almost intuitive - finding has been the 
discovery of the expansion of market 
logic, in a period of increasing liberalization and privatization. But, at the same 
time, it has emerged that the public interest is still solid there and only needs to find 
a proper legal accommodation. 
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Another important finding is the intriguing relationship between law and 
economics. Sometimes they quarrel with each other but they need each other. 
They should only understand what is their proper role and the kind of contribution 
that they can offer towards the same end. The current debate in the EC is very 
thought-provoking from this perspective. We just need to see the fruits of the 
harvest. 
Another interesting issue, which is worth exploring in the future, is the relationship 
between subsidy/State aid law and other areas of the law, and in particular the rules 
of liberalization of trade. The interplay between trade and competition, and trade 
regulation and competition regulation should be explored further. Many valid 
scholars have started to follow this path. The writer proposes to do the same in the 
future. 
The comparison between EC and WTO law has also been very stimulating. Again, 
this is another path of research which is increasingly followed. But it is worth. 
Despite their differences, the two systems seem somewhat to share the same DV. -1. 
Moreover, an almost continuous legal analysis has exposed the writer to the 
intricacies of the methods of legal interpretation, another (always) topical issue, 
particularly in the context of two different legal systems. 
The final consideration is a recognition of self-limitation. This research does not 
fully, correspond to what the writer was proposing to do a few years ago. Many more 
issues should have been analysed. In this regard, he cannot say to have completely 
respected the indication of Paul: `Probe everything! '. A possible justification comes 
from the Appellate Body and its indication that `the universe of subsidies is vast'. 
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